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In 1657 the Dutch East India Company (VOC) released fourteen employees from its 
service who settled as free burghers at the Cape of Good Hope. By 1795 their number 
had grown to almost fifteen thousand. The original free burghers shared the same socio-
cultural background and were uniformly poor. Yet in the course of the eighteenth century 
they developed into a stratified society with a clearly identifiable elite. Hitherto this 
development had been ascribed to capital accumulation in the form of land and slaves, 
with a focus on the settled arable farmers. This thesis challenges these arguments by 
applying the theoretical concept of entrepreneurship to the history of the 198 individuals 
who served as alcohol pachters (lease holders) in Cape Town between 1680 and 1795. 
The thesis argues that a study of their economic and social activities leads to greater 
conceptual clarity and a better understanding of the way in which social mobility 
operated. This study reveals how intertwined economic success was with social factors; 
and traces the changing uses and functions of kinship and social capital in VOC Cape 
Town. It demonstrates the importance of the urban free burghers to the Cape economy 
and the ways in which this group was linked to the rural free burghers. 
 
The first chapter treats the origins and operation of the alcohol pacht (lease) system and 
its contribution to the Cape economy. This is followed by a prosopographical analysis of 
all 198 of the alcohol pachters. Chapter three presents the biography of Hendrik 
Oostwald Eksteen as a vehicle with which to present the theoretical concepts attended on 











importance of social capital and kinship to what was still a largely immigrant society in 
the 1730s, while chapter five traces the changes which had occurred by the 1770s. These 
two chapters also demonstrate the ways in which the urban and rural elites coalesced over 
time. The final chapter shows to what extent the economic success of pachters was 
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Throughout this thesis the following terms relating to the organisation of the alcohol 
retail trade in Cape Town, as well as some other terms, are used in the original Dutch (for 
a full explanation, see chapter one):  
 
bijtapper   assistant tavern or bar keeper 
 
heemraad member of a local governing board (in the rural districts) 
 
knecht(en) European servant (usually a farm foreman) 
 
pacht(en)   lease or monopoly 
 
pachter(s)   lease or monopoly holder 
 
tapper(s)  tavern or bar keeper 
 
verpachten   to lease or monopolise  
 













A NOTE ON DATES 
 
Up to 1698 pacht contracts coincided with the calendar year, i.e. 1 January to 31 
December. The system was changed in 1699 when pacht contracts ran from 1 September 
to 31 August. To avoid a cumbersome way of referencing, this thesis (including the 
appendices) uses of the notion of a ‘pacht year’ which refers to the larger part of the year 
in which a contract fell for the whole period of the contract, for example: the pacht year 
1703 equals the period 1 September 1702 to 31 August 1703. The pacht year 1699 ran 














Social Stratification at the Cape  
 
When Otto Mentzel, who lived in Cape Town for seven years in the 1730s, later reflected 
upon the society that developed at the southernmost end of Africa during the 
administration of the Dutch East India Company (VOC), he divided the free-burgher 
society into four groups or classes.1 The second, third and fourth classes ranged from 
those farmers who could produce a surplus and lived fairly well, to cattle farmers in the 
interior who could barely eke out a living. The first class, however, Mentzel defined as 
‘those free burghers who live in the City [Cape Town] and have a considerable fortune 
and are comfortably off; and who, besides, also possess one or more farms in the 
country.’2 Yet the picture painted by Mentzel was not something static or eternal: seventy 
years before this, the second commander of the VOC’s outpost at the Cape, Zacharias 
Wagenaer, was shocked to discover the extent of the ‘painful poverty’ (smertelijcke 
armoede) which existed among the recently established (in 1657) group of free burghers. 
Year after year he reported with palpable distaste to the Heren XVII, his superiors in The 
Netherlands, the situation of the people he referred to variously as ‘spoilt, lazy and 
roguish creatures’ or as a ‘lazy, useless and harmful bunch.’3 His solution was that they 
                                                 
1  The term ‘class’, used by Mentzel, should not be considered in the modern sociological sense. 
Peter Burke has shown how, during the early modern period, some writers started to deviate from the usual 
language of ‘orders’ and ‘estates.’ This was the case in especially the Dutch Republic where society was 
classified in different tax classes according to wealth, while some contemporary commentators used the 
term to denote a ‘social group.’ It is in this sense that Mentzel’s usage should be seen, i.e. as a crude 
attempt to stratify society on the basis of wealth; P. Burke, ‘The Language of Orders in Early Modern 
Europe’, in M.L. Bush (ed.), Social Orders and Social Classes in Europe since 1500: Studies in Social 
Stratification (London and New York, 1992), 7.  
2  O.F. Mentzel, A Geographical and Topographical Description of the Cape of Good Hope 
(translated by H.J. Mandelbrote, G.V. Marais and J. Hoge) (3 vols, Cape Town, 1921, 1925 and 1944), vol. 
3, 98-116, quote from 98.  
3  ‘vroegh bedorven luije en verlopene gasten’ and ‘luijen, onnutten en schadelijken hoop’; A.J. 
Böeseken (ed.), Dagregister en Briewe van Zacharias Wagenaer, 1662-1666 (Pretoria, 1973), 288, 316-17, 











either be banished to Mauritius, a VOC colony at this time, or be sent back to the 
Netherlands and that they be replaced with ‘abler and more hardworking people’ from the 
fatherland.4  
 How do we explain the differences between these two accounts? What made it 
possible for the heap of impoverished, indebted and lazy farmers of the 1660s to develop 
into a stratified community divided on the basis of wealth and status, with a clearly 
identifiable elite, one which by the early 1780s would elicit comments from high-ranking 
visitors to the Cape for its wealth, pomp and circumstances?5 This development is the 
more remarkable when taking into account that most (though not all) of the immigrants 
who settled at the Cape originated from the same socio-economic stratum, namely the 
working classes of North-western Europe.6 Yet some of them could and did develop into 
Mentzel’s first class, while others remained miserably poor and had to struggle merely to 
subsist. What, then, were the factors which made possible the growth of a stratified 
society at the Cape of Good Hope? 
 One was the shift, in the two to three decades after Wagenaer’s term of office, 
from a European-style intensive farming to an extensive farming model much better 
suited to the soil and climate of the South-western Cape.7 Another was the replacement of 
                                                 
4  ‘bequamer en arbeijtsamer lieden.’ The alternative solution was that the Company should provide 
more slaves to assist these poor farmers. Ibid., 316-17 and 348. Quote from 316. It is likely that Wagenaer, 
a leading VOC official used to the splendour of the East Indies, was contemptuous of the free burghers and 
probably couched his language in more negative terms than the situation warranted.  
5  Hendrik Breton testified that ‘… als ik de eer heb te zeggen dat ik … niet dan teekenen van 
welvaard en voorspoet heb ondervonden, tot zoo verre, dat behalven de pragt en praal in kleederen en 
rytuijgen de huizen deftig met modieuse meubels voorzien zijn, de tafels met Zilverwerk gestoffeerd, en 
door propre bekleeden slaven vierden [sic] bedient’; quoted in S.D. Naude, ‘Willem Cornelis Boers’, 
Archives Year Book for South African History 13/2 (1950), 414. 
6  G.J. Schutte, ‘Company and Colonists at the Cape, 1652-1795’, in R. Elphick and H. Giliomee 
(eds), The Shaping of South African Society, 1652-1840 (Second edition, Cape Town, 1989), 298 and G.C. 
de Wet, Die Vryliede en Vryswartes in die Kaapse Nedersetting, 1657-1707 (Cape Town, 1981), 24-26. 
7  Extensive farming was more profitable and less labour-intensive, which has the potential for 
making the dedicated and forward-thinking farmer wealthy; L. Guelke, ‘Freehold Farmers and Frontier 
Settlers, 1657-1780’, in R. Elphick and H. Giliomee (eds), The Shaping of South African Society, 1652-











free labour with bonded labour: Wagenaer continually hammered upon the cost of paying 
European knechten (‘servants’) as a major factor in the financial struggle of Cape 
farmers. By the time of Mentzel’s stay in the 1730s, the Cape was a fully developed slave 
society where more than half the colonial population (slaves and Europeans, excluding 
the indigenes) consisted of slaves in the possession of settlers, the VOC itself and its 
employees.8  
 Another major factor, and one hitherto largely ignored in the historiography of the 
Cape, was allowing limited (and highly regulated) free trade in certain areas of economic 
life. The original purpose of allowing some VOC employees to become free burghers in 
1657 was that they would relieve the Company of having to farm and make the Cape self-
sufficient in wheat production.9 By the mid-1660s this experiment was clearly failing and 
most farmers were attempting to get out of their contracts. Wagenaer, in an act of 
desperation, allowed some of the poorest of these farmers to abandon their farms and to 
live in the small village that had sprung up close to the Fort of Good Hope (the 
predecessor of the Castle). These ‘villagers’ gained their livelihoods by plying their 
trades or selling alcohol.10 In his report to his successor, Wagenaer noted that since ‘the 
common agriculturalists come to notice daily that these [burghers around the Fort] find it 
much easier to subsist than they do with their heavy labour, many of them now want to 
leave their farmer’s work and establish themselves somewhat closer to the Fort in order 
to likewise ply such a trade….’11  
 In this lies the germ of the later prosperity of some Cape burghers. As will be 
discussed in chapter one below, it was clear by the 1670s that the alcohol retail trade was 
                                                 
8  See N. Worden, Slavery in Dutch South Africa (Cambridge, 1985), 19-40 on the importance of 
slavery to the Cape economy.  
9  See pages 15-16 below for a discussion.  
10  De Wet, Vryliede en Vryswartes, 27-28 and 46-105 provides a detailed overview of the 
possibilities.  
11  ‘… de gemeene lantbouwers dagelijcx comen gewaer te worden dat dese [borgers omtrent ’t Fort] 
veel gemackelijcker als zijlieden met haeren swaren arbeijt weten aen de cost te comen, souden der nu wel 
veele haer boerewerck willen verlaten, en met der woon oock nader aen ’t Fort comen, om insgelijcx 












highly successful and that it could be very lucrative. It was also a decidedly competitive 
business with several free burghers trying to partake in it. These two factors, the in-
fighting amongst alcohol entrepreneurs and the profitability of the trade, led the 
authorities to offer annually at a public auction the right to sell a certain type of alcohol 
within a certain geographic area to the highest bidder. Starting in 1680, the VOC held an 
auction to sell off the alcohol monopolies (or pachten) every year of its control over the 
Cape until 1795.12 During this period, 198 individuals bought at least one pacht at these 
auctions.13  
 
The subject of this thesis is not the operation or the economics of the alcohol pacht 
system at the Cape, although this will be covered briefly in chapter one. Instead it 
attempts, through an extended case study of the alcohol pachters, to answer two related 
sets of questions. The first deals with issues of social mobility: what factors in their 
background or their VOC careers could have played a role in the success of some 
pachters; to what an extent and in what ways did kin and social networks aid their 
advancement, and how did this interact with economic factors? The second set deals with 
issues of status and identity: was there a link between the economic importance of this 
group and their social status? Did they enjoy some form of prestige and how did this 
interact with their business activities and, finally, how did they view themselves and their 
role in Cape society? Can one argue that the alcohol pachters of Cape Town were 
different from the rural gentry – did they form a separate urban elite or were they part of 
a general Cape gentry? Was there a clear relationship between the urban environment, 
entrepreneurship and social mobility?14 And how did these factors change over more than 
                                                 
12  The British found the notion of monopolies abhorrent, and almost instantly demolished the system 
of pachten when they took over the Cape in 1795; only to re-instate the alcohol monopolies two years later 
in a bid to increase the revenue of government; H. Giliomee, Die Kaap tydens die Eerste Britse Bewind, 
1795-1803 (Cape Town and Pretoria, 1975), 168-73.  
13  See chapter two below for a discussion.   
14  Studies of social mobility in early modern Europe, the colonial USA as well as Southeast Asia 
have all indicated that expanding cities were the loci of social change with regards to mobility, the 
availability of commercial opportunities and the provision of social networks; R. Grassby, ‘Social Mobility 











a century of VOC rule? Although the focus of the thesis throughout remains the alcohol 
pachters, the question hovering in the background – one with a much wider application 
than just the pachters – is: what mechanisms and processes were available to free 
burghers for social and economic advancement?  
 
Cape Historiography and the Role of Economics  
 
Answers to these questions have been sought for other colonial societies, but not yet for 
the Cape of Good Hope. This is partly due to the relative youth of the historiography in 
this field, but also to the peculiar trajectory of its development. The great expansion of 
pre-industrial Cape historiography started in the early 1980s as part of a revisionist 
project by English-language historians to write a more comprehensive and inclusive 
history of South Africa which also took class and capital seriously. Thus this decade saw 
a number of important and large-scale research projects dealing with hitherto neglected 
groups such as slaves and the Khoisan. In much of this work economic concerns were 
central. The first major studies in Cape slavery during this period were strongly slanted 
towards economics.15 Robert Ross’s original interest in issues like capital accumulation 
and class development16 led to the major study he published in 1987 with Pieter van Duin 
                                                                                                                                                 
and Revolutionaries: Essays in Seventeenth-Century History Presented to Christopher Hill (Oxford, 1978), 
355-81; G.B. Nash, ‘Social Development’, in J.P. Greene and J.R. Pole (eds), Colonial British America: 
Essays in the New History of the Early Modern Era (Baltimore and London, 1984), 247-51 and P. 
Boomgaard and H. Schulte Nordholt, ‘Connecting People, Places and Commodities’, in P. Boomgaard, D. 
Kooiman and H. Schulte Nordholt (eds), Linking Destinies: Trade, Towns and Kin in Asian History 
(Leiden, 2008), 1-12.  
15  Worden, Slavery in Dutch South Africa and M. Rayner, ‘Wine and Slaves: The Failure of an 
Export Economy and the Ending of Slavery in the Cape Colony, 1806-1834’ (unpublished PhD thesis, 
Duke University, 1986). Earlier work on the frontier was also very economically orientated: D. Neumark, 
The South African Frontier: Economic Influences, 1652-1836 (Stanford, 1957) and L.T. Guelke, ‘The Early 
European Settlement of South Africa’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Toronto, 1974). The latter’s 
work and arguments had a great influence on scholars such as Robert Ross and Susan Newton-King.  











on The Economy of the Cape Colony in the Eighteenth Century.17 This work inspired a 
series of important contributions by Ross on the role of economics in the development of 
Cape colonial society at the turn of the 1990s.18 Even the much more recent study by 
Susan Newton-King on the history of labour relations on the Cape Eastern Frontier has its 
roots in this tradition from the 1980s (when her study was begun) in its strong focus on 
how the Cape market operated and influenced developments in the interior.19 All of this 
work tended to be very firmly focused on the rural parts of the Cape of Good Hope, such 
as Ross’s essays and Worden’s study of slavery, with a strong and fruitful tradition of 
frontier studies which continues to this day.20 Only more recently has some research been 
done on the history of VOC Cape Town itself, most notably by historical 
archaeologists,21 to supplement the more general overviews which existed.22 
                                                 
17  P. van Duin and R. Ross, The Economy of the Cape Colony in the Eighteenth Century 
(Intercontinenta 7; Leiden, 1987). Although this work has been much utilised by early modern Cape 
historians, its obscure publication has meant that it is not as widely known among South African historians 
as it deserves to be.  
18  R. Ross, ‘The Origins of Capitalist Agriculture in the Cape Colony: A Survey’ in W. Beinart, P. 
Delius and S. Trapido (eds), Putting a Plough to the Ground: Accumulation and Dispossession in Rural 
South Africa, 1850-1930 (Johannesburg, 1986), 56-100; ‘The Cape of Good Hope and the World Economy, 
1652-1835’ in R. Elphick and H. Giliomee (eds), The Shaping of South African Society, 1652-1840 (Second 
edition, Cape Town, 1989), 243-80 and ‘The Cape Economy and the Cape Gentry’ in R. Ross, Beyond the 
Pale: Essays on the History of Colonial South Africa (Hanover and London, 1993), 13-49.  
19  S. Newton-King, Masters and Servants on the Cape Eastern Frontier, 1760-1803 (Cambridge, 
1999). The late publication of this book belies its roots in the 1980s. For a succinct summary of the 
contribution of the literature discussed here to our understanding of the economic development of South 
Africa, see J. Iliffe, ‘The South African Economy, 1652-1997’, Economic History Review 52/1 (1999), 88-
90.  
20  In addition to Newton-King’s study, the most important works on the frontier during this period 
are N. Penn, The Forgotten Frontier: Colonist and Khoisan on the Cape’s Northern Frontier in the 18th 
Century (Athens, OH and Cape Town, 2005) and L.J. Mitchell, Belongings: Property, Family and Identity 
in Colonial South Africa (An Exploration of Frontiers, 1725-c. 1830) (New York, 2009).  
21  Earlier (and more popular) work in this vein are G.E. Pearse, The Cape of Good Hope, 1652-1833: 
An Account of its Buildings and the Life of its People (Pretoria, 1956) and H.W.J. Picard, Gentleman’s 
Walk: The Romantic Story of Cape Town’s Oldest Streets, Lanes and Squares (Cape Town, 1968). For 











This economic and rural focus changed rather suddenly in the late 1990s when the 
cultural and narrative turns in historiography worldwide engulfed Cape historiography 
virtually at once. Instead of writing on institutions and groups, historians now focused on 
issues important to the individual, such as status, honour, sexuality and identity.23 Some 
of this work also treated marginal groups within Cape Town who were previously 
ignored, such as artisans, soldiers and sailors.24 A hallmark of this writing was the use of 
micro-history, based on court records, to reveal marginalities and contingencies in the 
lived reality of individuals in the pre-industrial past of the Western Cape.25 This focus on 
                                                                                                                                                 
notably the following studies of A. Malan: ‘Households of the Cape, 1750 to 1850: Inventories and the 
Archaeological Record’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Cape Town, 1993); ‘Beneath the Surface – 
Behind the Doors: Historical Archaeology of Households in Mid-Eighteenth Century Cape Town’, Social 
Dynamics 24/1 (1998), 88-118; and ‘The Material World of Family and Household: The Van Sitterts in 
Eighteenth-Century Cape Town, 1748-1796’, in L. Wadley (ed.), Our Gendered Past: Archaeological 
Studies of Gender in Southern Africa (Johannesburg, 1997), 273-301. P. Mitchell, The Archaeology of 
Southern Africa (Cambridge, 2002), 385-99 provides a synthesis.  
22  The best synthesis of the academic research done on Cape Town during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries is N. Worden, E. van Heyningen and V. Bickford-Smith, Cape Town: The Making of a 
City (Cape Town, 1998), 11-83. There is also an earlier tradition of popular works on the history of Cape 
Town (though these books were often superficial and badly researched): P.W. Laidler, The Growth and 
Government of Cape Town (Cape Town, 1939) and L.G. Green, Tavern of the Seas (Cape Town, 1947).  
23  R. Ross, Status and Respectability in the Cape Colony, 1750-1870: A Tragedy of Manners 
(Cambridge, 1999); N. Worden, ‘Forging a Reputation: Artisan Honour and the Cape Town Blacksmith 
Strike of 1752’, Kronos 28 (2002), 43-65 and ‘Strangers Ashore: Sailor Identity and Social Conflict in mid-
18th Century Cape Town’, Kronos 33 (2007), 72-83; S. Newton-King, ‘For the Love of Adam: Two 
Sodomy Trials at the Cape of Good Hope’, Kronos 28 (2002), 21-42 and ‘Sodomy, Race and Respectability 
in Stellenbosch and Drakenstein, 1689-1762: The Story of a Family, Loosely Defined’, Kronos 33 (2007), 
6-44. See N. Worden, ‘New Approaches to VOC History in South Africa’, South African Historical 
Journal 59 (2007), 3-18 for a discussion of recent trends.  
24  For example, Worden, ‘Forging a Reputation’ and ‘Strangers Ashore’; Newton-King, ‘For the 
Love of Adam’ and N. Penn, ‘Great Escapes: Deserting Soldiers during Noodt’s Cape Governorship, 1727-
1729’, South African Historical Journal 59 (2007), 171-203. 
25  The classic work in this genre is N. Penn, Rogues, Rebels and Runaways: Eighteenth-Century 
Cape Characters (Cape Town, 1999). This work inspired other micro-histories, albeit with different aims 
and focuses, by historians such as Worden and Newton-King (see note 23 above for some examples), as 











the individual and the cultural has almost completely displaced work on the economy of 
the colonial period.  
There is, however, an irony here. In the battle of ideas which characterised 
twentieth-century economic history, the Keynesian macro-economic approach was 
dominant in the post-World War II era. This started to change in the late 1970s and 1980s 
when some world leaders took seriously the so-called Austrian School’s insistence on the 
supremacy of the free-market, and with it the importance of individual freedom and 
choice.26 It was perhaps this renewed focus on the economic role of the individual which 
had led to an interest from economic historians in business history and entrepreneurship 
during the 1980s and 1990s.27 Thus, since the 1990s, there has been an immense growth 
in the scholarship of the history of entrepreneurship in, for instance, the early modern 
Netherlands.28 While Dutch historians have, understandably, focused on the role of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Town’, Historical Approaches 2 (2003), 1-15; K. Thomson, ‘“The Mistress Will Be Consumed”: A Study 
of Slave Resistance in 18th-Century Cape Town’, Historical Approaches 2 (2003), 16-29; P. Truter, ‘The 
Robben Island Rebellion of 1751’, Historical Approaches 3 (2004), 37-49, and N. Taylor, ‘A Scapegoat of 
Status on the Streets of 18th-Century Cape Town’, Historical Approaches 4 (2005/6), 12-18.  
26  The watershed moment was probably the (controversial) award of the Nobel Prize in Economics to 
Friedrich von Hayek in 1974. Together with his teacher, Ludwig von Mises, and Joseph Schumpeter, he is 
the best known of the Austrian School economists. It was the adoptation of Hayek’s ideas by Margaret 
Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in the 1980s which resulted in a rapid abandonment of the Keynesian 
approach in the Western world during the 1980s; D. Yergin and J. Stanislaw, The Commanding Heights: 
The Battle for the World Economy (New York, 2002), esp. 123-33. 
27  It is no coincidence that, with the exception of the venerable Business History (1959), most of the 
foremost academic journals in business history were founded during the 1980s and 1990s: Essays in 
Economic and Business History (1979); Accounting, Business and Financial History (1990) and Enterprise 
& Society (2000).  
28  L. Noordegraaf, ‘Economic Historiography in the Netherlands, 1960-2000’, South African Journal 
of Economic History 22 (2007), 129-31. See also the following overview articles discussing the recent 
trends: F.M.M. de Goey, ‘Ondernemergeschiedenis in Amerika, Nederland en België (1940-1995). Trends 
in Vraagstellingen, Onderzoeksmethoden en Thema’s: Een Overzicht’, NEHA-Jaarboek voor 
Economische, Bedrijfs- en Techniekgeschiedenis 59 (1996), 21-65; O. Gelderblom and J.L. van Zanden, 
‘Vroegmoderne Ondernemerschap in Nederland’, NEHA Bulletin voor de Economische Geschiedenis 11/2 
(1997), 3-15; O. Gelderblom, ‘Uitdagingen voor de Vroegmoderne Ondernemersgeschiedenis’, NEHA 











entrepreneurs in the remarkable growth of their country’s economy in the seventeenth 
century, they have paid very little attention, as of yet, to the Dutch colonial world.29 This 
development was by no means restricted to Dutch scholarship as this period also saw a 
growth of similar studies for the colonial New World.30 Thus, during the 1990s, when the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Ondernemersgeschiedenis (1995-2005): Een Aanvulling’, http://www.iisg.nl/ondernemers/verderlezen.php 
(last accessed 25 March 2007). Major contributions during this period include the following collections of 
studies: C. Lesger and L. Noordegraaf (eds), Entrepreneurs and Entrepreneurship in Early Modern Times: 
Merchants and Industrialists within the Orbit of the Dutch Staple Market (The Hague, 1995); C.A. Davids, 
W. Fritschy and L.A. van der Valk (eds), Kapitaal, Ondernemerschap en Beleid: Studies over Economie en 
Politiek in Nederland, Europa en Azië van 1500 tot Heden (Amsterdam, 1996) and C. Lesger and L. 
Noordegraaf (eds), Ondernemers en Bestuurders: Economie en Politiek in de Noordelijke Nederlanden in 
de Late Middeleeuwen en Vroegmoderne Tijd (Amsterdam, 1999). There is currently a large, government-
funded project in the Netherlands to compile a database of biographies of some 4 000 Dutch entrepreneurs: 
http://www.iisg.nl/ondernemers/ (last accessed 15 September 2009).   
29  An exception being F. de Goey and J.W. Veluwenkamp (eds), Entrepreneurs and Institutions in 
Europe and Asia, 1500-2000 (Amsterdam, 2002), although most of these essays do not deal with the early 
modern period. There is a large historiography on the history of trade in the VOC empire, but the focus is 
macro-economic and institutional (the VOC being the main character); E.M. Jacobs, Merchant in Asia: The 
Trade of the Dutch East India Company during the Eighteenth Century (Leiden, 2006) is the most recent 
synthesis. There has been important new work on entrepreneurship on regions of the Indian Ocean outside 
of the Dutch world; see, for example, R. Ptak and D. Rothermund (eds), Emporia, Commodities and 
Entrepreneurs in Asian Maritime Trade (Stuttgart, 1991); R. Ptak and K.A. Sprengard (eds), Maritime 
Asia: Profit Maximisation, Ethics and Trade Structure, 1300-1800 (Wiesbaden, 1994); A. das Gupta, The 
World of the Indian Ocean Merchant, 1500-1800: Collected Essays (New York, 2001) and O. Prakash, 
Bullion for Goods: European and Indian Merchants in the Indian Ocean Trade, 1500-1800 (New Delhi, 
2004).  
30  There existed a longer (pre-1990s) tradition of studies on merchants and urban elites for colonial 
North and South America, but in this historiography too there was a noticeable increase in the focus on 
entrepreneurship during the 1990s; see, for example, T.M. Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit of Enterprise: 
Merchants and Economic Development in Revolutionary Philadelphia (Chapel Hill and London, 1986); 
R.J. Ferry, The Colonial Elite of Early Caracas: Formation and Crisis, 1567-1767 (Berkeley, 1989); L.S. 
Hoberman, Mexico’s Merchant Elite, 1590-1660 (Durham and London, 1991); J.F. Martin, Profits in the 
Wilderness: Entrepreneurship and the Founding of New England Towns in the Seventeenth Century 
(Chapel Hill, 1991); R.F. Jones, “The King of the Alley”: William Duer, Entrepreneur and Speculator, 
1769-1799 (Philadelphia, 1992) and R.F. Brown, Juan Fermín de Aycinena: Central American Colonial 











time was ripe to build on the macro-economic history of the Cape Colony established 
during the 1980s by focusing on the actors of the economy, as opposed to its structures, 
Cape historians completely moved away from economic history. While they did focus on 
individual lived experiences against the background of the social and cultural history of 
the pre-industrial Cape, they almost forgot about the importance of economics.  
 Thus, although a fair amount of work has been done on the Cape economy during 
the VOC period – of which Van Duin and Ross’s monograph is the most significant – it 
has largely been concerned with depersonalised economic institutions and market forces. 
There has been little work on the actual actors in the economy.31 This thesis starts to fill 
that gap. It aims to show that economic history needs to be taken seriously to understand 
properly the history of the colonial Cape. The approach is both wider in scope and 
conceptually more refined than the earlier economic approach of the 1980s by using 
theoretical work on the operation of entrepreneurship. But the focus is not narrowly on 
economic matters; through taking economic activities as a starting point, the thesis 
attempts to flesh out the lived reality of inhabitants at the Cape by showing the links 
between economic and social and cultural decisions made at an individual level. The 
concept of an entrepreneur allows the historian to do this, since business decisions are not 
made in a theoretical vacuum, but within a social and cultural context. Applying this 
theoretical concept has not been done before for the pre-industrial Cape or, indeed, the 
Dutch colonial world.  
 In addition, since most of the economic opportunities at the Cape of Good Hope 
during the Dutch period centred on the largest urban centre in the colony, Cape Town, 
this thesis also represents a major intervention in demonstrating the centrality of the 
urban locality to the development of the burgher population in the colony. Although there 
has been a renewed interest in the history of Cape Town itself,32 instead of the former 
focus on the rural districts and the frontier, there still remains a dearth of work on the 
                                                 
31  Two notable exceptions exist: G. Wagenaar, ‘Johannes Gysbertus van Reenen: Sy Aandeel in die 
Kaapse Geskiedenis tot 1806’ (unpublished MA thesis, University of Pretoria, 1976) and G.A. Cockrell, 
‘Die Lewe van Martin Melck, 1723-1781’ (unpublished MA thesis, University of Stellenbosch, 1984), 
although both are rather myopic and narrow in their focus on the lives of their subjects.  











history of urban free burghers.33 This thesis is an attempt at starting to fill that gap by 
demonstrating how central Cape Town and its burghers were to the development of both 
the Cape economy and the Cape gentry.  
 
The Making of the Cape Gentry  
 
A major achievement of the scholarship on the pre-industrial Cape from the 1980s was to 
reveal the development and workings of a landed gentry at the Cape during the eighteenth 
century. Thanks to the pioneering works of scholars like Robert Ross, Leonard Guelke 
and Robert Shell, this notion had become well-entrenched.34 The Cape gentry has been 
defined by Ross as consisting of ‘a relatively undifferentiated broad mass of farmers’, 
who were mostly engaged in wine and grain farming in the South-western districts of the 
Cape colony.35 Although there are differences in the approaches and conclusions of Ross 
on the one hand and Guelke and Shell on the other, it remains clear from their work that 
there existed at the Cape, from the early eighteenth century, a group of well-off families 
whose fortunes were based on the accumulation of capital in the form of property 
(notably land) and labour (slaves).  
 This interpretation of the development of Cape burgher society as the rise of 
capitalism has been criticised for its ‘theoretical insouciance’ (which resulted in too easy 
and smooth a developmental trajectory) which led to ‘frustrating silences’ regarding the 
pre-industrial development of South African society.36 In addition, Susan Newton-King 
has pointed out the empirical shortcomings of this work: according to her, ‘this term 
properly belongs to a group of families who have consolidated their position over several 
                                                 
33  Older work tended to focus on the relationship between the free burghers and the VOC: A.J. 
Böeseken, ‘Die Nederlandse Kommissarisse en die 18de-eeuse Samelewing aan die Kaap’, Archives Year 
Book for South African History 7 (1944) and C. Beyers, Die Kaapse Patriotte gedurende die Laaste Kwart 
van die Agtiende Eeu en die Voortlewing van hul Denkbeelde (Second edition, Pretoria, 1967).  
34  Ross, ‘Rise of the Cape Gentry’; L. Guelke and R. Shell, ‘An Early Colonial Landed Gentry: Land 
and Wealth in the Cape Colony, 1682-1731’, Journal of Historical Geography 9 (1983), 265-86. 
35  Ross, ‘Rise of the Cape Gentry’, 207-8. 
36  H. Bradford, ‘Highways, Byways and Culs-de-Sacs: The Transition to Agrarian Capitalism in 











generations – whose wealth has a dynastic quality in other words – and whose lifestyle 
and value mark them off from those below them.’37 This was not proved by either Ross’s 
or Guelke and Shell’s seminal articles. Newton-King’s own investigation of this 
hypothesis for the northern frontier suggested that ‘inherited wealth was not the decisive 
factor in an individual’s rise to social and economic prominence in frontier society.’38 
Likewise, Laura Mitchell has shown that, through a combination of inheritance patterns 
and contingent factors, wealth and property were dispersed and circulated throughout the 
northern frontier and did not pass on in a dynastic fashion.39 This then begs the question: 
were the agrarian districts of the South-western Cape somehow exceptional, or does the 
problem lie with our current conception of the rise and growth of the Cape gentry?  
 Martin Hall and, more recently, Wayne Dooling have contributed to the debate by 
demonstrating how important it was to families in the South-western Cape to consolidate 
their wealth over generations (particularly because of the difficulties caused by a system 
of partible inheritance). They also emphasised the central role that women, particularly 
widows, played in the continuance and expansion of this group of wealthy agrarian 
farmers.40 Families could and did retain their hold on land and wealth, although not 
always through the male line. Central to the interpretation of the development of Cape 
society in terms of ‘the rise of a Cape gentry’ is a focus on the agrarian districts and the 
                                                 
37  S. Newton-King, ‘In Search of Notability: The Antecedents of Dawid van der Merwe of the Koue 
Bokkeveld’, in S. Marks (ed.), The Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries, vol. 20 
(London, 1994), 26. 
38  Ibid., 33.  
39  Mitchell, Belongings, esp. 126-48. Mitchell does, however, stress the important unifying roles 
kinship and material culture played in creating a sense of community and connection on the frontier.  
40  M. Hall, ‘The Secret Lives of Houses: Women and Gables in the Eighteenth-Century Cape’, 
Social Dynamics 20 (1994), 1–48; W. Dooling, ‘The Making of a Colonial Elite: Property, Family and 
Landed Stability in the Cape Colony, c. 1750–1834’, Journal of Southern African Studies 31 (2005), 147–
62 and idem, Slavery, Emancipation and Colonial Rule in South Africa (Pietermaritzburg, 2007), 16-57. 
Mitchell, Belongings, 78-86 also illustrates the importance of marriage strategies and the role of women in 











belief that, over time, this group of people (and the power they held)41 were perpetuated 
through endogamous marriages between members of these leading burgher families.  
 There remain, however, questions to be answered about the origins and growth of 
the Cape gentry. How is the picture of a group of people who perpetuated and 
consolidated their wealth over time through capital accumulation to be reconciled with 
that sketched in the opening paragraphs of this Introduction? In other words, how did 
people with no or little capital become wealthy in the first place? What were the 
mechanisms of wealth creation at the Cape of Good Hope – other than accumulating land 
and slaves, which was only possible from a capital base? In addition, the previous focus 
of VOC Cape historiography on the rural areas of the colony meant that none of these 
scholars considered the role of free burghers in Cape Town in this process. Although 
Guelke and Shell pointed out in their seminal article that ‘[t]he complexity of early free 
society at the Cape has not generally been adequately appreciated, because scholars have 
made too much of the fact that most whites were farmers or, more accurately, made a 
living from the land’,42 this line of investigation has not yet been pursued.  
 This thesis attempts to cast some light on these issues through its study of the 
alcohol pachters and their relation to the wider society. It is argued (in chapters three and 
four) that the basis for the capital accumulation which enabled the development of a rural 
gentry should be sought, rather, in Cape Town which afforded business opportunities – 
most lucratively in the alcohol retail trade – that could be used as a springboard for 
agricultural investment. In addition, this study of the alcohol pachters also reveals the 
ways in which newcomers could enter this supposedly closed and endogamous group of 
families (chapters three and five). It also suggests that in the course of the eighteenth 
century there developed close business and family ties between the rural gentry and the 
merchant elite of Cape Town; in fact, it questions whether the notion of a ‘rural’ gentry is 
at all applicable and whether there ever was such a clear-cut differentiation between the 
burghers of the agrarian districts and the urban centre (chapter five). The various case 
studies which make up the bulk of the thesis suggest that there existed rather a process of 
                                                 
41  Ross already indicated the preponderance of members of the rural gentry in the local governance 
structures; Ross, ‘Rise of the Cape Gentry’, 208. 











assimilation between these two groups, and that the development of a free burgher 
society at the Cape was a much more dynamic process than had hitherto been realised. 
Finally, an investigation of how economic success translated into power and prestige 
among successful alcohol pachters also exposes much about the ways in which the elite 
at the Cape could and did differentiate them from those belonging to the ‘lower strata’ of 
society (chapter six). This thesis thus reveals much about the making of a free-burgher 













THE DEVELOPMENT, OPERATION AND ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE ALCOHOL PACHT 
SYSTEM AT THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE, 1652-1795 
 
It was not the intention of the Heren Bewindhebbers (Lords Governors) of the VOC in 
the early 1650s to establish a permanent settlement at the Cape of Good Hope but only a 
‘Fort and Garden’ for the ‘preservation of the Company’s ships and people’.1 Nature 
would provide the water, the Khoikhoi the meat, while the Dutch only needed to establish 
a garden for fruit and vegetables and build a fort for protection from their competitors 
and enemies. At first, though, the station was largely a failure and ran at a loss to the 
VOC. During its first years the settlement had to be saved from going under by having 
most of its supplies shipped from Batavia. The founding commander, Jan van Riebeeck, 
realised that because of the way the station was organised it could never succeed nor be 
profitable in the long run. There was simply too much to do with too few people, and all 
within the context of a merchant company which owned and controlled everything. His 
solution was to suggest the establishment of free burghers. These people would no longer 
be employees of the VOC (which had to pay, feed, clothe and defend them) but were to 
be farmers on their own land. They would, however, remain subjects of the VOC. Apart 
from the legal implications of this, it meant that there was to be no free-market – free 
burghers may own land and produce crops, but they could only sell their produce to the 
Company at pre-determined prices.2 In the eyes of the VOC, the raison d’être for the free 
                                                 
1  ‘Fort ende Thuijn’ … ‘preservatie van des Comps. schepen ende volcq’, quoted from the 1649 
‘Remonstrantie’, which led to the establishment of a station at the Cape; E.C. Godée Molsbergen, De 
Stichter van Hollands Zuid-Afrika: Jan van Riebeeck, 1618-1677 (Amsterdam, 1912), 206.  
2  On the establishment of the free burghers and its consequences, see : A.J. Böeseken, Jan van 
Riebeeck en sy Gesin (Cape Town, 1974), 110-21 and L. Guelke, ‘Freehold Farmers and Frontier Settlers, 
1657-1780’, in R. Elphick and H. Giliomee (eds), The Shaping of South African Society, 1652-1840 











burghers was to help fulfil more economically the function of the Cape as a refreshment 
station.3 
Much lip service has been paid to the fact that Cape Town served first and 
foremost as a halfway station in the VOC empire,4 yet little has been done to understand 
how one of the most important functions of this station, namely to provide alcohol to 
passing ships and their visiting crews, as well as to local inhabitants, was organised and 
regulated. This is of particular importance since alcohol production and provision played 
such a major role in the Cape economy, and hence in the lives of its permanent 
inhabitants. From 1680 onwards, during every year of VOC government at the Cape, the 
rights to retail various types of alcohol were sold at a public auction to the highest 
bidders. Yet this system, while remarkably stable after 1680, did not arrive part and 
parcel with the Dutch in 1652, but had a troubled development during the first decades of 
European settlement. This chapter describes how during the early decades the alcohol 
pacht system evolved at the Cape, against the background of developments in the Dutch 
world; how the system operated after its establishment in 1680, and what the overall 
meaning of and contribution by the alcohol pacht system was to the economy of the Cape 





                                                 
3  As late as the 1780s the Independent Fiscal, W.C. Boers pointed out that the free burghers did not 
have the same rights as citizens in the Netherlands ‘want het is eene waarheid, gelijk zulks door niemand 
sal kunnen worden ontkend … dat dit geheel establissement [sc. Kaap de Goede Hoop] alleenlijk is van 
Compagnies Weegen en om ’s Compagnies wille …’ (my emphasis); quoted from G.J. Schutte, De 
Nederlandse Patriotten en de Koloniën: Een Onderzoek naar hun Denkbeelden en Optreden, 1770-1800 
(Groningen, 1974), 66.  
4  A notable exception is K. Ward, ‘“Tavern of the Seas?”: The Cape of Good Hope as an Oceanic 
Crossroads during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries’, in J.H. Bentley, R. Bridenthal and K. Wigen 
(eds), Seascapes: Maritime Histories, Littoral Cultures, and Transoceanic Exchanges (Honolulu, 2007), 
137-52 and eadem, Networks of Empire: Forced Migration in the Dutch East India Company (Cambridge, 











Monopolies, Excises and Taxes in the Dutch World 
 
The rise of the nation state in Europe during the early modern period, and the many wars 
this process engendered, was concurrent with the increasing need and abilities of 
governments to raise money through taxation – both directly and indirectly (through 
customs and excises). These two processes are in fact inseparable: ‘Taxes not only helped 
to create the state, they helped to form it.’5 Taxing its populace and their economic 
activities became a convenient way of raising money for governments. The early modern 
era therefore witnessed various experiments which aimed to find the best and most 
convenient or expedient ways of collecting such income and getting it into the state’s 
coffers.  
In the Dutch Republic the most important source of income for the various 
provinces was the excises levied on virtually all consumer goods. Especially in the 
province of Holland there was hardly any commodity that remained untaxed.6 These 
excises on the gemene middelen (‘common commodities’) became the cornerstone of the 
Dutch tax system and expanded to such an extent that there were more than forty 
different types of excise taxes in Holland alone by the turn of the eighteenth century. By 
the 1630s about two-thirds of all taxes came from the excise alone, which increased to 
eighty-three percent by 1650. Consequently Holland was heavily taxed, especially as 
cities added their own excises on top of the provincial ones.7 The government itself did 
                                                 
5  Joseph Schumpeter, quoted in W.J. Ashworth, Customs and Excise: Trade, Production, and 
Consumption in England, 1640-1845 (Oxford, 2003), 5. 
6  A. Th. van Deursen, Mensen van Klein Vermogen: Het Kopergeld van de Gouden Eeuw 
(Amsterdam, 1991), 198-200. The States of Holland introduced excise taxes as early as 1583 but while all 
the other provinces eventually also adopted this system of taxation, ‘the rates of taxation and the goods 
burdened with excise varied considerably’, J. de Vries and A. van der Woude, The First Modern Economy: 
Success, Failure and Preservance of the Dutch Economy, 1500-1815 (Cambridge, 1997), 102. 
7  De Vries and Van der Woude, First Modern Economy, 103-106. England, which used to be 
relatively lightly taxed, primarily on land ownership, introduced excise taxes, ‘a system of indirect taxation 
modelled on Dutch precedents’ in 1643, which eventually became the prime source of tax income for the 
state, K. Wrightson, Earthly Necessities: Economic Lives in Early Modern Britain (New Haven and 











not gather these taxes but leased them out (verpachten). In Holland the different excises 
were divided into seventeen districts, resulting in 680 individual pachten. Usually the 
right to gather these taxes was auctioned off to the highest bidder who could provide two 
sureties for a period of six months. All the pachten in the province were sold on the same 
day in order to prevent a person from obtaining more than one. In this way the Dutch 
government deliberately tried to prevent the establishment of large tax farms such as 
those in France.8  
Why did the Dutch authorities opt for excises and for pachters? Excise tax affects 
only a small number of people directly, namely the retailers and producers of goods, not 
the consumers who paid indirectly through higher retail prices. It was thus more 
manageable than a general tax, especially if one considers that early modern governments 
could not easily enforce their will: there was no police force and government bureaucracy 
was negligible.9 This system was also much more flexible – whenever the authorities 
needed a greater income, they could increase the excise or introduce new ones.10 But why 
pachters? Not only did the state lack the necessary administrative ability, but the leasing 
out of the collection of taxes resulted in a more stable system: the government knew what 
its guaranteed income would be.11  
The notion of a pacht therefore already existed in the Dutch Republic by the 
seventeenth century. However, this term was mostly understood to mean the right to 
collect taxes within a certain industry or on certain goods. Much less common were 
monopoly type pachten which only existed where they concerned valuable or scarce 
commodities. An example is the case of fresh water fishing in seventeenth-century Graft, 
where the right to fish in fresh water and to sell the produce was verpachten annually to 
only one person, who may or may not have had partners or assistants, but who was the 
                                                 
8  Van Deursen, Mensen van Klein Vermogen, 200-203 and De Vries and Van der Woude, First 
Modern Economy, 103. England too had its tax farms, which by the 1670s tended to be controlled by a few 
groups, or sometimes a single group, of financiers, which made this model closer to the French one; cf. 
Ashworth, Customs and Excise, 100-111. 
9  Van Deursen, Mensen van Klein Vermogen, 208. 
10  De Vries and Van der Woude, First Modern Economy, 102. 











only one allowed to exploit the valuable resource of fresh water fish.12 The forms that a 
pacht could take in the Dutch colonial world were to diversify from this metropolitan 
form. 
 
In 1602 the Dutch East India Company (VOC) was established through a charter of the 
States General of the Dutch Republic which gave the Company a monopoly to trade in 
the Indian Ocean area. Within a few decades the VOC had conquered significant parts of 
Southeast Asia and became the leading colonial power in the Indian Ocean world.13 The 
VOC remained throughout a business company whose primary aim was to return a profit 
to its shareholders. It is, however, important to remember that the aim of a mercantilist 
company such as the VOC was not so much to obtain the highest possible profit, but 
rather direct and, above all, secure or safe profits.14 
Very soon after the VOC’s conquest of Jayakarta in 1619 and the establishment of 
its new ‘rendezvous’, Batavia, the new authorities instituted a ‘toll’, i.e. a customs duty, 
on all goods entering or leaving the city. The justification for this was the compensation 
of the Company for the ‘heavy burdens and unspeakably excessive expenses’ caused by 
the recent war.15 In addition a further means was devised ‘for the relief and repair of the 
heavy burdens experienced daily’, namely to compel all publicans and alcohol retailers to 
obtain a monthly licence (licentie briefken) at a set cost for the right to sell alcohol.16 
                                                 
12  A. Th. van Deursen, ‘Bronnen en Hun Gebruik: Het Verpachtingsregister van de Visgronden bij 
de Sluis van Westgrafdijk’, in R. Sanders et al. (eds), De Verleiding van de Overvloed: Reflecties op de 
Eigenheid van de Cultuurgeschiedenis (Amsterdam, 1991), 55-64. 
13  F.S. Gaastra, De Geschiedenis van de VOC (Second edition; Zutphen, 1991), 20-23 and 37-65. 
14  Cf. De Vries and Van der Woude, First Modern Economy, 431: ‘In general, the Company’s policy 
was to use its dominant position … to achieve a stable, medium-term optimum rather than short-term profit 
maximization’.  
15  ‘groote lasten ende onuytspspreeckelycke excessive costen’; J.A. van der Chijs (ed.), 
Nederlandsch-Indisch Plakaatboek, 1602-1811: Deel I, 1602-1642 (Batavia and The Hague, 1885), 74-75. 
A complete list of the various imposts survives from 1671: except for gold, silver, slaves and wood, 
everything was taxed at different rates for imports and exports; J.A. van der Chijs (ed.), Nederlandsch-
Indisch Plakaatboek, 1602-1811: Deel II, 1642-1677 (Batavia and The Hague, 1886), 535-44. 
16  ‘tot soulagement ende vindinge van de swaere lasten dagelycx te dragen’; Van der Chijs, 











With this the tone for the future was set. Taxing almost everything became an easy and 
useful way of supplementing the Company’s income.  
The Company quickly realised that it was easier to farm out the administration of 
this, thereby saving on the administration and providing an additional income by selling 
the right to collect these taxes. In 1622 the first verpachting in the history of the Dutch 
East Indies took place when the Chinese Jancongh was allowed to collect the toll levied 
on certain articles.17 This pacht was later expanded to include ever greater parts of the 
imports and exports of Batavia.18 Soon more and more pachten were sold to collect 
various taxes.19 Concomitant with these tax-farming pachten, a different sort of pacht 
developed, namely one which entailed control over a monopoly.20  Yet a third type of 
pacht was instituted in 1631 when the management of the meat and fish markets were 
verpachten, meaning that in exchange for a percentage of the goods sold these individuals 
took over the running of the markets.21 A combination of the tax-farming and 
management type pachten developed with the arack pacht of 1633, where the pachter 
ensured that there was no illegal distilling of arack through the selling of monthly 
licences to distillers – in a way he both managed the industry and collected the income 
from it.22  
At first the pachten were sold on an ad hoc basis to individuals who applied for 
them, and there was no uniformity in the administration of the various pachten and the 
different contracts. This changed in the 1650s when the pacht system was reviewed and 
standardised. One of the new innovations was that the various pachten were all publicly 
                                                 
17  Ibid., 94. For a general discussion of pachten in Batavia, and especially the important role of the 
Chinese population in it (who formed the majority of pachters), see: H.E. Niemeijer, ‘Calvinisme en 
Koloniale Stadscultuur: Batavia, 1619-1725’ (unpublished PhD thesis, Free University of Amsterdam, 
1996), 77-79 and idem, Batavia: Een Koloniale Samenleving in de 17de Eeuw (Amsterdam, 2005), 70-77. 
18  Van der Chijs, Plakaatboek I, 282 and Plakaatboek II, 187. 
19  For example, van der Chijs, Plakaatboek I, 291. 
20  The first was that of ‘sirih-pinang’ (the nuts and leaves of the betel palm which were chewed) 
which could only be sold by the pachters, followed shortly by a monopoly on the sale of tobacco; ibid., 112 
and 202-3. 
21  Ibid., 259-62. 











verpachten in the Castle at the end of every year on terms and conditions which were 
made public some time before the event.23 From 1658 onwards it is always mentioned 
that the pachten would go to the ‘those who offered the most’ (meest biedende),24 i.e. a 
measure of free competition was introduced with the institution of a public auction, open 
to everybody who could produce the sureties and pay the pacht penningen (the price for 
the pacht).25 
By the 1650s the pacht system not only dominated economic life in Batavia but 
was also very varied.26 Of the fifteen pachten, only one can be considered a strict 
monopoly, namely the right to control the making and selling of candles. Most of pachten 
were of the management type.27 There were also pachten which were out-and-out tax 
farms. Straightforward cases included the pachten of the right to use certain rivers and 
the very lucrative pacht of the ‘head money of the Chinese’ (’t Hooftgelt der Chinesen), 
which entailed the collection of the monthly tax every Chinese man had to pay for the 
privilege of living and working in Batavia.28 The pachten were not just purely an income-
generating device, but perhaps primarily a way of controlling and regulating a specific 
trade or aspect of the economy.29 By having pachters whose livelihood and fortune would 
depend on making sure everybody is taxed who ought to be taxed, the Company could 
put a check on smuggling and illegal trading, thereby securing its own due income.30 
                                                 
23  Van der Chijs, Plakaatboek II, 213. 
24  Ibid., 312. 
25  Pachters always had to produce two sureties when they took on the pacht. Before 1654 the 
pachters had to pay their pachtpenningen at the end of every month. After 1654 onwards they had to pay 
two months in advance on acceptance of the pacht; ibid., 200-201. See the discussion below for the case at 
the Cape.  
26  Ibid., 314-21. A similar complete set survives from 1669; ibid., 491-506. 
27  For example, managing the coconut trees (for the making of arack), the weighing house, the fish, 
meat and rice markets, the Company’s garden, mill, wood yards etc, as well as something akin to gambling 
houses (Chinese ‘topbanen’), cf. ibid., 240, 325-27, 356, 499-500 and 504. 
28  Ibid., 207-8, 251-52 and 314-15. 
29  When the import and export duties were verpachten, it was done to curb private trade and to 
prevent the traffic of goods on which the proper taxes have not been paid; ibid., 187.  
30  According to Niemeijer, the system of having ‘licentie briefkens’ was primarily a measure to curb 











 This dual function of pachten also informed the system of running alcohol retail 
in Batavia. Seemingly anybody who wanted to and was willing to pay the costs could run 
a tap. From the outset, though, excise taxes had to be paid on the various types of alcohol, 
in addition to a monthly licence fee.31 There were no pachten for different types of 
alcohol, but simply one over-arching ‘pacht der herbergiers ofte tapbriefkens’. The 
pachter’s only function was to sell a licence every month to everybody who comes to ask 
for it.32 His was purely an administrative function, but it implies that he would also 
ensure that there were no people tapping without having such a licence. To this end he 
had to keep a register of all licensed tappers (bar or tavern keepers),33 while all tappers 
had to clearly identify their taverns as such.34 To an extent, then, it was a management 
type of pacht in that it sought to control the trade, but mostly the pachter served as a tax 
farmer.  
 Fifty years after the foundation of Batavia, the system of pachten came to 
dominate almost every local economic activity.35 All the pachten together formed what 
Company officials called the ‘general income’ (generaele incomsten) of Batavia. While it 
was not a major source of income for the VOC as a whole, its importance to the urban 
economy, and especially to balance the expenditures of the city, was enormous. The 
pachten were predicated on the notion of protecting one’s market and ensuring a 
monopoly, crucial to the success of the mercantilist VOC, which might explain why they 
were viewed as a way of combating smuggling. Pachten were the Company’s 
instruments of control over the economic activities of their subjects, while they at the 
same time also made it possible for the VOC to benefit directly from these activities. 
Eventually, in one form or another, a system of pachten became part and parcel of the 
                                                 
31  On excise see for example Van der Chijs, Plakaatboek II, 103, 125-26, 237 and Realia: Register 
op de Generale Resolutiën van het Kasteel Batavia, 1632-1805: Eerste Deel (Leiden, 1882), 466 
(18.6.1641). For the need to have a licence, see for example Van der Chijs, Plakaatboek II, 85, 243-44, 
300, 316, 492 and Realia I, 466 (12.3.1658). 
32  Excise collection was not part of his job. That had to be paid when the tappers bought the alcohol 
from the Company, cf. Realia I, 154 (19.8.1645). 
33  Van der Chijs, Plakaatboek II, 476. 
34  Ibid., 244, 316 and 492-93. 











VOC Empire – from Makassar36 to Melaka37 – even though it was not always to the same 
extent as in the capital city. 
 
The Development of the Alcohol Pacht System at the Cape, 1656-1680 
When the Dutch arrived at the Cape of Good Hope, they were thus familiar with a system 
of excise taxes, and equally, with the notion of selling the right to collect certain taxes to 
a person. In addition, they also knew that certain privileges, due to their value, might be 
‘rented out’ (verpachten), i.e. the original right or ownership remains that of the 
authorities, but the use and management of it may be sold for set periods of time. This 
particularly developed in Batavia, largely as a way of controlling smuggling and 
protecting the VOC’s commercial interests, but with the useful side-benefit of generating 
an extra income. Tradition and precedent played an important role with regards to the 
development of the alcohol pacht system at the Cape, which partook of all these various 
systems, as will become clear; yet it was also the product of the unique circumstances of 
the Cape.  
Within a few years the VOC authorities at the Cape realised that it might be more 
advantageous (i.e. cost effective) if everything at the Cape was not controlled and 
handled by the Company. Thus, in 1655, the VOC decided to lease or hire out (i.e. 
verpachten) the Company’s milk cows. The cows remained the property of the Company, 
but the right to sell their milk and make butter from it was being sold. In this way the 
VOC’s possessions were managed by the pachter while the Company continued to get an 
easy and cheap supply of milk and butter. The pachter, the gardener Hendrick Boom, for 
his part, did not only have the duties of taking care of the cows and providing the 
                                                 
36   During the seventeenth century Makassar had only one pacht, namely an alcohol monopoly, but 
this system was expanded during the eighteenth century to include management and tax farm type pachten; 
H. Sutherland, ‘Eastern Emporium and Company Town: Trade and Society in Eighteenth-Century 
Makassar’, in F. Broeze (ed.), Brides of the Sea: Port Cities of Asia from the 16th-20th Centuries 
(Kensington, 1989), 113 and 123-24. 
37  Melaka’s port, like that of Batavia, was controlled through a system of excises and customs; F.S. 
Gaastra, Bewind en Beleid bij de VOC: De Financiële en Commerciële Politiek van de Bewindhebbers, 











Company with dairy products at a fixed price, but crucially obtained the right to sell the 
excess milk and butter to any individual at his own price, thereby supplementing his 
measly monthly wages from the Company.38  
Hendrick Boom received the cow pacht because he was living outside the Fort on 
a small piece of land adjoining the garden and his wife, Annetje Joris, had previous 
experience of farm work in the Netherlands.39 In 1656 she convinced the authorities to 
allow her keeping an inn ‘to host and house those coming and going on the passing 
ships.’40 The decision to permit an inn at the Cape was not a sudden whim, but something 
which Van Riebeeck had been proposing to the Heren XVII for several years. Up to this 
stage all visiting VOC servants had to be entertained in the Fort, and the more important 
ones had to eat at his table, at great expense to the Company.41 His superiors saw the 
sense of this suggestion and agreed to it, and when this became known at the Cape, 
Annetje Joris jumped at the opportunity. This right was awarded her on the condition that 
she buys all her provisions from the Company’s warehouse at pre-determined prices as 
well as sell it at prices determined by the authorities. In a sense, Annetje Joris was simply 
‘managing’ the redistribution of alcohol which was in any case meant for the Company 
employees.42 
 The new inn was a great success. Four months later another woman, Jannetjen 
Boddijs, was also granted an inn on the same conditions as Joris.43 After some employees 
                                                 
38  A.J. Böeseken (ed.), Resolusies van die Politieke Raad: Deel I, 1651-1669 (Cape Town, 1957), 
59-63.  
39  Ibid., 61. 
40  ‘tot tractement ende huijsvestinge van de gaende en de comende man der passerende schepen’; she 
herself advanced two reasons for awarding her this right: she considered herself to be ‘sufficiently a free 
woman’ (genouchsaem een vrije vrouwe) and because she was ‘lumbered with eight children’ (met acht 
kinderen beladen); ibid., 73. 
41  On Van Riebeeck’s efforts to establish an inn, see: Böeseken, Jan van Riebeeck, 94-95. In April 
1657, anticipating the creation of the free burghers, commissioner Van Goens suggested that the economic 
activities which de burgerije (the citizenry) could be favoured with by the Company should include: beer 
brewing, wine farming, brandy distilling and the keeping of taps; A.J. Böeseken (ed.), Memoriën en 
Instructiën, 1657-1699 (Cape Town, 1966), 8.  
42  Böeseken, Resolusies I, 73-74.  











became free burghers in 1657, certain of them were also allowed to have tapjens or bars 
to complement their income (see table 1.1), all on the same conditions as the first two: 
namely that they buy all their alcohol at set prices from the Company. None of these 
tappers (bar or tavern keepers) had to pay anything for the privilege of running a public 
house. The most important condition remained that they all had to obtain their alcohol 
from the VOC – in this way the Company managed both a strict control over the retail 
trade of alcohol and received an income by selling it at pre-determined prices. This 
started to change from 1665 onwards. The following fifteen to twenty years were ones of 
intense struggles over access to and control over the retail trade of alcohol at the Cape. 
This issue is important since the outcome of these struggles resulted in an economic 
system which remained stable for more than a century, and which became one of the 
corner-stones of the Cape economy. 
 




Boddijs, Jannetjen  1656-1661 
Botma, Cornelis Stevensz   1675-1680 
Botma, Steven Jansz   1670-1675 
Brinkman, Barend   1676 
Cooijman, Matthijs   1670 
Cornelisz (van Langesont), Pieter   1657 
De Wacht, Jan Martensz   1664-1665  
Ferdinandus, Jannetje   1676-1677 
Geens, Barbara   1677 
                                                 
44  The years in this column denote the first and the last known years in which the individual had a 
concession to retail alcohol; it should not be assumed that they necessarily held this right continuously 
during the years indicated. These names and dates should be seen as the minimum – there were unoubtedly 











Hendrikz, Hendrik Thielman   1662-1675 
Israels, Jan   1670 
Jansz (van Hoesum), Christiaen   1657 
Jansz, Joris   1660-1673 
Joris, Annetje   1656 
Leendertsen, Wijnand (and his widow)   1677 
Marquaerdt, Jochem   1670-1679 
Mostaert, Wouter   1666-1677 
Smient, Dirck Jansz   1672 
Smit, Hendrik Evertsz 1670-1679 
Valckenrijk, Jan   1671-1678 
Valckenrijk, widow   1679 
van Dieden, Willem   1673-1679 
van Rosendael, Jacob   1665-1676 
van Suerwaerden, Hendrik   1661-1671 
Vetteman, Jan   1658 
Victor, Gerrit   1678 
Source: CA, C 1344; Resolusies; De Wet, Vryliede, 50-52 
 
By 1665 the Council of Policy realised that ‘amongst all these free burghers 
nobody can achieve more comfort, greater prosperity and more advantages than those 
who have long been permitted to retail strong liquor.’ The reason for this was that these 
people have not had ‘the least trouble of any impost’, nor did they have to pay any 
‘reasonable acknowledgement’ (billicke erkentenisse) for this right.45 Even worse was 
that the success of these tappers meant that those who failed at agriculture continually 
requested the Council to let them set up bars. Considering this, the Council decided that 
the four people, who at that time had been permitted taps, would have to pay in future a 
                                                 
45  ‘er onder alle dese vrije ingesetenen alhier niemant is, die meer gemack, beter welvaart, en grooter 
voordelen behalen kan, als alleen die geene, die dus lange is toegestaen geweest, eenige tapneringe in 











‘moderate excise’ (matigen accijns) for the liquor they bought from the Company.46 
Thus, the Cape authorities finally realised both that alcohol retail was lucrative to the free 
burgher population and that this fact afforded them an opportunity for creating another 
source of income for the Company.  
A further innovation came in 1668 when one of these tappers, Wouter Mostaert, 
was allowed to buy alcohol, not from the VOC as before, but from passing ships. For this 
right he had to pay f 100 per annum as recompens, in addition to the excise.47 In 1670 the 
system was thoroughly reviewed and the rights and obligations of the tappers were 
determined: a tapper could retail a specific type of alcohol only by permission of the 
Council of Policy and by paying a monthly impost, i.e. the excise of 1665.48 An 
important development in the evolution towards the pacht system occurred in 1673, 
namely the renting out (or verpachting) of the Company’s farm Rustenburg. This was 
done on much the same principles as with the milk cows some years earlier, i.e. the farm 
remained the property of the VOC, but that the pachter paid for the right to use it. The 
two pachters who took it on had to pay f 4000 a year for the exploitation of the land, 
while their contract remained valid for four years.49  
During the same year, the Council of Policy became increasingly alarmed at the 
extent of alcohol smuggling which ‘robbed’ the Company of its excises.50 This concern 
                                                 
46  Ibid. The four tappers were Hendrick van Suerwaerden, Joris Jansz, Thielman Hendricxz and 
Jacob van Rosendael. 
47  M.K. Jeffreys (ed.), Kaapse Plakkaatboek, Deel  I (1652-1707) (Cape Town, 1944), 93-94; 
Böeseken, Memoriën en Instructiën, 77 and Böeseken, Resolusies I, 372-73. 
48  A.J. Böeseken (ed.), Resolusies van die Politieke Raad: Deel II, 1670-1680 (Cape Town, 1959), 
24-27 and Böeseken, Memoriën en Instructiën, 91-92. This resolution should be considered a sort of micro-
economic reform of the Cape by Van den Brouck, as in the same document the fate of several other 
industries was decided, i.a. fishing, tannery, milling, brick making and the provision of wood.  
49  CA, VC 6, 742-44. For details of the contract, see CA, C 1344, 114-16.  
50  CA, C 1344, 116: ‘Ende gemerct de luijden hier aan ’t Fort woonende geensints comen afgeleijt 
werden van d’ tapneeringe wat middelen ooc daar toe aangeneemt hebben, en buijten de gepreviligeerde 
haar sulcx seer strict verboden is, mitsgaders door overtreedinge van ’t verbot verscheijde reijsen tot 
[illegible] vervallen sijn, desgelijcx ’t volc van de overcomende schepen stercken drank soo uijt Hollandt 
als Batavia herwaards te brengen, ende onaengesien de wachten en nacht gaand’ patrollien den meesten tijt 











might have been prompted by a specific case of smuggling of January 1673, which 
involved some prominent free burghers and a high-ranking Company official.51 The 
Council’s solution was to lease out (verpachten) alcohol retail ‘to those who offer the 
most [money], and to such four individuals as we deem to be the most suitable for it.’ Not 
only would this relieve the authorities of ‘many troubles’, but the VOC would get its due 
income from the excise, in addition to the new pachtpenningen.52 Everybody else but 
these ‘privileged pachters’ (as they were now called) was prohibited from retailing 
alcohol. Two important innovations seem to be inaugurated with this. Firstly – perhaps 
resulting from the example of Mostaert paying for the right to obtain alcohol from 
passing ships – tappers had to pay for the right to sell alcohol. The second major 
innovation which started in 1673 was that these tap concessions, now called pachten, 
were expressly limited to one year, after which they had to be renewed. Heretofore, 
concessions normally stated that they were granted simply ‘until changed again’ (tot 
wederseggings).  
The system, which was in place by the mid 1670s, meant that pachters had to pay 
an annual fee for the right to retail alcohol. This was not a system open to all free 
burghers and there was no free competition involved: the Council of Policy nominated 
those burghers they deemed ‘most suitable’ for the job, while the Council also 
determined the sum they paid for the privilege. It was for this reason that the same 
individuals’ contracts were renewed year after year during the 1670s. This closed system 
which favoured some burghers and not others caused unhappiness in the small burgher 
community. Already in 1676 the visiting commissioner, Nicolaas Verburch, commented 
on the harsh treatment of the free burghers by the Cape authorities, saying that the laws 
and ordinances at the Cape were ‘very strict and in certain cases rather too severe,’ which 
served as proof for his remark that ‘the Dutch Colonists are called here free people, but 
they are so restricted and bounded in everything that their unfreedom becomes more than 
                                                 
51  Jacob Rosendael, with the assistance of his knecht, brought liquor from a ship without the 
necessary permission, nor having paid the Company’s geregtigheijt (‘entitlement’) on it. Upon 
investigation, the Company dispensier, Willem van Dieden, was also implicated; CA, VC 6, 612-15 and 
CA, C 2398, 83-86. Their sentences are in CA, CJ 1, vol. ii, 836-38. 











just apparent…’. This moved him to recommend that the free burghers should be 
‘cherished with greater freedom, gentleness and kindliness.’53 He was the first 
commissioner to have realised that the reason why so many free burghers were inclined 
to tap keeping was not due to laziness but because of real economic hardships. Verbruch 
noted that these people were not allowed taps because the Council only ever privileged 
the wealthiest tavern-keepers, while in fact ‘the common man’ ought to be permitted to 
participate in this trade as well. Because of the complaints he received over this, 
Verbruch instructed the Cape authorities to take this into consideration, and to give these 
burghers ‘some relief and comfort’.54 
 This resulted in several requests from free burghers who wanted to enter the 
alcohol retail business. The Council of Policy noted the unhappiness (doleantien) which 
existed among the burghers at large over this issue and the fact that only some individuals 
were allowed to profit from the most lucrative industry at the Cape. Consequently it was 
decided to wait for the return fleet of 1679 and a new commissioner to rule over this 
matter.55 This led to the last major reform of the system of tap concessions. The Council 
submitted the request of the burghers ‘that these privileges may be verpachten at a public 
auction to the highest bidder’ to commissioner Dirk Blom. He agreed that it was a fair 
request and allowed a public auction, but insisted that only six to eight people were 
admitted to it who were able to produce sureties for the price the pachten would likely 
get.56  On 25 April 1679 the first public auction of the rights to sell certain types of 
                                                 
53  ‘seer precijs en in sommige gelegentheden al wat rigoreus’; ‘de Nederlandtse Coloniers dragen 
hier de naam van vrije luijden, daar se noghtans in alles soo gerestringeert en bepaelt zijn, dat haere 
onvrijheijt niet dan al te veel is blijckende…’ and ‘met meerder liberteijt, saghtigheijt en minsaamheijt … 
gecoestert werden.’ 
54  ‘wat verlichtinge en troost’; all quoted from Böeseken, Memoriën en Instructiën, 124. 
55  Böeseken, Resolusies II, 270-71.  
56  ‘dat dese privilegien bij openbare opveijlinge aan d’ meest biedende verpacht mochte werden’; 
ibid., 281. The commissioner also decided that proper contracts must be drawn up for the pachters, which 
became the so-called pacht conditiën which every pachter had to sign after having accepted a pacht at an 











alcohol was held, ‘in order to prevent unhappiness among the common [people].’57 This 
auction was deemed a huge success because more money than ever before had been 
realised for the Company. The Council of Policy therefore decided that all other 
industries which heretofore had been entrusted to free burghers on an ad hoc basis be 
verpachten at a public auction to the highest bidders.58 
 Despite this victory to the Cape burghers, the Council of Policy still had too great 
a say in who could have access to the alcohol retail business. Their continuing complaints 
forced the Batavian government to order the Cape authorities to open the alcohol retail 
trade, to all free burghers ‘without exception.’59 Henceforth any burgher could bid for an 
alcohol pacht at a public auction. And thus, by 1680, there was in place a system that 
would remain stable for the remaining 115 years of VOC rule at the Cape. From this year 
onwards, there was a public auction of the alcohol pachten every year at which any free 
burgher could bid for a pacht which would allow him or her to sell a specific type of 
alcohol at a set place for a set period. It took twenty-five years to develop the alcohol 
pacht system but, once it was established, it stayed remarkably stable and became the 
most successful and profitable form of retail for both the free burghers and, indirectly, the 




                                                 
57  ‘tot voorcominge van doleantien onder ’t gemeen’. The pachten ran for only eight months until the 
end of the year, after which they would be auctioned off every New Year; CA, VC 8, 864-65.  
58  This included the brewing of Cape beer, bread baking, milling, ‘d’ bouwerij van Hottentoos 
Hollandt en coornschuir’; Böeseken, Resolusies II, 290. Earlier it was decided to henceforth also auction 
off the right to sell ‘vivres’ (oil, vinegar, butter and bacon) and Spanish wine in large quantities; ibid., 283-
84. None of these, with the exception of the Cape beer pacht, were as successful as the alcohol pachten, 
and came to an end within a few years.  
59  ‘sonder onderscheijt van persoon’; ibid., 317. 
60  Between 1680 and 1795 more than one thousand individual alcohol pachten were leased out to 
almost two hundred different individuals. Of these one thousand pachten only twelve were not auctioned 
off, ten of which were special ad hoc arrangements with the Menssink family concerning beer brewing. In 
addition, only four alcohol pachten over this period were not awarded, usually because the amount bid was 











The Operation of the Alcohol Pacht System at the Cape, 1680-1795 
 
From 1680 the right to retail various types of alcohol in small quantities was auctioned 
off annually to the highest bidder. This remained the basic underlying principle of the 
alcohol pacht system at the Cape until the end of VOC rule. Here a brief description is 
offered of the way in which the system was operated and the changes which were 
introduced.  
 
From the inception the pachten were divided by type of alcohol. They were, in the order 
they were auctioned off every year: Cape malt beer (from 1681); brandy and ‘distilled 
waters’ (including arack and certain types of Spanish wines); Cape wines (from 1684) 
and vaderlandsche en uijtheemse bieren en wijnen, i.e. various imported European 
alcohol types not covered by the other pachten. All of these pachten gave the holder the 
right to sell that type of alcohol for one year in ‘this Table Valley’ (the farm 
Roodebloem, i.e. modern Woodstock, was considered the boundary for this purpose). A 
change occurred in 1699 when the Council of Policy decided to divide the Cape wines 
pacht, given its profitably, into four ‘parts’ (perceelen).61 This meant that there were in 
effect seven pachten available at the annual auction. The success of this measure led to 
the adoption of a similar division of the brandy pacht in 1703, resulting in a total of ten 
pachten.62 There was however no limit on how many parts any individual may hold, and 
several individuals held a number or even all of a given pacht. In August 1705 W. A. van 
der Stel and the Council of Policy decided to change the rules for selling the wine pacht. 
When the pachten for the new year were sold, the four parts of the wine pacht were 
auctioned off as per usual: three were bought by Van der Stel’s business partner, 
Johannes Phijffer and one by another individual. The whole wine pacht (i.e. all four parts 
together) was then auctioned off again and awarded to Phijffer at a slightly higher price 
                                                 
61  J.I. Janse van Rensburg, ‘Die Geskiedenis van die Wingerdkultuur in Suid-Afrika tydens die 
Eerste Eeu, 1652-1752’, Archives Year Book for South African History 17/2 (1954), 70-71 and G.J. Krause, 
‘Drankpagte gedurende die Eerste Honderd Jaar van die N.O.I.K. aan die Kaap’ (unpublished MA thesis, 
University of the Orange Free State, 1955), 73-74. 











than the four individual parts.63 This, however, went against the guidelines for 
verpachting drawn up by commissioner Daniel Heijns in 1699 and caused great 
dissatisfaction among the free burghers who considered this another example of Van der 
Stel’s favouritism and corruption. Their complaints led the Heren XVII to order a 
reversion to the usual format of dividing the wine pacht into four parts.64 This idea was, 
however, revived in 1734 when the Council of Policy decided to institute a generaele 
pachter for Cape wines: this is a person who offered more for the combined four parts of 
the Cape wine pacht than the individual parts had realised.65 This happened on all but one 
occasion, in 1759, when the offer for the generaele pacht was lower than the four parts 
combined, meaning that on that occasion there were four Cape wine pachters.66 The 
generaele pacht could, however, be held by two or even three individuals who shared the 
wine pacht between them.67 In 1793, commissioners-general Nederburgh and Frijkenius 
decided to revert to the original system, so that there were four Cape wine pachters 
annually for the period 1794-1795.68 
 The number of alcohol pachten were increased in the 1710s, not through a 
subdivision of existing pachten, but through the institution of new geographic pachten. In 
1714 a pacht was created for selling Cape wines and brandy in the Stellenbosch district, 
and in 1716 one for the Drakenstein district. At first these two pachten were auctioned off 
in Stellenbosch every year, but from 1722 they were auctioned off with the other alcohol 
pachten at the Castle. This year also saw the amalgamation of these two pachten into one, 
                                                 
63  CA, C 2701, 18-25. 
64  See on this incident, Krause, ‘Drankpagte’, 78-83; G.C. de Wet, Die Vryliede en Vryswartes in die 
Kaapse Nedersetting, 1657-1707 (Cape Town, 1981), 49 and G.J. Schutte, ‘Company and Colonists at the 
Cape, 1652-1795’, in R. Elphick and H. Giliomee (eds), The Shaping of South African Society, 1652-1840 
(Second edition, Cape Town, 1989), 304. 
65  Janse van Rensburg, ‘Geskiedenis van die Wingerdkultuur’, 79-80 and Krause, ‘Drankpagte’, 87-
89. 
66  CA, C 2714, 2-17. 
67  In 1737, 1738, 1740, 1746 and 1747 (pacht years); see Appendix 1 below for details.  
68  A.J. Böeseken, ‘Die Nederlandse Kommissarisse en die 18de-eeuse Samelewing aan die Kaap’, 











allowing the holder to sell alcohol in both districts.69 Another addition came in 1716 
when a pacht was instituted for selling alcohol at the Company’s farm Rustenburg. This 
followed on the precedent of the 1670-80s when Rustenburg was rented out to private 
individuals who not only produced wine for the Cape market but also held the right to sell 
some in the area.70 The farm reverted to the VOC in 1683, however, but the idea of 
creating a geographic alcohol pacht on the basis of the Stellenbosch one revived the 
Rustenburg pacht which allowed the holder to sell alcohol in the Cape district outside of 
the Table Valley. In 1720 the name was changed to the ‘Rondebosje’ (Rondebosch) 
pacht, to which was added in 1743 ‘Baaij Fals’ (i.e. Simon’s Town).71 This meant that by 
the 1720s there were four alcohol type pachten (divided into ten72) and two geographic 
ones available for auction. Only in 1757 was a seventh alcohol pacht added, namely the 
impost op vreemde natiën (‘the excise on foreign nations’) which entailed the 
management and collection of the excise tax which the VOC levied on all alcohol sold to 
foreign ships anchored in Table Bay.73 The latter was the only alcohol pacht at the Cape 
which was of the management type so common in Batavia.  
 Alcohol pacht contracts ran for one year.74 Between 1679 and 1698, the pacht 
year coincided with the calendar year. However, in 1698 it was decided to make the 
pacht year coincide with the financial year of the VOC, which ran from 1 September to 
                                                 
69  Janse van Rensburg, ‘Geskiedenis van die Wingerdkultuur’, 76-77 and Krause, ‘Drankpagte’, 145-
51. 
70  Böeseken, Resolusies II, 122; Jeffreys, Kaapse Plakkaatboek I, 126-27; CA, VC 6, 742-44 and C 
1344, 114-16.  
71  Krause, ‘Drankpagte’, 159-61. 
72  But only seven when there was a generaele pachter for Cape wines, i.e. one each for Cape beer, 
Cape wines, European alcohol and four brandy pachters.  
73  G.J. Erasmus, ‘Die Geskiedenis van die Bedryfslewe aan die Kaap, 1652 tot 1795’ (unpublished 
PhD thesis, University of the Orange Free State, 1986), 220-21 and G.J. Jooste, ‘Die Geskiedenis van 
Wynbou en Wynhandel in die Kaapkolonie, 1753-1795’ (unpublished MA thesis, University of 
Stellenbosch, 1973), 42. 
74  For a summary of the contents of the contracts, which remained more or less fixed throughout the 
eighteenth century, see Janse van Rensburg, ‘Geskiedenis van die Wingerdkultuur’, 68-69; Krause, 











31 August.75 The pachten were auctioned off in the Castle on the 31st of August (except if 
that was a Sunday) every year.76 According to eye-witness accounts, this was one of the 
highlights of the social calendar in Cape Town when the VOC provided free drinks and 
tobacco to those who assembled to bid on the pachten – a clear indication of the 
importance of this event to the VOC.77 A pacht was first auctioned off to the highest 
bidder, with the prices going up. After the highest bidder had signed the contract, the 
same pacht was again auctioned off, this time from a much higher starting price which 
was decreased in small increments until someone called it. If the latter auction realised a 
higher price than the first one, a new contract was signed with the bidder. If not, the 
contract of the highest bidder from the first auction was retained. In this way the VOC 
ensured the highest possible price for the right to retail alcohol.78  
The contracts, which were drawn up beforehand, had to be signed by the pachter 
who bought the pacht, along with two ‘sufficient’ sureties. Although the pacht price was 
only paid in two instalments, due after six and twelve months respectively, the huge 
amounts paid for most pachten meant that the capital layout was beyond the means of 
most individuals. Thus, as Mentzel testified, most sureties were in effect business 
                                                 
75  Krause, ‘Drankpagte’, 74. In this thesis the year given for any given pacht from 1699 onwards 
should be interpreted as a ‘pacht year’, i.e. running from 1 September the previous year to 31 August of the 
year stated, i.e. the pacht year 1702 equates to the calendar year 1 September 1701 to 31 August 1702. 
76  There are a few exceptions when some pachten were not auctioned off. The most common 
exception was that of the malt beer pacht which, as the pachter was mostly also the producer, was simply 
re-awarded to the holder without bringing it to the public auction. This happened in: 1680-81, 1693-96, 
1700-1706 and 1708-11 (cf. CA, VC 8, 1061; C 2698, 21; C 2699, 96 and 101-2; C 2700, 68 and 94-95; C 
2701, 26, 88, 111 and 125 and C 2702, 7). The following pachten were not awarded during the following 
years (the first two because the VOC was unhappy with the price offered for it): malt beer (1720), 
European alcohol (1714) and the ‘excise on foreign nations’ (1783-84).  
77  It appears as if anyone who attended the auction (which was widely advertised beforehand) was 
treated to these free refreshments.  
78  For eye-witness accounts, see P. Kolb, Naaukeurige en Uitvoerige  Beschrijving van de Kaap de 
Goede Hoop (2 vols, Amsterdam, 1727), vol. 2, 275-77 and O.F. Mentzel, A Geographical and 
Topographical Description of the Cape of Good Hope (translated by H.J. Mandelbrote, G.V. Marais and J. 











partners who shared in the costs and the profits of a pacht.79 An indication of the 
seriousness with which the system of underwriting by sureties was viewed, is revealed by 
the fact that the governor sometimes interviewed prospective pachters who were new to 
the business ahead of the auction, during which he interrogated them about their sureties 
and financial backing.80 The Company was in general ruthless about getting its due 
income from a pachter and several cases survive in which pachters had to struggle 
paying off their debt; even being sued by the authorities.81 Therefore, being a surety was 
a serious responsibility: if a pachter should die or for some reason or the other be unable 
to fulfil his contractual obligations, the sureties either had to take over the pacht or ensure 
that the Company get its due, either from the estate of the pachter or (if it was not big 
enough) pay it themselves.82 Although it was tacitly agreed that sureties could be partners 
in a pachter’s business, the VOC was vigilant about collusion between pachters 
(especially the Cape wines and brandy pachters) who by forming a cartel could force 
down the price they pay for their pachten. When this was discovered in 1710, the wine 
pachters’ contracts were annulled and the pacht re-auctioned. In addition to being fined, 
the guilty pachters also had to make up the loss that the Company experienced for having 
sold the pacht for only eleven months in the second auction.83 
  A complex but important issue related to tavern holding was that of the so-called 
bijtappers (assistant tavern-keepers). Essentially this refers to individuals who, in 
addition to the pachter’s own tavern, would run another tavern (or taverns) on his or her 
behalf. The issue was complex and controversial because the right to a bijtapper or 
bijtappers was never part of the pacht contracts. During the period of W.A. van der Stel’s 
governorship, the issue came to the fore and it was decided that each pachter would be 
allowed one bijtapper. However, in order not to change the contracts this would only be 
                                                 
79  Mentzel, Description, vol. 2, 52. 
80  See G.C. de Wet (ed.), Resolusies van die Politieke Raad: Deel IX, 1735-1739 (Pretoria, 1981), 
289-90. 
81  For example CA, C 1073, 12-14 and 41-46; C 1074, 65-68; C 1092, 154-55 and Jooste, 
‘Geskiedenis van Wynbou’, 43. 
82  See for example CA, C 1073, 12-14 and Jooste, ‘Geskiedenis van Wynbou’, 42-43. 
83  CA, C 2702, 14-17 and 22-26; A.J. Böeseken (ed.), Resolusies van die Politieke Raad: Deel IV, 











an oral agreement for which the pachters would apply each year. In the 1720s the issue 
again caused unhappiness when the Council of Policy decided no longer to allow 
bijtappers.84 The outcome of this was an agreement that pachters could apply for 
bijtappers and be granted this right on an ad hoc basis.85 One therefore finds in the 
Requesten en Nominatiën series in the Cape Archives numerous applications from 
pachters for bijtappers, sometimes stating the name and place of the bijtapper and tavern 
in question. Although in the 1720s it seems as if pachters were allowed one bijtapper 
each, Mentzel mentions that wine pachters could have up to four taverns, meaning that 
there were up to sixteen wine shops for the four pachters of the Cape wine pacht.86 There 
were also contraventions of the ad hoc agreement, as revealed by the complaints of the 
generaele wijnpachter, Carel Boetendagh, in 1738 that the four brandy pachters had 
more than twenty taverns in total, as opposed to the eight they were allowed to by the 
Council of Policy.87 This was more than an emotive issue: with the ability to run more 
taverns, a pachter could increase his or her turnover, while a competitor with a large 
number of taverns could likewise harm one’s business. But for some reason, the Cape 
authorities never gave a final verdict regarding the issue of bijtappers, and the system 
continued to be run on an ad hoc basis of applying to the Council of Policy for 
permission.  
 This was the way in which the alcohol pachten at the Cape operated. There were, 
however, also other pachten sold at the Cape. As mentioned above, after the first 
successful auction of alcohol pachten in 1679, the VOC authorities decided to verpachten 
a whole range of other goods. In 1681, commissioner Van Goens also instituted a tobacco 
pacht.88 However, these pachten were clearly considered not profitable enough to the 
                                                 
84  In answer, the pachters stated that it would mean they would be unable to pay their 
pachtpenningen; CA, C 1088, 232-35. 
85  See the discussion in Krause, ‘Drankpagte’, 85-87. 
86  Mentzel, Description, vol. 2, 86. During the deliberations about instituting the generaele 
wijnpacht in 1734, one factor which was hoped would make this a more desirable proposition was to allow 
the generaele pachter as many bijtappers as he wished, though this seemingly was not incorporated into the 
pacht contracts; Krause, ‘Drankpagte’, 88. 
87  CA, C 1100, 68-70. 











Cape population to generate much competition and they dwindled away until they were 
all abolished in the early years of the eighteenth century.89 The only other pacht which 
remained in place throughout the eighteenth century was the meat pacht. It differed in 
important respects from the alcohol pachten: it was never sold publicly by auction and 
only rarely on an annual basis (nor did the pachters have to pay an overt sum for the 
privilege), but rather took the form of three to five individuals who were contracted to 
deliver meat to the Company and its passing ships at a pre-determined price on certain 
conditions, normally for a period of four to five years.90 Like the alcohol pachten it was a 
monopoly, but there the similarities end. 
 
Alcohol Pachten and the Cape Economy 
 
As shown above, the alcohol pacht system ultimately derived its origins from the 
realisation that alcohol retail at the Cape was highly profitable. This was particularly 
thanks to Cape Town’s position as a port of call for the outward and homeward VOC 
fleets. There is naturally a very close connection between Cape Town’s origins as a port 
and the success and profitability of the alcohol business.  
 This link became apparent very early on in the history of the town. When, in 
1669, the visiting commissioner, Joan Thijsen asked the commander, Jacob Borghorst, 
‘what profits occur here annually, and whence do they take their origin?’, the latter 
replied: ‘No remarkable profits occur here except through the selling of alcohol, for the 
rest there are only expenditures and for this reason no profits can be made in this place.’91 
As the colonial population of Cape Town was very small at this period, these profits were 
derived essentially from transient sailors. The arrival of the annual homeward fleet from 
                                                 
89  The ‘vivres’ (oil, vinegar, butter and bacon) pacht was stopped in 1695 and that of tobacco in 
1707. The import and sale of tobacco then reverted to be a VOC monopoly; cf. Mentzel, Description, vol. 
2, 54 and De Wet, Die Vryliede en Vryswartes, 90-91.  
90 H.B. Thom, Die Geskiedenis van die Skaapboerdery in Suid-Afrika (Amsterdam, 1936), 133-43 
and Erasmus, ‘Geskiedenis van die Bedryfslewe’, 205-8. 
91  ‘Item wat overwinsten hier jaerlijx come voor te vallen, waeruijt deselve haer oorspronck 
nemen…Hier en vallen geen sonderlinge winsten als door ’t vercopen van den dranck, andersints sijn ’t in 











Batavia during the Cape summer and autumn months was therefore considered the 
underpinning of the Cape retail economy, so much so that Cape burghers created a 
special term for it: Oorlammentijd. 
 This name was derived from the term (Oorlammen) for ‘men who have been in 
the East for many years, or who have gone there for a second time after having once 
returned to Europe.’92 Although the VOC restricted the amount of time their ships should 
remain in Table Bay to ten, and ‘at most’ fourteen, days,93 the reality was that the VOC 
fleets remained generally about three to four weeks at the Cape.94 This meant that at least 
twice a year, for one to two months, Cape Town’s population was dramatically increased 
by thousands of passing sailors and soldiers, with equally dramatic results for the social 
and economic life of the town.95 Peter Kolb testified that the town’s inhabitants 
considered this Oorlammentijd their annual market or fête ‘since their houses are then 
filled with many strangers who richly burn money and who help to use up the abundance 
of farm and garden produce as well as meat.’ In addition, these visitors brought a variety 
of retail products from the East to be sold or bartered, while the ship’s personnel and 
other officials also sold some of their provisions.96 Officials too recognised the 
importance of the arrival of the annual return fleet to the local retail economy, as 
witnessed by Hendrik Crudorp in 1678: ‘[the free burghers] earn almost all their money 
                                                 
92  O.F. Mentzel, Life at the Cape in the Mid-Eighteenth Century: Being  The Biography of Rudolph 
Siegfried Allemann (translated by M. Greenlees) (Cape Town, 1919), 79.  
93  The authorities became so exasperated by, what they deemed the tarrying of the ships (which 
increased the running costs of getting their imports from Asia), that in the 1760s they considered 
prohibiting their ships stopping at the Cape except in emergency cases; Böeseken, ‘Nederlandse 
Kommissarisse’, 15-16.  
94  See the table in J.R. Bruijn, F.S. Gaastra and I. Schöfer (eds), Dutch-Asiatic Shipping in the 17th 
and 18th Centuries (3 vols, The Hague, 1979-87), vol. 1, 68-69. 
95  See N. Worden, ‘Strangers Ashore: Sailor Identity and Social Conflict in Mid-18th Century Cape 
Town’, Kronos 33 (2007), 72-83 for the social impact of this phenomenon.  
96  ‘houden zy dezen Orlammen-tyd jaarlyks voor een halve Misse of jaarmerkt, aangezien hare 
huizen daar door met vele vreemdelingen opgepropt worden, die rykelyk geld verteren’; Kolb, Naaukeurige 
Beschrijving, vol. 2, 417. For a similar description, cf. that of J.W. de Grevenbroek in I. Schapera (ed.) and 
B. Farrington (tr.), The Early Cape Hottentots: Described in the Writings of Olfert Dapper (1668), Willem 











upon the annual arrival of the homeward bound fleet, arranging all the contracts among 
themselves to become payable on the arrival or departure of the return fleet of such a 
year; and should a single fleet fail to put in here, many persons would be reduced to the 
utmost distress.’97 The importance of this event in the economic and mental worlds of the 
Cape inhabitants that Crudorp alludes to is also borne out by examples in the archive.98 
 When it comes to alcohol retail, the crews of the moored ships acted as the 
customers of the pachters’ taverns. Although we do know, thanks to Dutch-Asiatic 
Shipping, how many people were on any given ship, we cannot determine exactly the 
number of people who actually visited the town. Travel descriptions reveal, however, that 
although some passing sailors and soldiers may have chosen to remain aboard ship during 
their lay-over in Table Bay, the majority of them obtained permission to spend at least 
part of their time ashore in the town where drinking at taverns seems to have been their 
chief pastime.99 Certainly Cape Town developed a reputation among weary seafarers as a 
place where abundant alcohol could be had at a price; celebrated in songs with lines such 
as ‘A big glass of Cape wine / will be tasty to him with money.’100 Kolb testified to the 
                                                 
97  D. Moodie, The Record: Or a Series of Official Papers Relative to the Conditions and Treatment 
of the Native Tribes of South Africa (Amsterdam and Cape Town, 1960), 363. 
98  Cf. L. Hattingh, Die Eerste Vryswartes van Stellenbosch, 1679-1720 (Belville, 1981), 23 and CA, 
CJ 780, 871-75.  
99  A particularly apposite example is that of Georg Naporra who chose not to leave his ship while 
anchored in Table Bay with the express intention of saving his money; his account does however reveal 
that many of his fellow shipmates did go ashore and how they spent their time in town; R. van Gelder, 
Naporra’s Omweg: Het Leven van een VOC-Matroos (1731-1793) (Amsterdam and Antwerp, 2003), 285-
88. This is also confirmed by the many court cases in which visiting sailors and soldiers got into trouble 
with the law (for example CA, CJ 335, 326-38; CJ 338, 9-27; CJ 340, 64-94 and CJ 785, 299-305 ); cf. 
Worden, ‘Strangers Ashore’ for a general discussion.  
100  This comes from a song at the turn of the nineteenth century, but there is little reason to doubt that 
similar songs existed earlier in the eighteenth century; cf. M. Barend-van Haeften and B. Paasman, De 
Kaap: Goede Hoope Halverwege Indië: Bloemlezing van Kaapteksten uit de Compagniestijd (Hilversum, 











reputation of all European nations visiting the Cape as heavy drinkers,101 while cases of 
sailors drinking themselves to death are recorded.102 
 This in effect meant that twice a year, for three to four weeks, tavern keepers 
could expect very brisk business from a large transient population desperate for what they 
could offer.103 It therefore follows that the profitability of alcohol retail in Cape Town 
during the VOC period must have been closely related to the number of visiting ships and 
the duration of their layovers.104 This is even more the case if we believe Kolb who 
claims that Cape burghers considered it the affschuwelykste laster (‘most horrendous 
slander’) to be seen drunk in the street (preferring, instead, private festivals and 
celebrations to do so).105 Although tavern keepers could always rely on the local garrison 
and other VOC personnel stationed in town for regular business, the fact still remains that 
the profitability of alcohol retail in early modern Cape Town depended on visiting ships. 
Can this link be proved? 
 
Figures are available for both the number of Dutch and foreign ships which called at the 
Cape of Good Hope during most of the eighteenth century. Between 1700 and 1793 some 
8444 ships called at the Cape, of which just over sixty percent belonged to the VOC (see 
table 2.1 and graph 2.1 in Appendix 2). On average, during this period, about fifty-five 
Dutch ships stopped annually at the Cape. But the numbers, though fairly stable overall, 
did fluctuate: after climbing in the first part of the century, there were normally more than 
                                                 
101  Kolb, Naaukeurige Beschrijving, vol. 2, 123.   
102  For example, on 11 February 1702 the Dagregister notes: ‘The cook of the Noordgouw found 
dead before the door of a certain canteen. The surgeon’s report stated he had died of drink’; H.C.V. 
Leibbrandt (ed. and tr.), Precis of the Archives of the Cape of Good Hope: Journal, 1699-1732 (Cape 
Town, 1896), 47-48.  
103  On the role of taverns in fulfilling the material and psychological needs of sailors; see M. Seltzer, 
‘Haven in a Heartless Sea: The Sailors’ Tavern in History and Anthropology’, The Social History of 
Alcohol and Drugs: An Interdisciplinary Journal 19 (2004), 63-93.  
104  Mentzel provides an eye-witness account: ‘I knew a man who held the lease of a beer-hall in the 
town and during the stay of the homeward fleet in Table Bay [“Orlamme-tyd”] he made enough silver to 
fill a fireman’s bucket’; Mentzel, Description, vol. 2, 54.  











sixty or even seventy ships which came here from 1715 to 1740. Thereafter the numbers 
dipped below sixty for most of the rest of the period.106 The figures for foreign ships 
varied much more greatly per year. For most of the eighteenth century, their number 
remained firmly under thirty per year, occasionally going below ten. However, this trend 
changed during the early 1770s when the number of foreign ships annually calling at the 
Cape started to increase drastically, overtaking the number of Dutch ships for the first 
time in 1772. For the following twenty years, the number of foreign ships calling at the 
Cape would outstrip that of the VOC ones by a very large margin, especially during the 
1780s when well in excess of one hundred foreign ships annually stopped at the Cape. 
While the overall average number of foreign ships at the Cape during the period under 
discussion is thirty-four, the average rose to almost ninety-three between 1781 and 1790. 
This sudden rise (as also the decrease of VOC ships calling at the Cape during the same 
period) is undoubtedly related to both the increase in international trade during the 
second half of the eighteenth century and, more especially, the revolutionary wars of the 
1770-80s, especially the Fourth Anglo-Dutch war of 1780-1784 during which France was 
an ally of the Netherlands. These upheavals had major consequences for the social and 
economic history of Cape Town during this period.107 
 The total income derived from the alcohol pachten by the VOC between 1685 and 
1795 fluctuated rather much, although here too there is a clear increase from the 1760s 
onwards. The seven pachten can be divided into two groups: the smaller pachten, 
comprising the two geographical ones as well as the malt beer and European alcohol 
pachten, were rather negligible to the total income from the alcohol pachten. It was 
especially the malt beer and the Stellenbosch-Drakenstein pachten which remained small 
throughout this period, the latter never realising more than f 2 000 per annum,108 and the 
                                                 
106  This concurs with Maurice Boucher’s statement that there was a decline in the number of ships 
calling at the Cape during the period 1735-1755 in comparison with the preceding twenty years; M. 
Boucher, The Cape of Good Hope and Foreign Contacts, 1735-1755 (Pretoria, 1985), 9.  
107  Cf. N. Worden, E. van Heyningen and V. Bickford-Smith, Cape Town: The Making of a City 
(Cape Town, 1998), 81-83 and Jooste, ‘Geskiedenis van Wynbou’, 56. 
108  This is because of the tiny population of these settlements. Apparently the main source of income 
for the Stellenbosch-Drakenstein pachter was the week or so that the garrison from Cape Town encamped 











former hardly ever f 4 000 (see graph 2.2 in Appendix 2). The European alcohol pacht 
shows a curious pattern of wildly fluctuating in price throughout the century for reasons 
which still need to be uncovered. Of the minor pachten, the Rondebosch-False Bay one is 
exceptional in that it shows a clear growth from the 1750s onwards and a rapid increase 
from the mid 1770s. This is no doubt related to the decision reached in 1742 to make 
VOC ships anchor in Simon’s Town between May and August (during which period 
Table Bay was deemed too dangerous due to the bad winter weather),109 which resulted 
in a greater number of potential customers for this pachter. The major alcohol pachten 
also show relatively minor fluctuations in price for most of the eighteenth century, with 
prices starting to increase in the mid 1760s and very drastically (almost fourfold in the 
case of the Cape wine pacht) during the 1780s. This coincides with the introduction of 
the ‘excise on foreign nations’ pacht in 1757 which likewise increased in value during the 
1770s and 1780s (see graph 2.3 in Appendix 2).110 
 As graph 2.4 (in Appendix 2) clearly illustrates, overall there is a clear pattern 
between the increase in ships calling at the Cape and the total income the VOC generated 
from the alcohol pachten at auctions. Where there are sudden increases in shipping 
volume, the pachten income follows within a year or two (as is to be expected, since 
pachters would be reacting to an observable trend). It is noticeable how the overall pacht 
income started to increase during the 1760s, and drastically so during the 1770s and 
1780s, with a decrease in the early 1790s. This is quite in line with the increase in 
shipping volume during these decades.111 The quantitative data is also supported by 
qualitative evidence: Johannes Heufke made his fortune from farming and only bought 
his first alcohol pacht in 1727, when he was an elderly man. He later declared that he had 
never had any intention of becoming a pachter but was tempted to enter the business 
                                                 
109  D. Sleigh, Die Buiteposte: VOC-Buiteposte onder Kaapse Bestuur, 1652-1795 (Pretoria, 2004), 
302-3.  
110  See also the discussion in P. van Duin and R. Ross, The Economy of the Cape Colony in the 
Eighteenth Century (Intercontinenta 7; Leiden, 1987), 52. 
111  Boucher identified 1755 as a watershed year since it marked ‘the inauguration of a period of a 
considerably increased volume of shipping in South African waters’; Boucher, Cape of Good Hope and 











since the prices of the pachten had become so low by the mid 1720s.112 This was indeed 
the case, and must be related to the sudden and severe decrease in the number of foreign 
ships which called at the Cape during this period.113 Although the general trend was for 
the pacht prices to be related to shipping volume, as can be most clearly seen in the 
drastic increase in both during the 1770s and 1780s, the pacht income fluctuated much 
more wildly than the shipping volume, and there were periods (notably in the 1710-20s 
and the 1740-50s) when the overall pacht income decreases while the overall shipping 
volume was slightly increasing. Clearly there were other, contingent factors which also 
influenced the prices prospective pachters were prepared to pay for the right to retail 
alcohol. One such factor, although not a major one,114 which often caused pachters to 
complain about their lot, was a lack of supply because of insufficient alcohol 
provisions.115 Another was smuggling – the selling of alcohol (presumably at lower 
prices) by people who did not pay the Company for the privilege – which could also 
undercut the profits of a pachter and hence the price someone would be willing to pay for 
that pacht.116 A further factor was the fluctuating size of the garrison stationed at the 
                                                 
112  G.C. de Wet (ed.), Resolusies van die Politieke Raad: Deel VIII, 1729-1734 (Pretoria, 1975), 110. 
When the authorities investigated in the 1730s why the income from the pachten was decreasing, they also 
blamed it on the decrease in shipping volume; cf. Janse van Rensburg, ‘Geskiedenis van die 
Wingerdkultuur’, 74-76. 
113  A total of 49 during 1725-29 as opposed to 116 during 1720-24. The number of Dutch ships 
remained fairly stable during this decade.  
114  Van Duin and Ross, Economy of the Cape Colony, 54-55 argue that the variation in the trend of 
the pacht income was related more (about two-thirds) to issues of demand (most notably the number of 
ships calling at the Cape) than to supply (which was responsible for one-third of the fluctuation in pacht 
prices).  
115  See for example CA, C 1076, 22-23 and 34; C 1096, 80-81 and H.C.V. Leibbrandt (ed. and tr.), 
Precis of the Archives of the Cape of Good Hope: Requesten (Memorials), 1715-1806 (5 vols, Cape Town, 
1905-6 and 1989), vol. 2, 703. 
116  For examples of pachters complaining about how smuggling affected their profits (or livelihoods, 
as they claimed), see CA, C 1080, 44-45; C 1086, 41-42; C 1091, 46-48; C 1100, 68-78; C 1101, 150-53 
and Kolb, Naaukeurige Beschrijving, vol. 2, 278-81; and cf. Jooste, ‘Geskiedenis van Wynbou’, 61-97 and 
A.G. Hesselink, ‘In de Schaduw van de Tafelberg: Onderhuidse Spanning en Samenwerking in een 
Koloniale Samenleving in Zuid-Afrika, 1751-1771’ (unpublished doctoraalscriptie, University of 











Cape. Clearly the massive increase in the prices the lucrative pachten realised in the 
1780s is related as much to the foreign legions stationed in Cape Town as to the ships 
calling in its bays.117 But these are issues which a future economic historian of the Cape 
should investigate in greater detail. 
 
According to Otto Mentzel, writing in the 1780s (but reflecting on his experiences of the 
Cape in the 1730s), the income of the VOC government at the Cape was derived from 
three broad categories: (1) ‘The revenue proper, derivable from taxation’; (2) ‘Receipts 
derived from merchandise imported from Holland and Batavia’; and (3) ‘Credit balances 
due to profits made on the rate of exchange, and to payment of portion of the salaries in 
Holland.’118 The last of these categories was negligible in comparison to the other two; 
while in Mentzel’s calculation (on which year his figures are based is not stated) the 
VOC derived more income from the profits (ranging from fifty to one hundred percent) 
on the goods it imported to the Cape and sold to the populace at large. The latter source 
of income is, however, one that would fluctuate and be dependent on a number of 
contingent factors. The traditional, more stable source of income for a government is 
taxation (under which Mentzel considered the pacht income). At the Cape there was a 
variety of taxes imposed on the colonists, the most significant (in terms of income) of 
which was the ten percent grain tax.119 But in general, the income derived from the 
alcohol pachten was such a major contribution to the direct income of the VOC at the 
Cape that it was enumerated in a separate category from the income from various forms 
of taxation.  
 After the first auction of the alcohol pachten in 1679, the Council of Policy 
decided to continue with the system and to expand it to other products, because of the 
large amount of money the VOC could receive from this institution ‘which would so 
improve the Company’s dominions here at this place that it could only, in our opinion, 
                                                 
117  For examples of the wrangling caused by access to (and protection of) this very lucrative market, 
see Leibbrandt, Precis: Requesten, vol. 1, 145-50 and 208-10; vol. 2, 787; vol. 3, 1003, and CA, C 190, 
327-409 (my thanks to Erika van As for alerting me to the latter reference).  
118  Mentzel, Description, vol. 2, 34-44. 











improve the bad state of the impoverished society of the Cape.’120 This decision was of 
course related to the efforts of the local authorities to prove the profitability of the Cape 
station to their overlords in the Netherlands,121 something to which the verpachting of the 
alcohol retail trade could only contribute. Within two years of this event, the visiting 
commissioner Rijckloff van Goens jr., could report that the ‘most important’ 
(voornaamste) income of the Company at the Cape came from the verpachtingen, 
followed by the sale of tobacco.122 More than a century later, when commissioners-
general Nederburgh and Frijkenius were undertaking a thorough-going investigation of 
the Cape economy, they came to the conclusion that the income from the alcohol pachten 
‘must without a doubt be considered the most notable branch of income for this 
Government.’123 
 These statements are borne out by the figures which show the increasing 
importance of the alcohol pachten to the direct income of the VOC at the Cape in the 
course of the period under discussion. Thus, we know that for the decade 1730 to 1739, 
the total net income of the Cape station: f 1 368 911. Of this amount, almost thirty-one 
percent (f 423 960) was derived from the alcohol pachten. The contribution of the 
pachten to the net profit during individual years during this decade fluctuated wildly, 
from twenty-four to forty-seven percent, but still indicates that the income the VOC 
derived, virtually effortlessly, from the verpachting of alcohol retail formed the single 
largest contribution to its direct income.124 By the last decade of VOC rule at the Cape 
(1784-1794), the average annual income of the Company here was f 351 298 of which 
                                                 
120  ‘… en gevolgelijck Compagnies domainen alhier ter plaetse daer door sooveel sijn verbetert, dat, 
na d’ slechte constitutie van d’ Caapse verarmde gemeente ons bedunckens heel wel gaen can, staende 
sodanigh voortaan alle jaren...’; CA, VC 8, 866.  
121  In the 1670s the VOC management in the Netherlands seriously considered closing the Cape 
station due to the high costs of maintaining it. This has to be seen against the background of the reforms 
within the VOC during this period and the subsequent attempts at bezuiniging, cf. Gaastra, Bewind en 
Beleid, chapters four and five. 
122  Böeseken, Memoriën en Instructiën, 151. 
123  ‘De pachtpenningen … moeten gewisselyk voor de notabelste tak van inkomsten in dit 
Gouvernement gehouden worden’; Böeseken, ‘Nederlandse Kommissarisse’, 197.  











more than thirty-eight percent (f 134 891) derived from auctioning off the alcohol 
pachten. If one considers that a further ten percent of the VOC’s income came from 
alcohol tax, the enormous contribution of the alcohol industry to the Company becomes 
clear.125 In total, for the period 1685 to 1795, pachters offered the VOC almost f 6, 7 
million for the right to retail alcohol (see chapter two),126 which makes the alcohol 
pachten the single most significant sector of retail trade in early modern Cape Town, at 
least from the perspective of the authorities.  
 The importance of the pacht system to the Cape government is revealed by the 
various attempts of the latter to increase and expand the system, in the hope of increasing 
its income from it. Thus, as discussed above, the decision to verpachten a wide variety of 
other retail goods after the success of the first alcohol pachten. The decisions to divide 
the brandy and wine pachten into four parts, and later on to unite the wine pachten into a 
generaele pacht, should all be seen as part of the VOC’s desire to increase its revenue 
from this easily exploitable system. Likewise, the introduction of a new alcohol pacht in 
the 1750s was probably the result of the desire to do something about the stagnating 
pacht prices as well as to exploit the increase in the volume of foreign ships calling at the 
Cape. As has been suggested by others, it was probably also due to the fear that this pacht 
had caused a decline in the income from the very profitable Cape wine pacht that caused 
it to be discontinued for two years in the 1780s.127 The realisation that the pachten 
formed the best and easiest way to gain direct income for the local government came too 
late to be fully exploited: when commissioners-general Nederburgh and Frijkenius drew 
up recommendations to increase the Cape colony’s income, they suggested expanding the 
system of verpachting. Not only were other management type pachten (after the example 
of the existing meat pacht) introduced (on bread, vinegar, dairy, vegetables etc) during 
1792-1793, but they also suggested the establishment of a true tax-farm pacht, viz. to 
                                                 
125  Jooste, ‘Geskiedenis van Wynbou’, 58.  
126  The actual income was likely somewhat lower since there are some cases of pachters being unable 
to pay their full pachtpenningen.  











collect the ten percent tax on wheat.128 Although the latter was not realised, the 
recommendation does illustrate how central verpachting had become to the Cape 
economy. 
 
Pieter van Duin and Robert Ross have demonstrated that as regards alcohol production 
and retail, there was no ‘stagnant, glutted market, or indeed … an economy little 
concerned with market opportunities.’129 The system of alcohol pachten played a major 
role in the possibilities which this sector of the economy presented to the inhabitants of 
the Cape (which in turn was exploited by the VOC authorities).130 There was clearly a 
market for alcohol at the Cape of Good Hope and both the producers and the retailers 
were geared to its possibilities. How entrepreneurs in Cape Town exploited these 
possibilities is the subject of the rest of this thesis.   
                                                 
128  Jooste, ‘Geskiedenis van Wynbou’, 45-47 and Böeseken, ‘Kommissarisse’, 197-99. Already in 
1711 commissioner Peter de Vos suggested that the Cape government should create a tax farm for the 
collection of the ten percent wheat tax, but the Council of Policy decided against this.  
129  Van Duin and Ross, Economy of the Cape Colony, 57. 
130  It also illustrates how burgher activities on the economic front were not only intertwined with, but 
were also, to a large extend, influenced by the larger aims and structures of the VOC empire and its 
























THE ALCOHOL PACHTERS AT THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE, 1680-1795: A 
PROSOPOGRAPHY 
 
 Methodology and Sources 
 
This thesis is based on a combination of the prosopographical method and the analysis 
of certain qualitative material. Prosopography entails ‘the investigation of the 
common background characteristics of a group of actors in history by means of a 
collective study of their lives.’1 A collective biography is built up by asking a uniform 
set of questions about each individual in a given group. Thus, by collecting seemingly 
isolated facts and information about a certain group of individuals, it is possible to 
discern long-term trends which reveal something about the structural and more 
general aspects of a society. Prosopography is often used in this way to uncover two 
sets of historical problems, viz. the working of political power, and the development 
of social stratification and the workings of social mobility in a given group or society. 
It is with this latter object in mind that this thesis focuses on the alcohol pachters: 
what can a study of their social patterns reveal about the larger forces at work in VOC 
Cape Town? In this aim and methodology, the thesis is influenced by the extensive 
work done on the development of social stratification and elite formation in the cities 
of the Dutch Republic – work which relied heavily on the prosopographical method.2 
                                                 
1  L. Stone, ‘Prosopography’, in idem, The Past and the Present Revisited (London and New 
York, 1987), 45.  
2  See L. Stone, ‘Prosopography’, 45-73 and F. Lequin, ‘De Prosopografie’, Spiegel Historiael 
20 (1985), 543-46 for a general discussion of the uses and problems of the prosopographical method. 
For a discussion of how this methodology has been applied to studies of the urban elite during the 
Dutch Republic, see D.J. Roorda, ‘Prosopografie, Een Onmogelijke Mogelijkheid?’, Bijdragen en 
Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden 94 (1979), 212-25 and J. de Jong, 
‘Prosopografie, Een Mogelijkheid: Eliteonderzoek tussen Politieke en Sociaal-Culturele Geschiedenis’, 
Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden 111 (1996), 201–15. F. 
Lequin, ‘Het Personeel van de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie in Azië in de Achttiende Eeuw, 
Meer in het Bijzonder in de Vestiging Bengalen’ (unpublished PhD thesis, Leiden University, 1982) is 
a pioneering study applying the prosopographical method to a VOC settlement. More recently, Roelof 











 In order to perform prosopographical research, a fairly uniform serial source is 
needed. One such source is provided by the lease contracts every pachter had to sign, 
along with two sureties, when he or she bought a pacht – a large series of fairly 
uniform documents which has hitherto hardly been utilised by Cape historians. These 
contracts survived fairly completely for the period during which the alcohol pacht 
system operated at the Cape, 1680-1795.3 There are, however, two lacunae: the years 
before 1688 and those from 1715 to 1727. Most of the period between 1715 and 1727 
is covered by the existence of a volume which lists the details of the annual auction of 
the alcohol pachten.4 Since for most years the details of the pacht auctions were also 
recorded in the Dagregisters (Daily Journals) of the Castle of Good Hope, as well as 
the Resolutions of the Council of Policy, the details for the period 1715 to 1718 could 
also be uncovered. The early years of the pacht system, before 1688, proved to be 
most difficult to research. However, by utilising a variety of sources, I could 
determine the names and details of all the pachters for this early period except for the 
year 1681.5 In this way it was possible to build-up a database of all the individuals 
who invested in alcohol pachten at the Cape of Good Hope from 1680 to 1795. This 
data is presented in Appendix 1 and, in summary form, in table 2.5 below. In addition 
to the details of the pacht-holdings of the individual pachters, I also use genealogical 
data to determine the origins (and in later chapters, the marriage patterns) of the 
alcohol pachters.6  
                                                                                                                                            
Gelder, Het Oost-Indisch Avontuur: Duitsers in Dienst van de VOC (1600-1800) (Nijmegen, 1997), 
esp. 53-70 and 289-97.  
3  CA, C 2697-2729.  
4  In fact, there are three such volumes covering 1718 to 1794 which usefully summarise the 
detail of the contracts; CA, C 2730-31 and RLR 163 (the latter volume is a continuation of the previous 
two but, for some reason, was not archived in the Council of Policy series in the Cape Archives).  
5  Some pacht contracts were found in CA, ZK 8/1/12; while the details of most of the years 
could be found in the various Dagregisters; CA, C 1887, 1889 and 1893 as well as VC 8-9. 
6  Genealogical data were derived from the following sources: C.C. de Villiers and C. Pama, 
Geslagsregisters van die Ou Kaapse Families (3 vols, Cape Town and Amsterdam, 1966); J.A. Heese 
and R.T.J. Lombard, Suid-Afrikaanse Geslagregisters / South African Genealogies (15 vols, Pretoria 
and Stellenbosch, 1986-2007); J. Hoge, ‘Personalia of the Germans at the Cape, 1652-1806’, Archives 
Year Book for South African History 9 (1946), and E. Moritz, Die Deutschen am Kap unter der 











 The current chapter presents a brief overview of some significant patterns 
derived from an analysis of the data of all the alcohol pachters of the period 1680 to 
1795. In the chapters to follow, more detailed prosopographies for smaller groups of 
alcohol pachters, relating to their career and marriage patterns, will be presented to 
help answer the questions raised by each case study.  
 
Minor and Major Alcohol Pachters 
 
From the inception of the alcohol pacht system in 1680 until the end of VOC rule in 
1795, some 198 individuals were successful in bidding for the right to retail alcohol at 
the Cape of Good Hope (see table 2.5).7  One would be mistaken, though, to view all 
of these people as a group apart with several characteristics in common. Clearly, the 
economic and social behaviour of those individuals who only ever bought one or two 
pacht(en) each, must have differed greatly from those who invested a considerable 
amount of money in alcohol retail over an extended period of time. But why did some 
individuals only ever invest in one or two alcohol pachten while others made a 
success of the opportunities this business afforded? The explanation for the existence 
of the former group lies in a number of factors.  
 Several pachters simply did not continue to invest in more alcohol pachten 
because death or some other disaster befell them. Thus, in September 1734 Jan 
Sprangel was murdered in his Rondebosch tavern by one of his customers, only three 
weeks after taking on only his second pacht.8 Earlier that year Willem Raams also 
abandoned alcohol retail at the Cape shortly after buying his first pacht due to an 
impulsive decision to repatriate, caused more than likely by the early death of his wife 
                                                 
7  In a few cases investors sold their pachten to a third party (mostly a fellow pachter) some time 
after having bought them (or they died, necessitating a sale). This analysis is based on the data 
generated by the actual auctions of the pachten – in reality circumstances sometimes later caused 
people to give up pachten before the expiry of their terms, or paying less than the bid with which they 
won the pacht. As a result the picture presented here is a somewhat idealised one; although only very 
slightly since such cases were generally rare. All of these exceptions are noted in the ‘Database of 
Alcohol Pachters, 1680-1795’ presented in Appendix 1.  
8  J. Hoge, ‘Personalia of the Germans at the Cape, 1652-1806’, Archives Year Book for South 
African History 9 (1946), 405 and G.C. de Wet (ed.), Resolusies van die Politieke Raad: Deel VIII, 











and tension with his family-in-law.9 A different sort of ‘misfortune’ was brought upon 
himself by Godfried Meijhuizen who, after four years as a pachter was prevented 
from further investment because he was banished to Robben Island for cruelly 
murdering one of his slaves.10 In all of these cases failure to continue investing in 
further pachten was related to personal misfortunes which befell these individuals (or 
were the result of their actions), rather than a lack of financial acumen or access to 
resources.  
 Yet others seemed to have been mere opportunists who tried their luck but 
failed due to a lack of the requisite skills and access to networks of financial support. 
Thus Jacobus Marshoorn was at the Cape for almost two decades before attempting to 
invest in an alcohol pacht in 1734. But he was ill-suited to this as his chequered career 
before this event indicates a lack of focus and drive: he variously worked as a cobbler 
and tappersknecht (‘tavern servant’) who was described by the governor a few years 
earlier as ‘a loafer who lodges sailors and who is poor.’11 He was no more successful 
in the alcohol retail business and, within a year of his experiment, he repatriated.12 A 
similar case of failed opportunism relates to Noach Backer: after being in the VOC 
service as beadle (koster) of the local church, he became a free burger in 1725 and 
also tried to exist by lodging passing sailors. A few years later he too tried his luck at 
the alcohol pachten – within two months he realised this was a mistake as he sold his 
pacht to somebody else.13 Clearly, in his case, taking on alcohol retail was just 
another desperate measure as a few months before this he had applied to be allowed to 
serve as a private undertaker.14 In the event, Backer was not able to survive on his 
                                                 
9  De Wet, Resolusies VIII, 311. See page 126 with note 81 below for Raams and his family.  
10  Hoge, ‘Personalia’, 273 and CA, CJ 780, 1265-79. Meijhuizen was sentenced for life and died 
in 1701 while still on Robben Island.  
11  ‘is een leegloper die matrose logeert en is arm’; L. Guelke, R. Shell and W. Whyte (eds), The 
De la Fontaine Report, 30th January 1732 (New Haven, 1990). 
12  De Wet, Resolusies VIII, 366 note 148. The fact that he was a Dutchman who married an ex-
slave woman may have made it difficult for him to gain entry into the alcohol retail business which at 
this time was dominated by a fairly tight-knit group of German immigrants; see pages 117-24 below.  
13  Ibid., 375.  











own and returned to VOC service, yet again as beadle, shortly after selling his alcohol 
pacht – at least he was assured of a monthly income and a free house.15 
 Perhaps the largest group of these minor pachters consists of those who only 
invested in the pachten because of family ties. In some cases, it is clear that blood 
relations or in-laws bought alcohol pachten because of the success of their family. 
Their motivation is not always clear, but they were either inspired by the success of 
their relatives, or (perhaps more likely) were asked by their successful kin to buy 
pachten on their behalf, thus spreading their risks over several individuals. This will 
be seen in several of the case studies to follow, but a particularly good example is the 
family of Aletta de Nijs whose pacht investments included two sons-in-laws who each 
bought one pacht but who thereafter reverted to their other careers, leaving the 
alcohol retail business to their more successful relatives.16 This great diversity in the 
motivations and careers of the minor pachters would make them a difficult – and 
perhaps not very rewarding – group to study for significant trends and patterns.  
 An altogether different group of people is formed by those who were 
sufficiently adept or successful to continue investing in the alcohol retail trade over a 
period of time. It seems likely that these individuals must have had some 
characteristics or abilities in common that set them apart from not only the less 
successful pachters, but also from Cape society at large. With the help of 
prosopography, it may be possible to discover some of these characteristics.   
 
Table 2.1: Number of Pachten Bought by Individual Pachters 




1 73 (37%) 
2 33 (17%) 
3-5 41 (21%) 
                                                 
15  He was paid f 12 per month as beadle, in addition to the free accommodation. He remained 
beadle until his death a few years later; G.C. de Wet (ed.), Resolusies van die Politieke Raad: Deel IX, 
1735-1739 (Pretoria, 1981), 28 and H. Storm de Grave, ‘’t Capitael der Caebsen Armen: Werking en 
Beleid van de Diaconie van Kaap de Goede Hoop, 1715-1725’ (unpublished doctoraalscriptie, Free 
University of Amsterdam, 1996), 39.  
16  They were Michiel Daniel Lourich (1737) and Jan Biesel (1754). See pages 138-49 below on 











6-9 18 (9%) 
10+ 33 (17%) 
Total 198 
Source: CA, C 2697-2731 and RLR 163 
 
However, the latter group is relatively small. The vast majority (seventy-five percent) 
of alcohol pachters invested in five or fewer pachten; with the majority of these only 
ever buying one or two pachten each (respectively thirty-seven and seventeen percent 
of the total number; see table 2.1). This means that the majority of alcohol pachters 
were likely to have been the sort of opportunists described in the preceding 
paragraphs – people who experimented with investing in alcohol retail but who, for a 
variety of reasons, chose not to repeat the experiment. Holding or investing in a pacht 
could not have had a major impact on the lives and behaviour of this group of minor 
pachters. One cannot therefore claim that pacht-holding contributed significantly to 
their social standing or social advancement.  
 This was, though, certainly not the case with the small minority of pachters 
(seventeen percent of the total) who invested in ten or more pachten over a number of 
years.17 Between them, these thirty-three individuals paid sixty-three percent of the 
total amount of almost seven million guilders that the VOC received from the 
individuals who bought alcohol pachten between 1680 and 1795 (see table 2.2).  
 
Table 2.2: Pachters who Invested in Ten or More Pachten, 1680-1795 






    
Bam, Jan Christiaan 1780-1792 13 131850 
                                                 
17  If one takes the number of years between their first and last investment in an alcohol pacht 
(although they did not necessarily – although this was more often the case than not – hold pachten for 
every year between the terminal ones), these people held alcohol pachten for an average of fifteen 
years.  
18  For the period after 1699, the years in this column refer to pacht years, i.e. from 1 September 
the previous calendar year to 31 August of the year given (e.g. ‘1702’ equates to 1 September 1701 to 
31 August 1702). Before that, the pacht year coincided with the calendar year, except for 1699 when 











Bateman, Maarten 1763-1787 36 261000 
Beck, Johann Zacharias 1723-1737 15 76625 
Boetendagh, Carel Diederik 1731-1739 14 ½ 77400 
De Jong, Dirk 1756-1763 10 32600 
De Kruger, Willem 1770-1786 19 142025 
De Nijs, Aletta 1744-1762 17 14675 
Eksteen, Hendrik Oostwald 1708-1721 25 113270 
Esselaar, Johannes Nicholaas 1762-1774 13 70375 
Esser, Isaac 1719-1725 10 37450 
Greijling, Jan 1753-1769 10 4400 
Heufke, Johannes 1727-1731 10 47800 
Hoesemans, Anthonij 1709-1723 31 152995 
Holst, Jan 1740-1754 24 ½ 166700 
Hubner, Jochem Daniel 1740-1761 37 207225 
Hugo, Daniel 1781-1793 13 677400 
Leever, Abraham 1727-1758 28 ⅔ 273076 
Melck, Martin 1760-1781 32 604700 
Mulder, Hendrik 1699-1711 11 41280 
Pentz, Michiel 1736-1752 17 ⅔ 46411 
Phijffer, Johannes 1697-1711 21 ½ 155775 
Roep, Johannes 1767-1781 21 86875 
Schreuder, Johan Jacob 1762-1790 39 160525 
Schreuder, Jan Jurgen 1738-1752 13 25325 
Steenbok, Rudolf Frederik 1714-1725 11 26900 
Stokvliet, Jan Jacob 1725-1729 11 56150 
Van der Spuij, Melt 1722-1733 20 76125 
Van der Swijn, Jan 1732-1747 19 ⅔ 123591 
Van Dijk, Hendrik 1725-1734 11 45400 
Van Leijpsig, Marthinus 1719-1728 10 25525 
Van Schalkwijk, Theunis Dirksz 1683-1697 13 35600 
Vermeij, Steven 1693-1705 12 132205 
Wispelaar, Jacob 1788-1795 10 113700 












The average personal investment in the alcohol monopolies by this group of major 
pachters amounted to almost f 129 000 – this in comparison with an average of just 
under f 12 000 for those who invested in five or fewer pachten; while the average 
amount invested for the one-timers came to just over f 6 000. The pattern here is a 
clear one: those who repeatedly invested in the alcohol pachten were also the ones 
who were successful in the alcohol retail business. It is important to keep the 
differences between these two groups in mind throughout the discussion in this thesis, 
and to this end I shall differentiate between them by referring to those who invested in 
ten or more pachten as the major pachters. It is this group of wealthy entrepreneurs 
who in some ways set the trends in Cape Town, as discussed in chapter six below, and 
who best exemplify the possibilities that the alcohol pacht provided the alert 
entrepreneur.  
 
The Origins of the Alcohol Pachters 
 
The world of the alcohol pachters at the Cape of Good Hope was one of immigrants, 
and a very German one at that. Only fifty-six of the total number of alcohol pachters 
whose place of origin could be determined (N = 187) were Cape-born,19 which means 
that the vast majority (seventy percent) of them came to the Cape as immigrants. 
Among this latter group, those from the German-speaking lands20 predominate: they 
form almost forty-three percent of all pachters, while the Dutch contingent only 
                                                 
19  This number includes those who were born elsewhere but came to the Cape as children with 
their parents. They were to all extent and purposes Cape burghers – not least of which was the fact that 
they did not work for the VOC before becoming free burghers, the crucial difference between Cape-
born free burghers and the majority of those who came to the Cape as immigrants (the majority of 
immigrants came to the Cape as VOC-servants, although there was a small minority who immigrated to 
the Cape without ever having been VOC-employees).  
20  Naturally this is a broad ‘cultural’ indicator which does not correspond to a political or 
‘national’ unit. The German-speaking areas of Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
correspond to parts of modern Germany, Austria and Switzerland as well as Poland and the Baltic 
states; cf. J.E. Louwrens, ‘Immigrasie aan die Kaap gedurende die Bewind van die Hollandse Oos-











makes up twenty-four percent; with a small number of French and Scandinavians 
being responsible for the remainder (see table 2.5).21 
 A chronological analysis of the origins of alcohol pachters reveals interesting 
patterns. Based on when a person first bought a pacht, the following picture emerges. 
Most of the Dutch pachters, thirty-two out of forty-four, entered the business before 
1730 while the majority of Cape-born pachters, forty-three out of fifty-six, only 
started investing in the alcohol pachten after 1740. The latter trend is not unusual as 
one would expect greater involvement of Cape-born burghers in the second half of the 
eighteenth century as by then the number of second and third generation South 
African settlers had increased significantly.22 However, the pattern becomes highly 
unusual when the German pachters’ chronological spread is analysed: the majority of 
them (sixty-three percent) were active in the alcohol pacht business in the decades 
from 1710 to the end of the 1760s.  
 
Table 2.3: Origins of Alcohol Pachters over Time 
Period Dutch German  Cape  Other 
     
1680-1709 16 (44%) 16 (44%) 2 (6%) 2 (6%) 
1710-1769 25 (24%) 50 (49%) 24 (23%) 4 (4%) 
1770-1795 3 (6%) 14 (29%) 30 (63%) 1 (2%) 
Source: Genealogical Data 
 
A breakdown of the figures for the three periods, 1680-1709, 1710-69 and 1770-95 
shows that during the first period the number of Dutch and German immigrants who 
began investment in the pacht business were equal. During the second period, 
however, the Germans dominated (the combined number of Dutch and Cape-born 
pachters during this period was still lower than that of the Germans). During the last 
decades of VOC-rule, the pachten were dominated by Cape-born burghers; although 
there were still a substantial number of Germans entering the trade, yet very few 
                                                 
21  The Dutch figure includes two persons from Flanders, while the German one includes 
someone of Swiss origin. There were four known French pachters, two Danes and a Swede. 
22  Cf. P. van Duin and R. Ross, The Economy of the Cape Colony in the Eighteenth Century 











Dutch (see table 2.3). When one considers that these figures only refer to those who 
first entered the pacht business and ignore those who continued their investments over 
a number of years, it is clear that throughout most of the eighteenth century Germans 
dominated the alcohol pacht business. This is proved by the fact that German pachters 
bought fifty-six percent of the total number of pachten, while the German pachters 
represent only forty-three percent of the total number of alcohol pachters.23 This trend 
is also confirmed when one concentrates only on the top or major pachters, i.e. those 
who invested in ten or more pachten. Twenty of the thirty-two whose origins are 
known were Germans. Of the eight Dutch pachters in this category, only one entered 
the trade after 1740.  
 Are these figures surprising? Up to a certain extent they conform to what we 
know about immigration to the Cape during the VOC era. During the early decades of 
the settlement at the Cape, the majority of free burghers were indeed of Dutch 
origin.24 One would, therefore, expect a greater predominance of Dutch pachters for 
the first few decades of the alcohol pachten. Indirect immigration to the Cape 
continued at a consistent level throughout most of the eighteenth century – primarily 
through VOC personnel who were stationed at the Cape and became free burghers.25 
Thus we know that 2 667 Company employees became free burghers at the Cape 
during 1657 and 1795. Of these, sixty percent (1 598) originated from the German-
speaking lands. The vast majority (seventy-five percent) of these German immigrants 
came in the decades after 1706 and before 1779, and mostly around the middle 
decades of the century.26 Thus, the majority of the (male) immigrants to the Cape 
                                                 
23  This is based on the total number of pachten bought (N = 1041) minus those bought by people 
whose origins have not been established (1041 minus 48 = 993). Interestingly enough, the Dutch share 
in the total number of pachten bought corresponds with the percentage of Dutch pachters (both at 
about twenty-four percent). The Cape-born pachters, though, were less successful: although they made 
up thirty percent of all pachters, they only bought seventeen percent of the total number of pachten 
(see Table 2.5). This clearly indicates that German pachters were on the whole more successful than 
others, generally invested in more pachten, and usually over a longer period.  
24  G.C. de Wet, Die Vryliede en Vryswartes in die Kaapse Nedersetting, 1657-1707 (Cape 
Town, 1981), 112. 
25  R.C.-H. Shell, ‘Immigration: The Forgotten Factor in Cape Colonial Frontier Expansion, 
1658 to 1817’, Safundi: The Journal of South African and American Comparative Studies 18 
(2005), 3-13.  











during the VOC period were German-speakers who arrived through indirect 
immigration.  
 These facts about immigration do not, however, sufficiently account for the 
dominance of Germans in the alcohol retail trade in the early and middle decades of 
the eighteenth century – if the origins of first-time pacht holders had reflected exactly 
the demographic realities of the VOC Cape, one would have expected greater 
numbers of Dutch and Cape-born burghers among the pachters of the first half of the 
eighteenth century. German immigrants undoubtedly dominated the alcohol retail 
business in Cape Town for most of the century; the reasons for which are to be found 
in other factors, as will be demonstrated in the chapters to follow.   
 
Women Alcohol Pachters 
 
The world of the alcohol pachten at the Cape was a largely male one. Yet the world of 
alcohol retail was exceptional in not being completely dominated by men, as was the 
case with most other economic activities at the Cape. Thus ten of the 198 pachters 
who were active during the VOC period were women (table 2.4). The hospitality 
business, and hence also alcohol retail, had been closely associated with women 
during the mediaeval and early modern periods, in both Europe and the colonial 
world. In fact, recent research has shown that tavern-holding during the early modern 
era was generally a family affair. The stereotypical picture is that of men attending to 
the (public) business and management of taverns while their wives were responsible 
for serving and dispensing drink and food, with their children often acting as barmaids 
and waiters.27 But while there is undoubtedly truth in this, the reality was often 
considerably less clear-cut: in many cases husbands and wives took decisions 
together, and it is likely that in some cases it was really the wife who ran the business, 
yet used the husband to deal with the legal and official side of it, like obtaining the 
licence or, as was the case in the Cape, publicly bidding for the pacht at the annual 
                                                 
27  On women and alcohol retail during this era, see J.M. Bennett, Ale, Beer and Brewsters in 
England: Women’s Work in a Changing World, 1300-1600 (New York and Oxford, 1996); S.V. 
Singler, Taverns and Drinking in Early America (Baltimore, 2002), 161-73; D.W. Conroy, In Public 
Houses: Drink and the Revolution of Authority in Colonial Massachusetts (Chapel Hill and London, 
1995), 99-141 and K.S. Rice, Early American Taverns: For the Entertainment of Friends and 











auction. That this was indeed the case, and was a generally known and accepted fact, 
is proved by a comment of the Council of Policy. In 1678 the Council summoned the 
current alcohol pachters to appear before it about changes to the pacht system, yet 
two of them did not come since they were away on business. Instead they sent their 
wives, who ‘declared to be authorised by the same [their husbands] and to have full 
power of attorney.’ Significantly, the Council added in parentheses to this statement: 
‘as we are also aware that they [these women] concern themselves the most with it.’28 
 
Table 2.4: Women who Invested in the Alcohol Pachten, 1680-1795 






     
Berdenis, Gerbregt (widow Mensink) Dutch 1701-1711 7 19475 
Bernard, widow (Sara Strand?) Dutch? 1745 1 200 
Coster, Maria (widow Feijt) Cape 1728-1732 3 4000 
Datis, Cecilia (widow Dumont) French 1719-1720 2 760 
De Bruijn, Christina (widow Botma) Cape? 1720-1722 3 4030 
De Nijs, Aletta (widow Honk) Cape 1744-1762 17 14675 
Odendaal, Judith (widow Reijndersz) Cape 1790-1794 3 3950 
Redox, Hilletje (widow Valckenrijck) Dutch? 1680 1 1900 
Truter, Anna Clofia (widow Keijser) Cape 1788 1 11000 
Van Dam, Josina (widow Stokvliet) Cape 1730-1731 5 20525 
Source: Genealogical Data; CA, C 2697-2731 and RLR 163 
 
It is significant that all ten of the independent pachter women were widows at the 
time of first buying a pacht (see table 2.4).  In at least eight cases, these women 
                                                 
28  ‘verclaerende van de selve [haar mannen] g’authoriseert en volmachtight te wesen’ and 
‘gelijck ons oock bewust is dat haar daarmede wel meest bemoeijen’; A.J. Böeseken (ed.), Resolusies 
van die Politieke Raad: Deel II, 1670-1680 (Cape Town, 1959), 271-72. It seems likely that this was 
also the case later in the history of the alcohol pachten; the more so when the wife was a pachter 
herself, or had been married to one.  











invested in the same alcohol pacht as their late husbands had done.30 Essentially they 
were continuing the trade of their husbands or, more simply, continuing the family 
trade. Early-modern Dutch society was characterised by the fact that ‘single women 
and widows had the same freedom to trade or engage in commerce as did men.’ This 
was the case because ‘marriage under Dutch law was essentially a partnership’ with 
equal ownership of properties.31 The eight pachter widows who continued with their 
husbands’ business were therefore not exceptional by early modern standards: in the 
Dutch Republic widows often took over their husbands’ trade, especially where he 
had been an artisan who had built up a specialised skill, equipment and connections 
over time.32 In some ways working in the alcohol business required specialised skills 
and knowledge, which would make it similar in some sense to an artisanal trade. This 
was certainly the case with the beer pachters at the Cape who were also involved in 
the production of their wares. Three of these women were the widows of malt beer 
pachters. This group includes Gerbregt Berdenis and Aletta de Nijs who were the two 
most active women pachters in the history of alcohol retail at the Cape.33 
 This suggests that, certainly in some cases, it was the wives who were really 
running the business even though the pachten were officially in their husbands’ name 
                                                 
30  The exceptions being Hilletje Redox, the widow of Jan Valckenrijck, whose late husband had 
had no known affiliation to alcohol retail. The other is a person who is identified in the sources only as 
‘the widow Bernard’. She can plausibly be identified as Sara Pietersz Strand from Amsterdam who had 
married Johannes Bernard of Cologne in 1710. He died in 1728 which meant that Sara Strand must 
have remained a widow for an exceptionally long time as she only remarried in 1753 to one Johann 
Georg Hansen, the cobbler of Stellenbosch (which is where she had had her tavern); Hoge, 
‘Personalia’, 27 and 132. 
31  M. Dickinson Shattuck, ‘Women and Trade in New Netherland’, Itinerario 18/2 (1994), 44.  
32  A. Schmidt, Overleven na de Dood: Weduwen in Leiden in de Gouden Eeuw (Amsterdam, 
2001), 143-54. This was also the case in Germany and other parts of Europe where the wives of master 
artisans were closely involved in the running of their husbands’ businesses. Because of her familiarity 
with the business (and her close involvement over many years), and because remaining active in trade 
would prevent her family from becoming a burden to others, local governments were eager to allow a 
widow in charge of an established business to continue her trade; cf. M.E. Wiesner, ‘Gender and the 
World of Work’, in B. Scribner (ed.), Germany: A New Social and Economic History, Volume 1: 1450-
1630 (London, 1996), 222-23. 
33  See N. Penn, Rogues, Rebels and Runaways: Eighteenth-Century Cape Characters (Cape 
Town, 1999), 15-16 and 21-34 on Gerbregt Berdenis’s role in the malt beer pacht; and pages 138-44 











or, at the very least, that there was close co-operation between the two sexes. Clearly, 
these pachter women had to be well familiar with the alcohol pacht system before 
they could take on the risk of investing large sums in the alcohol pachten on their 
own. However, although the alcohol retail sector did see active participation from 
women, the figures suggest that it was difficult for a single woman to survive in the 
high-risk world of direct investment in alcohol retail.34 The majority of these women 
bought pachten in their own name for only a short period; in fact, only three of them 
invested in more than five pachten over a number of years. And although Aletta de 
Nijs stands out as having invested in some seventeen pachten over almost twenty 
years, the combined investment from all ten of these women pachters was very small 
– just over one percent of the total amount of money invested in the alcohol pachten 
came from them. 
 This, though, does not mean that women did not fulfil a crucial role in the 
alcohol retail world of the Cape. Women served an important linking function 
between different holders of the same pacht and often they were the ones who assured 
continuity in pacht-holding. Thus at least four of these widows remarried,35 
whereupon their new husbands became the holders of the pacht. In this way, they 
essentially ensured keeping a pacht in the same family, even though three different 
names would appear in the records.36 The centrality of women in the alcohol retail 
business at the Cape – by introducing and linking different people to the alcohol 
pachten, irrespective of whether or not they held any in their own name – is an 
important issue which will be discussed at greater length in the chapters to follow.  
 
In summary: the large bulk of the pachters who controlled alcohol retail at the Cape 
between 1680 and 1795 were men who only ever invested in a small number of 
                                                 
34  The impression one gets from court cases was that women (especially widows) often acted as 
tavern keepers or bijtappers for pachters. This would tie in with the situation elsewhere in the early 
modern world where alcohol retail was seen as a welfare measure to help women who had fallen on 
difficult times; cf. Schmidt, Overleven na de Dood, 134-36 and the references in note 27 above.  
35  They were Maria Coster, Aletta de Nijs, Judith Maria Odendaal and Josina van Dam.  
36  The best example of this is the history of Aletta de Nijs, see pages 138-49 below. But the 
same principle operated in the other cases as well: Maria Coster provided continuity in the holding of 
the malt beer pacht by linking Coenraad Feijt (1722-1727) and Godlieb Opperman (1730-1734). 
Likewise Judith Odendaal provided the continuity in the Stellenbosch-Drakenstein pacht between her 











pachten. At first men and women of Dutch descent played a prominent role in this 
business, but for most of the eighteenth century alcohol retail in Cape Town was 
dominated by German immigrants (see table 2.5). How some of these men and 
women managed to make a success of the alcohol pacht business, and what 
mechanisms they used to ensure financial success and social mobility, are the topics 
of the case studies in the chapters to follow.  
 
Table 2.5: Alcohol Pachters at the Cape of Good Hope, 1680-1795 






     
Adriaansz, Lambert  3 1700-1701 17000 
Auret, Jeremias Dutch 1 1783 8000 
Backer, Noach Dutch 1 1735 1375 
Bam, Jan Christiaan Cape 13 1780-1792 131850 
Bam, Jan Andries Cape 4 1782-1785 29600 
Bateman, Maarten German 36 1763-1787 261000 
Beck, Johann Zacharias German 15 1723-1737 76625 
Berdenis, Gerbregt Dutch 7 1701-1711 19475 
Bernard, widow (Sara Strand)  1 1745 200 
Beukes, Dirk Cape 2 1787-1788 2950 
Bierman, Frederik German 1 1726 2250 
Biesel, Jan Cape 1 1754 1125 
Boetendagh, Carel Diederik German 14 ½ 1731-1739 77400 
Botma, Cornelis Stevensz Cape 2 1688-1691 4150 
Botma, Jan Cape 4 1715-1719 9370 
Bouwman, Hendrik German 1 1700 5825 
Broeders, Pieter German 8 1758-1773 109100 
Bruijns, Johannes German 1 1753 1000 
Coert, Claas German 1 1762 2350 
Combrink, Hermanus Cape 2 1770-1774 1075 
                                                 











Conterman, Hans Jacob German 9 1718-1734 7195 
Coster, Maria Cape 3 1728-1732 4000 
Cruijwagen, Jan Meijndertsz Dutch 8 1701-1719 47050 
Datis, Cecilia French 2 1719-1720 760 
De Beer, Jan Dirksz Dutch 4 1686-1692 16500 
De Bruijn, Christina  3 1720-1722 4030 
De Goede, Jan Cape 9 1784-1794 25130 
De Jong, Dirk Dutch 10 1756-1763 32600 
De Kruger, Willem German 19 1770-1786 142025 
De Nijs, Aletta Cape 17 1744-1762 14675 
De Swart, Ernst Frederik Dutch 1 1719 2450 
De Vos, Gerrit Reijndersz  1 1751 900 
De Vries, Hendrik Dutch 1 1720 2000 
De Waal, Jan Dutch 1 1744 900 
Deele, Johan Bernard German 4 1749-1752 8125 
Dempers, Willem Cape 1 1775 600 
Doman, Gabriel German 1 1705 1100 
Dreijer, Andries Cape 1 1763 2750 
Eberg, Bartholomeus Swedish 5 1790-1795 50200 
Eksteen Pietersz, Johannes Paulus Cape 4 1790-1794 46800 
Eksteen, Hendrik Oostwald German 25 1708-1721 113270 
Esselaar, Johannes Nicholaas German 13 1762-1774 70375 
Esser, Isaac Dutch 10 1719-1725 37450 
Eversdijk, Hendrik Dutch 2 1730-1736 2350 
Feijt, Coenraad German 3 1722-1727 3750 
Frank, Dirk Gijsbert Cape 5 1752-1755 15450 
Frisnet, Guilliam Dutch 2 1711-1712 14300 
Gardieu, Jean French 2 1704-1705 3220 
Geeringh, Willem Cape 1 1795 750 
Gockelius, Nicolaas Dutch 2 1715-1723 3150 
Greijling, Jan German 10 1753-1769 4400 











Heems, Guilliam Flemish 6 1684-1687 28375 
Heijns, Paul German 5 1708-1713 44125 
Herhold, Albrecht German 4 1755-1758 2825 
Hertzog, Johannes Cape 1 1792 1700 
Herwich, Johan Frederik German 2 1792-1793 13200 
Heufke, David German 4 1706-1708 21150 
Heufke, Johannes German 10 1727-1731 47800 
Heugh, Evert German 3 1785-1795 50100 
Hoesemans, Anthonij  31 1709-1723 152995 
Holst, Jan Daniel Dutch 3 1764-1773 7025 
Holst, Jan Dutch 24 ½ 1740-1754 166700 
Holtman, Johannes Casparus German 2 1756-1766 5000 
Holtsmit, Jan Dutch 1 1685 1000 
Honk, Hans Jurgen German 8 1738-1743 5845 
Hubner, Joachim Daniel jr Cape 1 1795 9600 
Hubner, Jochem Daniel sr German 37 1740-1761 207225 
Hugo, Daniel Cape 13 1781-1793 677400 
Hurling, Jan Frederik German 9 1756-1759 26325 
Hurter, Jan Willem German 7 1763-1783 12550 
Jansz, Cent Dutch 2 1717 9700 
Joubert, Josua Cape 1 1787 18000 
Joubert, Pieter sr French 1 1728 6900 
Kalteijer, Anthonij German 2 1776-1777 2225 
Kamp, Jacob Dutch 1 1769 6100 
Kannemeijer, Frederik Cape 4 1789-1795 9250 
Keijser, Jan Simon German 7 1781-1786 64850 
Kemp, Gerrit Cape 1 1750 250 
Kotze, Johan German 2 1696-1702 10370 
Laurik, Daniel German 1 1737 2900 
Le Roux, Gerrit Cape 1 1789 7300 
Le Roux, Jan jr Cape 4 1736-1739 2825 











Le Roux, Johannes jr Cape 1 1758 2300 
Le Roux, Matthiam Cape 5 1740-1744 1000 
Lever, Abraham Dutch 28 ⅔ 1727-1758 273076 
Loubser, Claas Swiss 1 ½ 1700-1718 7700 
Luijt, Frederik German 1 1752 125 
Luijten, Jan German 2 1793-1794 4950 
Maartensz, Isaac Dutch 7 1735-1741 42285 
Maasdorp, Christiaan German 6 1717-1726 8150 
Marshoorn, Jacobus Dutch 1 1735 2600 
Matfeldt, Hendrik German 9 1792-1795 109200 
Meijboom, Claas Dutch 4 1706-1717 8400 
Meijburgh, Jan Lambertz Cape 4 1716-1720 22800 
Meijer, Gerrit German 5 1704-1713 14285 
Meijer, Hendrik German 3 1771-1773 1675 
Meijer, Pieter French 9 1705-1713 20470 
Meijhuijsen, Godfried German 5 1691-1695 41110 
Melck, Martin German 32 1760-1781 604700 
Mensink, Rutgert Dutch 1 1700 2950 
Mensink, Willem Dutch 5 1701-1713 12075 
Morkel, Philip German 2 1713-1714 20800 
Mulder, Hendrik German 11 1699-1711 41280 
Mulder, Jan Theunis German 1 1791 19100 
Munnik, Gerhardus Cape 1 1779 48000 
Munnik, Johannes Albertus sr Cape 3 1741-1746 2500 
Odendaal, Judith Maria Cape 3 1790-1794 3950 
Oortmans, Pieter Bertram German 1 1716 1050 
Opperman, Godlieb Christiaan German 4 1730-1734 5225 
Palmer, Hannes  1 1721 120 
Pentz, Michiel German 17 ⅔ 1736-1752 46411 
Phijffer, Johannes German 21 ½ 1697-1711 155775 
Pijthius, Johannes Dutch 8 1705-1714 51000 











Raams, Willem Dutch 1 1734 1375 
Rabe, Christiaan Danish 1 1739 1500 
Rasp, Christiaan German 1 1716 2600 
Redox, Hilletje  1 1680 1900 
Reijndersz, Johannes Daniel  2 1783-1786 1750 
Roep, Johannes German 21 1767-1781 86875 
Rogiers, Jan Dutch 2 1714-1726 9525 
Rogiers, Tobias Cape 4 1775-1778 9200 
Roos, Francois Tielmansz Cape 1 1794 8100 
Rothman, Sebastiaan German 1 1792 90000 
Roux, Jeremias Cape 1 1729 6100 
Russouw De Wit, Frederik German 8 1688-1696 77120 
Scheffer, Hendrik German 1 1722 30 
Schenk, Joost German 1 1717 2010 
Schreuder, Johan Jacob German 39 1762-1790 160525 
Schreuder, Jan Jurgen German 13 1738-1752 25325 
Sebrits, Frans German 4 1778-1782 2300 
Smal, Jan Jurgen German 1 1746 200 
Smit, Carel Cape 4 1791-1795 59500 
Smit, Hendrik Evertsz German 2 1680-1682 625 
Smook, Jan German 5 1763-1779 22450 
Snijder, Jan Hendrik German 4 1757-1759 14450 
Spengler, Jurgen German 2 1762-1769 4325 
Spengler, Lodewijk Cape 1 1780 18500 
Spoor, Jan Dutch 2 1718-1722 2775 
Sprangel, Jan German 2 1732-1735 1475 
Steenbok, Rudolf Frederik German 11 1714-1725 26900 
Steijn, Jacobus Cape 3 1714-1716 10525 
Stokvliet, Jan Jacob German 11 1725-1729 56150 
Taute, Matthias Petrus Cape 1 1792 18300 
Thomasz, Hendrik German 1 1731 750 











Truter, Hendrik Cape 1 1786 19000 
Valk, Cornelis Dutch 2 1718-1720 4550 
Van Aarden, Johannes Cape 2 1759-1760 3700 
Van As, Willem Cape 1 1729 2625 
Van Bochem, Jacob Dutch 4 1721-1724 8900 
Van Dam, Josina Cape 5 1730-1731 20525 
Van den Bergh, Jacobus Johannes Dutch 4 1785-1791 291400 
Van der Lint, Frederik  2 1707-1708 3995 
Van der Poel, Pieter Dutch 4 1703-1716 25070 
Van der Spuij, Melt Dutch 20 1722-1733 76125 
Van der Swijn,Jan Dutch 19 ⅔ 1732-1747 123591 
Van der Westhuijsen, Pieter Flemish 1 1707 9400 
Van Dieden, Willem Dutch 2 1680-1682 7200 
Van Dijk, Burgert Cape 1 1734 360 
Van Dijk, Hendrik Cape 11 1725-1734 45400 
Van Donselaar, Claas Dutch 2 1724 11000 
Van Hartmansdorf, Carel Hendrik German 1 1736 1850 
Van Helsdingen, Jan Hendrik Cape 3 1728-1733 2170 
Van Helsdingen, Johannes Guilliam Cape 4 1781-1787 32000 
Van Leijpsig, Marthinus German 10 1719-1728 25525 
Van Reenen, Jacob German 1 1726 1950 
Van Reenen, Jacobus Arnoldus Cape 1 1789 9300 
Van Reenen, Sebastiaan Valentijn Cape 2 1788-1791 131500 
Van Reenen, Willem Cape 1 1782 32700 
Van Schalkwijk, Theunis Dirksz Dutch 13 1683-1697 35600 
Van Straalen, Joris  2 1690-1691 6500 
Van Wielligh, Hermanus Cape 1 1754 3400 
Vermeij, Steven Dutch 12 1693-1705 132205 
Victor, Gerrit Dutch 8 1683-1690 30125 
Victor, Jacobus Cape 1 1700 5875 
Vogel, Jacob German 9 1697-1709 66090 











Vooght, Johannes German 1 1702 5650 
Vos, Gabriel Jacobus Cape 2 1794-1795 19950 
Vrij, Jacob German 1 1717 350 
Weber, Hendrik German 2 1784-1785 2975 
Welcher, Hendrik Dutch 1 1795 1500 
Wendel, Hendrik German 1 1710 3000 
Wepener, Joachim Ernst German 2 1747-1749 2025 
Wiese, Benjamin Dutch 1 1717 7300 
Wilders, Casper German 1 1685 950 
Wilkens, Jan Willem jr Cape 1 1776 2500 
Wilkens, Jan Willem sr German 1 1777 3000 
Wimmer, Jacob German 1 1764 2150 
Wispelaar, Jacob German 10 1788-1795 113700 
Wolf van der Steur, Claas  1 1727 2000 
Wolmarans, Joseph German 1 1761 2175 
Zaaijman, Bartholomeus Cape 1 1749 150 
Zeeman, Pieter Cape 1 1786 9400 
Zieteman, Godfried Christiaan Danish 3 1762-1763 14075 
TOTAL  1041  6737588 
























EARLY MODERN ENTREPRENEURS AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THE CASE OF 
HENDRIK OOSTWALD EKSTEEN, 1702-1741 
 
In June 1702 one Heinrich Oswald Eckstein, a twenty-four-year soldier in the service 
of the Dutch East India Company (VOC), arrived with the ship Oostersteyn at the 
Cape of Good Hope.1 Here he became known as Hendrik Oostwald Eksteen. Born in 
Lobenstein, in what was then Saxony, he grew up in a poor family who had been 
engaged for generations in the cottage industry or craft of cloth shearing (called 
tuchscherers in German).2 In a rare insight into his pre-Cape life, Eksteen is recorded 
in 1735 as someone whose ‘profession’ had been wool farming ‘in the fatherland.’3 In 
1695, when he was seventeen, both his parents and an uncle died, leaving him with 
two younger siblings. Around his twentieth year he decided – for some unknown 
reason, though possibly connected to the death of his parents – to join the mighty 
VOC.4 In this he was no exceptional young man: thousands of his compatriots during 
this period left, for a variety of reasons, their familiar surroundings, their family and 
network of friends and kin, the communities which shared their language, religion and 
culture in order to travel to the coastal cities of the Netherlands.5 Although the 
motivations for leaving their native German soil differed from individual to 
                                                 
1  The Oostersteyn sailed into Table Bay on 12 June 1702 and left again on 7 July; J. Bruijn, F. 
Gaastra and I. Schöffer (eds), Dutch Asiatic Shipping in the 17th and 18th Centuries (The Hague, 1979), 
vol. 2, 274-75 (no. 1883.4). 
2  J.P.G. Eksteen, ‘Enkele Aantekeninge oor die Familie Eksteen’, Familia 6/2 (1969), 31-33.  
3  G.C. de Wet (ed.), Resolusies van die Politieke Raad: Deel IX, 1735-1739 (Pretoria, 1981), 
10-11.  
4  Eksteen, ‘Enkele Aantekeninge’, 33. At what point he left his two younger siblings to pursue 
his fortunes elsewhere is unknown. Given the chronology, it seems plausible that Eksteen may have 
undergone at least one return journey to the East Indies before the 1702 journey which deposited him at 
the Cape.  
5  For a recent synthesis of the literature on this topic, see E. Kuijpers, Migrantenstad: 











individual, the biggest single cause was economic.6 The almost continual wars which 
the German lands experienced during the seventeenth century resulted in economic 
and demographic upheavals with often deleterious effects on individuals. In personal 
and economic terms, particularly for young people, ‘[r]ecurring warfare meant the 
loss of calculable perspectives for the future’, and many chose to search for better 
prospects elsewhere.7 Nothing is known about the personal circumstances of 
Eksteen’s departure from his native land.8 But even so, a decision such as his was one 
with major consequences: on the one hand, he was sacrificing the security provided 
by his kinship and social networks, though on the other hand, by leaving his familiar 
surroundings and entering into new relationships – be they social, economic, personal 
– elsewhere, he increased the number of opportunities available for exploitation. This 
step represents a major risk for the individual concerned, and for many German 
immigrants who entered VOC service it was a mistake leading, more often than not, 
to a premature death in impoverished circumstances on foreign soil.  
 Not so with Eksteen. His success at the Cape can only be described as 
spectacular. His disembarkation may have been accidental, as he is listed with the 
impotenten (‘powerless ones’) in the Company Hospital on 1 July 1702.9 But he 
decided to stay and became a free burgher in 1704. Within six years he was able to 
buy a prime farm. Eight years later, in 1718, he owned four farms, three houses and a 
cellar in Cape Town, sizeable livestock holdings and 46 slaves – his estate was valued 
                                                 
6  See R. van Gelder, Het Oost-Indisch Avontuur: Duitsers in Dienst van de VOC (1600-1800) 
(Nijmegen, 1997), 113-122 for a discussion of the motivations of German emigrants for joining the 
VOC. 
7  B. Stier and W. von Hippel, ‘War, Economy and Society’ in S. Ogilvie (ed.), Germany: A 
New Social and Economic History, vol. 2: 1630-1800 (London, 1996), 256.  
8  Eksteen’s leaving his ancestral town can plausibly be connected to his parents’ death 
(although it is not certain when exactly he left Lobenstein, and how long he might have roamed about 
before joining the VOC), but was probably also motivated, directly or indirectly, by the upheavals 
caused by either (depending on when he left) the Wars of the Palatine (1688-97) or Spanish Succession 
(1701-13). More speculatively: Eksteen’s decision to join the VOC could have been influenced either 
by stories from, or the book published in 1679 by, his fellow Lobensteiner, Johann Schreyer, who was 
stationed at the Cape during the 1670s. Cf. J. Schreyer, Reise nach dem Kaplande und Beschreibung 
der Hottentotten, 1669-1677 in S.P. L’Honoré Naber (ed.), Reisebeschreibungen von Deutschen 
Beamten und Kriegsleuten in Dienst der Niederländischen West- und Ost-Indischen Kompagnien, 
1602-1797, vol. VII (The Hague, 1931).  










at more than f 91 000.10 He was without a doubt one of the wealthiest men at the 
Cape, a remarkable achievement for someone who, fourteen years earlier, was listed 
in the opgaaf (tax census) with no possessions.11 By 1731 Eksteen was the richest free 
burgher at the Cape of Good Hope: seven farms, six town properties, one hundred 
slaves, extensive livestock, including a large stable of fifty horses, and very big 
investments in wheat and vines.12  He was described at this time by Governor De la 
Fontaine simply as someone die rijkelijk kan bestaan (‘who can exist wealthily’). This 
laconic expression obscures just how extraordinary this was by Cape standards: of the 
938 people on De la Fontaine’s list, only ten are described unqualifiedly as well-off or 
rich, i.e. without qualifying that they had debts. Only six of these were actually at the 
Cape (the others had repatriated) and of them it was Eksteen who was most active in 
economic terms.13 By the time of his death in 1741 his estate had increased even 
further,14 so much so that his widow had no need to remarry, and could raise and 
                                                 
10  This was before debt amounting to f 24 500 was subtracted, but even then it was a big estate; 
CA, MOOC 8/3 no. 93. 
11  In 1705 the Eksteen household was listed as consisting of one adult male, one adult female 
and one boy who together owned no possessions worth listing in the opgaaf whatsoever. My thanks to 
Dr Hans Heese who shared with me his transcription of the 1705 opgaaf in the Nationaal Archief in 
The Hague. 
12  L. Guelke and R. Shell, ‘An Early Colonial Landed Gentry: Land and Wealth in the Cape 
Colony, 1682-1731’, Journal of Historical Geography 9 (1983), 278.  
13  There were 938 (including fifty-seven who had recently repatriated) individual householders 
commented upon in De la Fontaine’s report. Three of the six at the Cape who were described as well-
off or rich were widows (Beatrix Verweij, Geertruij de With and Helena Gulix). The two men who 
were thus described along with Eksteen, were Jan de With and Johannes Cruijwagen. The latter was 
Eksteen’s one time brother-in-law who had shortly before the compilation of the report inherited one 
third of his father’s large estate; CA, MOOC 8/5 no. 19. See L. Guelke, R. Shell and W. Whyte (eds), 
The De la Fontaine Report, 30th January 1732 (New Haven, 1990). 
14  According to the 1741 opgaaf, ‘he had doubled the size of his stable and increased his slave 
holdings by 25%’, Guelke and Shell, ‘Early Colonial Landed Gentry’, 278. Unfortunately there exists 
no inventory of his estate after his death. Eksteen requested in his will that his estate not be broken up 
and that it be handled en famille with no interference from the Orphan Chamber or other officials. His 
wife was to be the sole executor and had to ensure that their children would get their rightful portion of 
their inheritance. To this end an inventory and evaluation had to be drawn up, but it seems likely that it 
was not deemed necessary to lodge it with any official body like the Orphan Chamber or Council of 











establish their ten minor children on her own. An indication of how enormous 
Eksteen’s estate must have been is provided by the fact that when his widow died 
more than forty years later – and after providing their thirteen children with their 
rightful inheritance as they reached the age of majority – she did so as a very rich 
woman in her own right.15  
 
With the exception of the better-known Martin Melk, Eksteen’s career as a free 
burgher probably has no equivalent at the eighteenth century Cape, and it is 
remarkable that it has hitherto received relatively little attention from historians.16 The 
most extended discussion of his economic activities and achievements occurs in 
Guelke and Shell’s article about the rise of an early colonial landed gentry at the 
Cape. Here Eksteen serves as an example of one of the ‘many aggressive and 
upwardly mobile individuals.’ 17 In their argument Eksteen illustrates how the Cape 
gentry – some of whom, like Eksteen, were parvenus – built up capital (in the form of 
                                                                                                                                            
children at the time, probably explains why his widow never remarried; cf. CA, CJ 2650, 253-59 for his 
will of 1739. 
15  CA, CJ 2677, 396-438 (1784). She owned a residential house and three rented houses in town; 
four farms in Rondebosch and Tijgerberg (where she seems to have bred goats and horses) and 49 
slaves. Her estate had in cash the equivalent of more than f 20 000 while it was owed a phenomenal 
amount of f 121 990 by creditors, including the VOC itself who had an obligatie (debenture) of f 46 
500. This indicates that she must have acted as a rentier.  
16  Although both are ‘rags to riches’ stories, there is a significant difference in their rise to 
wealth: Melck’s early career at the Cape did reveal entrepreneurial activities, but he was suddenly 
catapulted to wealth and instant acceptance in the Cape gentry by marrying a wealthy widow; see G.A. 
Cockrell, ‘Die Lewe van Martin Melck, 1723-1781’ (unpublished MA thesis, University of 
Stellenbosch, 1984) and pages 156-59 below. Eksteen, on the other hand, had a much slower and more 
staggered rise to wealth and social prestige. Unlike Melck, he had no lucky breaks.  
17  Guelke and Shell, ‘Early Colonial Landed Gentry’, 277. Their portrayal of Eksteen has been 
followed by others, for example, Karel Schoeman, Armosyn van die Kaap: Die Wêreld van ’n Slavin, 
1652-1733 (Cape Town, 2001), 688 and idem, ’n Duitser aan die Kaap, 1724-1765: Die Lewe en 
Loopbaan van Hendrik Schoeman (Pretoria, 2004), 215-16. There are short entries for Eksteen in J. 
Hoge, ‘Personalia of the Germans at the Cape, 1652-1806’, Archives Year Book for South African 
History 9 (1946), 86 and E. Moritz, Die Deutschen am Kap unter der Holländischen Herrschaft, 1652-
1806 (Weimar, 1938), 228-29 though likewise not without their errors. Even the useful entry for 
Eksteen in J.A. Heese and R.T.J. Lombard, Suid-Afrikaanse Geslagregisters / South African 












land) and labour (in the form of slaves) which formed the basis of their wealth. These 
individuals are seen as essentially landed capitalists who consolidate and expand their 
wealth through agricultural activities. In their account of Eksteen’s activities, Guelke 
and Shell make no attempt to explain how it was possible for this man who came to 
the Cape with no capital to be economically so successful; nor do they account for the 
mechanisms which enabled his capital base of, say 1718, to grow to what he had by 
1731. Although this is partly due to the fact that their overview of Eksteen’s economic 
activities is incomplete and in some cases misleading,18 it is mainly the result of the 
fact that their approach to the establishment of wealth at the Cape is not applicable in 
the case of parvenus like Eksteen. Or, at the very least, analysing Eksteen’s activities 
in terms of capital accumulation cannot account for his spectacular rise, especially in 
the early part of his career.  
 Eksteen’s achievement can only be understood when his whole life course is 
considered in detail. This enables the historian to perceive the mechanisms which 
made it possible for Eksteen to achieve his successes. In addition, it allows the 
historian to discover how Eksteen’s individual actions can be related to larger 
structural and systemic forces in place at the Cape. It is crucial, therefore, to view 
Eksteen’s activities within the immediate context of the Cape of Good Hope, but also 
within the contexts of the VOC world and the workings of the early modern economy. 
Moreover, it would be wrong to concentrate only on Eksteen’s economic activities. 
As will become clear, his success in this field was wound up with both his personal 
and public lives.  
 When considered in this fashion, it is evident that every action of Eksteen’s 
must have contributed in some way or the other to his success. The first momentous 
decision was to leave his home in Lobenstein, which indicates an ability and 
willingness to take on risks. This opened up a number of opportunities, one of which 
was to join the ranks of the VOC. Accepting a position in the Company once again 
came with risks (not least of which was the loss of life and limb) but also brought 
with it a whole gamut of possibilities and opportunities. One of these was to 
disembark at the Cape and to decide to remain here. In all of this early experience of 
                                                 
18  They are for instance unaware of Eksteen’s involvement in the alcohol pachten, thereby 











and within the Company, Eksteen gained knowledge, experience19 and became 
acquainted with a large number of people – even if only very briefly and superficially. 
But enough is known from similar cases about how important these early experiences 
in Holland and aboard VOC ships were for German immigrants to be sure that, for 
Eksteen too, despite the absence of positive information, this must have been a 
formative and important experience.20 The most momentous decisions of the young 
Eksteen’s life, occurred in 1704 when he became a free burgher at the Cape and 
married a local woman.  
 
Capital, as Ludwig von Mises famously remarked pace Karl Marx, does not ‘beget 
profit.’21 Entrepreneurial activities and decisions do, however. Although Guelke and 
Shell once refer to Eksteen as an ‘entrepreneur’,22 they do not analyse his enterprises 
within a framework of entrepreneurship. Seeing Eksteen rather as a foremost 
exemplar of an early modern entrepreneur provides the historian with both the 
theoretical framework to explain the mechanisms of Eksteen’s success, and the ability 
to see the connections between Eksteen’s economic activities, his personal and public 
life, and to relate all of these subjective factors to the larger context. The aim of this 
chapter, then, is to present a theoretical framework which would enable the historian 
of eighteenth-century Cape society to analyse and understand the activities of men 
like Eksteen in a more complete and nuanced fashion. In doing so, Eksteen’s life is 
used as a superstructure, not only because he is such an outstanding example of a 




                                                 
19  One thinks here of him, inter alia, improving his Dutch; learning about the monetary system 
of the Dutch empire, and expanding his knowledge of humanity. 
20  Cf. R. van Gelder’s remarkable study of Naporra’s Omweg: Het Leven van een VOC-
Matroos, 1731-1793 (Amsterdam and Antwerp, 2003) and, for some Cape examples, Schoeman, ’n 
Duitser aan die Kaap. 
21  L. von Mises, ‘The Entrepreneur and Profit’, in: R. Swedburg (ed.), Entrepreneurship: The 
Social Science View (Oxford, 2000), 97. Both Adam Smith and Karl Marx conflated capitalists with 
entrepreneurs; for a critique, see M. Blaug, ‘Entrepreneurship Before and After Schumpeter’, in idem, 
Economic History and the History of Economics (Brighton, 1986), 219-22. 











Eksteen the Entrepreneur: What and How?  
 
In describing the isolated retail market that operated in the Cape during the 1730s – a 
market which depended on the irregular supply of retail goods from visiting ships – 
Mentzel provides us with the following example of Eksteen’s economic activities:  
 
Another article of common use [in addition to tobacco] that is liable to equally 
rapid fluctuation in price is soap. I can instance the case of a burgher called 
Eckstein who laid in a stock of 20,000 lbs. at 6 stuivers23 per lb. at a time 
when the market was glutted, owing to an unusually large number of 
shipments that came in within a short space of time. Some six weeks later it 
became known that no fresh soap was likely to arrive within the next three 
months, and then this astute speculator sold out at 20 stuivers per lb., netting 
within a short while a profit of f 14,000.24 
 
This seemingly straightforward account of the economic reality at the Cape contains 
within it almost all the elements with which to define the notion of ‘entrepreneur’.  
 All economic activity is subject to uncertainty.25 At the time of Mentzel’s 
incident, the consumers of soap could not foretell how long the good supply would 
last. It is this uncertainty that Eksteen exploited for his own profit. According to 
Mises it is precisely this exploitation of uncertainty which results in profit or loss, not 
capital investment. What Eksteen had done, was to judge ‘the future prices of 
products more correctly than other people do [and to buy] some or all of the factors of 
production at prices which, seen from the point of view of the future state of the 
market, [were] too low.’26 This is what an entrepreneur does: to make decisions or, 
                                                 
23  There were twenty stuivers to a guilder.  
24  O.F. Mentzel, A Geographical and Topographical Description of the Cape of Good Hope 
(translated by H.J. Mandelbrote, G.V. Marais and J. Hoge) (3 vols, Cape Town, 1921, 1925 and 1944), 
vol. 2, 76. 
25  F.M. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance (Second ed., Boston, 
1980), 29. 
26  Mises, ‘Entrepreneur and Profit’, 89. The converse, however, also holds: if the entrepreneur 
misjudges the future prices, the result would be a loss. This means that ‘one entrepreneur’s error 











phrased differently, to exploit opportunities.27 As theoreticians of entrepreneurship 
have shown, profit (or loss) arises from entrepreneurs who notice and exploit 
opportunities created by uncertainties inherent in the market.28 What distinguishes 
entrepreneurs from other people is not their possession of specific skills or forces of 
production, but their behaviour. What had set Eksteen apart from others was his 
ability to correctly anticipate ‘uncertain events’29 (i.e. his spotting of the opportunity), 
his willingness to act on this30 (i.e. his grasping of the opportunity) and, finally, his 
decision to act on this knowledge (i.e. to exploit the opportunity). In general, it is this 
decision process which distinguishes an entrepreneur from other people. 
 Eksteen was an entrepreneur because he grasped and exploited opportunities 
like the one described by Mentzel. How did he manage to do that? Through his access 
to different types of information and knowledge: Eksteen’s long experience of Cape 
circumstances had taught him that fresh soap was a commodity in constant demand, 
but that supply of it could be erratic at times. So when there was a glut (instead of 
assuming like the other inhabitants of the Cape that it would last), he used his 
knowledge of the opportunity as well as the suspicion (undoubtedly based on previous 
experience) that the supply would drop to buy up the existing stock. He needed, of 
                                                                                                                                            
their own errors; R. Swedburg, ‘The Social Science View of Entrepreneurship: Introduction and 
Practical Applications’, in: idem (ed.), Entrepreneurship: The Social Science View (Oxford, 2000), 23. 
27  Cf. Mises, ‘Entrepreneur and Profit’, 97: ‘It is the entrepreneurial decision that creates either 
profit or loss. It is mental acts, the mind of the entrepreneur, from which profits ultimately originate. 
Profit is a product of the mind, of success in anticipating the future state of the market. It is a spiritual 
and intellectual phenomenon.’ 
28  ‘Opportunity’ is necessarily a relativistic concept since opportunities vary over time and from 
person to person. H.J. Stevenson and J.C. Jarillo, ‘A Paradigm of Entrepreneurship: Entrepreneurial 
Management’, Strategic Management Journal 11 (1990), 23 define ‘opportunity’ in this context as ‘a 
future situation which is deemed desirable and feasible.’ 
29   Swedburg, ‘Social Science View’, 20 summarises Mises’ definition of entrepreneurship as 
‘anticipations of uncertain events.’ For a discussion of Mises’ work on entrepreneurship, see R.L. 
Hébert and A.N. Link, The Entrepreneur: Mainstream Views and Radical Critiques (2nd ed., New 
York, 1988), 127-30. 
30  Mises did not dwell on the importance of the willingness of the entrepreneur to grasp an 
opportunity. Several people can notice an opportunity, but it is only the entrepreneur who is willing to 
take on the risk and goes on step further, namely to act on the opportunity arising. Thus Stevenson and 
Jarillo, ‘Paradigm of Entrepreneurship’, 17-27, consider the willingness to pursue opportunities as the 











course, a capital layout of f 6 000 but the possession of that money is not the central 
issue in this entrepreneurial activity: a person with a confident expectation of success 
could probably have loaned the money.31 Crucial for the success of this venture, was 
first of all knowledge of the opportunity and, secondly, making the decision to grasp 
it. 
 Thus it is knowledge which enables an entrepreneur to grasp opportunities. 
Friedrich Hayek has argued cogently about the importance of knowledge to economic 
activities. Since in any given situation a person’s knowledge of that situation does not 
correspond with the facts – i.e. knowledge is of necessity imperfect – it means that 
there is a need ‘for a process by which knowledge is constantly communicated and 
acquired.’32 Moreover, knowledge is dispersed and nobody has it in its totality.33 The 
consequence of the fact that different kinds of knowledge exist is that a person’s 
possession of or control over knowledge can be used to his or her advantage. In order 
to bring home this point, Hayek stresses that ‘scientific knowledge is not the sum of 
all knowledge’, and makes a powerful case for the existence of 
 
a body of very important but unorganized knowledge which cannot possibly 
be called scientific in the sense of knowledge of general rules: the knowledge 
of the particular circumstances of time and place. It is with respect to this that 
practically every individual has some advantage over all others because he 
possesses unique information of which beneficial use might be made, but of 
which use can be made only if the decisions depending on it are left to him or 
are made with his active co-operation.34 
 
                                                 
31  Cf. Mises, ‘Entrepreneur and Profit’, 95: ‘Those who know how to take advantage of any 
business opportunity cropping up will always find the capital required’ and Stevenson and Jarillo, 
‘Paradigm of Entrepreneurship’, 23: Entrepreneurs ‘pursue opportunities without regard to the 
resources they currently control.’ Likewise, I.M. Kirzner, Competition and Entrepreneurship (Chicago 
and London, 1973), 38-39 argues that entrepreneurs do not require ‘means’ in order to make decisions, 
i.e. to grasp opportunities. This was already recognised by Richard Cantillon, an early theoretician of 
entrepreneurship, in the first half of the eighteenth century; Hébert and Link, The Entrepreneur, 25-26. 
32  F.A. Hayek, ‘The Use of Knowledge in Society’, in: idem, Individualism and Economic Order 
(London and Henley, 1976), 91. 
33  Ibid., 77-78. 











He defines this knowledge as the ‘knowledge of people, of local conditions, and of 
special circumstances’; which relates closely to how anthropologists define ‘local 
knowledge.’35 It was Eksteen’s possession of local knowledge about the 
circumstances at the Cape, the characteristics of its market and, possibly, ‘insider’ 
knowledge about current sources of soap supply36 which had enabled him to exploit 
the opportunity.  
 The ideas of Mises and Hayek were later combined and expanded by Israel 
Kirzner in his work on modern entrepreneurship. For Kirzner, entrepreneurship 
revolves around three notions: imperfect knowledge, opportunities and alertness. The 
fact that in the real economic world every actor suffers from imperfect or incomplete 
knowledge means that, since ‘the participants in this market are less than omniscient, 
there are likely to exist at any given time a multitude of opportunities that have not yet 
been taken advantage of.’ Thus, in addition to local knowledge, Eksteen possessed 
‘alertness’ – the ability to spot relevant new information or resources – which enabled 
him to make decisions about new profit opportunities. Hence Kerzner’s definition of 
an entrepreneur as ‘a decision-maker whose entire role arises out of his alertness to 
hitherto unnoticed opportunities.’37  
 
                                                 
35  Ibid. Clifford Geertz, in arguing that ‘law is local knowledge not placeless principle’, echoes 
what Hayek argued for economic activity: that it is not driven by knowledge of abstract theory, but by 
actors on the ground operating on the basis of local knowledge. Geertz’s notion of local knowledge is 
contained in this statement about law: ‘Law … is local knowledge, local not just to place, time, class, 
and variety of issue, but as to accent – vernacular characterizations of what happens connected to 
vernacular imaginings of what can’; C. Geertz, ‘Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative 
Perspective’, in: idem, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology (New York, 
1983), 215 and 218. 
36  At this stage Eksteen was a meat pachter who routinely had to supply meat to visiting ships, 
so could have learned of it via that; or, alternatively, in the course of his duties as burgher councillor 
who sat in on the meeting of the Council of Policy.  
37  Kirzner, Competition and Entrepreneurship, chapter two; quotes from 39 and 41. It is a much 
discussed issue in studies of entrepreneurship whether or not there is something like an entrepreneurial 
type of personality; i.e. is this special ‘alertness’ entrepreneurs have some personal characteristic 
unique to some individuals and not to others? Cf. R.H. Brockhaus sr. and P.S. Horwitz, ‘The 
Psychology of the Entrepreneur’, in D.L. Sexton and R.W. Smilor (eds), The Art and Science of 
Entrepreneurship (Cambridge, Mass., 1986), 25-48; and Swedburg, ‘Social Science View’, 32-34 for 











How far can these theoretical perspectives be applied to the world of VOC Cape 
Town? The preceding paragraphs have suggested a way in which to view the 
activities of a person like Eksteen. It is my contention that the economic success of 
Eksteen at the Cape can be more plausibly described and understood with reference to 
entrepreneurship, rather than to capital accumulation. In order to explicate this point, I 
present here the conceptual tools with which to do so, followed by an analysis of 
Eksteen’s economic activities. 
 
Early Modern Entrepreneurship: Risks,  Profits and the Uses of Capital 
 
At about the same time as Eksteen was successfully exploiting economic 
opportunities at the Cape, Richard Cantillon was reflecting in his Essai sur la Nature 
de Commerce en Général (published posthumously in 1755) on the role of 
entrepreneurs in the economy. For Cantillon the entrepreneur was the link in the chain 
of distribution between producers and consumers. Since individuals do not have 
perfect foresight about the future, entrepreneurs have to exercise their business 
judgment. This means that the willingness to take on risk and uncertainty becomes the 
distinguishing feature of an entrepreneur. Because the entrepreneur is willing to take 
on risks in order to make goods available at a given time and place, he functions as 
the central actor in the economy who continually deals with uncertainty in his 
economic decisions. Hence, entrepreneurs are people ‘who engage in market 
exchanges at their own risk in order to make a profit.’38  
 Although modern economists differentiate between ‘true’ uncertainty and risk 
(the latter is something which can be insured against), the fact remains that 
entrepreneurial success depends on successfully taking a chance or gambling on a true 
uncertainty, such as predicting demand.39 Profit, Frank Knight stated, is the result of 
‘a unique uncertainty resulting from an exercise of ultimate responsibility which in its 
                                                 
38  Hébert and Link, The Entrepreneur, 19-28, quote from 21. 
39  This argument is associated with Frank Knight’s ‘uncertainty theory of profits.’ Subsequently 
economists have differentiated further between ‘uncertainty’ and ‘radical uncertainty’; on Knight’s 











very nature cannot be insured nor capitalized nor salaried.’40 The converse, however, 
also holds: entrepreneurial misjudgement can lead to loss.  
 P.W. Klein, the foremost scholar of early modern Dutch entrepreneurship, has 
identified ‘the elementary features of entrepreneurial behaviour’ as, first, ‘the 
management and administration of relatively scarce economic resources’ through 
‘planning on the basis of a mixture of rational calculation and inspired intuition in the 
face of competition under constantly changing market conditions.’ This implies the 
second feature, namely taking the responsibility for risks, which in the case of early 
modern entrepreneurs meant ‘the risks peculiar to creative optional choices between 
change and continuity, adaptation and originality, tradition and innovation.’ Thus, the 
entrepreneur has to decide on ‘the optimal position of the enterprise on a continuum 
between the two poles of security and uncertainty.’ For this reason Klein argues that 
the early modern entrepreneur’s central task was ‘to balance risks and profits.’41 
 Uncertainty was all pervasive in the world of early modern business. This was 
particularly the case with one of the most important aspects of entrepreneurship, 
namely access to information. Due to the slow and unpredictable nature of the 
movement of news and knowledge, entrepreneurs were often unable to make proper 
risk analysis and could not always adapt in time to changing circumstances. Hence, 
Clé Lesger’s characterisation of early modern entrepreneurship as ‘calculated 
gambling’. Early modern transport was slow and dangerous, which resulted in a 
number of consequences for entrepreneurs, not least of which could be slow payment 
leading to problems with cash flow. In addition, early modern markets were small and 
unstable, with the result that determining demand was an even greater uncertainty 
then than in the modern economy.42 This was clearly the case at the Cape where the 
                                                 
40  Quoted from Hébert and Link, The Entrepreneur, 98. This was written apropos the question of 
whether or not the entrepreneur is also a capitalist. Like Cantillon, Knight argued that although the 
entrepreneur could be a capitalist, the essence of entrepreneurship does not lie in the possession of 
capital, but in the entrepreneur’s behaviour.  
41  P.W. Klein and J.W. Veluwenkamp, ‘The Role of the Entrepreneur in the Economic 
Expansion of the Dutch Republic’, in K. Davids and L. Noordegraaf (eds), The Dutch Economy in the 
Golden Age: Nine Studies (Amsterdam, 1993), 28. 
42  On uncertainty and risk, see C. Lesger, ‘Over het Nut van Huwelijk, Opportunisme en 
Bedrog: Ondernemers en Ondernemerschap tijdens de Vroegmoderne Tijd in Theoretisch Perspectief’, 
in C.A. Davids, W. Fritschy and L.A. van der Valk (eds), Kapitaal, Ondernemerschap en Beleid: 











success of investment in the alcohol retail trade depended crucially on the size of 
visiting fleets and the length of their stay-overs.43 
 However, the fact that the early modern business world was one in which risks 
and uncertainties were plentiful must be seen in conjunction with the social and 
cultural nature of that world. Although entrepreneurship revolves around personal 
gain, another dimension has to be added to it where it concerns the early modern 
world, at least in the case of the Dutch world. Thus Veluwenkamp and others have 
shown that Dutch entrepreneurial enterprises were mostly family businesses founded 
on family capital. Entrepreneurs were motivated as much by their social environment 
as by a desire for profit. This includes a concern over the standing and future of the 
family. As a result of this, continuity became a very important factor influencing 
economic decisions. Since the social and economic position of the family had to be 
maintained and improved, it follows that an entrepreneur should not unnecessarily 
risk the economic, and hence social, downfall of the family. The aim of an 
entrepreneur in such circumstances was, then, to realise ‘the largest trading results 
possible’ while ‘safeguarding the continuity of the enterprise.’ One of the 
consequences of this was that entrepreneurs tended to invest in enterprises which 
promised both profit and continuity.44 In general, early modern entrepreneurship was 
characterised by the subordination of profit maximisation to long-term stability.45  
 How, then, did early modern entrepreneurs manage to diminish risks and 
minimise uncertainties? One way was to build up human capital, i.e. one’s skills and 
knowledge.46 An entrepreneur needed to have knowledge of the market and of the 
commodity he traded in, of the nature of that commodity, of prices, demand, supply 
and possible markets. Hence, personal experience could play a major role, but also the 
ability to learn from others, and to identify and exploit human capital in others. For 
                                                                                                                                            
1996), 66-69; L. Kooijmans, ‘Risk and Reputation: On the Mentality of Merchants in the Early Modern 
Period’, in C. Lesger and L. Noordegraaf (eds), Entrepreneurs and Entrepreneurship in Early Modern 
Times: Merchants and Industrialists within the Orbit of the Dutch Staple Market (The Hague, 1995), 
28-29 and R. Grassby, ‘Social Mobility and Business Enterprise in Seventeenth-Century England’, in 
D. Pennington and K. Thomas (eds), Puritans and Revolutionaries: Essays in Seventeenth-Century 
History Presented to Christopher Hill (Oxford, 1978), 368-69.  
43  Cf. the discussion on pages 37-41 above.  
44  Klein and Veluwenkamp, ‘Role of the Entrepreneur’, 36-38. 
45  Cf. Kooijmans, ‘Risk and Reputation’, 30 and Lesger, ‘Over het Nut’, 71. 











this reason early modern entrepreneurs often specialised in a specific commodity or 
range of commodities.47 Another, more tangible, form of protecting one’s position 
was to spread one’s investments. Although entrepreneurs tended to specialise in one 
area or industry, they were not averse to speculate in some other field if the profit 
margins seemed good, but this was mostly ad hoc and was never a major investment. 
In general, Dutch entrepreneurs diversified their estates by investing part of it in 
business, part in stocks and bonds and part in land and property. An entrepreneur had 
to weigh up the different advantages of his investments since higher profits were to be 
made from high risk ventures while safe investments such as in land yielded very low 
but stable interest.48 
 Business, however, is not purely a matter of markets and investments; it is first 
and foremost a social phenomenon where individual people interact with one 
another.49 Entrepreneurs are perhaps more than any other actors in the economy 
people-centred since they are mediators between producers and consumers. In the 
early modern high-risk context of doing business, trust was a crucial commodity. 
Trust can lead to loyalty from customers; open up new opportunities through 
recommendations; and provide credit. Hence, Veluwenkamp’s statement that ‘[t]rust 
was perhaps even more important than capital, the main function of which indeed was 
… to generate trust, and thereby credit. Money is trust; the equation is reversible.’50 In 
practical terms this translated into a preference for doing business with family 
members, people from the same town or area, or of the same background. Foreigners, 
in this context, were people whose behaviour was unpredictable, thereby increasing 
one’s risks. Another result was that reputation became a crucial resource. Reputation 
was something that had to be earned – and it was something that only existed in a 
                                                 
47  Klein and Veluwenkamp, ‘Role of the Entrepreneur’, 41-42. 
48  W. Frijhoff and M. Spies, 1650: Bevochten Eendracht (The Hague, 1999), 19-20; P. Burke, 
Venice and Amsterdam: A Study of Seventeenth-Century Elites (2nd ed., Cambridge, 1994), 62-70. 
49  Cf. M. Vaughan, ‘The Character of the Market: Social Identities in Colonial Economies’, 
Oxford Development Studies 24 (1996), 61-77. 
50  Klein and Veluwenkamp, ‘Role of the Entrepreneur’, 41. For an application of this to the 











social context. Consequently, someone with a good reputation could be trusted, and 
was deemed credit worthy. The converse, however, also held.51 
 Trust and reputation are both related to the final, and perhaps most important, 
resource for early modern entrepreneurs, namely their social capital. This notion is 
related to that of human capital in that both were at first used metaphorically: as with 
physical capital, the idea was that a person could invest in it and expect a profitable 
return on this investment. Like capital, it can be accumulated and exploited. However, 
this metaphor does not work quite as well for social capital as there is no direct 
relationship between inputs and outputs and its value cannot be measured in terms of 
currency.52 Yet subsequent research has led to the development of a useful concept, 
defined by H.D. Flap as ‘an entity, consisting of all expected future benefits derived 
not from one’s own labor, but from connections with other persons.’53 Central to this 
definition is connections with other people, the results of which can be beneficial to 
an individual.54 Robert Putnam’s definition shows both what social capital consists of, 
and how it can be used: social capital consists of ‘features of social organisation, such 
as trust, norms and network, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating 
coordinated actions.’55  
 Being part of networks is central to building up social capital. Knowing a large 
number of people means greater access to credit and information, both of which are 
crucial for identifying and exploiting business opportunities. But in order for people 
to cooperate, they need not only to know one another, but also to trust one another. 
This in turn implies certain norms and expectations, which relate to the crucial role of 
                                                 
51  Lesger, ‘Over het Nut’, 72; Kooijmans, ‘Risk and Reputation’, 30-32. Cape pachters’ concern 
with reputation is discussed on pages 181-86 below.  
52  Field, Social Capital, 3, 9 and 12. 
53  H.D. Flap, ‘Patronage: An Institution in its Own Right’, in M. Hechter, K.-D. Opp and R. 
Wippler (eds), Social Institutions: Their Emergence, Maintenance and Effects (New York, 1990), 232. 
54  Pierre Bourdieu’s definition is similar: ‘Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or 
potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized 
relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition – or in other words, to membership in a group – 
which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectively-owned capital, a “credential” 
which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word’; P. Bourdieu, ‘The Forms of Capital’, 
in J.G. Richardson (ed.), Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education (New 
York, 1986), 248-49.  











reputation – mediated through third parties. Having a good social network is crucial 
for starting an economic enterprise, but it is also important for management and 
growth since networks give easy access to economic resources which would 
otherwise only be obtainable at great(er) cost (for example, obtaining capital through 
formal bodies; needing to draw up formal contracts, etc).56 
 How does one acquire social capital? By helping and giving to others, who are 
thereby indebted. Such direct ties do not need to be the result of intentional acts but 
can get built up unconsciously over time. There are also indirect or weak ties with 
acquaintances and other people which are the ‘by-products of actions directed towards 
other goals.’57 Thus social capital can be built up through the course of ordinary work 
experience. The extent of one’s social capital gets determined by three factors: (1) the 
size and scope of one’s social network; (2) the resources these friends and family have 
at their disposal, and, equally crucial, (3) their willingness to make these resources 
available.58 All of these factors played a role in achieving Eksteen’s economic and 
social success at the Cape of Good Hope.  
 
Eksteen the Entrepreneur: Alcohol and the Free-Black Community 
 
Viewed against this background, everything in Eksteen’s life – every experience, 
every acquaintance, every bit of knowledge he picked up – contributed in one way or 
another to his success. It is plausible that he kept up links with his home country or, 
more likely, that he used his ethnicity as a point of connection with other Germans in 
Cape Town.59 Certainly his early years at the Cape indicate that this was the case. 
During his first two years at the Cape Eksteen seems to have had close contact with 
the free-black community: he procreated at least two illegitimate children, both born 
around 1704, the year in which he became a free burgher, with free black women.60 
                                                 
56  Ibid., 50-57 and 62-65. It should be noted that there is some debate as to whether trust ought 
to be considered integral to social capital or rather as one of its outcomes.  
57  Flap, ‘Patronage’, 232-33.  
58  Ibid., 231-32; Lesger, ‘Over het Nut’, 66.  
59  See pages 117-24 below on the role of ‘ethnic identity’ in building up social capital in Cape 
Town.  
60  The exact chronology is uncertain: Hendrik Eksteen was baptised in February 1705, so was 











The first, also called Hendrik, was with Anna Maria Colijn, who thereafter 
disappeared from his life.61 This son later achieved some notoriety on the Cape 
frontier when he was murdered by his Khoi mistress.62 The second son, called 
Michiel, was with Sara, the illegitimate daughter of a fellow German Paul Heijns and 
the freed slave Maria Schalk. Heijns was at this stage married to another free-black 
woman, Maria Lozee.63 By then Heijns had been at the Cape for a few decades and 
made his living from various farming enterprises, although he was not very successful 
and was in debt to the Orphan Chamber and the Poor Fund.64 Shortly after the birth of 
Michiel, Eksteen married Sara Heijns on 13 July 1704.  
 It is plausible that Eksteen at first worked with his father-in-law, thereby 
gaining experience and knowledge of the Cape circumstances, but also building up 
social capital with the links Heijns had.65 A revealing indication of Eksteen’s social 
network at this early stage comes from the fact that he was one of the signatories in 
early 1706 of a testimonial to the ‘honour and virtue’ of W.A. van der Stel. Eksteen’s 
support of this was likely influenced by the fact that his father-in-law was a supporter 
of the Van der Stel faction, and along with most of the free blacks of Cape Town 
signed this testimonial, including the relations of Eksteen’s late mother-in-law, Maria 
Schalk.66 That Eksteen’s early support and contacts were with the free-black 
community he entered via his wife and father-in-law is also revealed by his friendship 
                                                                                                                                            
uncertain: he was later referred to as a voorkind which means he must have been born before the 
marriage of Eksteen with Sara Heijns in July 1704 (in the event he was baptised in April 1705). Having 
illegitimate children was no impediment to social or other success in the eighteenth-century Cape; cf. 
G. Groenewald, ‘“A Mother Makes no Bastard”: Family Law, Sexual Relations and Illegitimacy in 
Dutch Colonial Cape Town, c. 1652-1795’, African Historical Review 39/2 (2007), 58-90. 
61  H.F. Heese, Groep sonder Grense: Die Rol en Status van die Gemengde Bevolking aan die 
Kaap, 1652-1795 (Bellville, 1984), 48.  
62  Cf. R. Viljoen, ‘“Till Murder Do Us Part”: The Story of Griet and Hendrik Eksteen’, South 
African Historical Journal 33 (1995), 13-32. 
63  Heese and Lombard, Genealogies, vol. 2, 174 and Hoge, ‘Personalia’, 161.  
64  G. C. de Wet, Die Vryliede en Vryswartes in die Kaapse Nedersetting, 1657-1707 (Cape 
Town, 1981), 108 and H.C.V. Leibbrandt (ed. and tr.), Precis of the Archives of the Cape of Good 
Hope: The Defence of Willem Adriaan van der Stel (Cape Town, 1897), 184-85. 
65  For a more extensive discussion of the role that marriage, kinship and ‘ethnic identity’ played 
in the entrepreneurial success of German immigrants at the Cape during this period, see the discussion 
on pages 114-24 below.  











with Claas Cornelisz (another signatory of the Van der Stel testimonial) and Beatrice 
van Couchin.67 When the latter couple drew up their will in 1709, they made 
provision for Michiel, Eksteen’s son with Sara Heijns. This friendship seemingly 
survived Eksteen’s later success, for in 1720 he acted as an executor of Beatrice’s 
estate.68   
 
How was a newly released free burgher to maintain himself and his young family? As 
discussed in chapter one, economic options at the Cape of Good Hope were limited 
since it was controlled by the VOC which did not permit a free-market and jealously 
guarded its monopoly. Free burghers remained subjects of the VOC and their 
activities had to aid the Company in its aims. This primarily meant being engaged in 
the productive sector, particularly agriculture, and only secondarily in the service 
sector. Although the Cape did not have a completely free market system since the 
Company bought most agricultural produce at pre-determined prices, there still 
existed a small retail market. It was cheaper for the VOC to lease certain productive 
activities to free burghers. The best example of this system is the meat pacht 
(monopoly or lease) whereby three to five individuals were contracted to provide 
passing ships and the VOC establishment at the Cape with meat at a fixed price, 
usually for periods of multiple years.69 There were also certain needs of both free 
burghers and callers at the Cape which had to be met. One of these was the demand 
for alcohol and sociability in taverns. As illustrated in chapter one, this trade was 
immensely lucrative with the result that the VOC was unwilling to allow complete 
free trade in alcohol and instead controlled it through selling pachten to the free 
burghers. Despite the restrictions, the alcohol trade remained the closest the VOC 
Cape came to a free market system since any person could invest in one of the 
pachten as the sole criterion for ownership was a financial one. Thus, seen from the 
viewpoint of entrepreneurial activities, there were fewer opportunities for exploitation 
at the Cape, although the very restrictions of the system created some other, albeit 
illegal ones. It is in forgetting about the opportunities that the alcohol pacht system 
                                                 
67  M. Upham, ‘Armosyn Revisited’, Capensis 2 (2000), 26. 
68  A.J. Böeseken (ed.), Resolusies van die Politieke Raad: Deel VI, 1720-1723 (Cape Town, 
1965), 78-79. 
69  See pages 36-37 above for details of the retail market in Cape Town and the operation of the 











provided, that led Guelke and Shell to miss the key to Eksteen’s spectacular rise to 
success.  
 In August 1707 Eksteen bought one of the brandy pachten for f 2 725.70 The 
fact that he bought the fourth quarter of the brandy pacht and paid a higher price than 
the others fetched may indicate that he was keen to get a pacht.71 It is unknown how 
much capital Eksteen had by this stage, but it needed not have been much: the price 
he offered for the pacht had to be paid in two instalments, the first only after six 
months. A year later he borrowed f 3 000 from a fellow brandy pachter, Claas 
Meijboom, and it is plausible that they may have been business partners and that 
Meijboom could have helped him earlier as well.72 Eksteen’s main capital outlay 
would have been his stock of liquor and perhaps some furniture and other equipment 
to turn a room of his house into a tavern.73 Thus, during 1708-9, he bought at various 
auctions equipment such as lamps, drinking and eating vessels, as well as game 
boards which were popular entertainment in taverns. 74 What is most significant about 
this venture is that Eksteen entered the alcohol retail trade at the same time as his 
father-in-law, Paul Heijns, who bought one of the Cape wines pachten for f 8 325. 
They may well have decided to share the costs and run one tavern together selling 
both brandy and wine (a common procedure). This cannot be proved, but given 
Eksteen’s later history and the fact that Heijns had not invested in the alcohol pachten 
                                                 
70  It is significant that he first invested in brandy. It was along with Cape wines the most popular 
of the alcohol pachten and had a huge set off (reflected by the fact that both pachten were divided into 
four parts). Unlike Cape wine, though, the brandy pachten could be bought much cheaper. Cf. table 2.2 
and graph 2.3 in appendix 2 below for details.  
71  The brandy pachten were sold in four parts, each auctioned off separately. The VOC 
bookkeepers noted in which order the parts were sold. Since, as explained on page 34 above, auctions 
first went up to a high price, and then down from a much higher price, it is likely that a nervous, 
inexperienced or very keen buyer would stop the bidding at a higher price than what it could have gone 
for.  
72  DO, T 17, 04.09.1708. Eksteen was able to repay fully his debt within a year along with the 
six percent interest charged. My thanks to Susan Newton-King for sharing the Deeds Office references 
with me.  
73  Though he could have bought the liquor on credit; as he did in 1710 when he entered into a 
contract with Henning Hüsing for almost f 3 000 for liquor provided on credit; this debt Eksteen was 
able to repay within less than a year; DO, T 19, 292.  











in the decade or more that he had been a free burgher, it seems plausible that it was 
Eksteen’s idea to invest in the alcohol pachten.  
 Investing in the alcohol retail trade at the Cape was at best a risky business. 
Since, in addition to one’s layout costs, one had to pay a sizeable premium to the 
VOC for the privilege, plus the fact that retail prices were fixed, the variable of 
demand carried even greater importance. Since the pachten were auctioned off at the 
beginning of the pacht year (September), before demand was known, it meant that at 
best prospective pachters made a calculated guess as to how much they could offer 
for the privilege of retailing alcohol (usually based on the experience of the preceding 
few years). Since the stable, local Cape market was relatively small, the profitability 
(assuming that there were no problems with supply) of alcohol retail in Cape Town 
depended crucially on the number of ships calling and the amount of time their crews 
had to spend in town visiting taverns. At the time that Eksteen entered the alcohol 
retail business, the number of ships that called at the Cape – both Dutch and foreign – 
remained stable and grew slightly in absolute terms.75 
  Eksteen was clearly successful enough to pay the VOC their due for his first 
pacht, and his experience was sufficiently positive to make him continue investing in 
the brandy pachten, with Heijns continuing with the wine pachten, for the following 
three years. Curiously enough, Eksteen did not use his early success to expand his 
alcohol pacht interest, as most other successful pachters tended to do, i.e. by buying 
more and more pachten, but preferred to diversify his investments slowly. He must 
have bought livestock during his first years as a pachter, for at the beginning of 1709 
he was granted a grazing licence at Dieprivier.76 During that same year he utilised his 
free-black links by buying two houses in Cape Town.77 The following year he bought 
his first farm, in the Tijgerberg, naming it after his home town (‘dutchified’ to 
                                                 
75  This is based on an analysis of the relevant figures in Bruijn, Gaastra and Schöffer, Dutch 
Asiatic Shipping, vols. 2-3. 
76  CA, RLR 1, 80. 
77  DO, T 18, 31.05.1709 and 14.11.1709. In May 1709 he paid f 940 cash to the ex-Company 
slave, Sara Jansz (aka Sara van de Caab) for her house in block K, and in November bought a larger 
house from Jan Oberholster for f 3 400, f 1 500 of which he paid cash. The latter was no free black, but 
his relationship with Agnieta Colijn, the sister of the mother of Eksteen’s first-born son, caused some 
notoriety during this period; cf. Schoeman, Armosyn, 653. The latter transaction is a good example of 
the workings of social capital, as Eksteen in exchange stood as one of Oberholster’s sureties when the 











Loewenstein), for the large sum of f 12 000.78 By the early 1710s Eksteen both 
exploited the one lucrative retail market at the Cape, to wit the alcohol trade, and 
started to invest in agriculture, the main economic activity of Cape free burghers. The 
alcohol pachten allowed one to make quick profit with relatively low input costs, but 
had high risks built into the system. Agriculture required a larger capital base, 
yielding slower and less spectacular profits, but had the advantage of greater stability 
while offering the possibility to expand greatly.  
 By 1710 Eksteen had clearly built up sufficient experience and confidence in 
his entrepreneurial activities to attempt expansion in the hope of greater profits. He 
formed an illegal cartel with his father-in-law and two other pachters in an attempt to 
control the most lucrative of pachten, namely that of Cape wine. By doing this they 
presumably had hoped to control the first great uncertainty of investing in alcohol 
pachten: the price paid for the monopoly. In the event, the conspiracy was discovered 
and the pacht was re-auctioned after a month.79 This was no set-back for Eksteen: in 
1711 he successfully bid for one of the Cape wines pachten, along with his usual 
brandy pacht. This expansion into wine retail shows how confident Eksteen was that 
he could pull it off: a wine pacht by this stage usually sold for about three times as 
much as a brandy pacht.80 Yet despite the higher risks Eksteen managed to make a 
success of the wine retail trade as well. Throughout the 1710s he bought one brandy 
and one wine pacht every year until 1720 when he bought two wine pachten. After 
that year he ceased to invest in the alcohol pachten. During the fourteen consecutive 
years that Eksteen invested in the alcohol pachten, he bought the rights to fourteen 
brandy and eleven Cape wine pachten, for which he paid the Company in total f 113 
270. 81 Unfortunately, due to the lack of the necessary data, it is not possible to 
calculate the profit Eksteen made from his investments. In general pachters could sell 
brandy at twice the price they paid for it which should translate into a sizeable 
                                                 
78  DO, T 19, 352. He paid f 4 000 in cash and undertook to repay the remaining sum in two 
instalments over two years.  
79  CA, C 2702, 14-17 and 22-6; A.J. Böeseken (ed.), Resolusies van die Politieke Raad: Deel IV, 
1707-1715 (Cape Town, 1962), 172-83. See also the discussion of this on page 35 above.  
80  The fact that he owned several properties by this stage could also have aided him in securing 
loans.  
81  Data on Eksteen’s investment in the alcohol pachten are derived from the original contracts, 











profit.82 Of course, this is without taking into account the manifold running and 
capital expenses a pachter incurred, but since many of these could be offset against 
capital investments (in labour, property and movable goods), it meant that the longer 
one was engaged in the alcohol retail business, the higher one’s yields tended to be. 
What is remarkable about Eksteen’s involvement in the alcohol pachten is his stable 
and controlled conduct. Unlike other pachters he did not overplay his hand by using 
his profits to invest in ever larger shares of the alcohol retail market.83 Instead, he kept 
his investment more or less stable during the 1710s and used the profits to build up a 
capital base with which to undertake new entrepreneurial endeavours. His behaviour 
reveals someone who was remarkably well aware of the possibilities available for 
exploitation at the Cape.  
 
Eksteen’s early years at the Cape are the most obscure to the historian, but it seems 
clear that his connections with and marriage into the free-black community, as well as 
his links with fellow German Paul Heijns, must have been a factor in his early 
ventures into the alcohol retail trade. It is no co-incidence that he and his father-in-law 
both started to invest in alcohol pachten at the same time, and that Eksteen – as soon 
as he could afford it – entered agricultural life at the Cape. By joining the support of 
the free black and urban community for the powers-that-be in 1706, Eksteen ensured 
their goodwill (and that of his father-in-law) – an example of investing in social 
capital – which was necessary for someone who soon thereafter entered the retail 
world of Cape Town. During the 1720s, Eksteen’s shaky beginnings as a businessman 
at the Cape would expand spectacularly, leading to greater social prestige.  
 
 
                                                 
82  In the 1718 inventory of Eksteen’s estate, a legger brandy (560 litres) was valued at f 175 
(CA, MOOC 8/3 no. 93). According to the 1725 price regulations of the VOC, brandy pachters could 
sell their product at four schellingen per bottle (2.4 litres) which means that a legger brandy would 
retail at f 350. Cf. G.J. Krause, ‘Drankpagte gedurende die Eerste Honderd Jaar van die Bewind van die 
N.O.I.K. aan die Kaap’ (unpublished MA thesis, University of the Orange Free State, 1955), 110 for 
the prices of brandy.  
83  This meant that as time went by (assuming all variables remained stable) his profits should 
have increased as most of his capital layout (for example, investing in a room or building for his tavern; 
a store; vats; furniture and drinking vessels and, probably, a slave or slaves to work in his tavern) 










Eksteen the Entrepreneur: Farming, Fishing and Social Prestige  
 
After buying his first farm in 1710 for f 12 000, Eksteen spent most of his profit 
(except for what he needed to continue in the alcohol retail business) on his 
agricultural concerns. He continually obtained grazing licences and loan farms in 
prime areas around Cape Town, implying increasing herds of stock.84 During these 
years he often bought livestock at auctions.85 In addition to his six loan farms, he 
bought three more freehold farms between 1710 and 1718 and by the latter date also 
owned three houses in Cape Town as well as a store or cellar in which to keep his 
taverns’ supplies.86 By 1718 his stock holdings had grown to 1600 sheep, three 
hundred and fifty heads of cattle and a surprising thirty horses which suggests that he 
must have bred horses, a very profitable undertaking due to the scarcity of horses at 
the Cape.87 It seems from his holdings and the variety of land that he owned and 
loaned, that he was equally engaged in stock and crop-farming.88 He also seems to 
have produced on his farms at least some of the wine and brandy he sold in his 
taverns in town since he owned two distilling kettles and a wine press.89  
 Eksteen, though, was never satisfied with going the safe route of investing in 
land and expanding his agricultural activities. He kept his eyes open for new 
opportunities. Already in 1713 he and Willem ten Damme offered to buy the meat 
pacht. Their application was unsuccessful as the Council of Policy preferred to 
continue with the incumbent meat pachters.90 This step of Eksteen is somewhat 
surprising as he did not own sufficient land and cattle to take on the major risk of 
supplying the Company with meat for several years.91 It seems more likely that it was 
                                                 
84  CA, RLR 1, 261, 318, 336 and 2, 62, 90, 128.  
85  For example, CA, MOOC 10/1 nos. 68, 75 and 76. 
86  CA, MOOC 8/3 no. 93. 
87  S. Swart, ‘Riding High: Horses, Power and Settler Society, c. 1654-1840’, Kronos 29 (2003), 
49-59. 
88  For example, already by 1712 he both kept cattle and planted wheat on the post Burgerspost in 
the Groenekloof; Böeseken, Resolusies IV, 274, 277 and 314. 
89  CA, MOOC 8/3 no. 93. 
90  Böeseken, Resolusies IV, 323. 
91  A meat pachter did not primarily provide the cattle from his own farms and holdings, but 











Ten Damme who was the main investor and senior partner in this case and that he 
chose Eksteen for his financial acumen to be the managing partner. This incident 
indicates that Eksteen’s links with the pro-W.A. van der Stel factions survived into 
the 1710s: Ten Damme was a supporter of and former high-ranking official under 
Van der Stel who greatly benefited from the latter’s favour.92 This incident also 
illustrates the power of networks; in this case a negative one. The Council of Policy 
stated that its awareness of the applicants’ ‘partisanship’ against the current meat 
pachters played a role in its rejection of the bid. One the incumbent pachters was the 
wealthy Jacobus van der Heijden – who played a prominent role in the anti-Van der 
Stel faction and was the long-standing business partner of Henning Hüsing. The latter 
was responsible for the financial troubles of Paul Heijns – or at any rate, so the latter 
believed.93 At any rate, Ten Damme died the following year and Eksteen waited more 
than a decade before finally investing in the meat pacht.  
 Eksteen’s opportunism did however pay off handsomely in another case. In 
1717 he bought a boat for f 2000 – a sizeable capital layout. This was the first step in 
a careful strategy: Eksteen petitioned the Council of Policy that he did not want the 
boat to go to waste and thus requested permission to fish in the well-stocked waters of 
Saldanha Bay, an area which at this stage the Company had decided to keep for its 
own use (namely to provide fish for the Slave Lodge, the garrison and passing ships).  
In exchange for this prerogative Eksteen was prepared to supply the Company gratis 
with a mutually agreed upon quantity of salted fish. This reflects how well aware 
Eksteen was of the market conditions and economic opportunities at the Cape. There 
was at this stage an increasing demand for fish from free burghers for their growing 
number of slaves,94 a demand which could not be fully met by the so-called ‘free 
fishers’ who were restricted to Table Bay – by having a monopoly of Saldanha Bay 
                                                                                                                                            
(most meat pachters also owned extensive land and cattle) and a meat pachter needed grazing land for 
the cattle while waiting for the VOC fleets – the major consumers of meat.  
92  It was rumoured at the time that Ten Damme’s wife was Van der Stel’s mistress. In 1708, 
after Van der Stel’s downfall, Ten Damme became a free burgher and built up large land and stock 
holdings (as did his sons and wife, Helena Gulix, who by 1731 was one of the six richest inhabitants of 
the Cape); cf. his entry by A.J. Böeseken in C.J. Beyers (ed.), Dictionary of South African Biography, 
vol. 4 (Pretoria, 1981), 644-45 and Schoeman, Armosyn, 226.  
93  Cf. Leibbrandt, Precis: Defence, 184-85. Eksteen too had had business dealings with Hüsing.  
94  Between 1711 and 1733 the number of burgher slaves increased from 1 771 to 4 709; cf. N. 











his profits could soar. But Eksteen must also have been aware of the enormous 
success his one-time fellow pachter, Johannes Phijffer and Simon van der Stel had 
had between 1711 and 1716 when they were contracted to be the sole providers of the 
Company’s fish demands.95 Perhaps he was hoping that this might be the outcome of 
his request. In the event Eksteen’s plans were thwarted since the Council of Policy 
decided that granting him a monopoly in Saldanha Bay would look like favouritism.96 
But ultimately Eksteen was successful since the Council resolved to open fishing in 
Saldanha Bay to all free burghers on condition that they cede twenty percent of their 
catch to the VOC for use in the Slave Lodge.97  
 Eksteen soon made a success of this venture. The competition could not have 
been great since few burghers would have had the capital layout to invest in the large 
vessel required for journeys to Saldanha Bay, and the prospects were sufficiently 
good for Eksteen to decide on further capital investment for exploiting this 
opportunity fully, such as erecting a small house there for his fishermen.98 The fishing 
industry was visibly successful and a major source of Eksteen’s growing wealth by 
the late 1710s, so much so that it is plausible that this may have played a role in his 
decision to stop investing in the alcohol pachten. A marker of Eksteen’s increasing 
concentration in this industry was that he bought another small ship sometime 
between 1718 and 1720.99 By 1721 Eksteen’s original wish got fulfilled: by then he 
was the main supplier of fish to the VOC authorities at the Cape – a very large and 
stable market.100 By 1729 the VOC was sufficiently dependent upon Eksteen’s supply 
                                                 
95  C.F.J. Muller, ‘Die Geskiedenis van Vissery aan die Kaap tot aan die Middel van die Agtiende 
Eeu’, Archives Year Book for South African History 5/1 (1942), 22-28 and A.J. Böeseken, Simon van 
der Stel en sy Kinders (Cape Town, 1964), 217-18. 
96  G.C. de Wet (ed.), Resolusies van die Politieke Raad: Deel V, 1716-1719 (Cape Town, 1964), 
175. 
97  Muller, ‘Geskiedenis van die Vissery’, 28. 
98  Böeseken, Resolusies IV, 395. 
99  It must have been bought after the 1718 inventory and before January 1721 when the VOC 
considered approaching Eksteen to buy this vessel; A.J. Böeseken (ed.), Resolusies van die Politieke 
Raad: Deel VI, 1720-1723 (Cape Town, 1965), 93. 
100  This seems to have been the practice but there is no formal contract due to the loss of such 











of fish to have offered him very favourable terms on which to continue his service.101 
By this stage the VOC was his sole market. In 1733 their relationship was formalised 
when Eksteen was contracted to provide the Company at the Cape with all its fishing 
needs for five years. This Eksteen achieved by threatening the VOC with ceasing his 
supply since, so he claimed, it was not profitable enough to him. To ensure a 
continuous supply from him, the authorities not only gave him this (in terms of risk) 
relatively safe contract, but even sold him one of their vessels.102 This contract was 
renewed after its expiry and continued by his widow after Eksteen’s death.103 In this 
fashion, then, Eksteen managed to exploit another one of the few viable economic 
opportunities at the Cape, and indeed seems to have dominated the fishing industry 
for more than two decades.  
 
The 1710s was not only a decade during which Eksteen greatly expanded his 
economic interests; it was also a period in which his social network expanded beyond 
the urban free-black community. After buying his first farm in 1710, Eksteen soon 
started building up good networks with the farming community of the Cape district. 
Through both his business activities, family, social and political life, Eksteen built up 
connections. At the Cape, marriage strategy was an important factor in social 
mobility.104 It is plausible that Eksteen developed ties with the Cruijwagen family 
early on in his career since Jan Mijndertsz Cruijwagen was another of the signatories 
in favour of W.A. van der Stel. Cruijwagen had invested in the alcohol pachten during 
the younger Van der Stel’s governorship, and did so again in the year that Eksteen and 
his father entered the alcohol retail business.105 Eksteen must have cultivated these 
links for in 1714, after the death of his first wife, he married the young Everdina 
Cruijwagen, the daughter of Jan Mijndertsz. This was a much more advantageous 
match than with the late Sara Heijns, but Eksteen’s circumstances had changed 
                                                 
101  G.C. de Wet (ed.), Resolusies van die Politieke Raad: Deel VIII, 1729-1734 (Pretoria, 1975), 
60. 
102  CA, C 2705, 17-18; De Wet, Resolusies VIII, 310-11 and 313. 
103  CA, C 2705, 18-19 and C 122, 440-42 (per TANAP); G.C. de Wet (ed.), Resolusies van die 
Politieke Raad: Deel X, 1740-1743 (Pretoria, 1984), 65. 
104  See pages 112-18 below for a fuller discussion of the workings of this strategy.  
105  On Jan Mijndertsz Cruijwagen’s career at the Cape, see W.A. Cruywagen, Die Cruywagens 











radically during his first ten years at the Cape. Paul Heijns, who acted as a partner of 
Eksteen in their alcohol retail business, plausibly died in the 1713 small-pox 
epidemic. Cruijwagen – whose investments in the alcohol pachten were very 
haphazard (i.e. in different pachten over a long period) – started investing in them 
again in 1716, which makes it likely that this was done in partnership with, or at least 
with the close cooperation of, Eksteen. Cruijwagen was a well-off man who owned 
four houses in Cape Town and could loan sizeable amounts to a range of 
individuals.106 It is not implausible that he helped Eksteen with capitalising some of 
his ventures in the late 1710s and 1720s. By the time of Cruijwagen’s death in 1728, 
his granddaughter, Catharina Rosina Eksteen, inherited one third of his large estate 
since her mother had died in 1718. Seen purely in economic terms, Eksteen’s 
connections with the Cruijwagen family paid off handsomely.  
 By the second half of the 1710s, when Eksteen was newly married to Everdina 
Cruijwagen and busily expanding his business interests, his social position and 
prestige also rose. It has long been recognised that entrepreneurial activity is about 
more than pure economics as the motivation of an entrepreneur consists of both 
economic and extra-economic gain.107 Given, then, that entrepreneurship is about both 
economic and extra-economic gain; an entrepreneur can be defined as someone who 
is ‘ingenious and creative in finding ways that add to their own wealth, power and 
prestige.’108 In line with this, the economic historian Clé Lesger has argued that 
entrepreneurship is ultimately only a means to an end, namely the realisation of one’s 
wishes and desires. These wishes and desires can be grouped into three categories: 
wealth, power and prestige.109 Whether or not Eksteen felt the need to prove himself 
                                                 
106  CA, MOOC 8/5 no 19. Guelke and Shell, ‘Early Colonial Landed Gentry’, 277 exaggerate 
when they claim that Cruijwagen was the ‘main creditor’ at the Cape – although many creditors owed 
him money at his death in 1728, the largest chunk of this credit came from his son and son-in-law. 
What this does show, however, is that Cruijwagen possessed large amounts of cash which he could 
loan out.  
107  Joseph Schumpeter, the pioneering theoretician of entrepreneurship, identified three 
motivations for entrepreneurs: personal enrichment; a need to prove oneself and ‘the joy of creating, of 
getting things done’; J.A. Schumpeter, ‘Entrepreneurship as Innovation’, in Richard Swedburg (ed.), 
Entrepreneurship: The Social Science View (Oxford, 2000), 70-71.  
108  W.J. Baumol, ‘Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive’, Journal of 
Political Economy 98 (1990), 897. 











is something the historian cannot know for certain.110 By the late 1710s Eksteen had 
clearly amassed sufficient riches to be one of the foremost free burghers in economic 
terms. From this period onwards, his economic successes also translated into power 
and prestige in the Cape context. 
 The first indication of Eksteen’s standing in the community111 comes from 
1716 when he and eleven other free burghers submitted a request to the VOC for 
some reduction in taxes. Among the names are prominent and well-off farmers of the 
Cape district such as the Van der Westhuijzens, Nicolaas Loubser and the wealthy 
Verweij sisters, Aletta and Beatrix.112 It is a sign of Eksteen’s success that within six 
years of his entering agriculture he could – at least in symbolic terms – act as a 
spokesperson for the farming community.113 Another indication of Eksteen’s growing 
standing in the free burgher community was his elevation to ensign in the burgher 
militia in June 1718, a rank he held for the following seven years. Clearly, by the late 
1710s – after ten years as an alcohol pachter, and making a success of agriculture and 
fishing – Eksteen was a leading free burgher, and this the VOC authorities at the Cape 
had to notice. So, we find him nominated for his first public office – that of 
Commissioner of Marriage and Civil Affairs – in 1718, although he was not chosen 
that year. He was however elected in 1719 and re-elected in 1720. Clearly Eksteen 
must have made a good impression, for he was chosen very soon after this, in 1722, as 
                                                 
110  It seems plausible, though, from a psychological point of view that his poor background and 
presumably difficult years as a teenager when his parents and other family members died in quick 
succession, in addition to the terrible years of war he experienced, may have made him more 
determined to succeed and build up wealth as a form of protection.  
111  The notion of a ‘community’ is a complex one which certainly needs investigation for the 
colonial Cape. It is now widely accepted that ‘all communities larger than primordial villages of face-
to-face contact … are imagined’; B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and 
Spread of Nationalism (London, 1983), 15. In addition, historians of colonial societies elsewhere have 
shown that the notion of a unified community hardly ever existed; as J.F. Martin has demonstrated for 
New England, ‘not one single community, but, rather, several different communities existed within 
each town’; Profits in the Wilderness: Entrepreneurship and the Founding of New England Towns in 
the Seventeenth Century (Chapel Hill, 1991), 235. Which communities existed within Cape Town, how 
they were imagined and in what ways they interacted and connected with one another, are questions 
which require an in-depth study of their own. 
112  All three these families had farms in the Tijgerberg, although some also owned others. On 
Aletta and Beatrix Verweij, see Schoeman, ’n Duitser aan die Kaap, 231-35. 











both an Orphan master and as one of the Burgher Councillors – the highest public 
office a free burgher could hold at the Cape. He served several more terms as an 
Orphan master in the 1720s and was continuously re-elected as Burgher Councillor 
until the end of 1738 when he retired from public office.114  
 In just over twenty years Eksteen managed to reach the highest political office 
a free burgher could attain at the Cape while his social prestige was such that already 
in 1723, when he and Johannes Blankenberg were involved in a fracas with the 
Governor, they were referred to als van de considerabelste deeser ingesetenen sijnde 
(‘as being [part] of the most considerable of these inhabitants’).115 His standing 
amongst his fellow burghers is reflected in his election to lieutenant and, shortly 
thereafter, to captain of the burgher militia in 1725 – once again the highest rank 
possible in this public body. During the 1720s Eksteen also acted as a fire warden, 
which made him one of very few free burghers in the history of Dutch Cape Town to 
have held every public office open to him. There can be no doubt that Eksteen’s 
entrepreneurial activities enabled him not only to prove himself but also to increase 
his wealth, power and prestige. 
 
But the social prestige and increasing respect that Eksteen commanded in the 1720s 
did not weaken his entrepreneurial skills or desire to expand his business enterprises. 
During the 1720s Eksteen continued to invest in property and land, buying at least 
three more freehold farms and two town properties over and above those he owned in 
1718. By this stage his capital base was so large that he could, with the exception of 
his fishing activities, concentrate on agricultural ventures. He continued to buy 
livestock at auctions throughout this period and by 1731 had doubled his number of 
oxen. Presumably he must have regularly sold off his sheep to the meat pachters since 
the number of his sheep did not increase much during this period.116 During the 1730s 
he also concentrated on horse breeding since the number of his horses doubled during 
that decade. In addition, the ever alert Eksteen also exploited the Company’s attempts 
to introduce wool farming to South Africa, though this time with less success: in 1725 
the VOC imported Kirman goats from Persia which, the Company hoped, could be 
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5-9. 
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interbred at the Cape with other goats or sheep to produce wool sheep. The procedure 
was complicated and Eksteen, given his background in Germany and his 
entrepreneurial skill, was asked to take on the project. By 1735, however, he had to 
report that his attempts were not successful.117 All of these activities required a large 
labour force and thus Eksteen’s slave holding increased from forty-six in 1718 to one 
hundred by 1731 and a hundred and twenty-five ten years later, in addition to some 
Khoi workers.118 The large increase in the 1720s was likely the result of his growing 
agricultural concerns. Between 1731 and 1741 the median number of slaves arable 
farmers had in the Cape district fluctuated between fifteen and twenty-two; while in 
1731 only nineteen percent of farmers in the Cape district had slave holdings of more 
than twenty slaves.119 Eksteen’s large number of slaves (no doubt spread out over a 
number of farms) must have made him one of the biggest, if not the biggest, slave 
owners outside of the VOC itself at the Cape of Good Hope.120 These slaves serve 
both as an indication of Eksteen’s wealth but also as a reminder of what made his 
economic expansion possible in Cape society.  
 
Eksteen the Entrepreneur: Meat Provision and Social Ascendancy 
 
In 1719 Eksteen married his third wife, Alida van der Heijde, who was to bear him 
twelve children and outlive him by more than forty years. Eksteen’s relations with the 
Cruijwagen family did not suffer from this at all – in fact, it seems that he tended to 
keep the contacts he built up through his marriages and various undertakings 
throughout his life. Both the Cruijwagens and the Van der Heijdens played a major 
role in the success of Eksteen during the 1720-30s. Thus their own networks brought 
in a larger circle of potential creditors and helpers, for example his sister-in-law 
Catharina Cruijwagen married Cornelis Heufke, the son of one of the major pachters 
                                                 
117  For a variety of climatic and other reasons; cf. De Wet, Resolusies IX, 10-11 and Thom, 
Geskiedenis van die Skaapboerdery, 264-65.  
118  N. Penn, The Forgotten Frontier: Colonist and Khoisan on the Cape’s Northern Frontier in 
the 18th Century (Athens, OH and Cape Town, 2005), 298 n. 124. 
119  Worden, Slavery in Dutch South Africa, 29 and 32.  
120  We unfortunately do not know much about his slaves, but it seems likely that there must have 
been specialisation in such a large labour force, as was the case with Martin Melck’s similarly large 











of the 1720-30s, Johannes Heufke; while in 1730 his brother-in-law Willem van der 
Heijden married Helena Josina Esser, the daughter of the alcohol pachter Isaac 
Esser.121 Most importantly, however, was that Johannes Cruijwagen, Eksteen’s former 
brother-in-law, entered the meat pacht in 1728 with Eksteen as one of his sureties.122 
The timing of this is not coincidental. Jan Mijndertsz Cruijwagen had died shortly 
before this, leaving his large estate to his two children and his surviving Eksteen 
grandchild.123 It may well have been this injection of cash which convinced Eksteen 
to join Cruijwagen and his new father-in-law Pieter Jurgen van der Heijden in the 
meat pacht. The financial security, large land and stockholdings, and the large circle 
of contacts and connections that these families had built up over the years, made it 
possible for them to control the most lucrative trade at the Cape for almost two 
decades.  
 By the late 1720s, with the combined resources of all these family 
connections, Eksteen felt financially secure enough to embark on his biggest venture 
yet, the meat pacht. The meat pacht differed substantially from the alcohol pacht. The 
fact that there were no pachtpenningen to be paid made it seem easier to enter, but the 
sheer size of the operation, and the investments and contacts that it required, made it 
something that only financially very stable people with good contacts among the 
cattle farmers could take on. The risks were phenomenal: the successful bidders 
secured the contract by offering to provide the Company with meat for an extended 
period at a rate offered by them at the start of that period, i.e. without knowing exactly 
what either the demand (dependant on the number of ships) or the supply (dependant 
on the state of the stock holdings in the Colony and farmers’ willingness to sell at a 
certain price) would be.124 To minimise this risk, which was compounded by the fact 
that the Company was most unlikely to change the terms of the contract once it had 
                                                 
121  Heese and Lombard, Genealogies, vol. 2, 233 and vol. 3, 355. 
122  On Johannes Cruijwagen as meat pachter, see Cruywagen, Die Cruywagens, 202-10; and on 
his activities as commando leader (‘protecting’ his herds of livestock and interests on the pastoral 
frontier), see Penn, Forgotten Frontier, 66-70. 
123  Eksteen had three children with Everdina Cruijwagen, but only the eldest, Catharina Rosina, 
survived infancy.  
124  The pachters had to provide a very good rate (cost price or even less) to the VOC in exchange 
for the monopoly right to provide meat to foreign ships. As the number of the latter fluctuated wildly 
during this period, the business of providing meat to the port could be very risky. Cf. page 37 above for 











been accepted, a meat pachter needed good stock holdings of his own, in addition to 
sizeable amounts of land and labour. These Eksteen possessed by this stage, unlike his 
position in 1713 when he unsuccessfully applied for the meat pacht.  
 Eksteen plausibly entered the meat pacht because of the involvement of his 
former brother-in-law, Johannes Cruijwagen who took on one quarter of the pacht in 
1728.125 In the following year, the pacht was awarded to Cruijwagen, Eksteen and the 
latter’s father-in-law, Pieter Jurgen van der Heijden, along with Jacob van Bochem, a 
former alcohol pachter. As an experiment, the VOC authorities awarded them the 
contract for a three-year period, a sure indication that the quartet was deemed capable 
of providing the goods.126 This they did to the satisfactions of all parties concerned, 
for in 1732 all four successfully ensured the meat pacht for the following five years. 
Van Bochem died but was replaced as meat pachter by Aletta van Es, who was 
related to the other three by marriage, in 1737 when they received a contract for 
another five years.127 Although Eksteen died in 1741 his obligations continued until 
the expiry of the contract. His estate was clearly well geared towards this business, for 
in 1742 his widow was part of the quartet who was awarded the meat pacht for a 
further five years.128  
  
A Cape Entrepreneur 
 
Thus ended the entrepreneurial activities of Eksteen after almost forty years at the 
Cape. His career illustrates clearly how it was possible for someone without capital to 
increase his wealth by exploiting opportunities, even at a place like the VOC Cape 
colony with its very limited opportunities for free trade. Entrepreneurship can flourish 
under the most adverse of conditions, and Eksteen clearly made use of almost every 
opportunity that the Cape did offer: starting with the alcohol retail trade – which was 
the easiest to enter and one which offered continuity and the possibility of expansion. 
This he successfully exploited for fifteen years during which he used his profits to 
diversify his assets and to invest in agriculture. By the 1720s he could concentrate on 
his wide-ranging agricultural concerns, while also having a very profitable sideline 
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providing fish to a stable market. In the last decade of his life his expertise and 
experience of life at the Cape helped him to make a success of the most profitable, but 
also the greatest risk-bearing, enterprise at the Cape – providing the VOC and passing 
ships with a regular supply of meat. However, even though this would have ensured a 
very sizeable profit, Eksteen could not resist opportunities to speculate, even in the 
1730s when he was very wealthy – some of this paid off handsomely, such as his soap 
hoarding, while others, like his experiment with wool farming, was doomed to failure. 
It was Eksteen’s ability to grasp opportunities and his willingness to take on risks 
which made him the wealthiest man at the Cape in the 1730s, not the capital which he 
did not possess when he started off in 1705.129  
 Not only did Eksteen’s entrepreneurial activities enable him to be successful 
during his own lifetime, it also laid the foundation for an influential eighteenth-
century Cape dynasty.130 As already mentioned, his wife was able to live wealthily 
and expand her business interests for another four decades, while most of his 
(legitimate) children entered advantageous alliances with other families. Only two of 
Eksteen’s children were married by the time he died in 1741, but the marriage pattern 
of his children, most of who wed during the 1740s, reveals the extent of the large 
social network Eksteen had built up. Most of his daughters married medium-ranking 
VOC officials: the minister Henricus Cock (in the mid-1730s), the administrators 
Joachim Prehn (1739) and Jan Raeck (1746), and the surgeon Rijno Berthault de St. 
Jean. The latter was the son of the chief surgeon, and his sister shortly thereafter 
married Eksteen’s namesake and oldest surviving son in 1744. The other son Petrus 
Michiel married Sophia Cloete, from a foremost burgher family, who was also related 
to the wealthy Loubser farming family, one of whose sons also married an Eksteen 
                                                 
129  Cf. note 11 above.  
130  In psychological terms, one could note that it may have been pride in this achievement which 
made him request in his will of 1739 that his estate not be broken up after his death: ‘en dewijl ik niet 
en begeer dat den boedel daarom sal moeten vercogt werden, maar integendeel dat mijn gemelte 
huijsvrouw … in het volle bezit gelaten werden…’ and ‘zoo wil en begeer ik niet dat zig ijmand anders 
met mijne kinderen of goederen bemoeijen sal, ten dien eijnde uijtsluijtende alle magistraaten, de 
weescamer, soo hier als elders, of wie ook eenig gezag of bewind daar over zouden kunnen of 











daughter.131 These children and their descendants were destined to play influential 
roles in colonial Cape society.  
 Although Eksteen’s was an exceptional life in terms of his many successes, 
the mechanisms he used in his upward mobility are not. Much has been written about 
the growth of the Cape gentry, but little work has been done on how it came about: 
what were the actual mechanisms which made it possible for a fairly homogenous 
group of free burghers (in terms of cultural background and economic possibilities) in 
the mid-seventeenth century to develop into a stratified society with a clearly 
identifiable elite within less than century? This chapter has started to fill that gap by 
illustrating the usefulness of applying the concept of entrepreneurialism to 
understanding the rise of the Cape gentry, while also showing that some aspects of it 
(such as its supposed rural roots and the role of endogamy) need to be revisited. 
Eksteen’s remarkable career is exemplary of how the Cape, despite the strictures of 
the VOC monopoly, did offer sufficient opportunities for an entrepreneurial 
individual to create wealth, not least of which was the relatively easy accessibility of 
the alcohol pachten. The outcome of Eksteen’s life: from poor beginnings in 
Lobenstein to leaving a dynasty of wealthy children marrying into successful families 
at the Cape of Good Hope is a felicitous example of the principle underlying social 
capital – one which is so crucial to all entrepreneurial success: Connections count. 
The next two chapters investigate in detail how these kinship networks and social 
capital operated at the Cape, and how these strategies changed over time.  
 
                                                 
















IMMIGRANTS, KINSHIP AND SOCIAL CAPITAL IN CAPE TOWN: THE ALCOHOL 
PACHTERS OF THE 1730S 
 
By the 1730s Cape Town, some eight decades after its founding, was beginning to 
change from a small face-to-face community where most people knew one another to 
a more settled and complex society. We know that by 1731 the town had a population 
of at least 3 157, of whom well nigh forty-five percent were unfree (slaves and 
convicts). The free population consisted of three categories. The biggest group 
comprised the VOC employees (959), most of whom were soldiers stationed in the 
garrison or Company administrators. The smallest group was the two hundred free 
blacks about whom relatively little is known. The free burghers living in Cape Town 
came to 585, which included 151 men and 127 women, with about three hundred 
children between them.1 Of these roughly one hundred or so burgher households in 
Cape Town, we know very little. Yet, as Leonard Guelke and Robert Shell have 
pointed out, in 1731 a remarkable thirty-eight percent of the Cape Colony’s free 
population lived in Cape Town.2 Cape historians are still a long way off from fully 
understanding the development of a free burgher community in VOC Cape Town, but 
the case study of the pachters of the 1730s presented in this chapter provides some 
important pointers and suggestions.  
 The period 1730-39 is a generation after the early years of the century during 
which Hendrik Oostwald Eksteen started to build up his wealth through investment in 
the alcohol pachten. A close study of the alcohol pachters of this decade affords an 
opportunity to determine the role of alcohol retail in the socio-economic life of Cape 
Town during the early-mid eighteenth century. What was the composition of the body 
of pachters during this period and in what ways did they invest in the alcohol pacht? 
How did they raise capital, and what were the function and nature of business 
networks? How did the fact that Cape Town during this period was a growing 
settlement with many newcomers affect the type of alliances entered into and the 
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ways in which alcohol entrepreneurs operated? In an attempt to answer these 
questions for the 1730s, this chapter aims to help Cape historians understand the 
social dynamics operating in VOC Cape Town.  
 This chapter is not concerned with the operation or the economics of the 
alcohol pacht system at the Cape. Instead it presents a synchronic analysis of a group 
of people who had one thing in common: they invested in the alcohol retail business 
during the 1730s. By making use of a combination of prosopography or collective 
biography3 and the analysis of certain qualitative material, it addresses the following 
topics: what factors in their background or their VOC careers played a role in the 
success of some pachters but not others; and to what an extent did kin and social 
networks aid their advancement? In short, what factors influenced social mobility at 
the Cape during this period?  
 
The Pachters of the 1730s: A Prosopography  
 
There were twenty-seven individuals who invested in the alcohol pacht during the 
decade 1730-39.4 Their activities in this business were not restricted to this decade, 
since some began their involvement years before 1730 and others continued into the 
1740s and 1750s. Overall the twenty-seven pachters who form the database for this 
chapter (see table 4.2) held pachten from 1718 to 1758 so that their pacht activities 
covered most of the first half of the eighteenth century. Not every pachter was of 
course successful, and a measure of this is the number of pachten a person bought in 
his or her career as a pachter. As demonstrated in chapter two, during the whole 
period of alcohol pachten at the Cape, the vast majority (seventy-five percent) of 
                                                 
3  See pages 49-50 above for a discussion of this methodology.   
4  The sources for compiling this prosopography are varied. They include, in addition to the 
pacht contracts (CA, C 2697-2729), A.J. Böeseken and G.C. de Wet (eds), Resolusies van die Politieke 
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Lombard, Suid-Afrikaanse Geslagregisters / South African Genealogies (15 vols, Pretoria and 
Stellenbosch, 1986-2007); J. Hoge, ‘Personalia of the Germans at the Cape, 1652-1806’, Archives Year 
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pachters invested in five or fewer pachten, while the single largest group (thirty-seven 
percent) was formed by those who only ever bought one pacht. Only thirty-three 
individuals (seventeen percent) held ten or more pachten. This pattern largely held the 
same for the 1730s as well, when two-thirds of all pachters active during this period 
bought fewer than ten pachten in total, with the majority only ever buying one or two. 
But the number of people who invested in ten or more is larger than the overall figure: 
fully one third of all 1730s pachters (nine in total) were in this category (see table 
4.1). The reasons for this are not quite clear, but probably relate to the greater 
economic stability of the Cape during this period and the fact that the pacht system 
had overcome the uncertainty of its early years. In addition, the introduction of the 
generaele pacht system during this decade may also have influenced this pattern.5 
Whatever the case may be, it is important to realise that throughout the history of 
alcohol pachten at the Cape, only a small number of those who became pachters were 
seriously involved in this business. Many invested in the alcohol retail business, but 
for one reason or another were not successful enough to continue. It is crucial in any 
analysis of the alcohol pachters to distinguish between these two groups. I therefore 
differentiate between the minor pachters (those who invested in nine or fewer pachten 
during their whole career) and the dominant or major pachters (those who held ten or 
more pachten).  
 
Table 4.1: Number of Pachten Bought by Individual Pachters 





   
1 73 (37%) 8 (30%) 
2 33 (17%) 2 (7%) 
3-5 41 (21%) 5 (19%) 
6-9 18 (9%) 3 (11%) 
10+ 33 (17%) 9 (33%) 
Total 198 27 
Source: CA, C 2697-2731 and RLR 163 
 
                                                 














The pachter world of the 1730s was, officially at least, a male one: only two of the 
twenty-seven pachters were women, although this is high considering that overall less 
than five percent of pachters at the Cape were women. While the numbers may be 
low, investment in the alcohol trade was, as we have seen in chapter two, one of the 
few areas of economic life where women could compete with men in public. The 
more so since the official figures are no true reflection of reality: although the 
contracts may have been in the husbands’ names, it is clear that in many, if not most, 
cases both husband and wife were involved in the running of the business.6  
 The pachter world of this decade was also one of immigrants. Of the twenty-
seven pachters, only six were born at the Cape, including the two women pachters.7 
This means that the vast majority of the 1730s pachters arrived in Cape Town as 
Company employees and subsequently became free burghers. Of these immigrants, 
eight hailed from the Netherlands, twelve from German-speaking areas and one from 
Denmark. The large number of immigrants and the prevalence of Germans were very 
typical of the pachter scene in the first half of the eighteenth century.8 It reflects both 
the realities of immigration to South Africa at this time, with high numbers of German 
immigrants settling at the Cape,9 and, very clearly, the importance of networking 
among alcohol traders (on which, see the discussion below). 
 
 
                                                 
6  See pages 59-62 above for a discussion of the role of women in alcohol retail in Cape Town. 
The close involvement of both husband and wife in the risky (and demanding) business of investment 
in the alcohol pachten may also explain the rather high rate of marital discord among pachters of this 
period: the wives of at least four of the 1730s pachters (Jacobus Marshoorn, Carel van Hartmansdorf, 
Godlieb Christiaan Opperman and Daniel Lourich) started divorce proceedings against them during 
this decade; cf. CA, CJ 826, 65-66; CJ 829, 108-11, 122-24 and 132-33; CJ 839, 1-4, 85-86, 91-92, 
106-7, 147, 168-69 and 176-77; and CJ 831, 44, 49, 58, 67-70 and 100-101. Isaac Maartensz also 
became divorced later, in 1752.  
7  Jan Hendrik van Helsdingen came to the Cape with his parents as a child in 1696. He was 
never a Company employee.  
8  See pages 57-59 above on the large number of German immigrants among alcohol pachters at 
the Cape, and, for an overview of the involvement of Germans in the alcohol trade; Moritz, Deutschen 
am Kap, 155-65. K. Schoeman, ’n Duitser aan die Kaap, 1724-1765: Die Lewe en Loopbaan van 
Hendrik Schoeman (Pretoria, 2004), 147-82 provides a discussion of the German immigrant 
community at the Cape during the period under discussion.  

















Table 4.2: Alcohol Pachters at the Cape, 1730-39 




    
Backer,  Noach Dutch 1735 1 
Beck, Johann Zacharias German 1723-1737 15 
Boetendagh,  Carel German 1731-1739 14 ½  
Conterman,  Hans Jacob German 1718-1734 9 
Coster,  Maria Cape 1728-1732 3 
Eversdijk,  Hendrik Dutch 1730-1736 2 
Heufke,  Johannes sr German 1727-1731 10 
Honk,  Hans Jurgen German 1738-1743 9 
Lourich,  Daniel German 1737 1 
Le Roux,  Jan jr Cape 1736-1739 4 
Leever,  Abraham Dutch 1727-1758 28 ⅔ 
Maartensz,  Isaac Dutch 1735-1741 7 
Marshoorn,  Jacobus Dutch 1735 1 
Opperman, Godlieb German 1730-1734 4 
Pentz, Michiel German 1736-1752 17 ⅔ 
Raams, Willem Dutch 1734 1 
Rabe, Christiaan Danish 1739 1 
Schreuder, Jan Jurgen German 1738-1752 13 
Sprangel, Jan German 1732-1735 2 
Thomasz, Hendrik German 1731 1 
Van Dam, Josina Cape 1730-1731 5 
Van der Spuij, Melt Dutch 1722-1733 20 
Van der Swijn, Jan Dutch 1732-1747 19 ⅔ 
                                                 
10  The years in this column refer to pacht years, i.e. from 1 September the previous calendar year 














Van Dijk, Burgert Cape 1734 1 
Van Dijk, Hendrik Cape 1725-1734 11 
Van Hartmansdorf, Carel German 1736 1 
Van Helsdingen, Jan Cape 1728-1733 3 
Source: C 2697-2731 and RLR 163 and Genealogical Data 
 
Did a person’s earlier career in the VOC play a role in his subsequent career as a 
pachter, i.e. was there a link between one’s rank in the Company and later success as 
an entrepreneur? Of the twenty-one individuals in the 1730s group who were VOC 
employees, the rank of eighteen could be traced. Only two of them came out as 
matrozen (‘sailors’), the majority (ten) were soldaten (‘soldiers’), while six of them 
held higher ranks: three were adelborsten (‘sea cadets’), while there were one each of 
a corporal, a landspassaat (a rank junior to corporal) and a sergeant. Two of the 
adelborsten and the corporal, Abraham Leever, Jan van der Swijn and Melt van der 
Spuij, became the most active alcohol pachters of this period with twenty or more 
pachten each. The first two also had several years as assistenten (‘assistants’) – the 
lowest rank in the civil service of the VOC11 – at the Cape before becoming free 
burghers. Similarly, another major pachter, Michiel Pentz, who had a lengthy career 
in VOC service, rose through the ranks from soldier to become a boekhouder (‘book-
keeper’).12 Clearly, their superior literacy and extensive knowledge of the VOC 
administration, in addition to the links they must have built up during their service, 
must have helped these men in achieving their later success as entrepreneurs.13 
 Could there also be a link regarding the length of the period between arriving 
at the Cape, becoming a free burgher and investing in a pacht for the first time? On 
                                                 
11  The administrative or civil (as opposed to the military) sector of the VOC was divided into six 
categories of rank, with the governor-general at the head of the first one. The lowest of the ranks was 
that of ‘assistant’. The names of the ranks were derived from the merchant origins of the Company, but 
a rank did not necessarily equate with somebody’s actual function; cf. F. Lequin, ‘Het Personeel van de 
Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie in Azië in de Achttiende Eeuw, Meer in het Bijzonder in de 
Vestiging Bengalen’ (unpublished PhD thesis, Leiden University, 1982), 48-50 and 343. 
12  A boekhouder was the rank above an ‘assistant’ and below that of an onderkoopman (‘junior 
merchant’); ibid.  















average, the 1730s pachters were in VOC service at the Cape for six years after 
arrival, ranging from a minimum of one to a maximum of thirteen years. The range 
for the period between receiving their free-burgher papers and becoming a pachter 
was considerably bigger, from one to twenty-nine years, with an average of eight 
years. But two cases are highly exceptional and should be discarded,14 which brings 
the figure down to six years. In and of itself the information regarding the period 
between burgerschap (‘citizenship’) and pacht-holding is not meaningful. Significant 
trends may, however, be discerned when this information is used in combination with 
the answers to the following question: what factors led people to first buy a pacht? 
 
Table 4.3: Careers of the 1730s Pachters 





      
Backer,  Noach matroos 13 10   
Beck, Johann Zacharias soldaat 7 1 x d 
Boetendagh, Carel soldaat 2 9 x d 
Conterman, Hans Jacob soldaat 5 20   
Eversdijk,  Hendrik adelborst 3 11 x d 
Heufke,  Johannes unknown 1 29  d 
Honk,  Hans Jurgen soldaat 11 4 xx  
Lourich,  Daniel soldaat 6 4 x  
Leever,  Abraham korporaal 5 3  d 
Maartensz,  Isaac unknown ? ? ?  
Marshoorn,  Jacobus matroos 5 12 x  
Opperman,  Godlieb soldaat 4 1 xx w 
Pentz,  Michiel soldaat 12 1   
                                                 
14  Hans Jacob Conterman and Johannes Heufke, both of whom only invested in the alcohol 
pachten in their old age, after having made their fortunes in other ways.  
15  The numbers in the columns ‘(arrival > burgher)’ and ‘(burgher > pachter)’ refer to years. 
16  In this column an ‘x’ indicates service as bijtapper before becoming a free burgher, and an 
‘xx’ after being a free burgher. 














Raams,  Willem unknown ? ? ? d 
Rabe,  Christiaan landspas. 7 9 x  
Schreuder,  Jan Jurgen soldaat 6 8 x?  
Sprangel,  Jan soldaat 9 1 x  
Thomasz,  Hendrik soldaat 7 15 x  
Van der Spuij,  Melt adelborst 7 7 xx d 
Van der Swijn,  Jan adelborst 8 1 x w 
Van Hartmansdorf, Carel sersant 3 6  w 
Source: Genealogical Data; Resolusies; Requesten 
 
One noticeable result of the tabulation of the period between receiving burgerschap 
and first pacht-holding is that five individuals became pachters within a year after 
being released from Company employment. Obviously these two events must be 
related. It comes as no surprise, then, to learn that three of these men married into 
pacht families shortly after becoming burghers, and that they bought their first pacht a 
few months thereafter. Godlieb Opperman and Jan van der Swijn married the widows 
Maria Coster and Josina van Dam, who were at that stage pachters in their own rights 
after the decease of their pachter husbands. Johann Zacharias Beck married Elsje van 
As, the step-daughter of the pachter Christiaan Maasdorp (who was active as pachter 
between 1717 and 1726).18 Marriage was a major avenue which led to becoming a 
pachter: at least ten of the 1730s pachters married either a widow or a (step-) 
daughter of a pachter (see table 4.3).19 That this entrance into pacht-holding was of 
significant advantage is shown by the fact that six of these men were part of the group 
of dominant pachters who invested in more than ten pachten.20 This means that two 
                                                 
18  The other two men who became pachters within a year after becoming burghers also married 
women with some link to pacht-holding: Michiel Pentz’s wife was the daughter of Jan Oberholtzer 
who acted as bijtapper in the 1720s; while Jan Sprangel’s wife was a cousin of the wife of the alcohol 
pachter Johann Zacharias Beck.  
19  Johannes Heufke sits oddly with the rest of these since he only became a pachter late in his 
life (at the age of 57) after the death of his first wife, Aletta Botma, although he was very familiar with 
this business due to extensive family involvement in it through most of its early existence. See the 
discussion below.  
20  Of the other three who make up this elite group of nine, the wives of at least two also had 














out of every three of the major alcohol pachters of the 1730s married into the 
business.   
 Another avenue to pacht-holding was through previous employment by a 
pachter. As discussed in chapter one above, most pachters were allowed to employ 
so-called bijtappers to assist them in the running of their retail business or to run 
additional taverns on their behalf.21 These bijtappers could be free burghers, even 
other pachters,22 but were mostly so-called leenknechten (‘loan servants’).23 
Considering that would-be pachters during the 1730s were at the Cape on average six 
years before becoming free burghers, they had ample opportunity to serve as 
knechten. Thus we find that thirteen pachters of the 1730s cohort served as bijtappers 
before they first became pachters, ten of whom did so as knechten, who were 
variously referred to in the contracts as tappersknecht (‘tavern or bar servant’), 
brouwersknecht (‘brewing servant’) or wijnverlater (‘wine seller’). In this way many 
would-be pachters served something of an apprenticeship with established pachters; 
thereby gaining valuable experience, or what economists would call ‘human capital’ – 
the skills and knowledge which give one an advantage in business activity. And with 
regards to this aspect as well, the major or dominant pachters of the 1730s had an 
advantage: at least five of them had experience as a bijtapper in their early career 
before first becoming pachters.24 
                                                                                                                                            
bijtapper. In addition, Jan Jurgen Schreuder was the second husband of Grisella Sweetmans who 
followed in the footsteps of her first husband, Jan Stavorinus, by working herself as a bijtapper in the 
late 1720s; cf. CA, CJ 333, 295. 
21  See pages 35-36 above on the bijtap issue.  
22  Since being a pachter meant that one owned the right to sell a specific type of alcohol, and 
could contract others to do so on one’s behalf, it was possible for a person to act as bijtapper for more 
than one pachter at the same time. Thus a brandy pachter may also act as a bijtapper for the Cape 
wines pachter thereby selling both brandy and wine in one locale.  
23  This was a system whereby a VOC employee such as a soldier could be released to work for a 
free burgher on an annual contract, without officially leaving the service of the Company. Often these 
contracts were renewed for years; see O.F. Mentzel, A Geographical and Topographical Description of 
the Cape of Good Hope (translated by H.J. Mandelbrote, G.V. Marais and J. Hoge) (3 vols, Cape 
Town, 1921, 1925 and 1944), vol. 1, 164-66 for a discussion of the system.  
24  They are: Johann Zacharias Beck, Carel Boetendagh, Jan Jurgen Schreuder, Melt van der 














 What, though, of the other third who became pachters in the 1730s but who 
neither married into a pacht family nor acted as bijtappers? There seems to be no 
factor unifying this group. Two of them were once-off investors.25 Two more invested 
in the very minor Stellenbosch pacht – they were essentially farmers who did some 
speculation on the side.26 But the rest form a heterogeneous group, albeit a fairly 
successful one – two of them ended up investing in more than ten pachten each, viz. 
Michiel Pentz and Hendrik van Dijk. What these people do have in common with all 
the other individuals who invested in alcohol pachten is that they were entrepreneurs 
who saw the system of alcohol pachten as a means to realise their desire for wealth, 
power and prestige.27 Yet not all of them were successful; nor were the playing fields 
level. This exercise in collective biography has shown that the ‘average’ pachter in 
the 1730s was male, an ex-Company soldier of German descent with some experience 
as a bijtapper. Some of the most successful pachters, though, did not fit this profile. 
What then was needed to make a success of the alcohol retail trade during this period? 
 
Compatriots, Kinship and Social Capital  
 
Investing in an alcohol pacht required at least some capital: by the second half of the 
1730s the Cape wine pacht was auctioned off for f 25-30 000 – this at a time when a 
soldier earned little more than f 100 a year or one could buy a healthy slave for about f 
300. Clearly it would have been impossible for an ex-Company employee, even at the 
rank of assistent or boekhouder with an annual income of around f 300,28 to save such 
vast amounts of money. Generally very few pachters started their careers by buying 
one of the expensive Cape wine pachten, but even the smaller pachten would require 
a capital layout in excess of f 1 000. Of course, rich farmers like Johannes Heufke, 
                                                 
25  Noach Backer and Burgert van Dijk, neither of whom ever acted as a bijtapper nor married 
into a pacht-holding family (although Burgert’s once-off investment may be related to the death of his 
cousin, Hendrik van Dijk, in 1734 after the latter had invested in eleven pachten between 1725 and 
1734).  
26  They were Hans Jacob Conterman and Jan le Roux who between them held the Stellenbosch 
pacht during the 1730s. This pacht produced in total f 7790 for the VOC during the whole decade, less 
than what one of the four parts of the Cape wine pacht produced in 1730 alone.  
27  These three elements constitute Clé Lesger’s definition of an early modern entrepreneur; cf. 
page 97 above.   














who only entered the alcohol trade late in his life, could amass capital over many 
years – it therefore comes as no surprise that he entered the pacht business by buying 
Cape wine and brandy pachten in his first year, costing him more than f 10 000. Most 
pachters, though, particularly those who recently left Company employment, needed 
access to credit.29 But the first hurdle a prospective pachter needed to overcome was 
to find sureties. As discussed in chapter one, the VOC, in order to ensure its income 
from the pachten, insisted that every pacht sold be underwritten by two solvent 
sureties who signed the contract alongside the pachter.30 Without sufficient credit and 
sureties, nobody could become a pachter. 
 Credit was indispensable to the early modern period entrepreneur, especially 
as most areas suffered from insufficient amounts of specie.31 At the Cape of Good 
Hope there existed during this period no loan banks such as in the big European cities. 
There were instead three alternative sources for personal credit: the Poor Fund of the 
Cape church (known as the Diaconij), the Orphan Chamber (Weeskamer) and loans 
from private individuals. Both the Orphan Chamber and the Diaconij possessed 
sizeable funds which were managed by loaning parts of them on interest – even the 
Council of Policy was known to loan from these bodies at times (which is a sure 
indicator of the shortage of specie at the Cape which only received fresh money when 
visiting ships called).32 Prospective pachters during the 1730s certainly made use of 
loans from both the Poor Fund33 and the Orphan Chamber.34 But such loans could be 
                                                 
29  Although pachters did not have to pay the money they offered for a pacht upfront, the first 
payment was due within six months, and the Company did not wait for its payment. It regularly sued 
pachters who were late with their payments; cf. page 35 above.  
30  Every different pacht needed two sureties, so a major pachter needed a pool. This duty was 
taken very seriously by all involved; see pages 34-35 above on the role of sureties in the alcohol pacht 
business.  
31  See J. Hoppit, ‘Attitudes to Credit in Britain, 1680-1790’, The Historical Journal 33 (1990), 
305-22. 
32  See on these bodies and their role in providing credit, G.J. Erasmus, ‘Die Geskiedenis van die 
Bedryfslewe aan die Kaap, 1652 tot 1795’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of the Orange Free 
State, 1986), 306-10 and R. Ross, ‘The Cape of Good Hope and the World Economy, 1652-1835’ in R. 
Elphick and H. Giliomee (eds), The Shaping of South African Society, 1652-1840 (Second edition, 
Cape Town, 1989), 258-60.  
33  The loss of most of the Church council’s minutes for the first half of the eighteenth century 














difficult to obtain because of the need to provide mortgage, and the fact that both 
institutions were very keen on regular payment of interest.  
 Like most traders in early modern Europe,35 pachters tended to rely on private 
sources of credit, which were readily available at the Cape and usually at one percent 
less interest than that charged by more formal bodies such as the Diaconij and the 
Orphan Chamber. In providing credit, private rentiers played an important role.36 
There lived during this period in Cape Town a group of well-off people with ready 
cash to invest, ranging from wealthy widows37 to retired Company servants38 and 
even high Company officials. Thus it is noticeable how often the governor, Jan de la 
Fontaine, loaned large sums to private individuals during the 1730s, also to 
pachters.39 It is regular and continuous access to the crucial commodity of sufficient 
credit which may well explain the differences in the careers of successful alcohol 
pachters and those of the once-off or small-scale investors.  
 As discussed with reference to Hendrik Oostwald Eksteen in the previous 
chapter, entrepreneurs required ‘social capital’ in addition to their financial and 
human capital. In short, this means the help a person could rely on from his or her 
social network consisting of family, friends and other relations. As Clé Lesger has 
                                                                                                                                            
one surviving volume of this era, covering 1719-24, it is clear that several pachters used the Diaconij 
to help fund their investments; NGKA, G 1 1/2. Hans Jurgen Honk, for instance, owed the Diaconij 
two hundred rixdollars at his death in 1743; CA, MOOC 8/6 no. 59. 
34  For example, of the 1730s pachters, Hendrik Thomasz had an obligation of f 3 000 with the 
Orphan Chamber in 1735 while Jan le Roux junior owed this institution some 2 000 rixdollars plus 
back interest in 1752; CA, MOOC 8/5 no. 133 and 8/7 no. 50. 
35  Hoppit, ‘Attitudes to Credit’, 315 and 318. 
36  See Ross, ‘Cape of Good Hope’, 259 on private rentiers at the Cape.  
37  In 1731, three of the six people described unqualifiedly by Governor de la Fontaine as ‘well-
off’ or ‘rich’ were widows: Beatrix Verweij, Geertruij de With and Helena Gulix; L. Guelke, R. Shell 
and W. Whyte (eds), The De la Fontaine Report, 30th January 1732 (New Haven, 1990). See below for 
a discussion of Geertruij de With’s activities in this regard.  
38  An example of this was the former minister of religion, Henricus Beck, who lived in 
retirement in Cape Town after 1731 (until his death in 1755) – according to the cash book he kept, he 
loaned money to a variety of people throughout the half century he lived at the Cape, but particularly so 
during his retirement; CA, MOOC 14/19 no. 124. (Henricus Beck, who was of Dutch descent was no 
relation to the German Becks who also feature in this chapter).  
39  Thus, in 1732, Jan van der Swijn had a mortgage from the governor amounting to the very 














suggested, the value of a person’s social capital gets determined by three factors: (1) 
the size and scope of one’s social network; (2) the resources one’s friends and family 
have at their disposal, and, equally crucial, (3) their willingness to make these 
resources available.40 When one analyses the activities of the 1730s pachters in terms 
of this framework, it becomes clear that it was access to and the use of social capital, 
more than any factor in their backgrounds, which determined the success of some 
pachters over others.  
 When an ex-Company employee married into a pachter family, it meant he 
instantly gained access not only to capital and expertise, but also to a network of 
credit. This is borne out by the success of those 1730s pachters who married the 
daughters or widows of pachters. However, marriage would in and of itself not have 
been sufficient: for social capital to become a determining asset, all three of Lesger’s 
factors had to be met favourably. Clearly this would differ from one case to another, 
and would depend on the specific context. Let us look more closely at how a kinship 
network based on a shared ethnic background assisted one pachter in his rise to 
success.  
 The making of Johann Zacharias Beck as pachter illustrates both the value of 
marriage as an entrée to an established social network, and the importance of trust in 
business relations. As discussed in the previous chapter, due to the very high risk 
factor inherent in early modern business, trust was a vital resource in trying to 
minimise risk. At the Cape, as elsewhere, this translated into a high degree of 
endogamy in business relations: it was preferable to do business with people one 
knew, or who one felt certain one could trust. Hence the high preponderance of family 
members, people from the same town or region, or with the same social and cultural 
background among the business associates of early modern entrepreneurs. As Lesger 
succinctly explained this phenomenon: ‘the problem with foreigners [or strangers] 
was not that they were different, but that this “being different” made their behaviour 
                                                 
40  C. Lesger, ‘Over het Nut van Huwelijk, Opportunisme en Bedrog: Ondernemers en 
Ondernemerschap tijdens de Vroegmoderne Tijd in Theoretisch Perspectief’, in C.A. Davids, W. 
Fritschy and L.A. van der Valk (eds), Kapitaal, Ondernemerschap en Beleid: Studies over Economie 
en Politiek in Nederland, Europa en Azië van 1500 tot Heden (Amsterdam, 1996), 66. See pages 85-86 














unpredictable.’ 41 Entrepreneurs could not afford to add even more uncertainty to their 
business ventures, hence the reliance on what was familiar and trusted.  
 Thus it comes as no surprise that German pachters often employed German 
soldiers as knechten – people who would not only understand their language but who 
more than likely also shared a similar outlook and approach.42 This was the case with 
Johann Zacharias Beck. Hailing from Langensalza in Saxony, he arrived at the Cape 
in 1715 as a soldier.43 In 1719 he became loan knecht to a fellow German, Christiaan 
Maasdorp, who had been at the Cape since 1697. From 1716 Maasdorp had held the 
Rondebosch pacht and for this reason Beck was appointed specifically to act as his 
bijtapper. During this time Beck must have become acquainted with Maasdorp’s step-
daughter Elsje van As.44 Early in 1722, shortly after her mother’s death, Beck married 
her and in April that year applied to become a free burgher on the basis that he had 
recently entered into matrimony.45 By this stage Beck had had some three years 
experience as bijtapper and through his new father-in-law must have had good 
contacts in the alcohol retail world of Cape Town since, on 31 August 1722, he 
successfully bid for one of the Cape wine pachten at f 7 400. It is significant that he at 
once opted for a major and expensive pacht and not one of the minor ones. The 
following year he bought three pachten, paying a sizeable f 10 750 for them. Clearly 
he would not have been able to do so without the capital – both physical and social – 
that he had gained upon marriage into the established pachter community.46  
 Social capital, though, is not something one only acquires; one also needs to 
actively invest in it.47 This Beck did by promoting his fellow Germans. Thus he 
                                                 
41  ‘het probleem met vreemden is niet dat ze anders zijn, maar dat dit “anders zijn” hun gedrag 
onvoorspelbaar maakt’; Lesger, ‘Over het Nut’, 72-73. 
42  Cf. the knecht contracts for this period; CA, CJ 2880-2882.   
43  Hoge, ‘Personalia’, 19.  
44  Her mother Helena van der Merwe, the widow Van As, was Maasdorp’s second wife, whom 
he married in 1713.  
45  CA, C 1087, 57.  
46  On the links between Christiaan Maasdorp and Johann Zacharias Beck who during the early 
1720s acted as each other’s business partners; see D. de Villiers, ‘Milling, Drinking and Carnage on the 
Banks of the Liesbeek’, Familia 33/1 (1996), 19-21.  
47  Cf. Lesger, ‘Over het Nut’, 66 and H.D. Flap, ‘Patronage: An Institution in its Own Right’, in 
M. Hechter, K.-D. Opp and R. Wippler (eds), Social Institutions: Their Emergence, Maintenance and 














employed as a knecht, Jan Ludwig Leopold from his own home town, Langensalza, 
for fifteen years in succession.48 The operation of the German-Cape immigration 
network which must have existed during this period is illustrated even more clearly by 
the case of Johann Zacharias Beck’s brother, Johann Christoffel. He arrived at the 
Cape as a VOC soldier in 1724 but was loaned as a knecht to Johann Zacharias Beck 
within a year.49 It seems plausible that Beck’s becoming a free burgher in 1722, and 
his early success as an alcohol pachter, must have influenced him to encourage his 
brother to join him.  
 Johann Christoffel worked as his brother’s wijnverlater (‘wine seller’) for less 
than a year before asking and receiving his free-burgher papers in 1725. In 1726 he 
married Anna de Groot, whom he must have met through his brother’s alcohol pacht 
links. She was twice widowed: she had three children with her first husband, Gabriel 
Doman, but none from her second marriage to Rudolf Steenbock. Both of these had 
been pachters: Doman only once, but Steenbock acted as the malt beer pachter 
between 1713 and his death in 1725. The beer pachter operated from the farm 
Papenboom, on the banks of the Liesbeek, and it was during the early 1720s that 
Johann Zacharias Beck was active in this region as the Rondebosch pachter. It is 
highly plausible that it was here that Johann Christoffel worked as his knecht during 
the period that Anna de Groot became a widow. The marriage between Johann 
Christoffel Beck and Anna de Groot illustrates very well the social and economic 
links between German immigrants at the Cape during this era: Anna was the daughter 
of a German immigrant and all three her husbands were likewise German immigrants. 
Within a short while Johann Christoffel Beck became a large property-holder and a 
hugely successful and wealthy wine farmer along the Liesbeek.50  
 All of this investment in social capital by promoting and helping fellow 
German immigrants at the Cape paid off handsomely for Johann Zacharias Beck. 
Thus, most of the sureties of his alcohol pachten were family members such as his 
                                                 
48  CA, CJ 2881, 204-7. Leopold was employed between 1726 and 1741, and acted specifically as 
Beck’s kelderknecht (‘cellar servant’).  
49  CA, CJ 2881, 112.  
50  On Johann Christoffel Beck and his success at the Cape; see G. Groenewald, ‘Friends Old and 
New: The Lammens Sisters at the Cape, 1736’, Quarterly Bulletin of the National Library of South 














brother, Johann Christian, and brother-in-law, Willem van As.51 Or else they were 
fellow German immigrants such as Nicolaas Gockelius and Jurgen Schoester. This 
favour Beck returned by standing surety for fellow German pachters like Maria 
Coster and Godlieb Opperman.52 An illustration of just how advantageous these 
family connections with immigrant Germans could be to a pachter such as Johann 
Zacharias Beck, is afforded by the inventory and estate account of Geertruij de With, 
the mother-in-law of Johann Christoffel Beck.53  
 Geertruij de With was born Gertrud Witt in Hamburg and, in 1685, married at 
the Cape Simon [de] Groot from Wittenburg and, after his death, Hendrik Bouman 
from Dithmarschen.54 By 1731 Governor de la Fontaine could remark laconically of 
this wealthy widow: ‘Is a woman who is well-off’ – one of only six people described 
as such on his list.55 By the time of her death in 1733 her estate was valued at f 144 
952. This very rich woman seemed to have spent her last years as a rentier: thirty-four 
individuals owed her numerous loans totalling an impressive f 77 190.56  Through her 
daughter, Anna de Groot – who twice married German pachters before marrying 
Johann Christoffel Beck – De With had clear links with the pachter community. The 
pachters Godlieb Opperman, Christiaan Maasdorp and Hendrik Eversdijk all had 
loans with her of more than f 1 000 each. These men all formed part of the group of 
German pachters with whom Johann Zacharias Beck associated and who supported 
                                                 
51  Between 1728 and 1730 Willem van As and Johann Christoffel Beck acted on six occasions as 
Beck’s surety for alcohol pachten. Van As, too, invested in a pacht, in 1729, presumably encouraged 
by the success of his brother-in-law. 
52  It is no co-incidence that these two individuals (who later got married) were the malt beer 
pachters during the late 1720s and early 1730s, as the Beck brothers seemed to have had close relations 
(due to both propinquity and family connections) with the holders of this pacht.  
53  CA, MOOC 8/5 no. 109a and MOOC 13/1/2 no. 91.  
54  J. Hoge ‘Die Geskiedenis van die Lutherse Kerk aan die Kaap’, Archives Year Book for South 
African History 1/2 (1938), 23 note 8.  
55  Guelke, Shell and Whyte, De la Fontaine Report.  
56  Judith Spicksley has traced the increase of single women in credit provision in seventeenth-
century England. She found that an exceptionally high proportion of their personal assets were tied up 
in lending and suggested credit provision was a mechanism through which single women could remain 
independent and even become wealthy – providing various forms of credit could and did become an 
occupation in itself; J.M. Spicksley, ‘“Fly with a Duck in thy Mouth”: Single Women as Sources of 














one another.57 But just how advantageous this connection via his brother was to Beck 
is shown by the fact that the second biggest amount owed to De With was by Johann 
Zacharias Beck: she loaned him, on five occasions, a total of f 6 695 without any 
interest.58  
The career of Johann Zacharias Beck59  and the network of Geertruij de With’s 
creditors clearly illustrate the financial, familial and other links which existed within 
the German immigrant community at the Cape during this period. It seems a near 
universal phenomenon that in immigrant communities where immigrants share the 
same national, cultural, linguistic and other backgrounds they tend to support, and 
often marry, one another.60 Thus Erika Kuijpers has recently demonstrated how 
immigrants – especially German and Scandinavian – in seventeenth-century 
Amsterdam worked in, and sometimes even dominated, the same types of 
employment. Many of these immigrants, especially amongst the working classes 
which had fewer incentives and opportunities to integrate, entered into endogamous 
marriages.61 The situation at the Cape during this period was similar, although here 
integration was made easier through the fact that immigration was almost exclusively 
male so that most immigrants married local women, albeit (during this period) the 
daughters of immigrant men. The case of the Beck brothers also suggests that by the 
early decades of the eighteenth century, on a small scale, something like chain 
                                                 
57  Hendrik Eversdijk, although Dutch born, was the brother-in-law of Carel Boetendagh, and like 
the latter invested in the Rondebosch pacht. He also started his career as the bijtapper of another 
German, Johannes Heufke.  
58  While her son-in-law had three loans with her totalling more than f 10 000, these were all 
given out on interest.  
59  Johann Zacharias Beck encountered financial troubles in the early 1730s when he was 
embroiled in a number of court cases over unpaid debt (CA, CJ 824, 145-55, 171-77, 192-93, 212 and 
CJ 825, 5-22, 25-26, 36-37, 42, 54 and 101), so much so that Governor Jan de la Fontaine could remark 
of him in 1731: ‘was een pagter geweest, dog nu armer als arm’ (had been a pachter, yet is now poorer 
than poor); Guelke, Shell and Whyte, De la Fontaine Report. But Beck rebounded and was investing 
again in the alcohol pachten by the late 1730s, no doubt helped by the massive obligatie (debenture) of 
f 9 000 awarded him by Johannes Blanckenberg, the father of his second wife; MOOC 8/5 no. 142a. 
60  For a study of such support networks among modern immigrant entrpreneurs, see R. 
Waldinger and M.I. Lichter, How the Other Half Works: Immigration and Social Organization of 
Labor (Berkeley, 2003).  
61  E. Kuijpers, Migrantenstad: Immigratie en Sociale Verhoudingen in 17e-Eeuws Amsterdam 














migration was happening between the German lands and the Cape:62 in the place of 
origin migration became a well-known option and many people there would know of 
(and have contact with) somebody who had emigrated. When somebody then 
considers migrating, these contacts and knowledge are used to help establish the new 
immigrant. This process explains why one tends to find a concentration of immigrants 
in certain economic spheres or activities in the place of migration.63 This may well 
explain the dominance of Germans in the alcohol retail world of Cape Town during 
the first half of the eighteenth century, in addition to the fact that the urban 
environment was more conducive to the establishment and maintenance of ethnic or 
cultural links.  
One cultural factor, in addition to a linguistic one, which most German 
immigrants shared – in both Amsterdam and in Cape Town – was their Lutheran faith. 
Although there were Lutherans at the Cape since the inception of the station, a 
number of factors indicate that they only became more cohesive, or at least displayed 
a more active awareness of their Lutheran identity, by the 1730s.64 This was partly 
due to the fact that several high-ranking VOC personnel such as Johan Tobias 
Rhenius (captain of the garrison) and Johannes Needer (a junior merchant who acted 
as deputy to the fiscal) were actively promoting the Lutheran cause.65 In addition, 
                                                 
62  The case of the Beck brothers is not unique: during the same period Jurgen Schoester (or 
Georg Schuster in German), who acted as one of Johann Zacharias Beck’s sureties, had his brother 
Marthinus come out in VOC service. The latter worked for Schoester as a knecht for some years before 
becoming a free burgher himself; H.C. Bredekamp and J.L. Hattingh (eds), Das Tagebuch und die 
Briefe von Georg Schmidt, dem Ersten Missionar in Südafrika (1737-1744) / Dagboek en Briewe van 
George Schmidt, Eerste Sendeling in Suid-Afrika (1737-1744) (transcribed by B. Krüger and H. 
Plüddemann; translated by J. du P. Boeke; Bellville, 1981), 79 with note 7. Doubtless there must have 
been other similar cases.  
63  See Kuijpers, Migrantenstad, 217 on this process. The history of the Beck brothers suggests a 
similar process, but this can only be properly demonstrated once a full-scale investigation of German 
immigration to the Cape has been performed.  
64  Cf. Hoge, ‘Geskiedenis van die Lutherse Kerk’, 26-30 for a discussion of this evidence.  
65  Although the bulk of the Lutherans at the Cape were German, not all Lutherans were 
Germans: people of Scandinavian descent such as the Bergh family as well as some Dutch people were 
also Lutheran. The best example of the latter is Johannes Needer who was born in Amsterdam yet 
remained a professed Lutheran (even though it may have stymied his promotion through the VOC 
ranks); see on him and his Lutheranism, M. Boucher, ‘A Cape Girl Writes Home from Holland in 














adherents were able to maintain links with others of similar convictions through the 
growing number of German immigrants in Cape Town during this era, as well as the 
regular visits by Lutheran chaplains serving aboard Danish ships which regularly 
visited Cape Town at this time – Needer, for instance, was able to have all his 
children confirmed by such chaplains.66 
That there was a network amongst German immigrants at the Cape based on 
language and faith is well illustrated by the diary of the German missionary Georg 
Schmidt who maintained links with them during his stay in South Africa in the late 
1730s and early 1740s. During his visits to Cape Town he regularly visited and 
discussed religious and other issues with a wide spectrum of German and Lutheran 
immigrants in Cape Town: ranging from high-ranking VOC officials such as the 
Rhenius family,67 Johannes Needer and Captain Rudolph Siegfried Alleman, to 
ordinary soldiers and other minor officials; from pre-eminent burgher families such as 
the Berghs and Jurgen Schoester (the wealthy surety of Johann Zacharias Beck) to 
free-burgher Germans working as servants and artisans in Cape Town.68 What they all 
had in common was a shared identity centred on their German background and 
Lutheran faith, which they could live out due to their propinquity and the fact that the 
nature of Cape Town allowed them links with kindred spirits – both those visiting and 
through correspondence.69 
It thus comes as no surprise to discover that amongst the signatories of the first 
two petitions, in 1742 and 1743, for the founding of a Lutheran church in Cape Town 
are all the most active and best-connected alcohol pachters of the period: Johann 
Zacharias Beck, Jan Fredrik Bierman, Joachim Daniel Hubner, Michiel Pentz, Jacob 
                                                 
66  Ibid., 10.  
67  The Rhenius family is another illustration of chain migration: three of Johan Thobias Rhenius’ 
brothers followed him to the Cape, and at least two of them worked under him in the garrison – the one 
as an ensign and the other as the garrison’s bookkeeper. One of these brothers married into the 
Lutheran Bergh family; cf. Bredekamp and Hattingh, Tagebuch und Briefe von Georg Schmidt, 41 with 
note 6.  
68  Ibid., 41-43, 77-79, 193-201 and 331-41.  
69  Schmidt’s diary also reveals how aware the higher-ranking Germans were of what was going 
on in Europe and elsewhere in the VOC world, and how the Cape formed part of a textual world 














van Reenen and Jan Jurgen Schreuder.70 And that entrance and acceptance into this 
German immigrant community allowed access to social capital is clearly illustrated by 
the case of the Beck brothers: they were both Lutheran and their benefactress, 
Geertruij de With, was a German immigrant woman from Hamburg who was a 
convinced and active Lutheran.71 It was thanks to such networks of kinship and shared 
identities that several of the most prominent pachters of the 1730s were able to make 
a success of their entrepreneurial endeavours since these links allowed them access to 
social capital and, with that, financial and other forms of capital.  
 
Friends, Business Networks and Social Capital 
 
The importance of social capital for success in the alcohol pacht business is also well 
illustrated by the career of Abraham Leever. In his case, though, while family 
connections did help his career initially, it was the cultivation of close business ties 
which helped to make him perhaps the most successful pachter of the 1730s and 
1740s. Abraham Leever arrived at the Cape in 1719 with the rank of corporal. In 1720 
he became an assistent in the civil service of the VOC, which makes him the highest-
ranking VOC official to have become a pachter. In 1723 he married Margaretha 
Paassen and in the following year he became a free burgher.72 
 Margaretha was the daughter of Jacob Paassen and Barbara de Jongh. In 1724, 
the widow Paassen married Johannes Heufke. She was an independently wealthy 
woman whose estate was valued after her death in 1736 at f 117 442.73 Johannes 
                                                 
70  The list includes only three pachters from the 1730s (Beck, Pentz and Schreuder), but this is 
because most of the other German pachters from this decade were dead by 1742. But having seven 
pachters on this list constitutes a high number considering that only thirty-one of the sixty-four 
petitioners were in fact free burghers. The majority of signatories were VOC employees of higher ranks 
such as Needer and members of the Swellengrebel and Rhenius families. In addition, this list only 
included those Lutherans prepared to sign this public petition, which was by no means everybody who 
professed the faith; cf. Hoge, ‘Geskiedenis van die Lutherse Kerk’, 32-33 for a list of the signatories.  
71  Ibid., 23 with note 8. She actively promoted the Lutheran cause, but died before the petitions 
(which were unsuccessful in the event) of the early 1740s.  
72  G.C. de Wet (ed.), Resolusies van die Politieke Raad: Deel VIII, 1729-1734 (Pretoria, 1975), 
43 note 146 and idem (ed.), Resolusies van die Politieke Raad: Deel IX, 1735-1739 (Pretoria, 1981), 26 
note 146.  














Heufke, the man she married, originally came from Hamburg but by the time of their 
marriage had been living at the Cape for more than a quarter of a century. He himself 
was a well-off man who by the time of his death in 1739 owned two valuable farms, a 
number of town properties and eleven slaves. His success as a farmer and 
businessman also translated into social success and prestige: he held the offices of 
Orphan Master and Commissioner of Matrimonial Affairs and rose through the ranks 
to become Captain of the Burgher Militia during the 1710s.74 Clearly marrying into 
such an established and wealthy family greatly aided Abraham Leever in establishing 
himself as an entrepreneur.  
 However, it was only in 1727 that Leever invested in the alcohol pachten for 
the first time. Curiously enough, both he and his father-in-law bought their first 
pachten at the same time: Heufke obtained one each of the expensive brandy and 
Cape wines pachten while Leever invested in the minor Rondebosch pacht. By this 
stage Johannes Heufke was fifty-seven years old and had already made his fortune 
from farming. He later declared that it had never been his intention to invest in the 
alcohol retail business, but that he had only done so because the pachten decreased 
markedly in price by the late 1720s.75 Johannes Heufke was, however, well familiar 
with the alcohol pacht business: his brother, David, was a pachter during the early 
1700s,76 as also his brother-in-law, Johannes Pijthius, who was a major pachter 
between 1705 and 1714; they were followed by the father of his first wife, Jan Botma, 
who was the Stellenbosch pachter during the late 1710s.77 In addition, Heufke’s only 
son, Cornelis, married Catharina Cruijwagen, who was both the daughter of a pachter, 
Jan Mijndertsz Cruijwagen and the sister-in-law of the hugely successful Hendrik 
                                                 
74  Cf. Moritz, Deutschen am Kap, 227-28; Hoge, ‘Personalia’, 157; De Wet, Resolusies VIII, 53 
note 173 and Resolusies IX, 48 note 11; CA, MOOC 8/6 no. 44 and 44½, and MOOC 13/1/3 no. 34. 
Here is another case of chain migration as it seems likely that Johannes Heufke had followed his 
brother David to the Cape during the late 1690s.  
75  De Wet, Resolusies VIII, 110. The slump in prices was due to a lower than usual number of 
ships calling at the Cape during the late 1720s; see pages 42-43 above.  
76  His expertise came in handy: he acted as one of his brother’s bijtappers in the late 1720s; CA, 
CJ 333, 295v.  














Oostwald Eksteen.78 Clearly Johannes Heufke must have known about the 
possibilities and dangers of investing in alcohol retail at the Cape.  
 After his first gamble in 1727, Heufke continued to invest in the alcohol 
pachten over the following five years.79 Leever, on the other hand, did not repeat his 
early experiment until 1731, and it is plausible that during this period he was assisting 
his father-in-law as a bijtapper as he was described by Governor de la Fontaine in 
1731 as being ‘the bijtapper of a pachter, yet he has debts’.80 From that year onwards, 
though, Leever continued to invest in the alcohol trade for almost every year until the 
1750s. His brother-in-law, Willem Raams, who married Heufke’s daughter, Alida, in 
1733 also invested in the alcohol pachten. He, however, had a short career as pachter 
since he left the Cape in 1734 shortly after the death of his wife.81 
 An analysis of Leever’s sureties presents a rather different pattern from that of 
Beck in that it was considerably less endogamous:82 for instance, Leever only once 
made use of a surety who was related to him, viz. Nicolaas Brommert, the brother-in-
law of Abraham’s own brother, Jacob Leever.83 Curiously enough Johannes Heufke 
never stood as surety for any pachter during the 1720s and 1730s, least of all his two 
son-in-laws.84 But Leever acted as a surety for Heufke through most of the period of 
                                                 
78  See appendix 1 below for details of their pacht holdings; and pages 96-97 above for the links 
between the Cruijwagen and Eksteen families.  
79  This makes him an example of what Lesger argues was one of the entry points for an 
entrepreneur, along with marriage, viz. opportunism; cf. Lesger, ‘Over het Nut’, 73-74. 
80  ‘is bijtapper van een pagter, dog heeft schulden’; Guelke, Shell and Whyte, De la Fontaine 
Report. I have been unable to confirm this as it was not necessary to draw up contracts for free-burgher 
bijtappers as was the case with loan knechten. In 1728, Leever acted as bijtapper for Melt van der 
Spuij; CA, CJ 333, 295v. 
81  This seems to have been a sudden, even impulsive decision, as he did not even serve out his 
term as pachter but sold his pacht to Jan van der Swijn; De Wet, Resolusies VIII, 302-303. This 
plausibly relates to tension in the Heufke family caused by the affair (and illegitimate child) Raams had 
with his sister-in-law, Catharina Cruijwagen; cf. CA, CJ 828, 8-10. Raams left his children at the Cape 
and died in Zutphen in 1736; CA, MOOC 8/5 no. 138 and MOOC 13/1/3 no. 4.  
82  This analysis is based on the signatories of those standing surety for Leever as revealed in the 
pacht contracts between 1727 and 1740: CA, C 2703-2707. 
83  See page 187 with note 94 below on Jacob Leever and his wife, Jacomina Brommert.  
84  His inventory and estate account record only small debts relating to the provision of wine and 














the latter’s tenure as a pachter – which makes it even more plausible that they were in 
fact business partners, and that it was in this way that Leever built up some of his 
physical capital.  
 Three of Leever’s sureties were pachters of the late 1720s with whom he 
likely had had dealings while serving his apprenticeship with his father-in-law.85 But 
through most of the 1730s, Leever was supported as a surety by a small group of men, 
consisting of Hendrik van Dijk, Carel Boetendagh, Jan van der Swijn and Melt van 
der Spuij. During this period, these five men (including Leever) were the prime 
investors in the most lucrative of the alcohol pachten, viz. Cape wines and brandy.86 
Significantly enough, Leever regularly stood surety for these men too. Although 
pachters were not supposed to enter into mutual agreements in order to prevent 
collusion, the evidence suggests that these major brandy and Cape wines pachters 
formed something of a cartel during the early 1730s.87 In addition to these four major 
pachters who acted as his sureties, Leever had two others, viz. Abraham Paling and 
Dirk van den Berg. These connections he seemed to have gained through his close 
business partner, Carel Boetendagh, as they often acted as his financial backers.88 
Boetendagh had a long-standing relation with the Heufke/Leever family as his sister-
in-law was married to Hendrik Eversdijk, the bijtapper of Johannes Heufke during the 
late 1720s – the same period that Abraham Leever acted as his father-in-law’s 
bijtapper. In addition to backing Leever from 1731 onwards, Boetendagh and 
Leever’s brother-in-law, Willem Raams, also stood surety for each other. 
                                                                                                                                            
(whose sister was married to Heufke’s son, Cornelis) and rentiers such as Johannes Swellengrebel and 
the late Simon van der Stel; CA, MOOC 8/6 no. 44 and MOOC 13/1/3 no. 34.   
85  They were Johannes Rogiers; Jacob van Bochem and Jacob van Reenen. Significantly they 
were all three immigrants of Johannes Heufke’s generation (and the latter two were German like him) 
so that it is likely that Leever gained these men’s support thanks to his father-in-law.  
86  Between them they owned twenty-four of the forty brandy pachten during this decade; fifteen 
of the twenty Cape wines pachten before the institution of the generaele pacht in 1734, while for the 
rest of the decade the generaele pacht was held by one or the other member of this group.  
87  Throughout the early 1730s the authorities suspected the major pachters of collusion, although 
the latter vigorously denied it; cf. for example De Wet, Resolusies VIII, 110, 302 and Resolusies IX, 31. 
It was these suspicions, coupled with the decline in the overall pacht income, which led to the adoption 
of the generaele pachter system in 1734; see pages 31-32 above.  














 In this way, then, Leever had managed to build up substantial social capital 
through supporting and helping certain of his fellow pachters. It is plausible that this 
support was built-up over a long period during which these men got to know one 
another and started developing links: it is no co-incidence that, with the possible 
exception of Hendrik van Dijk (who could have worked as a vrijknecht for whom 
contracts were not necessary), all of the five major brandy and Cape wine pachters of 
the 1730s had acted as bijtappers during the late 1720s. They were of similar age; had 
just got married (mostly to the daughters of established pachters) and become free 
burghers; and must have had many dealings with one another through the deep 
involvement of their employers and in-laws in the alcohol retail business of Cape 
Town.89 Clearly, what must have started as bonds of friendship in the early parts of 
their lives at the Cape were translated into more formal bonds of patronage and 
support by the early 1730s when they became pachters themselves.90 
The desire of Abraham Leever and his close business associates to exert 
control over the most lucrative pachten, as well as their willingness to support one 
another, reflects another important aspect of early modern entrepreneurship, viz. that 
maximum profits were subordinate to long-term stability.91 It is for this reason that 
stable and enduring business relationships were an important means for the attainment 
of wealth, power and prestige. These relationships were the key to Leever’s success as 
an alcohol entrepreneur during the 1730s. It also explains why some pachters were 
not successful: it is clear from those who only ever bought one pacht that a crucial 
factor for their lack of success must have been their difficulty in finding willing and 
financially secure sureties. Most of these minor pachters used family members or 
friends as their backers, but unless they could find one of the big money-lenders or 
                                                 
89  Melt van der Spuij and Hendrik van Dijk started their careers earlier than the others (they 
were pachters by the mid 1720s); but we know that Abraham Leever worked as bijtapper for Van der 
Spuij while Boetendagh acted in a similar capacity for Van Dijk during the late 1720s.  
90  These friendships did not always survive being translated into business partnerships: in the 
early 1730s Melt van der Spuij and Hendrik van Dijk engaged in a long drawn-out court battle over 
mutual insults relating to their honesty; see pages 182-83 below.  
91  Lesger, ‘Over het Nut’, 71. The VOC itself was an exemplar of this mercantilist principle: ‘In 
general, the Company’s policy was to use its dominant position … to achieve a stable, medium-term 
optimum rather than short-term profit maximization’; J. de Vries and A. van der Woude, The First 















(ex-)pachters to support them, they were doomed to failure. This underlines the fact 
that the value of one’s social capital gets determined by all three of the factors 
discussed above.  
 How the lack of social capital could stymie a person’s desire to enter the world 
of Cape alcohol pachten, is shown by the case of the unfortunate Jan Horn. During the 
1730s, he had acted as bijtapper for the malt beer pachter, Hans Jurgen Honk. In 1739 
he saw an opportunity for advancement when Carel Boetendagh, who had had close 
business dealings with Honk, died. Horn quickly became a free burgher and at the end 
of July he married Catharina Valk, the widow of Boetendagh. A month later, on 31 
August, he was in the Castle where he won the bidding on the generaele pacht at f 31 
950. But when he had to sign the contract, he was unable to produce the requisite two 
sureties. He was denied the pacht, which was re-auctioned but realised less than what 
Horn had bid. Instead, it went to the well-connected and established Isaac Maartensz 
and Jan Holst. The VOC held Horn responsible for the difference between the two 
sums and instituted criminal proceedings against him. He ended up in the debtor’s 
ward (gijzelkamer), having financially ruined himself and Catharina Valk.92 Without 
family, friends and social capital, social mobility through the use of the alcohol 




By the 1730s Cape Town was a small, albeit expanding, town whose most marked 
feature was the transience of a large part of its population. The roughly one hundred 
or so burgher families who lived in it were mostly also of recent date, and the town’s 
free population continued to expand through the arrival and settlement of new 
immigrants, mostly single men. This synchronic study of the alcohol pachters has 
revealed the way in which a significant portion of these newcomers managed to 
establish themselves, make a livelihood and in some cases become wealthy in Cape 
Town.  
 In a VOC-town with limited opportunities for an entrepreneur, alcohol retail 
provided a relatively accessible entry into business. Yet, as this chapter has 
demonstrated, this was not possible without access to credit. The key with which to 
                                                 














unlock this access to credit was social capital. By the period under discussion there 
seemed to have been two ways of accumulating social capital. The most significant  
was through the cultivation of links with people of a shared background: immigrants 
(or their children) from the German lands who came out in VOC service, and who 
often shared their Lutheran faith. During the 1730s, German immigration to the Cape 
was at its height (see chapter two above) and it appears that there existed something 
akin to chain migration whereby successful immigrants at the Cape encouraged their 
kin to join them. This meant that for many German immigrants a network of support 
was already awaiting them upon arrival. It is clear from this study of the business 
networks of these German pachters that kinship and friendship, based on a shared 
background, played a crucial role in access to credit and entry into alcohol retail.  
 Not all alcohol pachters during the 1730s were German, although it is clear 
that this business was dominated by German immigrant men. Pachters such as the 
Dutchman Abraham Leever relied less on shared cultural links, but instead carefully 
cultivated over many years a business network based on mutual support. In both these 
ways of accumulating social capital, marriage was an important point of entry which 
brought with it access to already-established support networks. In several cases, 
business networks were cemented by family alliances. These processes clearly 
illustrate the crucial role that trust played in early modern business. How the nature 
and operation of kinship and social networks among alcohol entrepreneurs changed 
















DYNASTY BUILDING, FAMILY NETWORKS AND SOCIAL CAPITAL IN CAPE TOWN: 
THE ALCOHOL PACHTERS OF THE 1770S 
 
This chapter continues the close study of a group of alcohol pachters, this time for the 
period 1770-79. This period falls firmly within the last quarter of the existence of 
alcohol pachten at the Cape of Good Hope, and given that it is a full generation after 
the 1730s, it affords the opportunity to determine to what an extent the role of the 
pacht in the socio-economic life of Cape Town had changed by the second half of the 
eighteenth century. What differences occurred in the composition of the body of 
pachters in the 1770s as opposed to the 1730s? What changes happened in the ways 
in which Cape Town burghers invested in the alcohol pacht? Was capital raised in 
different ways by this later stage, and to what extent did the nature and function of 
business networks change? What were the continuities and what were the changes 
regarding the way alcohol entrepreneurs operated in Cape Town? Given that by this 
stage the Cape was a more settled society, with a mostly second and third generation 
population, was dynasty building occurring? How did the different social set-up, in 
terms of a growing local population, affect the type of alliances alcohol entrepreneurs 
entered into? In suggesting answers to these questions, a study of the 1770s enables 
the historian to determine how the pacht system was used by a new generation of 
Cape Town inhabitants. This in turn helps the historian to understand how the 
composition and social dynamics of the burgher population differed in the late 
eighteenth century from the earlier period.  
 
The Pachters of the 1770s: A Prosopography 
 
During the decade 1770-79 there were nineteen individuals who invested in the 
alcohol pachten.1 Given that this division into decades is an artificial procedure, it is 
                                                 
1  The sources for compiling this prosopography are varied. They include: the pacht contracts 
(CA, C 2697-2729); H.C.V. Leibbrandt (ed. and tr.), Precis of the Archives of the Cape of Good Hope: 
Requesten (Memorials), 1715-1806 (5 vols, Cape Town, 1905-6 and 1989) and various genealogical 
sources: C.C. de Villiers and C. Pama, Geslagsregisters van die Ou Kaapse Families (3 vols, Cape 














natural that their activities span much longer than this decade: only a minority of them 
started investing in the 1770s: most of them were active by the 1760s, with the earliest 
investment by one of these individuals being 1758. Some also continued investing in 
the pacht long after the end of the decade under focus, with the latest year of activity 
by this group being 1790. The pacht activities of this group therefore cover most of 
the second half of the century and continued until close to the demise of the pacht 
system in 1795 (see table 5.2). As with the earlier decade discussed (1730s), the 
number of pachten held by individual pachters varied greatly. As shown earlier (in 
chapter two), the vast majority of pachters held only five pachten or less during his or 
her career, with about thirty-seven percent who only ever bought one pacht. In the 
1770s, too, the majority of pachters invested in five or fewer pachten (eleven out of 
the nineteen). But an unusual feature of this group of pachters is that so many of them 
(six out of the nineteen, which is more than thirty percent) held ten or more pachten in 
total. This is almost double the average for the whole period of the pacht at the Cape 
(when only seventeen percent of pachters held that many pachten). In fact, this era 
saw the biggest investors in the history of the alcohol pacht: Jan Jacob Schreuder, 
who was active between 1762 and 1790, is the person who had invested in the largest 
number of pachten in the whole period of the pacht system’s existence. Two other 
pachters active during the 1770s, Martin Melck and Maarten Bateman, respectively 
bought the third and fourth largest number of pachten, with Melck being the person 
who invested the second largest fortune in the pachten during its existence at the Cape 
(cf. chapter two and see table 5.1 for a breakdown of pacht-holding during this 
decade). In general this fits a pattern of pacht-holding in the second half of the 
eighteenth century where fewer individuals held more pachten. Whether or not this is 
related to greater capital accumulation (or a different avenue or pattern of 
accumulation) will be discussed later in this chapter. It is fair to say that during the 
1770s, the alcohol retail trade in Cape Town was dominated by six men: Jan Jacob 
Schreuder, Martin Melck, Maarten Bateman, Willem de Kruger, Johannes Nicholaas 
Esselaar (or Esler) and Johannes Roep.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
African Genealogies (15 vols, Pretoria and Stellenbosch, 1986-2007); J. Hoge, ‘Personalia of the 
Germans at the Cape, 1652-1806’, Archives Year Book for South African History 9 (1946), and E. 















Table 5.1: Number of Pachten Bought by Individual Pachters 





   
1 73 (37%) 4 (21%) 
2 33 (17%) 2 (11%) 
3-5 41 (21%) 5 (26%) 
6-9 18 (9%) 2 (11%) 
10+ 33 (17%) 6 (32%) 
Total 198 19 
Source: CA, C 2697-2731 and RLR 163 
 
Based on a study of patterns from the 1730s, one would have expected pachters of the 
late eighteenth century either to have remained immigrants (showing that urban 
entrepreneurship was ultimately related to a relative lack of deep connections) or that, 
one to two generations down the line, pachters would be locally-born individuals who 
continued in the family tradition of alcohol retail. Yet, the tabulation of the origins of 
the 1770s pachters is surprising in that it shows a result which does not conform 
completely to either one of these scenarios. Of the 1770s pachters, the majority were 
still immigrants: only six were Cape born. Of the remaining thirteen, all bar one (viz. 
Jan Daniel Holst) came from the German-speaking lands. 
 At first sight this seems contradictory to what was established in chapter two, 
viz. that Germans were dominant in the alcohol retail trade in Cape Town from the 
1710s to the 1760s, but that in the last decades Cape-born investors took prominence. 
But the latter periodisation was determined on the basis of when pachters bought their 
first pacht. A closer examination of the German-speaking pachters of the 1770s 
reveals that of the twelve active during that decade, eight started their activities a 
decade or more earlier. All six the Cape pachters of this decade, however, started 
their activities in the 1770s. Even so, the Cape pachters remained a small contingent 
as few of them invested in more than a few pachten: the Germans – who had a good 
head-start – continued to dominate the alcohol retail trade of the 1770s: All six of 















Table 5.2: Alcohol Pachters at the Cape, 1770-79 




    
Bateman,  Maarten German 1763-1787 36 
Broeders,  Pieter German 1758-1773 8 
Combrink,  Hermanus Cape 1770-1774 2 
De Kruger,  Willem German 1770-1786 19 
Dempers,  Willem Cape 1775 1 
Esselaar, Johannes German 1762-1774 13 
Holst,  Jan Daniel Dutch 1764-1773 3 
Hurter,  Jan Willem German 1763-1783 7 
Kalteijer,  Anthonij German 1776-1777 2 
Meijer,  Hendrik Cape 1771-1773 3 
Melck,  Martin German 1760-1781 32 
Munnik,  Gerhardus Cape 1779 1 
Roep,  Johannes German 1767-1780 21 
Rogiers,  Tobias Cape 1775-1778 4 
Schreuder,  Johan Jacob German 1762-1790 39 
Sebrits,  Frans German 1778-1782 4 
Smook,  Jan German 1763-1779 5 
Wilkens,  Jan Willem jr Cape 1776 1 
Wilkens,  Jan Willem sr German 1777 1 
Source: CA, C 2697-2731 and RLR 163, and Genealogical Data 
 
Thus, as with the pachters of the 1730s, most of those from the 1770s had a career in 
the VOC before becoming free burghers and, subsequently, pachters. Of the thirteen 
immigrant pachters of this decade, the rank of twelve could be determined. Of these, 
all but two came to the Cape as soldaten (soldiers). Only one (Maarten Bateman) 
arrived as a matroos (sailor), while another (Jan Daniel Holst) was an artisan on a 
                                                 
2  The years in this column refer to pacht years, i.e. from 1 September the previous calendar year 














ship, a so-called zijlmaker (‘sail-maker’). The pachters of the 1770s do not, however, 
show the same range of positions in the VOC as those of the 1730s – only one of them 
is known to have had a position in the VOC hierarchy, viz. Pieter Broeders who 
worked as an assistent – the lowest rank in the civil service of the VOC. Clearly, for 
the pachters of this decade, experience in the VOC seems not to have been a major 
factor in their later success. There is, for instance, no clear link between the VOC 
careers of Maarten Bateman, Johan Jacob Schreuder and Martin Melck and their huge 
success in the alcohol retail business later in their lives. Other factors must evidently 
have played a greater role by this stage. Clearly in the course of the eighteenth 
century, new entrepreneurs had less need to rely on the favour of the VOC and 
expended more of their energy in establishing and maintaining links with the growing 
burgher population, as will become clear later in this chapter.  
 As we saw with the pachters of the 1730s, there were clear links regarding the 
length of the period between arriving at the Cape, becoming a free burgher and 
investing in a pacht for the first time. Was this still the case by the 1770s? On average 
the 1770s pachters were in VOC service at the Cape for just over five years after 
arrival, ranging from a minimum of one to thirteen years. This is only slightly less 
than the average for the pachters of the 1730s. The range for the period between 
receiving their free-burgher papers and becoming a pachter was also rather similar to 
that of the 1730s. In the 1770s, the immigrant pachters took between one year and 
sixteen years from becoming free-burghers to investing in a pacht for the first time, 
with an average of about seven years.  
 Thus far the prosopography of the 1770s pachters shows a surprising amount 
of continuity with that of the earlier period. But there were also changes which started 
to occur during this period. In the 1730s there was a clear link between being released 
from Company service and obtaining a pacht shortly thereafter, viz. marriage to the 
widow or a daughter of a pachter. This way into the pacht business was much less 
common by the 1770s. Only three of these men became pachters within a year of 
becoming free burghers (see table 5.3). But in only one of these cases, viz. that of Jan 
Willem Hurter, did he marry into a pacht family. Hurter married Barbara Honk, the 
daughter of Hans Jurgen Honk and Aletta de Nijs, in 1755 (while still a VOC servant) 
and bought his first pacht in September 1762 shortly after becoming a free burgher. 
Hurter, however, never became a major pachter, and although he invested in the 














relatively rarely (only seven times) although his involvement in the world of alcohol 
retail was extensive, as will become clear later. In total, of the nineteen pachters 
active during the 1770s, only four married the (step-)daughters of pachters,3 and none 
who married widows of pachters. There were also three individuals who married the 
granddaughters of pachters (see table 5.3).4 The remarkable thing, however, is that 
none of those pachters who married into pacht families became particularly 
successful in this business: Hurter is the one who invested in the largest number of 
pachten although his influence was much larger than his direct investment would 
indicate. In fact, of the six main pachters of this period, only Johannes Roep could 
show some connection to a pachter family in that he married Johanna Elisabeth Staf, 
the granddaughter of Aletta de Nijs.  
 
Table 5.3: Careers of the 1770s Pachters 





     
Bateman, Maarten matroos 4 6  
Broeders,  Pieter soldaat 2 1  
Combrink, Hermanus n/a n/a n/a  
De Kruger,  Willem soldaat 5 15  
Dempers, Willem n/a n/a n/a  
Esselaar,  Johannes unknown ? ?  
Holst,  Jan Daniel zijlmaker 1 7 gd 
Hurter,  Jan Willem soldaat 13 0 d 
Kalteijer,  Anthonij soldaat 5 12  
Meijer, Hendrik n/a n/a n/a  
Melck,  Martin soldaat 4 10  
Munnik, Gerhardus n/a n/a n/a  
                                                 
3  Jan Willem Hurter; Frans Sebrits and Jan Willem Wilkens sr.  
4  Jan Daniel Holst; Johannes Roep and Tobias Rogiers.  
5  The numbers in the columns ‘(arrival > burgher)’ and ‘(burgher > pachter)’ refer to years.  















Roep,  Johannes soldaat 5 7 gd 
Rogiers, Tobias n/a n/a n/a gd 
Schreuder,  Johan Jacob soldaat 4 8  
Sebrits,  Frans soldaat 6 4 d 
Smook,  Jan soldaat 9 1  
Wilkens,  Jan Willem jr n/a n/a n/a  
Wilkens,  Jan Willem sr soldaat 6 16 d 
Source: Genealogical Data; Resolusies; Requesten 
 
This finding – the fact that pachters by the 1770s were still largely immigrants and 
did not (generally) marry into pacht families – is most surprising in terms of seeing 
the pachters as entrepreneurs. Clearly something was beginning to change in relation 
to how the pachters were connected and operated. What variety was there in the ways 
in which different entrepreneurs operated in the alcohol pacht world – particularly 
with regards to social capital – during the 1770s; and how did their approaches differ 
from an earlier generation, such as the pachters of the 1730s? In what follows, I 
demonstrate the existence in the 1770s of two different approaches to building up 
social capital and networks by alcohol pachters, both of which show varying degrees 
of continuity and change from the earlier period.  
 
A Matriarchal Cape Dynasty 
 
The economist Joseph Schumpeter suggested that one of the desires or motivations for 
entrepreneurial activity is ‘the dream and the will to found a private kingdom, usually, 
though not necessarily, also a dynasty.’7 Given the fact that by the 1770s large parts 
of the burgher population of the Cape of Good Hope were second and third generation 
inhabitants, one would expect a much greater proportion of second generation 
entrepreneurs who were building on the successes of their parents. Yet this seems not 
to have been the case during the period under discussion: although no less than four of 
the pachters of the 1770s were the sons or grandsons of pachters, not one of them was 
successful as a pachter in his own right: Hendrik Meijer, Gerhardus Munnik, Tobias 
                                                 
7  J. Schumpeter, ‘Entrepreneurship as Innovation’, in R. Swedburg (ed.), Entrepreneurship: The 














Rogiers and Jan Willem Wilkens jr. could, between them, only buy eight pachten, and 
not one of these was a major one such as the brandy or Cape wine pachten.8 On a 
superficial level, then, it seems as if no ‘dynasty building’ was taking place during 
this period. Yet on a deeper level there certainly appears to have been something of 
this process among a section of the pachter community. It was, however, hidden due 
to its matrilineal nature.  
 The one outstanding case of dynasty building involved the (relatively minor) 
moutbier (malt beer) pacht. This case illustrates well both the continuities of pacht 
holding through most of the eighteenth century, and the changes which were 
occurring towards the end of the century. Superficially there seems to be no pattern in 
the holding of the moutbier pacht during the 1770s as it was held by five different 
individuals, none of whom had it for more than four years in succession. But once one 
looks into the marriage patterns and the role of female descent, it becomes clear that 
during this decade the malt beer pacht continued to be controlled by a family complex 
that centred on Aletta de Nijs. It was thanks to her business acumen that the malt beer 
pacht remained in the same family’s hands for more than four decades.  
Aletta de Nijs was born at the Cape in 1699, the daughter of Jan de Nijs from 
Germany who worked as soldier and wood-cutter first on Mauritius and then at the 
Cape.9 In 1716 she married the Danish soldier Christiaan Biesel who became a free 
burgher in 1719.10 He seemed to have been of some prominence in the burgher 
community (he was a corporal in the burgher militia but was demoted in 1728)11 but 
died in 1730. The young widow was now left with their six surviving (out of nine) 
children and seemingly little money, as she was described by Governor De la 
Fontaine in 1731 as having ‘a cooper shop and labouring under debts.’12 In 1734, 
however, De Nijs married the German soldier, Hans Jurgen Honk (also spelled: 
                                                 
8  In spite of his name, Johan Jacob Schreuder was no relation to the pachter, Jan Jurgen 
Schreuder who was active during the 1740s. 
9  J.A. Heese and R.T.J. Lombard, Suid-Afrikaanse Geslagregisters / South African Genealogies 
(15 vols, Pretoria and Stellenbosch, 1986-2007), vol. 6, 476. 
10   G.C. de Wet (ed.), Resolusies van die Politieke Raad: Deel VII, 1724-1728 (Johannesburg, 
1971), 269 note 186.  
11  Ibid., 391.  















Hauk), with whom she had three more children (only one of whom survived him and 
reached adulthood). After buying the farm De Papenboom, the site of the Cape’s 
brewery, the couple became involved in the malt beer pacht. Right from the start a 
pattern of family involvement was established, as the first time the family obtained a 
malt beer pacht was when Aletta de Nijs’ son-in-law, Michiel Daniel Lourich (or 
Laurik) obtained the pacht for 1737.13 Between 1738 and 1743 Honk himself held the 
malt beer pacht, in addition to holding the right to sell wine and liquor in Rondebosch 
during the early 1740s. After Honk’s death in 1743, De Nijs came into her right 
(helped by the sizeable capital she inherited from her husband)14 and, with two 
exceptions, held the malt beer pacht in her own name from 1744 until 1762. During 
this time she married Gerrit Reijndersz de Vos who held the pacht in 1751. This was a 
once-off affair, as De Nijs continued to buy the pacht from 1752 onwards in her own 
name (De Vos seems to have died some time between 1752 and 1755). Although De 
Nijs herself only ever invested in the malt beer pacht, for which she produced her own 
beer, she also acted on several occasions as the bijtapper for pachters who held the 
Rondebosch and False Bay pachten. Her son from her first marriage, Jan Biesel, held 
the Rondebosch and False Bay pacht for one year during this period (1754). 
But the De Nijs family involvement in the malt beer pacht did not end with 
her retirement from pacht holding (or death) in 1762.15 During 1763-64 this pacht was 
held by the German immigrant, Jan Willem Hurter. He arrived at the Cape in 1750 
and worked as master gardener until he became a free burgher in 1762, in time to take 
over the pacht from Aletta de Nijs. He had married Barbara Honk in 1755, the 
daughter of Aletta de Nijs with her second husband, Hans Jurgen Honk. As the only 
surviving child of Honk, (the then minor) Barbara shared her father’s reasonably 
wealthy estate with her mother.16 Although Hurter married into a successful and 
wealthy pachter family, he was only involved in the malt beer pacht on and off, 
investing in it seven times over twenty years, and in no other pachten at all. Like his 
                                                 
13  Lourich was married to Anna Catharina Biesel, a daughter from De Nijs’ first marriage. He 
started his career in 1730 as the bijtapper of his fellow-German, Johannes Heufke; CA, CJ 2882, 323-
35. 
14  This includes the farm Papenboom, valued at f 15 000, a house in Table Valley (valued at f 
5000) and fourteen slaves; cf. CA, MOOC 8/6 no. 59.  
15  I have been unable to ascertain her date of death.  














mother-in-law, though, he also often served as bijtapper for the Rondebosch and False 
Bay pacht (which during this period had increased much in turnover due to ships 
calling at False Bay); and since he possessed the brewery at Papenboom, he continued 
to be the sole provider of beer to pachters at the Cape. The malt beer pacht during the 
1760-70s developed a curious pattern of ownership, alternating between descendants 
of De Nijs and their associates. After Hurter’s stint, it was held by Jan Jacob 
Schreuder for three years in a row. It is plausible that Schreuder and Hurter were 
long-standing friends: they were born in 1722 and 1723 respectively in the German-
speaking lands and both arrived at the Cape in 1750. What is more certain is that they 
were part of a group of business associates – or at least financial backers – centred on 
Hurter’s relative, Johannes Roep.  
Johannes Roep, another German immigrant (five years younger than 
Schreuder and Hurter) who arrived at the Cape as a soldier in 1755 and became a free 
burgher in 1760, seemed to have been at the epicentre of a group of pachters who 
shared connections with Aletta de Nijs; in addition to their shared German origins and 
VOC experience. In 1761 he married Johanna Elisabeth Staf, who was the daughter of 
Lourens Staf and Elisabeth Biesel. The latter was one of Aletta de Nijs’ children from 
her first marriage. But Johanna Staf seems to have been more than just a 
granddaughter of De Nijs: her father had been incarcerated on Robben Island due to 
insanity and it seems as if she and her mother lived with De Nijs (and no doubt 
assisted her in her business activities). When Johanna’s mother died during the small-
pox epidemic of 1755, De Nijs formally adopted her grandchild.17 To all extent and 
purposes, then, she was more like a daughter of Aletta de Nijs and this, coupled with 
the closeness in age between her husband, Johannes Roep, and what was technically 
her step-uncle, Jan Hurter, must explain the close business links between these two 
men. For Johannes Roep acted as one of the two requisite sureties for Hurter on each 
of the four occasions the latter bought the malt beer pacht during the 1760s and 
1770s. Johannes Roep was likewise a very regular surety for Jan Jacob Schreuder’s 
many investments in the pacht business.18 Roep himself entered the family business in 
                                                 
17  H.C.V. Leibbrandt (ed. and tr.), Precis of the Archives of the Cape of Good Hope: Requesten 
(Memorials), 1715-1806 (5 vols, Cape Town, 1905-6 and 1989), vol. 1, 383 and CA, C 133, 409-15.  
18  Schreuder held thirty-nine pachten during a twenty-eight-year period (1762-90). He started 














1767 by investing in the malt beer pacht after Schreuder’s three year stint. In total 
Roep invested four times in this particular pacht during the late 1760s and 1770s, thus 
ensuring the continuing dominance of the De Nijs family in the malt beer business.  
During this period a non-German married into the family. Jan Daniel Holst 
from Amsterdam arrived at the Cape in 1754, a year before Roep, and became a 
burgher shortly thereafter. In 1757 his wife joined him from Amsterdam,19 and in the 
mid-1760s he twice invested in alcohol pachten. On one of these occasions Schreuder 
acted as one of his sureties. In 1767, shortly after the death of his first wife, he 
married Aletta Johanna Biesel, the granddaughter of Aletta de Nijs, thereby becoming 
related to both Hurter and Roep.20 He was, however, a minor cog in the wheel of the 
Hurter/De Nijs family as he only invested in one more pacht after his marriage, viz. in 
the Rondebosch-False Bay pacht in 1773, a pacht in which several of his relatives had 
invested over the years and which was closely tied to the malt beer pacht.  
During the early 1770s ownership of the malt beer pacht circulated between 
Jan Willem Hurter, the son-in-law of Aletta de Nijs, Johannes Roep, her ‘grandson-in-
law’ and Johannes Esselaar (or Essler). The latter was another German immigrant 
who arrived at the Cape during the late 1740s or very early 1750s (he was married by 
1751) and had been actively investing in the brandy pacht during the 1760s. He had 
no family ties to De Nijs herself, but seems to have formed part of the group of 
German immigrant pachters centred on Johannes Roep. It was Esselaar who, along 
with Roep, acted as Hurter’s surety during the times he bought the malt beer pacht in 
the 1760-70s. In addition Esselaar also acted as Schreuder’s surety on at least eight 
occasions during the 1770s, and also three times for Johannes Roep when the latter 
started investing in the alcohol pachten in the late 1760s (in which Schreuder became 
so prominent). Esselaar himself seems to have made use of these fellow Germans as 
sureties less often: on only three occasions did Roep and Schreuder stand as sureties 
for him during his twelve-year long involvement in the pachten.  
Another expatriate German who invested briefly in the malt beer pacht (in 
1779) during this period, and seems to have formed part of this group of mutual 
supporters, was Jan Smook (or Schmuck). He was born in 1724 and arrived at the 
                                                                                                                                            
business to include the lucrative brandy pacht in the 1770s, often buying more than one of the four 
brandy pachten a year.  
19  CA, C 135, 174.  














Cape in 1753 where he became a burgher in 1762. He therefore follows the pattern of 
Hurter, Roep, Schreuder and Esselaar who were all born in the early 1720s, arrived at 
the Cape as soldiers in the early 1750s and became involved in the alcohol pachten 
during the 1760s. On four of the five occasions that Smook invested in an alcohol 
pacht, Roep acted as one of his sureties, while Smook in his turn stood as surety for 
Schreuder (four times) and on many occasions for Roep (nine times), especially at the 
start of their respective careers as pachters. Acting as a surety for someone in the 
eighteenth-century Cape, as illustrated earlier (in chapter four), was no mere formality 
since it carried formidable risks and was normally only done for people one trusted. In 
addition, as Otto Mentzel had testified of the situation in the 1730s, more often than 
not the person who stood as someone’s surety acted more as business partners and not 
mere sureties.21 It is clear from the aforegoing that during the 1760-70s there 
developed a group of German men of roughly the same age and experience who all 
invested in pachten, also the malt beer one, and supported one another financially. 
This group seems to have been centred on Johannes Roep (in terms of the network of 
sureties) who was helped by his connections via his wife and Hurter to the De Nijs 
family business complex.  
In the mid-1770s the malt beer pacht was held for three years in succession by 
a newcomer to the business, viz. the Cape-born Tobias Rogiers. But his involvement 
too was no accident: he was the son of Johannes Rogiers (and a free-black woman, 
Maria Vermeuelen) who had worked as tappersknecht for most of his life but also 
twice held a pacht (in 1714 and 1726).22 In 1765 Rogiers junior married Maria 
Elisabeth van Ellewee, another granddaughter of Aletta de Nijs via her daughter Anna 
Catherina Biesel. During 1775-77 he held the malt beer pacht, and on all three 
occasions Johannes Esselaar stood as one of his sureties, along with his ‘step-uncle’, 
Jan Willem Hurter on two occasions and Jan Smook once. In the tradition of his 
family-in-law, he also acted as bijtapper for the Rondebosch and False Bay pachters. 
After Rogiers’ stint as malt beer pachter, he was succeeded by his ‘cousin-in-law’ for 
1778, who in turn was succeeded by the family friend, Jan Smook for 1779, after 
                                                 
21  O.F. Mentzel, A Geographical and Topographical Description of the Cape of Good Hope 
(translated by H.J. Mandelbrote, G.V. Marais and J. Hoge) (3 vols, Cape Town, 1921, 1925 and 1944), 
vol. 2, 52. 
22  M. Cairns, ‘The Land and Its Owners, 1660-1822’, in J. Walton (ed.), The Josephine Mill and 














which the pacht returned to the head of the family again, Jan Willem Hurter, the son-
in-law of Aletta de Nijs and Hans Jurgen Honk, in 1780 and again in 1782-83. Hurter 
died in 1783 which meant the end of the involvement – which started in 1738 – of the 
family of Aletta de Nijs (and some of their associates) in the malt beer pacht and beer 
brewing at the Cape. Although Hurter’s son-in-law, Dirk Gijsbert van Reenen, 
inherited Papenboom, which he greatly expanded and improved,23 he never became 
directly involved in the alcohol pachten (although three of his many brothers briefly 
invested in some of the other pachten during the 1780-90s).  
For more than forty years, De Nijs, her husbands, sons-in-laws and grandsons-
in-law controlled the malt beer pacht and beer brewing at the Cape. While this 
particular pacht was not the most lucrative of the alcohol pachten, it did produce a 
continuous income – the more so since it did not have any competition from other 
pachters, unlike the more lucrative brandy and Cape wine pachten. It seems to have 
become particularly lucrative during the 1770-80s, during which era the wine 
pachters complained about the unfair competition they received, to their detriment, 
from the beer pachter.24 In addition, the De Nijs family complex all seem to have 
been working closely with the Rondebosch and False Bay pachters, acting as their 
bijtappers on their farms and premises in the area behind Table Mountain. In fact, the 
De Nijs family appears to have been quite prominent in this part of the Cape: Aletta 
de Nijs’s niece, Elisabeth de Nijs,25 married in 1750 the colony’s master woodcutter, 
Salomon Bosch, with whom she lived at Paradise, Newlands – not far from her aunt’s 
                                                 
23  Moritz, Die Deutschen am Kap, 163.  
24  G.J. Jooste, ‘Die Geskiedenis van Wynbou en Wynhandel in die Kaapkolonie, 1753-1795’ 
(unpublished MA thesis, University of Stellenbosch, 1973), 71-79. Certainly, by the 1770s the beer 
pachters were better established and deeper connected than ever before. It is not impossible that the 
Cape wine pachters feared their growing influence precisely because of the dynasty building that was 
taking place. It could also be, by the late 1770s and early 1780s, that the beer pachters (who were so 
closely connected to the Van Reenens and other leading burgher families) were associated with the 
dissenting Cape Patriot movement while the wine pachters, especially Martin Melck, were keen to 
dissociate from this movement.  
25  Heese and Lombard, Genealogies, vol. 6, 476 list Elisabeth de Nijs as the second daughter of 
Jan de Nijs who was born at the Cape and married in 1725. Although they do not make this connection, 
it seems highly plausible (certainly in chronological terms) that this Jan de Nijs is the same as the third 














farm Papenboom.26 During this same period another De Nijs worked for the VOC in 
this area, viz. Adriaan de Neijs (sic). He seems not to have been directly related to the 
Cape De Nijs family as he came from The Netherlands (not Germany) in 1741 but 
some distant relation is not impossible and would certainly have been cultivated in the 
small social world of the Cape.27 Adriaan de Neijs was a wealthy and respectable man 
who as postholder of Simon’s Bay between 1751 and 1761 fulfilled an important 
function in the Cape settlement as is indicated by his rank of junior merchant 
(onderkoopman).28 It was precisely during his tenure that Simon’s Bay became the 
preferred anchorage for the VOC fleet which caused a major increase in the value of 
the Rondebosch and False Bay pachten with which the De Nijs family was so 
intimately concerned. No doubt their close relation to senior officials in the VOC 
establishment at the Cape added to the status of the De Nijs family.29 
 
In and of itself the story of the De Nijs family’s involvement in the malt beer pacht 
illustrates the family nature of the alcohol retail business during this period. In this 
sense, as well as the fact that new links continued to be made based on a shared 
German background, this case study proves similar to that of the 1730s where German 
immigrants were building up business networks. Yet the history of the De Nijs 
involvement in the pachten also illustrates how, as connections became deeper with 
each new generation, the nature of alliances changed – this became particularly 
evident during the 1770s and 1780s. For one thing, the fact that the De Nijs family 
was able to hold onto the malt beer pacht for three generations also indicates that 
dynasty building was possible through investment in the pachten, especially if it was 
                                                 
26  M. Cairns, ‘Paradise, Newlands’, Quarterly Bulletin of the South African Library 35/2 (1980), 
60-65. 
27  His eldest daughter had the family name Aletta; while (at the time of his wife’s death in 1773) 
Johannes Roep, married to the granddaughter of Aletta de Nijs, owed the estate some f 3000; CA, 
MOOC 8/15 no. 15. 
28  Leibbrandt, Precis: Requesten, vol. 1, 381 and D. Sleigh, Die Buiteposte: VOC-Buiteposte 
onder Kaapse Bestuur, 1652-1795 (Pretoria, 2004), 321-22. The source of his wealth is not known, yet 
he managed to transfer thousands of guilders every year to his family in The Netherlands. Although 
Sleigh does not speculate, it seems likely that his wealth must have been connected to his post which 
afforded any number of opportunities for enrichment.  
29  Adriaan de Neijs’ daughter was married to Ensign Johan Arnold Bleumer, adding another 














coupled with owning the correct type of property, viz. the farm which produced their 
retail.  
 Establishing a dynasty, though, is about more than just business and economic 
success. The capital – both economic and social – which the De Nijs family built up 
over several generations paid off handsomely by the period under discussion. The 
children of Jan Willem Hurter and Barbara Honk all made spectacularly advantageous 
marriages. Their first daughter married in 1775, but five of their other children all 
married in 1782-83, which is no co-incidence. This was at the height of the Patriot 
agitation and almost all of the families into which the Hurter children married were 
closely involved in this movement. The exact origin of Hurter’s involvement with the 
Patriots cannot be determined, but certainly his family’s close contact with the van 
Reenens since 1775 and his long-standing friendship with Schreuder (who was a 
supporter of the Patriots; see below) contributed to this. 30  
The first Hurter daughter, Aletta (named after the matriarch) married Dirk 
Gijsbert van Reenen in 1775, while her sister, Catharina, married his younger brother 
Sebastiaan Valentijn in 1783. In 1782, Elisabeth Maria Hurter married Arend Munnik, 
while her brother followed suit by marrying Martha Maria Munnik, Arend’s niece, the 
following year. Another daughter of Hurter married Servaas van Breda, also in 1782. 
Hurter’s eldest son, Jacobus Adam, married Anna Elisabeth Bergh in 1783.31 
These were about the most advantageous (in social and economic terms) 
marriages a person could make in the late eighteenth-century Cape. The Munniks 
were one of the foremost burgher families with large landholdings. Arend was the 
younger brother of Gerhardus Munnik, the father of Martha Maria.32 It is likely that 
there existed a long-standing business relationship between the De Nijs/Hurter family 
and the Munniks: Gerhardus Munnik was the pachter of Rondebosch and False Bay 
in 1779 while his father, Johannes Munnik, also held this pacht for three years during 
the 1740s. Gerhardus Munnik was, however, better known and well-respected as a 
heemraad of Stellenbosch, captain of the burgher militia and a man of property.33 By 
                                                 
30  They were also all connected via their interest in promoting the Lutheran church at the Cape; 
see below.  
31  Heese and Lombard, Genealogies, vol. 3, 531-32. 
32  Heese and Lombard, Genealogies, vol. 5, 738-39. 
33  G.J. Schutte (ed.), Briefwisseling van Hendrik Swellengrebel Jr oor Kaapse Sake, 1778-1792 














marrying Martha Maria Munnik, Jan Willem Hurter jr. obtained not only another Van 
Reenen brother as a brother-in-law (to add to the two his sisters had married), but also 
a Morkel brother-in-law as well as both a Dreyer sister and brother-in-law. This was 
in addition to having a De Waal as his mother-in-law. By this stage the Munnik 
family was at the epicentre of a network of very wealthy families who intermarried to 
consolidate their wealth.34 
 The van Bredas were like the Van Reenens by this stage a third-generation 
Cape family with connections to most of the other wealthy burgher families. Servaas 
was the brother of the better-known Patriot leader, Pieter van Breda who both lived 
off their properties and inheritances.35 Through them the Hurter family became related 
to the Smuts, Myburgh, Loubser, Eksteen and (yet again) the Van Reenen families. 
By the 1780s the Hurter family was immensely intertwined with the Van Reenens – 
not only through direct marriage alliances but also via indirect ties through in-laws. 
These links were most advantageous. By this stage the Van Reenen family was 
probably the wealthiest at the Cape thanks to their father, Jacobus van Reenen’s vast 
landholdings and major involvement in the meat pacht over several decades.36 Dirk 
Gijsbert continued in this vein and with several of his brothers also invested in the 
meat pacht. Apart from his other farms, he bought his father-in-law’s estate, De 
Papenboom, in 1785 for the massive sum of f 110 000. In addition to continuing to 
grow malt for the brewery, he also turned it into a foremost wine farm.37 It was partly 
thanks to his business acumen that the beer pacht (which he provided with its 
produce) became a threat to the wine pachters during the 1780s.38  
Finally, the oldest Hurter son, Jacobus Adam, married Anna Elisabeth Bergh. 
She was the great-granddaughter of the high-ranking VOC official Olof Bergh and 
Anna de Koning who at the turn of the eighteenth century became some of the 
                                                 
34  Cf. Martin Hall, ‘The Secret Lives of Houses: Women and Gables in the Eighteenth-Century 
Cape’, Social Dynamics 20/1 (1994), 10-20. 
35  J.H. Verduyn den Boer, Schetsen uit het Kaapse Leven van de 18e en 19e Eeuw (Cape Town, 
1929), 1. 
36  G. Wagenaar, ‘Johannes Gysbertus van Reenen: Sy Aandeel in die Kaapse Geskiedenis tot 
1806’ (unpublished MA thesis, University of Pretoria, 1976), 3-10. 
37  W.J. de Kock and D.W. Krüger (eds), Suid-Afrikaanse Biografiese Woordeboek: Deel II 
(Cape Town and Johannesburg, 1972), 818-19. 













wealthiest landowners at the Cape. Like their ancestor, the descendants of Olof Bergh 
moved in both the worlds of the free burghers and VOC administrators at the Cape. 
Anna Elisabeth was the daughter of the burgher lieutenant Olof Bergh. The latter’s 
cousin, however, was a high-ranking Company official: secretary of the Council of 
Policy, Auction Master and (for a while) acting Independent Fiscal, Olof Martini 
Bergh reached the apogee of his career by becoming a chief merchant 
(opperkoopman) in 1785.39 Two of his sons became VOC officials like their father, 
but the rest entered the burgher community. The ambidextrous nature of this family is 
well-illustrated Olof Martini Bergh’s son, Marthinus Adrianus Bergh, who during the 
late 1770s and early 1780s caused something of a scandal when he resigned from his 
senior posts in the VOC (inter alia as landdrost of Stellenbosch, like his grandfather) 
to join the cause of the Patriots.40 The Hurter family was also related to him through 
his wife, Catharina de Waal. In addition, they must have had cultural links with Olof 
Martini Bergh because of his close association with the Lutheran movement of this 
period (see below).  
Via the Hurter family’s marriages to the Van Bredas, Munniks and Van 
Reenens during the late 1770s and early 1780s they became related to the most 
influential and wealthy of the Cape gentry families, viz. the Smuts, Myburgh, 
Eksteen, Morkel, De Waal, Dreyer and Loubser families. Many of these were also 
involved in the Patriot agitation of this period (see below). How then does one explain 
the Hurters’ link with a prominent VOC family such as the Berghs, the more so (as 
G.J. Schutte has written) since ‘even when certain official families had settled at the 
Cape, sometimes for generations, they retained the stamp of belonging to the 
Company rather than to the citizenry’?41 Yet, Aletta de Nijs had close links with 
family members such as Salomon Bosch and Adriaan de Neijs who were middle-
ranking VOC officials in the Rondebosch-False Bay area, while her third husband, 
                                                 
39  De Kock and Krüger, Biografiese Woordeboek II, 54-55. Olof Martini’s father, Marthinus 
Bergh, was the landdrost of Stellenbosch during the 1720-30s, cf. D.W. Krüger and C.J. Beyers (eds), 
Suid-Afrikaanse Biografiese Woordeboek: Deel III (Cape Town, 1977), 63.  
40  C. Beyers, Die Kaapse Patriotte gedurende die Laaste Kwart van die Agtiende Eeu en die 
Voortlewing van hul Denkbeelde (Second edition, Pretoria, 1967), 128-32. 
41  G.J. Schutte, ‘Company and Colonists at the Cape, 1652-1795’, in R. Elphick and H. Giliomee 














Gerrit Reindersz de Vos, was a retired VOC captain. The answer lies in the changing 
nature of family alliances by this period.  
 Robert Ross has described the last decades of the eighteenth century and the 
start of the nineteenth as a period during which officials in Cape Town ‘were not a 
distinct economic class’ but who, through marriage alliances, became increasingly 
closely allied with the established farming families of the Western Cape. These 
locally-born officials with deep and wide-spreading roots acted as political links 
between the government and the farming community.42 Ross is primarily concerned 
with the turn of the nineteenth century, but the process he is describing seems already 
to be at work in the 1770-80s, and has even deeper roots with certain families such as 
the Berghs. In the course of the eighteenth century, as some administrator families 
settled at the Cape and their children remained there, marriages between the Company 
and burgher elites increased. By the period under discussion, when third and fourth 
generation Cape inhabitants were getting married, the desired links between wealth, 
power and status overrode any differences that may have existed between Company 
and burgher families.43 
The history of Aletta de Nijs and her family’s involvement in the malt beer 
pacht for four decades and her son-in-law, Jan Willem Hurter’s spectacular success – 
both financially44 and socially – illustrate the role of pachters in the making of the 
Cape gentry during this period. Ross has argued that there was a remarkable 
continuity in families who were involved in wine farming in the Western Cape. As a 
result of this the division of wealth within the rural gentry ‘did not become extreme’, 
but at the same time the number of what Ross terms ‘middle-level’ farmers increased 
in the course of the eighteenth century.45 This means that despite the continuity of 
                                                 
42  R. Ross, ‘The Rise of the Cape Gentry’, Journal of Southern African Studies 9/2 (1983), 196, 
quoting William Freund.  
43  Although it must be added here that it is unlikely that any ‘Company family’ who had been at 
the Cape for more than two generations would not also include several members who were part of the 
burgher community. In this sense Schutte’s statement quoted above seems wrong – although that may 
have been the appearance, it was the reality with only a very few Company families such as the 
Swellengrebels.  
44  This is illustrated in the increase of the value of their main estate, De Papenboom: in 1743, at 
the death of Honk, it was valued at f 15 000, half a century later, Hurter’s son-in-law bought it from his 
estate for f 110 000. 














some families in the farming sector, the gentry also expanded with new blood. Ross 
continues to argue that ‘the Cape gentry consisted of a relatively undifferentiated 
broad mass of farmers, rather than a very small elite …’ with the exception of the 
‘small group’ of meat and wine pachters who, however, ‘became submerged in the 
growing group of substantial, but not exceptionally rich, farmers’.46 But by the late 
eighteenth century there were exceptionally rich farmers, and none more so than the 
Van Reenens. The success of Dirk Gijsbert van Reenen would not have been possible 
without the history of the pachters of De Papenboom. Van Reenen was able to build 
on Hurter’s achievements and successes as brewer and farmer, and with his own 
capital – both financial and social – to expand it immensely. But in his turn Hurter 
would not have been as successful had it not been for the many small achievements of 
Aletta de Nijs over the decades as she slowly consolidated and expanded her family’s 
wealth from a relatively meagre base.  
 
This case of ‘dynasty building’ by Aletta de Nijs and her descendants is unusual in the 
history of pacht holding as no other family controlled a single pacht for such a long 
period and with so many different family members being involved in it. This is partly 
due to the fact that the malt beer pachters were also the producers of beer which 
generally translated in greater continuity of ownership than with the other pachten.47 
But in many other ways the De Nijs/Hurter involvement in this pacht also illustrates 
well the continuities of the ways in which pachters operated: the centrality of German 
immigrants to the business; the role of endogamous marriages and the importance of 
kinship in building up social capital. It does however also indicate that by the 1770s 
and 1780s some aspects of this process started to change, especially in the changing 
nature and object of family alliances, which moved from urban entrepreneurs to the 
Cape gentry. But how does the experience of the De Nijs/Hurter family complex 




                                                 
46  Ibid., 207-8. 
47  See page 34 note 76 on the nature of the malt beer pacht.  In general, female pachters were 














Friends, Family Networks and Social Capital 
 
As indicated earlier in this chapter the pachters of the 1770s reveal different 
prosopographic patterns as a group from those of the 1730s. There were both 
continuities and changes: a surprising continued dominance of immigrant Germans, 
no clear patterns between VOC ranks and pacht holding, and generally a lack of using 
marriage as a direct entry into the world of alcohol retail at the Cape. The history of 
the De Nijs/Hurter family complex well demonstrates how, among some pachters, the 
way into the world of alcohol retail remained similar for a long period. However, 
there are also indications from the history of that family that important changes were 
beginning to occur during the 1770s. These changes can be discerned more clearly 
with the history of the other pachters of this decade.  
 
As late as the 1770s there was still a sizeable and prominent German community in 
Cape Town and its surrounds, consisting of both immigrant and second-generation 
members. It was during this period that they reasserted themselves in an attempt to 
practise a prominent part of their heritage, viz. their Lutheran faith. After their 
attempts of the 1730-40s failed, the Lutherans at the Cape kept a low profile until the 
1770s. This was due to two factors, one was the death of Rijk Tulbagh in 1771 (who 
was very unsympathetic to the Lutheran cause)48 but probably more significant is the 
rise to prominence during this period of German Lutherans in the public life of the 
Cape of Good Hope – both civilian and official. A study of those involved in the 
campaign for religious freedom reveals many of the links suggested above.  
 In the early 1770s Martin Melck, the wealthiest pachter of this period, erected 
a ‘warehouse’ in Strand Street for use by the Lutherans of Cape Town, although this 
met with some official resistance. In 1776 a number of prominent Lutherans sent a 
memorandum to the Dutch Reformed Church authorities in Amsterdam to plead their 
cause. For fear of reprisal, this memorandum was signed by only twenty Lutherans. 
The names include three of the foremost pachters of this era: Martin Melck, Maarten 
Bateman and Johannes Esselaar. This in addition to a number of individuals who were 
related to them (such as Johannes van Reenen) and several who acted as their sureties: 
                                                 
48  J. Hoge, ‘Die Geskiedenis van die Lutherse Kerk aan die Kaap’, Archives Year Book for South 














Jens Jansen (to Esselaar), Dirk Lehman (to Melck), Baltus Willem Beets (to De 
Kruger) and Johannes Gijsbert Frank (to Melck).49 A fascinating aspect of the 
Lutheran struggle is how involved high-ranking VOC officials at the Cape were in the 
process: the request of 1778 to establish a congregation was signed by eight 
individuals, four of whom were Company administrators: the bookkeeper, Jan Anthon 
Hitzman, the junior merchants, Tobias Christian Rönnenkamp and Jan Fredrik Kirsten 
as well as the secretary of the Council of Justice, Christian Ludolph Neethling.50 The 
very influential and high-ranking official, Olof Martini Bergh, also supported their 
cause and became a member once the congregation was established in 1780.51 This 
partly explains the links between the Bergh and Hurter families discussed in the 
previous section. When the Lutheran congregation came into existence, the most 
successful German pachters of the 1770s who were still alive became members: 
Maarten Baateman, Johannes Esselaar and Martin Melck, in addition to several of the 
families to whom they were related by marriage, such as the Dreyer, Hoffman, Hop, 
Meijer and Wispelaar families.52 
   
If, as the previous paragraphs suggest, there were still some important links due to a 
shared cultural background between Capetonians of German descent, did this also 
translate into business networks as during the 1730s? Let us first consider marriage 
alliances and then the issue of financial backers.  
                                                 
49  Ibid., 72. 
50  Ibid., 75. It is possible that the support of Lutherans in high office was a redeeming factor in 
finally allowing a Lutheran congregation. Likewise, it could be that because the German community 
was much better integrated with both the local burgher and VOC populations by this late period, there 
was less fear of them forming a ‘separatist’ group which could divide the populace.  
51  De Kock and Krüger, Biografiese Woordeboek II, 55. The way in which officials were 
interlinked with burghers is illustrated by the fact that Bergh owed Jan Christoffel Fleck a sizeable loan 
of f 12 000 in 1783, the same period when Jan Jacob Schreuder owed Fleck f 6 000 (see below). 
Although Schreuder did not join the Lutheran congregation in 1780, he was linked to Bergh via the 
Hurter complex.  














 Twelve of the nineteen pachters active during the 1770s were German 
immigrant men and one was Dutch.53 They all married at the Cape and, with one 
exception,54 they all married Cape-born women. But only four of them married into 
‘German’ families, with only two of them having links to parents who were pachters. 
One of the latter is Jan Willem Hurter who, as discussed, married the daughter of 
Hans Jurgen Honk and Aletta de Nijs. The other one is Johannes Roep who married 
the granddaughter of De Nijs, Johanna Elisabeth Staf, who had grown up in the De 
Nijs household. As shown above, these family links played an important role in the 
success of Hurter and Roep as pachters and alcohol traders. Only two other pachters 
from this period married the daughters of German immigrants: Jan Jacob Schreuder,55 
after a brief first marriage to Johanna Meyn, married Maria van Laar whose father 
was a German immigrant to the Cape in the 1720s.56 Martin Melck first worked as a 
knecht to the German immigrant, Johan Gubeler (or Gubelaar), and later married his 
widow, Anna Margaretha Hop, the daughter of the successful German farmer (and 
burgher councillor) of the 1720-40s, Jan Heinrich Hop.57 All of them, most 
spectacularly Martin Melck, used these marriages to gain the financial and social 
capital with which to pursue their entrepreneurial interests.58 In this sense they did not 
differ much from the German immigrant pachters of the 1730s. 
                                                 
53  I will not deal with Jan Daniel Holst here as he is highly exceptionable. As a Dutch immigrant 
he brought out his wife but married into the De Nijs family upon her death in 1767. His involvement in 
the pachten was minor.  
54  Pieter Broeders first married Maria Strand from Amsterdam who had been at the Cape for 
some time as she was twice widowed by the time she married Broeders in 1757; Heese and Lombard, 
Genealogies, vol. 1, 455 and J. Hoge, ‘Personalia of the Germans at the Cape, 1652-1806’, Archives 
Year Book for South African History 9 (1946), 48.  
55  Jan Jacob Schreuder was not the son of the earlier pachter, Jan Jurgen Schreuder, who was 
active during the 1740s.  
56  Hoge, ‘Personalia’, 230. 
57  Ibid., 173. 
58  It is no co-incidence that Schreuder only started to invest in the alcohol pachten after his 
second marriage. Although Melck already started his entrepreneurial activities before his marriage, the 
capital he gained through that marriage enabled him to expand his business interests massively, 
ultimately starting to invest in the expensive Cape wine pacht in 1760; cf. G.A. Cockrell, ‘Die Lewe 
van Martin Melck, 1723-1781’ (unpublished MA thesis, University of Stellenbosch, 1984), 21-35 on 














 They are, however, a minority of the pachters of the 1770s. Five of the 
pachters of this period married women of Dutch descent. Two of these concern the 
pachters of Stellenbosch-Drakenstein who are somewhat exceptional. Anthonij 
Kalteijer married Anna van Biljon, the widow of the farmer Bartholomeus Zaaijman. 
After his two-year stint as pachter, Kalteijer was succeeded by Frans Sebrits (or 
Zebrits) who was married to Rachel Francina Zaayman, the daughter of Kalteijer’s 
wife from her first marriage. In a minor way this was a bit of a family tradition: 
Bartholomeus Zaaijman acted as the Stellenbosch-Drakenstein pachter once, in 1749. 
Pieter Broeders, as mentioned, married a Dutch woman who had long been at the 
Cape, although his second marriage (much later in life) was to Maria Elisabeth Taute, 
the daughter of the German immigrant, Matthias Taute.59 More significant are the 
histories of Johannes Nicholaas Esselaar and Maarten Bateman, as they were two of 
the most successful pachters of this period. Esselaar married Pieternella Bury and 
Bateman married Catherina Elisabeth Jansen. Both of these women came from well-
established Cape families with no connections to the pacht business. Clearly, in none 
of these five cases could the marriages of these German men have played a direct role 
in gaining them access to the world of alcohol pacht-holding.  
 Three of the pachters during this period married free-black women. Neither 
Jan Smook’s wife Johanna Magdalena Needer nor that of Willem de Kruger (or de 
Grieger), Susanna Margaretha Fynton, had any direct links with the alcohol pachten. 
After the death of his first wife, De Kruger married Elizabeth Meijer who was the 
widow of the German immigrant, Paulus Beck.60 Jan Willem Wilkens sr. also married 
a free black woman at first, Maria Juliana Constant, but his brief involvement in 
pacht-holding only came after his marriage to Anna Susanna Wepener who was the 
daughter of the Rondebosch pachter, Joachim Ernst Wepener (active in the 1740s).  
There seems then to have been relatively little direct connection between 
marriage and entering the alcohol pachten during this period, at least for the German 
pachters. The six Cape-born pachters active during the 1770s were only involved in 
pacht-holding in a minor way – not one of them held more than three pachten, nor did 
any one of them ever own the lucrative Cape wines or brandy pachten. Three of these 
concern the minor and exceptionable Stellenbosch-Drakenstein pacht: Hermanus 
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Combrink, Hendrik Meijer and Willem Dempers. Except for Meijer – the grandson of 
Gerrit Hendrik Meijer who was involved with the alcohol pachten at the start of the 
eighteenth century – there is no identifiable link with other pachters in their families. 
This is not the case with the other three Cape-born pachters. The fathers of Jan 
Willem Wilkens jr., Gerhardus Munnik and Tobias Rogiers were all once pachters – 
but not one of them (either father or son) was particularly successful. Rogiers, in 
addition, was married to a granddaughter of De Nijs and was therefore closely related 
to a number of more prominent pachters of this period. Ultimately it seems, then, as if 
marriage and descent did not play a particularly important role in the careers of 
successful pachters during the 1770s, with the exception of the complex surrounding 
the De Nijs family. Clearly, by this stage, German immigrants did not need to contract 
endogamous marriages as during the 1730s. But had the nature of their business 
networks changed significantly by this later period?  
  
It has been shown in the previous section how the group of German pachters 
associated with the De Nijs/Hurter complex during the 1770-80s were connected 
through standing surety for one another. This had also been the case for the 1730s 
pachters studied in the previous chapter. If German immigrant pachters during the 
1770s did not primarily gain entry into the alcohol pacht business through marriages, 
did they do so via business links centred on standing surety for partners? In what 
follows an analysis is made of the sureties of the six most prominent pachters (each 
owning more than ten pachten) during this period: Maarten Bateman, Willem de 
Kruger, Johannes Esselaar, Martin Melck, Johannes Roep and Johan Jacob 
Schreuder.61 All of these men were German immigrants to the Cape. 
 Since all of these men held pachten over many years, it is not surprising that 
they each had many different individuals who stood as their sureties; and that these 
individuals changed over time (as some died, or for some reason or the other could 
not or chose not to remain involved in the alcohol trade). Yet some suggestive 
patterns do occur. Bateman, who was involved in the pachten for fifteen years, had 
eighteen different men who stood surety for him. His partner throughout this period 
                                                 
61  This analysis is based on the signatories of those standing surety as revealed in the pacht 
contracts between 1760 and 1789 (the years during which these men were actively investing in 














was his fellow-brandy pachter and compatriot, Johannes Esselaar, who was his surety 
on eighteen occasions. He was also, on one or two occasions each, supported by other 
of the German pachters active in the 1770-80s: Jan Jacob Schreuder, Willem de 
Kruger, Johannes Roep, Johannes Holtman and Jan Andries Bam. But after Esselaar, 
Bateman’s most regular sureties were two Dutchmen with no obvious family links: 
Jacob Kamp (nine times) who was a once-off pachter in the 1760s, and Jacobus van 
den Berg (eight times) who was to become a pachter in the 1780s. In addition, 
Bateman was supported by the German Michiel Benning (seven times) who had no 
direct involvement in the pachten.  
 Bateman returned the favour by being Esselaar’s most regular surety: a total of 
nine times, and one of only two of Esselaar’s sureties who regularly supported him. 
Although Esselaar also on one or two occasions had the support of Schreuder, Roep 
and Kamp, his second-most regular surety, Jan Verlee, has no other links to the 
pachten and also had no obvious relation to Esselaar. Both Esselaar and Bateman also 
supported Jan Jacob Schreuder during his lengthy career as pachter (thirty-nine 
pachten in almost thirty years) as sureties, although between them only eleven times. 
Schreuder’s most regular surety was the one-time pachter Johannes Holtman, who 
acted in this capacity nineteen times. Holtman, although he only invested in pachten 
twice, seems to have been quote supportive of this group of pachters – he stood surety 
for Schreuder, Melck, Roep and Bateman. Other regular supporters of Schreuder were 
Johannes Roep – at the start of his career (ten times) – and Jan Andries Bam (seven 
times) during the 1780s. Other fellow pachters who supported him on more than one 
occasion include Jan Smook and Jan Daniel Holst. But Schreuder’s lengthy career 
necessitated many sureties and the twenty-two men who acted in this capacity 
represent many – Dutch, German and Cape-born – who did so only once or twice. 
Johannes Roep’s shorter career as pachter resulted in only twelve individuals who 
acted as his sureties. The most regular of these were his fellow German pachters, Jan 
Smook (ten times) and Schreuder (five times). Holtman also acted as his surety on six 
occasions, in addition to other pachters such as Esselaar, Holst, Bam, van den Berg as 
well as Jurgen Spengler.  
 It is clear from the above that these four men were very closely linked through 
a web of mutual support – both for one another and through friends and relations who 
supported them to various degrees. The two exceptions among this group of 














Kruger remarkably only has one fellow pachter among his sureties, viz. Bateman who 
acted twice in this capacity. The remaining twelve of his sureties are a mixture of 
German, Dutch and Cape-born men, none of whom had clear links with pacht-
holding. This may well be related to the fact that De Kruger was twice married to 
free-black women: his brother-in-law, Johan Rediger (or Rettiger)62 supported him six 
times, while his two other most regular sureties, Adam Siedel (nine times) and Johan 
Peter Voges (six times), were both Cape Town artisans married to free-black 
women.63 The remainder of his sureties, with one exception, only supported him once 
or twice.  
 Martin Melck, the most successful of all pachters, had eighteen sureties in his 
eighteen-year career as a pachter. An analysis of them reveals an interesting 
development over time. During the first part of his career he was regularly supported 
by second-generation established Cape farmers, Nicolaas Brommert (nine times) and 
Jan Gijsbert Franke (seven times). Only by the late 1760s did he start making use of 
other pachters as sureties, viz. Spengler, Smook, Roep, Holtman and (later) van den 
Berg – but not one of them stood as surety more than twice. The only exception was 
Maarten Batemen who acted as his surety on five occasions. In the second half of his 
career Melck was mostly supported by fellow Stellenbosch farmers, notably Dirk de 
Vos and his fellow heemraad Johan Bernard Hofman. His biggest supporter during 
this period was, however, Hendrik Cloete who acted in this capacity on eight 
occasions. This Cloete was the son of Jacob Cloete, for whom Melck worked as 
knecht in the late 1740s. Melck maintained a close friendship with the Cloete family 
throughout his life and the Cloetes often acted as baptismal sponsors to his children.64 
This yet again illustrates how closely business interests were intertwined with social 
ones.  
 
This analysis of the sureties for the six most important pachters of the 1770s reveals 
an intriguing pattern: it is evident that bonds of friendship – especially with those of a 
similar cultural background (German and Lutheran) – played a huge role, especially 
with those pachters who formed part of the Hurter complex centred on the malt beer 
                                                 
62  Hoge, ‘Personalia’, 327. 
63  Siedel was a tailor and Voges a smith who both lived in Cape Town; ibid., 395-96 and 438. 














pacht. At its centre the pachters of the 1770s still exhibit a marked degree of German 
support for one another, albeit with significant shifts. This is also clear from other 
sources. Thus Jan Jacob Schreuder, who was certainly very much at the core of the 
1770s pachters, loaned money from his (not very wealthy) mother-in-law, a woman 
of Dutch descent who married a German immigrant, Dirk Gijsbert Frank, another 
second-generation German, and Jan Christoffel Fleck, also the son of a German 
immigrant.65 Likewise Johannes Esselaar was prepared to loan the large amount of f 
10 000 to the German, Johannes Beck, and stood surety for several of his fellow 
pachters, but gave out very few other loans, and certainly nothing as large.66 
However, the situation regarding the pachters during this period was more complex. 
There were continuities, such as those just indicated, but there were also changes. 
Thus the variety of sureties, and the many changes that occurred over time, indicate a 
significant change from the 1730s: German immigrant pachters by this stage did not 
limit themselves to fellow Germans for financial support and business partnerships – 
there was less reliance on direct family support (especially in-laws) and a greater 
willingness to enter into alliances with other groups.   
 It is clear, further, that the German community of Cape Town during this 
period were much better integrated with the rest of the citizenry than earlier in the 
eighteenth century. As an analysis of their marriage and business network patterns has 
revealed, one of the outstanding features of the German pachters of the 1770s is how 
interconnected they were with the wider burgher community as well as (to an extent) 
the VOC officialdom. This inter-connectedness is well illustrated through the 
involvement of some of the pachters (especially those who formed part of the Hurter 
complex) in the Patriot agitation of the late 1770s and early 1780s. Thus, the very first 
meeting of what became known as the Cape Patriots was held in May 1778 in the 
tavern of Jan Jacob Schreuder.67 The 1781 burgher request – in which the citizenry 
complained about taxation – was signed by the pachters Jan Willem Hurter, Johannes 
Roep, Tobias Rogiers and (a pachter of the 1780s) Jan Andries Bam. As significant is 
the fact that several men from the families related to the Hurter complex, as well as 
their financial supporters (in terms of sureties) also signed it, to wit the Dreijer, de 
                                                 
65  CA, MOOC 8/14 no. 53; 8/16 no. 52 and 8/18 no 53. 
66  CA, MOOC 8/19 no. 11. 














Waal, van Reenen, van Breda, Meijer, Taute, Voges, Beck, von Wielligh and Eksteen 
families.68 The Patriot manifesto of 1784 was signed by the son of Jan Willem Hurter 
(who died in 1783) along with men from his many relations, the most significant of 
Cape farming families, i.e. the van Reenens, Eksteens, von Wiellighs, van Bredas, 
Munniks, Meijers, Eksteens, Mijburghs, Morkels, Rossouws and Maasdorps.69 With 
the exception of the Van Bredas, every one of these families has had members invest 
in the alcohol pachten during the course of the eighteenth century. 
 The aforegoing discussion has shown that while certainly the main part of the 
1770s pachters still exhibited much in terms of co-operation based on a shared 
German identity, significant changes were occurring by this stage. Thus we see these 
pachters marrying exogamously, having business partnerships with established Cape 
burghers and even having some links with VOC officials. If one analyses this period 
and this group in terms of factions, as Teun Baartman is doing for the 1780s,70 it 
seems likely that the Hurter complex of pachters formed part of the van Reenen 
faction (to whom they were intricately related and connected) who led the Patriot 
resistance of the late 1770s and early 1780s. It is significant, however, that the most 
successful pachter of this period, Martin Melck, was in no way involved in the Patriot 
agitation. The discussion above has shown how his rise to prominence – in spite of his 
German background – was thanks to links with the established rural gentry of the 
Cape. As Baartman has suggested, it is likely that prominent burghers such as 
Hendrik Cloete (a friend and ally of Melck) formed part of a different faction which 
was much more closely allied to high Company officials.71 Yet Melck was also a 
friend of the Van Reenen family and had some business links with them as well.72 
Ultimately, as this chapter has demonstrated, the links and alliances between families 
and individuals at the Cape had become immensely intricate by the last quarter of the 
eighteenth century and are much more complex than had hitherto been realised.  
                                                 
68  K.M. Jeffreys (ed.), Kaapse Archiefstukken Lopende over het Jaar 1781 (Cape Town, 1930), 
166-67. 
69  Beyers, Die Kaapse Patriotte, 315. 
70  T. Baartman, ‘The Role of the Burghers and Factions in the Politics of Cape Town at the End 
of the Eighteenth Century’ (forthcoming PhD thesis, University of Cape Town).  
71  T. Baartman, ‘Burghers in Cape Town, 1780-1790’, unpublished paper, History of Cape Town 
Project (Department of Historical Studies, University of Cape Town), 1992. 














 The different behaviour of Melck and the Hurter complex raises the question 
of the role of space and location. The pachters of the Hurter complex and their 
relations were either based in Cape Town or on farms along the Liesbeek; Melck – 
although he owned several town properties – very much identified with the 
Stellenbosch district where he acted as heemraad. To what an extent did this influence 
their behaviour? A revealing comparison can be made between the pachters of the 
Hurter complex and those of Stellenbosch-Drakenstein. As shown above, both Frans 
Sebrits and Anthonij Kalteijer married Dutch women and became involved in the 
pachten through their in-laws. Yet both of them had German sureties, most often 
Coenraad Eb and Johannes Holtman, who also supported members of the Hurter 
complex. Yet neither Kalteijer nor Sebrits became members of the Lutheran 
congregation or had any role in the Patriot agitation.73 And when Sebrits, who worked 
as cooper and carpenter in the town of Stellenbosch, died in 1784 his estate account 
and inventory reveal only local debtors and creditors, with the exception of the tiny 
amount of eighteen rixdollars he owed Maarten Bateman.74 It was not possible for 
these Germans in Stellenbosch-Drakenstein to be as involved in the economic, social, 
political and cultural affairs of the colony, simply because they were too isolated and 
did not have the immediate support of a larger community of people with similar 
backgrounds.75 The same is true of Melck – but only to an extent. He chose to identify 
largely with the rural gentry of Stellenbosch (as is revealed by his sureties and the 
marriages of his children), but his wealth (and no doubt personal conviction) allowed 







                                                 
73  It seems plausible that those involved in the Patriot agitation were town-based burghers who 
had diverse economic interests, and were not largely dependent on agricultural production. Although 
Melck invested widely in the alcohol pachten, he came from a basis of wine farming.  
74  CA, MOOC 13/1/14 no. 1 and 8/18 no. 98. 
75  As an indicator: the Lutheran congregation had 442 members in 1780 – most of these would 
















As Robert Ross has reminded historians of this period, ‘the economy of Cape Town 
was … dominated by its dual function as a port and a government centre’76 The Cape 
Town of the 1770s was, however, a very different one from that of the 1730s. For one 
thing, the Company establishment (garrison and administrators) had increased from 
920 in 1730 to more than 1 700 by 1770, while the population of the Cape district 
(including Cape Town for which separate figures do not exist) almost doubled during 
the same period from 1 414 to 2 743 (excluding slaves and Khoikhoi).77 Not only did 
the population expand, and with it economic and other opportunities, but the social 
and political set-up was much more complex than earlier: there were more people, 
mostly with longer histories of being settled and with deeper connections. Ross’s 
statement is very apposite in this regard, for it reminds us that not only were wine and 
meat needed to feed the large local and visiting populations, but more officials were 
employed than ever before to cope with the growing and more complex 
administration of the colony. This translated in a reconfiguration of the links and 
bonds between the various parts of the burgher population on the one hand, and the 
Company administrators and their families on the other hand.  
 It is because of these changes that the pachters of the 1770s reveal a different 
pattern of advancement. Although many of them still were German and still did use 
their shared background to amass social capital, there are clear signs of a shift taking 
place with many of them abandoning endogamy and opting instead to establish much 
wider connections and alliances among the burgher and (to a lesser extent) 
administrative populations. There were both continuities with and significant changes 
from the 1730s. This is partly the result of a deeper history: by the 1770s there were 
families at the Cape with three to four-generation histories which of necessity meant 
deeper and wider links and connections between families. Highly successful pachters 
like Melck and those centred on Hurter (especially the extended De Nijs family) 
family knew how to exploit these to their advantage.  
                                                 
76  R. Ross, ‘Structure and Culture in Pre-Industrial Cape Town: A Survey of Knowledge and 
Ignorance’ in W.G. James and M. Simons (eds), The Angry Divide: Social and Economic History of the 
Western Cape (Cape Town and Johannesburg, 1989), 42. 
77  P. van Duin and R. Ross, The Economy of the Cape Colony in the Eighteenth Century 














Ultimately this study of the 1770s pachters reveals a ‘mixed’ system of 
advancement. Some pachters operated very similarly to those of the 1730s by 
becoming part of an urban network based on links of marriage and descent (either 
German or, in some cases, free black) and building up social capital through 
immigrant links. But increasingly some of them moved towards closer links with the 
established Cape gentry (at least those based in Cape Town or the Cape district) as 
well as some links with the world of VOC officialdom (which, also as a result of 
deepening histories, had become much more intertwined with the burgher population). 
But in both cases, marriage and kinship remained the keys which allowed entry to 
these networks and connections (which in turn resulted in support – economic, social 
and political). This case study also illustrated that the world of the Cape gentry during 
this period was by no means endogamous yet (i.e. intermarriage between important 
families) but still allowed for some ‘new blood’ from outside, in this case successful 
immigrant urban entrepreneurs. It yet again illustrates that connections and alliances 
were built on considerations larger than merely economic ones. Ultimately one can 
claim that the 1770s were on the cusp of a change-over from an urban elite or 
merchant class to a Cape gentry which not only maintained links with this group but 
eventually incorporated it.78 This means that the foundations of the Cape gentry lie in 
more than accumulation of land and slaves – an important component of its wealth 
ultimately derived from entrepreneurial activities (over several decades) in Cape 
Town itself.  
                                                 






























SYMBOLIC CAPITAL, CONSUMPTION AND IDENTITY AMONG THE ALCOHOL 
PACHTERS OF CAPE TOWN, 1680-1795 
 
The preceding chapters have demonstrated how the relatively homogenous group of 
free burghers of the mid-seventeenth century could have developed into a stratified 
society with a clearly identifiable elite by the end of the eighteenth century. This was 
possible due to entrepreneurial activity within Cape Town which played a crucial role 
in allowing some families to gain financial and social ascendancy over others. At the 
Cape, the alcohol pacht system was the premier vehicle with which to act 
entrepreneurially. As argued in chapters three to five, some pachters managed to be 
more successful in the alcohol retail business than others. This success was made 
possible through using marriage and kinship as an entry point into networks of 
financial support, and through building up social capital which could be converted 
into financial assistance.  
 There is little doubt that between 1680 and 1795 some of the wealthiest free 
burghers at the Cape had made their fortunes from the alcohol pachten, and that the 
pacht system had been responsible for the economic advancement and upward 
mobility of some of the most notable Cape families. Taking that as a given, this 
chapter explores how the economic pre-eminence of some alcohol pachters was 
expressed or translated into other forms of power. As discussed in chapter three, the 
motivation of an entrepreneur consists of both economic and extra-economic gain. 
According to William Baumol, an entrepreneur is someone who is ‘ingenious and 
creative in finding ways that add to their own wealth, power and prestige.’1 The early 
modern economic historian Clé Lesger built on this statement by arguing that 
entrepreneurship, which can take many different forms, is ultimately only a means to 
an end, viz. the realisation of one’s wishes and desires. This can be grouped into three 
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categories: wealth, power and prestige.2 Did the wealth of successful alcohol pachters 
in early modern Cape Town translate into power and prestige?  
 In trying to understand this issue, the concept of symbolic capital is useful. 
Symbolic (or cultural) capital refers to the resources which are available to an 
individual on the basis of his or her honour, prestige or recognition. Unlike social 
capital which can operate in such a way as to give access to economic capital, 
symbolic capital cannot be converted directly into other forms of capital but is more 
often than not the result of having power and influence of some sort, mostly (as in the 
case of the pachters) economic. It is important to keep in mind that symbolic capital is 
defined by the system in which it operates – what was valued as significant in the 
eighteenth-century Cape may appear rather strange to the modern reader.3 As such a 
study of symbolic capital reveals much about the system of values which were in 
place in early modern Cape Town. The successful alcohol entrepreneurs of Cape 
Town would not have experienced their success without access to and use of both 
economic and social capital; but how did this add to their symbolic capital? What 
forms did symbolic capital take in VOC Cape Town?  
 
Lifestyle, Material Culture and Consumption 
 
As will become clear later in this chapter, the desire and need for honour and respect 
was all-encompassing for the alcohol entrepreneurs of Cape Town. Possessing 
honour, or being seen as honourable, translated into trust and respect which in turn 
could lead to status and power. An honourable and respectable life was the sine qua 
non for successful entrepreneurship. In the early modern world, an honourable and 
respected person was one you could trust; and in the uncertain and risky world of 
early modern business, trust could translate into tangible financial assistance in the 
absence of financial institutions, as demonstrated in the preceding chapters.  
                                                 
2  C. Lesger, ‘Over het Nut van Huwelijk, Opportunisme en Bedrog: Ondernemers en 
Ondernemerschap tijdens de Vroegmoderne Tijd in Theoretisch Perspectief’, in C.A. Davids, W. 
Fritschy and L.A. van der Valk (eds), Kapitaal, Ondernemerschap en Beleid: Studies over Economie 
en Politiek in Nederland, Europa en Azië van 1500 tot Heden (Amsterdam, 1996), 58. 
3  See on symbolic capital and how it relates to other forms of capital, P. Bourdieu, Outline of a 
Theory of Practice (Cambridge, 1977), 159-97 and idem, ‘The Forms of Capital’, in J.G. Richardson 














 In the Dutch Republic of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, trade was 
not considered a degrading occupation due to the low profile of the nobility. In fact, in 
Dutch society, living off the fruit of one’s own labour was considered the most 
honourable way of living. But Dutch merchants also desired social mobility and the 
ultimate aim was to live as a rentier off the interest of one’s possessions – just as the 
regent class did (see below). The first condition for upward social mobility was 
wealth which would make possible a lifestyle such as those of the higher classes.4 
Hence in this world, external or outward show or presentation formed an essential 
subpart of someone’s social role and contributed in a major way to his or her 
reputation. And it is on the basis of someone’s reputation that a person decided 
whether or not he or she is honourable and could be trusted.  
 But to what extent did early modern Cape Town differ from the situation in 
North-western Europe? As Robert Ross stated more than two decades ago, ‘In Cape 
Town … social relations have never been a direct function of economic activity, but 
have been heavily influenced by all sorts of other considerations, including 
physiognomy, clothing, language, religious affiliation, even food, which are at best 
tangentially or derivatively linked to the productions and exchange processes of the 
town.’5 The immense power differentiations which existed in colonial Cape Town 
must have made these issues even more pertinent. It is thus important to realise that in 
eighteenth-century Cape Town, material culture and consumption were essential to a 
society where social boundaries and status were fluid and could be (and were) used to 
indicate or express something of an individual’s or group’s identity. In addition, 
consumption during the early modern period was closely linked to respectability, as 
Woodruff Smith has argued: ‘[r]espectability gave meaning – moral and political as 
well as social and economic – to consumption, thereby permitting the construction of 
                                                 
4  L. Kooijmans, ‘De Koopman’, in H.M. Beliën, A.Th. van Deursen and G.J. van Setten (eds), 
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5  R. Ross, ‘Structure and Culture in Pre-Industrial Cape Town: A Survey of Knowledge and 
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a host of connections between purchasing commodities and thinking and acting 
appropriately.’6 
 Unfortunately it is not possible to study the consumption patterns and use of 
material culture by all successful pachters for this period due to a lack of sources. 
This type of research relies crucially on the existence of household inventories, and at 
the Cape these were only drawn up when somebody died intestate or where the estate 
had minor children as heirs. This explains why only eight inventories of pachters who 
invested a total of more than f 50 000 in the alcohol pachten, or who held more than 
ten pachten, could be traced for use in this analysis.7 One has to restrict oneself to 
such a sample as those who invested less would more than likely have derived their 
wealth from other sources. Although this is a small number, the aim of this exercise is 
not completeness but to demonstrate how a certain approach and sources can be 
combined to raise important questions (and to suggest some answers) about the social 
and cultural history of VOC Cape Town.  
 To what extent did wealthy and successful alcohol pachters use their money to 
set themselves physically and symbolically apart from their fellow Capetonians? The 
first aspect of this concerns their choice of address, which might suggest some 
sentiment of unity. The addresses of eight of these successful pachters have been 
traced, and they reveal an interesting pattern.8 They all lived on the edges of what can 
be called the public centre of VOC Cape Town: the area roughly between the Grand 
Parade, Green Market Square and the Company Gardens. Thus, the rich and respected 
Johannes Heufke lived in block EE, modern St. George’s Street,9 while just around 
the corner from him was Melt van der Spuij and the wealthy Hendrik Oostwald 
                                                 
6  W.D. Smith, Consumption and the Making of Respectability, 1600-1800 (New York and 
London, 2002), 3.  
7  They are the inventories of (with their dates in brackets): Frederik Russouw (1699); Hendrik 
Möller (1713); Johannes Pijthius (1714); Theunis Dirksz van Schalkwijk (1717); Hendrik Oostwald 
Eksteen (1718); Jan van der Swijn (1732); Johannes Heufke (1736) and Johan Nicolaas Esler (1786).  
8  Although most of them owned several properties in Cape Town, it is normally possible to 
determine which one was their main residential address. 
9  CA, MOOC 8/6 no. 44. It is described in contemporary sources as ‘situated behind the 
Company’s hospital’: for a rare glimpse into the interior of a pachter’s house of this period, see the 
court case in which Jephta van Batavia, a slave of Johannes Heufke, was involved; N. Worden and G. 
Groenewald (eds), Trials of Slavery: Selected Documents Concerning Slaves from the Criminal 














Eksteen in Oliphant Street, modern Hout Street.10 Not far from them (in block QQ) 
the successful Martin Melck had his large house and garden bordering on the 
Company’s Gardens in what is now Long Street.11  
 




On the other side of the Company Gardens, Abraham Leever and Jan van der Swijn 
lived in the area between modern Buitekant and Parliament Streets (blocks T, V and 
W),13 an area where, according to contemporary descriptions, the houses were large 
                                                 
10  In addition, Van der Spuij’s immediate neighbour was the former pachter Jan Rogiers; V.A. 
van der Spuy, Die Van der Spuy-Stamregister (no place, 1973), 30-31; CA, MOOC 8/3 nos. 19 and 93.  
11  G.A. Cockrell, ‘Die Lewe van Martin Melck, 1723-1781’ (unpublished MA thesis, University 
of Stellenbosch, 1984), 49-51. 
12  Note that the street names are those of modern Cape Town. In some cases the locations are 
only approximations (it is not always known exactly where in a given block the person lived). This 
figure is based on the 1751 map of Cape Town by Carel David Wentzel. 
13  CA, MOOC 8/5 no. 110 and G.C. de Wet (ed.), Resolusies van die Politieke Raad: Deel IX, 














and the gardens big.14 There is no doubt that this is related to the fact that this was 
close to the area around the Church, Hospital and Slave Lodge which had a high 
proportion of taverns, but there is also no overlooking the fact that the area around 
modern Adderley and Darling Streets contained the most impressive houses.15 
Significantly enough, both Eksteen and Van der Swijn chose not to live in their 
respective taverns in Strand Street, but preferred their houses closer to the centre. 
Whether or not this spatial distribution of wealthy pachter residences may indicate 
some feeling of group identity cannot be proved, but it does demonstrate that the 
successful pachters were spatially set apart, at least as regards their living space, from 
the largest part of Cape society, viz. the customers of their taverns (see figure 6.1).  
 
In 1755 the Cape government adopted and adapted the sumptuary laws of Batavia.16 
These laws recognised that status in Dutch colonial society was asserted through 
visible symbols, and sought to restrict these mechanisms to those who were truly 
worthy of them. As Robert Ross had commented in his comparative study of 
sumptuary laws, the Batavian ones provide insight both into ‘the ways in which 
material objects were used to claim status in the colonial world of VOC Batavia and 
into the prime objects of the VOC’s rulers’ prejudices and dislikes.’17 The laws 
limited the use of certain types of carriages and, crucially, the number of horses they 
were drawn by, to VOC officials of certain rank. Likewise the use of slaves as status 
symbols was also restricted: only high-ranking Company officials could have liveried 
slaves, while only the wives and widows of such officials were allowed to walk the 
streets followed by more than two slave women. The greatest effort went into 
detailing and describing who would be allowed to wear what clothing. Only senior 
                                                 
14  O.F. Mentzel, A Geographical and Topographical Description of the Cape of Good Hope 
(translated by H.J. Mandelbrote, G.V. Marais and J. Hoge) (3 vols, Cape Town, 1921, 1925 and 1944), 
vol. 1, 135-36. 
15  Cf. K. Schoeman, Die Suidhoek van Afrika: Geskrifte oor Suid-Afrika uit die Nederlandse 
Tyd, 1652-1806 (Pretoria, 2002), 67 and N. Worden, ‘Space and Identity in VOC Cape Town’, Kronos 
25 (1998/9), 77-81. 
16  For a discussion, see Ross, Status and Respectability, 9-14. 
17  R. Ross, ‘Sumptuary Laws in Europe, the Netherlands and the Dutch Colonies’, in N. Worden 















officials could wear velvet and were allowed to sport gold or silver shoe buckles.18 
Although much of this appears alien to the modern reader, these laws reveal a great 
deal about both the nature of symbolic power in, and its immense importance to, Cape 
Town society during the VOC period.  
 Slaves, carriages, horses and clothing were, to judge by the sumptuary laws, 
the indicators of elitism in eighteenth-century Dutch colonial society. Of the eight 
pachters in the sample, only two possessed less than ten slaves. Between the eight of 
them, they owned a hundred and sixty-four slaves, more than twenty apiece on 
average. This is well in excess of the average Cape slave-holding, which tended to be 
small and rarely exceeded ten slaves.19 It is, however, difficult to make an argument 
about conspicuous consumption based on slave numbers as many of these slaves 
would probably have been used to help run these pachters’ taverns, while some of the 
wealthier pachters such as Eksteen (who had forty-five slaves by 1718) and Johannes 
Heufke also owned and operated farms. Yet somebody like Jan van der Swijn had no 
farms but possessed twenty-one slaves, which makes it highly likely that not all of his 
slaves were bought for purely economic reasons.20 
 Horses, unlike slaves, were in short supply at the Cape and few people farmed 
with horses21 – Eksteen was an exception and owned thirty horses by 1718, a number 
which he expanded much during the 1720-30s as his stud grew.22 Two of the pachters 
in the sample owned no horses, but three (in addition to Eksteen) who also had farms 
possessed thirty-two horses between them.23 Yet, interestingly enough, Theunis 
Dirksz van Schalkwijk, with fourteen horses on his farm, had the same number at his 
house in Cape Town.24 Jan van der Swijn, who possessed only town properties, 
nonetheless owned five horses.25 In general, horse-drawn carriages (especially for 
                                                 
18  The text of the Cape sumptuary laws is published in S.D. Naudé and P.J. Venter (eds), Kaapse 
Plakkaatboek, Deel III (1754-1786) (Cape Town, 1949), 12-15.  
19  N. Worden, Slavery in Dutch South Africa (Cambridge, 1985), 29 and 32.  
20  At least according to his 1732 inventory; CA, MOOC 8/5 no. 110.  
21  S. Swart, ‘Riding High: Horses, Power and Settler Society, c. 1654-1840’, Kronos 29 (2003), 
49-59.  
22  See pages 93 and 99 above.  
23  They are: Fredrik Russouw (CA, MOOC 8/1 no. 39); Hendrik Möller (CA, MOOC 8/2 no. 93) 
and Johannes Heufke (CA, MOOC 8/5 no. 137).  
24  CA, MOOC 8/3 no. 41.  














personal use) were relatively scarce at the Cape and most farmers used ox wagons. 
Yet five of these pachters had a horse-drawn carriage on their Cape Town properties. 
That of Hendrik Möller was valued at f 100 and Eksteen’s at f 200.26 In Jan van der 
Swijn’s inventory there is a ‘chaise with four horse-harnesses’.27 No doubt it was 
vehicles such as the latter, drawn by four horses, which would later lead to the 
sumptuary laws which limited such carriages to the use of senior Company personnel.  
 The inventories in this sample unfortunately do not record details of clothing, 
but at least two of them reveal the ownership of vast numbers of gold and silver 
buttons and shoe buckles. Theunis Dirksz van Schalkwijk owned eighty-seven silver 
buttons for his shirts and jackets, along with two pairs of golden shirt buttons and a 
pair of silver buttons for his trousers. That was in addition to two pairs of silver 
buckles for his shoes.28 This ostentation was outdone by Johannes Pijthius who owned 
thirty-eight pairs of gold buttons (mostly with agate stones in them) and sixty silver 
ones for his shirts and jackets; as well as eleven pairs of silver trouser buttons 
(likewise with agate stones) and a pair of golden ones too. Not only could Pijthius 
amble the streets wearing a pair of golden shoe buckles (in addition to the eleven 
silver pairs he owned), but he could choose to carry with him either one of his swords 
with silver work, or one of his walking sticks, the one with a golden and the other 
with a silver top.29 All of these items were ultimately aimed at, quite literally, 
‘showing-off’ their owners’ wealth and importance – to set them apart from others in 
the streets – not only by being drawn in a carriage but to be seen wearing expensive 
accessories. All of these examples come from the first half of the eighteenth century, 
before the sumptuary laws of 1755 were enacted, and they clearly reveal why the 
VOC became concerned with such ostentation.  
 There were other forms of conspicuous consumption about which the 
authorities did not complain. In three of these estates there were large quantities of 
jewellery. Wearing jewellery is an obvious way to advertise one’s wealth to the world 
in addition to serving as forms of investment. By 1718, Eksteen’s estate contained 
what was loosely described as ‘a chain made of gold, along with some gold rings and 
                                                 
26  CA, MOOC 8/2 no. 93 and MOOC 8/3 no. 93. In addition, Eksteen also owned six ‘old 
wagons’ valued at f 70 each. 
27  CA, MOOC 8/5 no. 110.  
28  Ibid. 














other pieces of gold.’30 Pijthius also owned much jewellery: nine gold rings, three 
with precious stones; six silver rings; seven pairs of silver earrings and two signet 
rings, one gold and the other silver.31 When Jan van der Swijn’s wife died, she left 
behind two strings of pearls, one with diamonds; two diamond bracelets; two gold 
bracelets; two pairs of gold and diamond earrings as well as two broaches (one 
diamond and the other gold), and a diamond ring.32  
 Much less valuable but equally significant in terms of showing off, was the 
possession of Bibles with clasps of precious metals. Both Eksteen and Heufke owned 
Bibles with copper clasps while the Van der Swijns had one with silver clasps.33 
Eksteen also had two further ‘church books’ (probably hymn books) with silver 
clasps. It was common in Dutch colonial cities, from Batavia to Cape Town, for 
wealthy women going to church services to be followed by a slave woman carrying a 
Bible and hymn book (sometimes wrapped in expensive cloth).34 This practice 
constituted a particularly visible form of ostentation and advertisement to the public at 
large. 
 All the estates in the sample contained vast amounts of silverware and 
porcelain, mostly in excess of what could conceivably have been used for everyday 
purposes. Paintings appeared in equally large numbers. Five of these inventories 
specify the number of paintings an estate owned, and in total this comes to 126, an 
average of more than twenty-five. But the two large owners were the Van der Swijns 
with forty-three paintings and the Heufkes with fifty-two: in both households these 
paintings were distributed over all the rooms of the house.35 This is exceptionable, 
even by Dutch standards. Ownership of paintings was not universal in the Dutch 
Republic by the first half of the eighteenth century. Paintings were, however, 
something of an urban fashion statement (and an expression of identity); and only 
                                                 
30  ‘een goude gemaakte ketting, benevens eenige goude ringen, en ander goudwerk’; CA, 
MOOC 8/3 no. 93. 
31  CA, MOOC 8/3 no. 13. 
32  CA, MOOC 8/5 no. 110.  
33  CA, MOOC 8/3 no. 93; MOOC 8/5 no. 137 and MOOC 8/5 no. 110. 
34  K. Schoeman, Dogter van Sion: Machtelt Smit en die 18de-Eeuse Samelewing aan die Kaap, 
1749-1799 (Cape Town, 1997), 116-17.  














about twenty percent of people who did own paintings had more than twenty.36 
Heufke and Van der Swijn are therefore definitely exceptionable and one should see 
their possession of so many paintings as a form of conspicuous consumption. An 
equally intriguing form of public display was hanging curtains. Even by the end of the 
eighteenth century, owning curtains in the Dutch Republic was by no means common 
in the cities, and even less so in the rural areas. It was an outright status symbol to 
have curtains, and in many cases people owned curtains but only hanged them on 
special occasions.37 At the Cape, when curtains do appear, the colours and types of 
material are described and a distinction is made between different types of curtains – a 
clear indication of their unusualness and value. Thus it is no surprise to find that in 
only four of these pachters’ estates do we find curtains, and in only two do they 
appear to a significant extent: Essler owned one curtain and Pijthius three.38 The 
Heufkes, however, owned eleven curtains, of which five were described as ‘window 
curtains’.39 The Van der Swijn family’s very large estate had quite a variety of 
curtains: six window curtains (four with frills), a set of red damask curtains and 
another one made out of the sought-after red sarsenet (a woven silk known as 
armozijn).40  
 In these ways, then, some of the wealthier alcohol pachters managed to set 
themselves apart from their fellow burghers. This was done through such visible ways 
of advertising their wealth and status as their choice of address, being driven in public 
by horse and carriage, having expensive and valuable decoration on their clothes, and 
wearing jewellery. This presentation of their wealth and importance was also done in 
more private spheres, such as their homes, through the display of commodities like 
paintings and curtains. In this way a certain praxis developed: these presentations 
served to showcase their wealth; to indicate that they were set apart from others 
because of their financial success. Yet at the same time this fed back into their self-
identity and self-conception of their own worth: by being seen and acknowledged as 
wealthy (even in negative ways such as being limited by the authorities as to how 
                                                 
36  Cf. H. Dibbits, Vertrouwd Bezit: Materiële Cultuur in Doesburg en Maassluis, 1650-1800 
(Nijmegen, 2001), 288-89. 
37  Ibid., 117-18. 
38  CA, MOOC 8/3 no. 13 and MOOC 8/19 no. 11.   
39  ‘venster gardijnen’; CA, MOOC 8/5 no. 137.  














much wealth could be showcased and in what forms) because of these symbolic 
representations, the pachters added to their own symbolic capital which could be 
translated into power and prestige.  
 
Status, Society and Symbolic Power 
 
In the Dutch Republic of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the various cities 
(the backbone of Dutch society and economy) were governed by councils of burghers. 
In effect, these formed oligarchies as new members were not elected democratically 
but entered the councils through co-optation by the existing members. Much debate 
has centred around how much these so-called regenten (‘regents’) developed as a 
‘class apart’ through, what is termed, the ‘aristocratisation of the regenten’ – although 
at first these councils were more ‘open’ for most of the seventeenth century they later 
became more ‘closed’ because of endogamy. At the same time the regenten 
increasingly imitated an aristocratic lifestyle by living as rentiers and obtaining all the 
trappings of a nobleman, including country estates and even titles.41 Although in 
practice any burgher in the Dutch Republic could become sufficiently wealthy to 
obtain all the necessary status symbols of the elite, merchants saw obtaining a seat on 
the city councils as the summum bonum. By becoming a regent, a merchant entered a 
‘class apart’.42 Now, was this the case at the Cape – if successful alcohol pachters 
were the closest Cape society came to a merchant class, did they also (over time) 
attain political, social and symbolic power by joining something like a ‘regent class’?  
 Early modern Cape Town, however, differed significantly from Dutch cities as 
it was founded and controlled by the VOC. The city and colony were governed by the 
Council of Policy which consisted of the VOC-appointed Governor and senior 
Company officials. But Cape Town mirrored Dutch cities insofar as it adopted most 
of the municipal institutions and civil bodies found in these cities, such as an Orphan 
Chamber, Commissioners of Marriage Affairs, the Court of Petty Cases, fire wardens 
                                                 
41  For a discussion of the debate, see J.L. Price, ‘De Regent’, in H.M. Beliën, A.Th. van Deursen 
and G.J. van Setten (eds), Gestalten van de Gouden Eeuw: Een Hollands Groepsportret (Amsterdam, 
1995), 33-42 and J. de Jong, Een Deftig Bestaan: Het Dagelijks Leven van Regenten in de 17de en 
18de Eeuw (Utrecht and Antwerp, 1987), 31-63. See also pages 197-98 below for a brief discussion.  














and the burgerwacht or town militia.43 Cape Town’s smaller size is reflected in its 
lack of institutions such as an Orphanage, Houses of Correction (tucht- en spinhuizen) 
and, for most of the Dutch period, a Latin School. Although all of these bodies were 
controlled by the VOC, they all had some representation from the free burghers. The 
Councils of Policy and Justice each had two and, later on, three such members, called 
burgher councillors, who were considered the representatives of the free-burgher 
community. The minor bodies tended to have greater representation of this kind, 
although in all cases VOC functionaries formed the majority of the council members. 
As in the Netherlands, there was no direct election to an office. Instead, council 
members drew up a shortlist of names from which the Council of Policy selected the 
new member(s).44 Office-holding was therefore a clear indication of the favour of and 
trust by the authorities in an individual.  
 In an attempt to gauge the role alcohol pachters played in the government of 
Cape Town,45 I concentrate on the twenty most active and successful pachters, i.e. 
those who held ten or more pachten and directly invested in excess of f 70 000 in 
alcohol retail. Together their years of activity stretch from 1692 to 1795. On the basis 
of how wealth and political power were connected in Dutch cities, one would expect 
that, if anybody, this group of alcohol merchants would show a similar pattern in the 
Cape context. A tabulation of the results, however, proves that this was not the case 
(see table 6.2). Of these twenty pachters, only two ever attained high civil office.46 
One of these was Hendrik Oostwald Eksteen, who fits the expected pattern very well 
in having held one office after the other – in order of their importance – culminating 
                                                 
43  Thus, as Ad Biewenga has argued, the Cape of Good Hope essentially had a Dutch 
‘superstructure’ in that it adopted most of the institutions that existed in the urban centres of the Dutch 
Republic. While this is certainly true, Biewenga fails, however, to take into account changes over time 
and how new generations of Cape-born burghers used, challenged and adapted these institutions. The 
forms may have been similar but their meanings and uses differed; A. Biewenga, De Kaap de Goede 
Hoop: Een Nederlandse Vestigingskolonie, 1680-1730 (Amsterdam, 1999). 
44  Cf. G.G. Visagie, Regspleging en Reg aan die Kaap van 1652 tot 1806 (Cape Town, 1969), 
41-46 and, on the origins of these councils, G.C. de Wet, Die Vryliede en Vryswartes in die Kaapse 
Nedersetting, 1657-1707 (Cape Town, 1981), 180-91. During the 1780s the number of burgher 
councillors were increased to six.  
45  These institutions were restricted to the town; a different system operated in the rural districts. 














in acting as a burgher councillor for eighteen years in a row.47 It does not mean, 
though, that these men were the only pachters who ever held civil offices – other 
pachters also held these offices (some even became burgher councillors), but they 
were not individuals of whom it could be claimed that involvement in the alcohol 
pachten was the prime or major origins of their wealth.48  
 Why was this so? The most plausible reason for the limited involvement of 
pachters in civil affairs was that such a position would have interfered with their 
business activities: these bodies met regularly for several hours at a time and did so 
during the day. Another factor may be that many of these offices tended to be held by 
the same person over a very long period: thus, as was seen earlier, Hendrik Oostwald 
Eksteen remained a burgher councillor through most of the 1720-30s until his 
retirement shortly before his death – given the fact that by this stage there were only 
two seats available for burgher members, it means that very few opportunities arose 
for new entrants. A final, more speculative, possibility is that there may well have 
been some form of prejudice against successful pachters in spite of their financial 
success. As discussed in chapters four and five, the majority of all pachters up to the 
1770s were German immigrants and, indeed, of the twenty pachters under discussion 
here, sixty percent were German. Several of them were involved in attempts, during 
the 1730-40s and again in the 1770-80s, to establish a Lutheran Church in Cape 
Town. The VOC authorities were for a long time very resistant to this idea, fearing it 
might be divisive and create split loyalties. This could have been a factor in the non-
consideration of some of these pachters for public office; yet at the same time both 
members of this group who held high office, to wit Hendrik Oostwald Eksteen and 
Martin Melck, were Lutherans of German descent.49 
 However, studies of Dutch merchants have shown that it was more likely for 
the children of merchants to enter the regent class, either through marriage or through 
                                                 
47  See page 99 above.  
48  An example of such a person is Johannes Heufke who sat on most of these boards, 
culminating in being elected as burgher councillor. However, he only became a pachter late in his life 
and had held all his public offices before becoming involved in alcohol retail. The fact that he was a 
pachter could therefore not have played a role in his election to public offices. On his career as an 
alcohol pachter, see pages 124-25 above.  
49  The fact that both these men were during their time the wealthiest free burghers at the Cape 














being co-opted into councils, after the first generation had established the appropriate 
lifestyle and gained prestige through amassing wealth and its trappings.50 This may 
also have been the case with the pachters at the Cape, as a brief case-study of the 
1780s seems to indicate: of the fifteen individuals who became burgher councillors 
during this decade,51 at least five were the direct descendants of pachters,52 while 
most of the others had other family links to earlier or current pachters through 
marriage and descent. It seems, then, that while wealth through investment in the 
alcohol pachten rarely brought political power and prestige (in the form of holding 
public offices in the VOC government) to the pachters, it could provide the basis for 
social and political prestige for their descendents in the future. This long-term 
development of a political Cape elite is, however, a topic that needs further and fuller 
investigation.  
 
Table 6.2: Public Offices Held by the Major Alcohol Pachters 
Pachter’s Name Years 
Active53 
Militia Other 
    
Vermeij,  Steven 1693-1705   
Phijffer,  Johannes 1697-1711   








Hoesemans,  Anthonij 1709-1723   
                                                 
50  Kooijmans, ‘De Koopman’, 88.  
51  Based on the tabulation of T. Baartman, ‘Burghers in Cape Town, 1780-1790’, unpublished 
paper, History of Cape Town Project (Department of Historical Studies, University of Cape Town, 
1992), 21.  
52  They were Christiaan George Maasdorp; Gerrit Hendrik Meijer; Johan Hendrik Munnik; 
Adam Gabriel Muller and Cornelis van der Poel.  
53  The years after 1700 in this column refer to pacht years, i.e. from 1 September the previous 















Van der Spuij,  Melt  1722-1733 lieutenant  
Beck,  Johann Zacharias 1723-1737 fire warden; 
sergeant 
 
Lever,  Abraham  1727-1758 ensign  
Boetendagh,  Carel Diederik 1731-1739 fire warden  
Van der Swijn, Jan 1732-1747 fire warden councillor 
(nominated) 
Holst,  Jan sr  1740-1754   
Hubner,  Jochem Daniel sr  1740-1761   
Melck,  Martin 1760-1781  heemraad 
Esselaar,  Johannes Nicholaas  1762-1774 corporal  
Schreuder,  Johan Jacob 1762-1790   
Bateman,  Maarten  1763-1787 fire warden  
Roep,  Johannes  1767-1781   
De Kruger,  Willem  1770-1786   
Bam,  Jan Christiaan  1780-1792   
Hugo,  Daniel  1781-1793   
Wispelaar,  Jacob 1788-1795 schutter; 
fire warden 
 
Source: Resolusies; Requesten 
 
The involvement of the alcohol pachters in the Cape Town schutterij or burgerwacht 
(town militia) was, however, of a rather different nature. The militia was a major 
source of social prestige for this group. The militia, based on similar bodies in Dutch 
cities, was more than just a group of able-bodied men. It performed an important 
social and symbolic function, expressed by Willem Frijhoff in these terms: ‘[Militias] 
formed the active centre of the city as a corporation, fed its inner strength and 
provided the visible form of this strength.’54 Although one may doubt whether quite 
the same amount of urban ‘patriotism’ existed at the Cape, it seems likely that here 
too the structure of the burgher militia was highly symbolic of the structure of society 
                                                 
54  ‘[Schuttersgilden] vormden de actieve kern van de stad als corporatie, voedden haar innerlijke 
kracht en gaven er een zichtbare gestalte aan’; W. Frijhoff and M. Spies, 1650: Bevochten Eendracht 














at large: since the militia represented order, virtue and civil co-operation, its members 
were expected to act in a similar spirit. Moreover, officers were chosen from among 
the socially foremost burghers – they were the people who would gain most from an 
orderly society. Thus, in Dutch cities most of the higher ranks of the officer corps 
were elected from the regenten class – which is a clear indication of the prestige 
which was attached to these offices.55 At the Cape, belonging to the officer corps both 
reflected eminence amongst one’s fellow burghers, and indicated the trust and 
approval of the VOC authorities: although militia members nominated their officers, 
the final choice was made by the Governor and the Council of Policy. But it is most 
likely that the VOC paid heed to the social standing of potential candidates as the 
militia was primarily a burgher institution, unlike the other public offices available.  
 It is therefore a significant indication of the social prestige of the successful 
alcohol pachters that nine of them held an officer rank in the burgher militia: four 
were fire wardens;56 two became corporals or sergeants while the other three reached 
the higher ranks of ensign, lieutenant and captain (table 6.2).57 These men were 
obviously considered by their fellow burghers and the authorities to be men of 
sufficient social importance and prestige to be elected to their offices. But it went both 
ways: no doubt the pachters were keen on such positions since the militia served as an 
important vehicle for male sociability and provided pachters – through its regular 
meetings and functions – with the opportunities of doing important networking, 
thereby also investing in their social capital.58 In this way there was a close link 
between possessing symbolic capital and gaining social capital. In addition, burgher 
militias often insisted on having some say in the governance and running of a town, 
and it is no co-incidence that at the Cape there were close ties between the burgher 
                                                 
55  Cf. J.A.J. de Jongste, Onrust aan het Spaarne: Haarlem in de Jaren 1747-1751 (Amsterdam, 
1984), 119-20. 
56   The fire wardens formed part of the militia and were responsible for maintaining order and 
discipline during fires; see C.G. Botha, The Collected Works of C. Graham Botha (3 vols, Cape Town, 
1962), vol. 1, 161 and Mentzel, Description, vol. 1, 133-34. 
57  Johann Zacharias Beck was both a fire warden and a sergeant.  
58  Frijhoff and Spies, 1650: Bevochten Eendracht, 141-43 and De Jongste, Onrust aan het 
Spaarne, 117-23. For a good discussion of the schutterij in the Stellenbosch district, see Biewenga, De 














councillors and the burgher militia.59 In this way, too, the alcohol entrepreneurs could 
use their influence in matters which concerned them.60 
 The importance of the militia in the symbolic world of Cape society is 
reflected by the role it played in occasions such as the arrivals, inaugurations and 
funerals of high-ranking VOC officials. Robert Ross has already explained the role of 
such public events to showcase the importance of hierarchy and pomp in the VOC 
establishment.61 More particularly in the current context, the role of the militia in 
these processions not only reflected the authorities’ belief in its importance, but also 
demonstrated in a symbolic way to the inhabitants of the Cape that the men of the 
militia were favoured. These public processions did not always follow the same 
format and the latter was contingent on the rank and status of the individual being 
honoured, as well as his or her relations at the Cape. But in general all office-holders 
were present and the militia played a significant role.  
 Thus in 1760, in the funeral procession of Sergius Swellengrebel, Secunde 
(deputy governor) and cousin of the former governor,62 the incumbent burgher 
councillors followed directly behind the governor, the Council of Policy, the Church 
ministers and the VOC’s military personnel. The burgher councillors were eleventh in 
order, while the ‘common burghers’ (gemeene burgers) came last in the thirty-first 
position. Former burgher councillors came in the seventeenth position followed 
immediately by the captains of the burgher militia, ahead of the incumbent members 
of the smaller civil institutions such as the Orphan Chamber and Matrimonial Court. 
Other officers of the militia followed in twenty-eighth place, ahead of some of the 
                                                 
59  Almost invariably burgher councillors also held high ranks in the militia, and it is significant 
that the Burgher Council had its meetings in the Burgerwachthuis; cf. Mentzel, Description, vol. 1, 
133. 
60  It should be stressed, though, that, unlike the case in Dutch cities where the elite tended to be 
defined by their involvement in city governance and hence their possession of political power, the case 
was rather different at the Cape. The lack of real influence by the burgher elite was an issue which 
came to the fore in the last quarter of the eighteenth century when, under pressure, the VOC increased 
the number of burgher councillors to six; see C. Beyers, Die Kaapse Patriotte gedurende die Laaste 
Kwart van die Agtiende Eeu en die Voortlewing van hul Denkbeelde (Second edition, Pretoria, 1967), 
on the Patriot movement, although his interpretation is in need of revision.  
61  Ross, Status and Respectability, 21-26. 
62  See on him the entry in W.J. de Kock and D.W. Krüger (eds), Suid-Afrikaanse Biografiese 














low-ranking VOC officials. Thus, clearly officers of the militia were symbolically set 
apart from the common citizens.63  
 In other funerals the militia played an even more prominent role: in the funeral 
of Governor Rijk Tulbagh the cortege was preceded by ‘the oldest Company cavalry’ 
(d’ oudste Comp[agnies] cavallerie), followed directly by the burgher infantry. In this 
procession, too, captains and other officers of the militia preceded many VOC 
officials in rank. Finally, it is not insignificant in symbolic terms that only right at the 
end of this very lengthy funeral procession followed ‘some free burghers who do not 
form part of the militia’ – their physical separation illustrates what was clearly also an 
important mental and social distinction.64  
 The burgher militia played an even more prominent role in the funeral of 
Governor Maurits Pasques de Chavonnes in 1724 when the procession was led by a 
company of burgher cavalry followed by the burgher infantry, in which their officers 
played an equally prominent role carrying various flags and standards.65 Likewise, 
when Baron Gustaaf von Imhoff was introduced to the Cape as the new governor 
general of the Dutch East Indies, the VOC organised an impressive public ceremony, 
‘the likes of which had never before been seen here’. On the day on which the new 
governor was to be ‘solemnly presented in public’ at the Castle of Good Hope, both 
the VOC’s garrison and the burgher militia stood directly in front of him under their 
various flags and banners. Only then were the burgerij (citizenry) allowed to enter 
and had to stand behind them.66 Thus, in symbolic terms, the town militia and its 
officers were held up to the rest of the inhabitants of Cape Town as being ‘different’ 
and ‘separate’ from them. There could be no doubt that they were important and 
favoured.  
 It is thus clear that in many cases the prominent role that alcohol pachters 
played in the business world of Cape Town was translated into social and symbolic 
power by their elections to and functions in the burgher militia, virtually the only 
public body in eighteenth-century Cape Town in which burghers could be 
                                                 
63  CA, M 41: Funeral Notices no. A (no pagination).  
64  ‘eenige burgers, die onder de resp[ectiev]e burger militie niet sorteeren’; CA, VC 31, 17 
August 1771 (no pagination).  
65  CA, VC 22, 167. 
66  ‘dewelke … alhier nooijt is gesien geworden’ and ‘in het openbaare solemneelijk sal werden 














prominently visible. Another way in which these pachters’ pre-eminence in the 
citizenry was reflected came to the fore in the leading position that many of these 
more prominent pachters played in forms of popular protests, often over taxes, during 
the eighteenth century. In the tradition of the ‘urban republicanism’ typical of Dutch 
cities, Cape burghers also made use of the unwritten right of citizens to petition their 
councils. This right was never contested and it was considered a matter of course that 
city councils should take heed of petitions and react to them.67 This was also the case 
with the Council of Policy at the Cape. In general, it seems as if pachters were not 
afraid to use their economic influence and social status to complain about conditions 
not conducive to their business activities: thus Eksteen took a leading role in 
complaining about excessive taxes in the late 1710s,68 while the pachters of the 1770-
80s added their signatures to petitions regarding business matters and taxation issues 
raised by the so-called Patriots.69 The issue of popular participation in Cape politics 
still needs investigation. It seems, however, at this stage as if in this arena too 
prominent alcohol pachters could and did take the lead, thereby expressing their 
symbolic importance and significance in Cape society.  
 
Honour, Respectability and Self-Identity 
 
Prestige was predicated upon a good reputation. Although reputation in the early 
modern world was not purely an individual matter since it was connected with one’s 
family and their status, it was essentially something that had to be earned. The 
converse of this is that one could also lose a reputation, and that would be disastrous 
to an entrepreneur: ‘If you wished to convince others that they could trust you, you 
could not afford to lose your reputation. Loss of reputation meant loss of credit, so 
you had to be careful to protect your good name.’70 As studies of Dutch 
                                                 
67  On the role of petitions in the ‘urban republicanism’ of early modern Dutch society, see H. 
van Nierop, ‘Popular Participation in Politics in the Dutch Republic’, in P. Blickle (ed.), Resistance, 
Representation, and Community (Oxford, 1997), 284-90. 
68  See page 98 above.  
69  See pages 157-58 above.  
70  L. Kooijmans, ‘Risk and Reputation: On the Mentality of Merchants in the Early Modern 














entrepreneurship during this period have shown, the ultimate aim of entrepreneurs 
was to take care of their families and to lead an honourable life. In both these cases 
continuity was essential.71 Reputation, then, should be seen as a resource which was 
‘closely linked to concrete issues of opportunity and loss.’72 Hence the obsession of 
Cape pachters with their reputation: they saw themselves as honourable people with 
good names, and were concerned to protect these valuable assets. Being honourable 
was an important facet in the self-identity of Cape alcohol entrepreneurs.73  
 Three court cases illustrate this issue very well. Hendrik van Dijk had a long-
standing dispute with Melt van der Spuij over outstanding debt. It finally came to a 
head in 1730 when Van der Spuij was ordered by the Council of Justice to pay the 
debt.74 Though before this happened, in one of the sessions before the commissioners 
from the Council, Van Dijk shouted at Van der Spuij: ‘Mate! You are a perjurer,’ and 
then told him: ‘You’d be prepared to swear an oath for a dime’.75 This was a terrible 
and potentially disastrous insult to Van der Spuij: by claiming that he was not a man 
of his word, Van Dijk could seriously damage his reputation. Since so much business, 
not least the granting of credit, in this period depended on trust, the faintest whiff of 
untrustworthiness in a merchant or trader could have disastrous consequences.76 
Tavern-keepers, as comparative studies have shown, were also particularly sensitive 
                                                                                                                                            
Times: Merchants and Industrialists within the Orbit of the Dutch Staple Market (The Hague, 1995), 
30.  
71  Kooijmans, ‘De Koopman’, 86. 
72  K. McKenzie, Scandal in the Colonies: Sydney and Cape Town, 1820-1850 (Carlton, 2004), 
10.  
73  This is not to suggest that a pre-occupation with one’s reputation was only limited to 
entrepreneurs and business people. Protecting one’s reputation was a common concern for most sectors 
of society, also in Cape Town; cf. N. Worden, ‘Forging a Reputation: Artisan Honour and the Cape 
Town Blacksmith Strike of 1752’, Kronos 28 (2002), 43-65. Yet, since trustworthiness was a valuable 
asset to entrepreneurs, as it could be translated into access to (or loss of) credit and profitable 
opportunities, they were particularly careful to protect it.  
74  CA, CJ 824, 14-15, 21-22, 26, 33, 36, 42-43 and 49-51. 
75  ‘Vent! Je bent een meijneediger! … Je zouw wel een eed doen voor een dubbeltje’; CA, CJ 
1043, 236. 
76  Lesger, ‘Over het Nut’, 72. For the link between credit and creditable behaviour, see J. 
Hoppit, ‘Attitudes to Credit in Britain, 1680-1790’, The Historical Journal 33 (1990), 318-20. See also 
pages 84-85 and 115-16 above for a discussion of this topic with reference to the alcohol pachters of 














to issues regarding their image since their business was ‘dependent on the good 
opinion of an extraordinarily broad cross section of the community, whose views on 
the proper conduct of a tavern were expressed with an intensity entirely absent from 
their assessments of other trades.’77 Moreover, in a relatively small settlement like the 
Cape, gossip and scandal, the vehicles through which to discredit people, spread very 
quickly.  
 Van der Spuij was well aware of this: he sued Van Dijk for injury to his 
honour and demanded that he, Van der Spuij, be acknowledged ‘as an honourable and 
virtuous man.’78 When the two of them appeared before the commissioners, who tried 
to effect a conciliation by asking the two parties to live ‘as good Christians with each 
another’, Van der Spuij claimed that he would desire nothing better, ‘yet since 
nothing is more dear to him than his honour, he is obliged to protect it’, and he 
therefore insisted that Van Dijk ‘must acknowledge him, Van der Spuij, to be an 
honest man about whom he has nothing to say.’79 Van Dijk consented to this, thereby 
avoiding a hefty fine, and the two of them left the court ‘in friendship and peace.’80 
Van der Spuij’s concern with his honour, and his desire to protect it, reveals how 
closely personal honour was wound up with social status and public reputation. It is 
for this reason that injuries to a person’s reputation and honour were taken very 
seriously by Dutch law, as revealed by the jurist Simon van Leeuwen’s statement that 
‘nothing is more precious in life than one’s honour, and the good opinion that others 
have of one.’ 81   
 In 1769 Martin Melck was similarly concerned with protecting his honour and 
went to great lengths in order to protect this valuable commodity. Melck sold a large 
                                                 
77  P. Thompson, Rum, Punch and Revolution: Taverngoing and Public Life in Eighteenth-
Century Philadelphia (Philadelphia, 1999), 55-56. Thompson also states that a ‘goodly number of 
licensees made healthy profits from keeping public houses, but equally many publicans were undone 
by the high financial and emotional overheads associated with this singular trade.’ 
78  ‘dat hij den gehoonden erkend voor een eerlijk en deugdelijk man’; CA, CJ 1043, 240.  
79  ‘als goede Christenen met den anderen te leeven’; ‘dog dat hij niets dierbaarder als zijn eer 
hebbende, hij ook verpligt was die te maintineeren’, and ‘hem, Van der Spuij, … voor een eerlijk man 
soude erkennen, op wie hij niet en weet te seggen’; ibid., 244.  
80  ‘in vriendschap en vreede’; ibid., 245.  
81   ‘Naar ’t leven en is niet kostelijker als de eer, ende het goed gevoelen dat een ander van ons 
heeft’; quoted from H. Roodenburg, ‘De Notaris en de Erehandel: Beledigingen voor het Amsterdamse 














quantity of wine to a visiting ship but did not obtain the requisite permission (and 
letter) from the Council of Policy to do so, with the result that the incumbent wine 
pachter, Pieter Broedersz, confiscated the wine and accused Melck of smuggling.82 
Melck then did obtain a letter of permission after Broedersz had confiscated the wine, 
but the latter refused to return the wares. Consequently Melck sued him for the 
restitution of the wine and asked for a full excuse from Broedersz, declaring that he, 
Melck, ‘was not only deeply wounded in his feelings, but that he also finds his 
honour, good name and reputation severely damaged, the more so since he had never 
involved himself with such infamous things and even less deserves the name of 
Smuggler.’83 Not only did Melck request that Broedersz return his wine, but that he 
should also proffer an apology which would be both ‘honourable and profitable’ 
(honorabel als profitabel). The latter aspect took the form of a fine to be paid to the 
Church’s poor fund; the former involved Broedersz  
 
 appearing before this Council [of Justice], with open doors so that everyone 
 can listen, and begging the claimant [Melck] for forgiveness, while declaring 
 that he had committed the aforesaid injuries unthinkingly, recklessly and 
 against the truth, and that it consequently pains his heart; and that he has 
 nothing to say about the claimant’s actions and behaviour other than that they 
 are only honourable and virtuous.84 
 
The importance of these issues is revealed by the fact that Melck did this despite 
being by this stage the wealthiest burgher at the Cape with little to lose. But part of 
                                                 
82  It was precisely to limit smuggling that the Council of Policy had instituted the requirement of 
first obtaining a letter of permission from it to sell wine to passing ships. 
83  ‘hij niet alleen in sijn gemoed geraakt, maar ook in desselfs eer, goede naam en faam, op het 
hoogste geledeert is vindende, temeer, zig nooijt met infame dingen heeft opgehouden, nog veel minder 
den naam van Smockelaar verdiend’; CA, CJ 1096, 295.  
84  ‘compareerende voor deese Vierschaar, met opene deuren, ten aanhooren van een ijder, den 
Eijscher [Melck] om vergiffenis te bidden, met betuijging dat hij de voorszeijde injurien onbedagtelijk, 
onbesonnen en teegens de waarheijd heeft gesprooken gehad, en dienvolgens ’t hem van hertenleed is, 
en niet op des Eijschers handel en wandel, als alle eer en deugd weet te seggen’; ibid., 299-300. See 
A.G. Hesselink, ‘In de Schaduw van de Tafelberg: Onderhuidse Spanning en Samenwerking in een 
Koloniale Samenleving in Zuid-Afrika, 1751-1771’ (unpublished doctoraalscriptie, University of 














the vehemence of Melck’s reaction may well lie in the fact that his actions were not 
entirely above board and that some suspicion may well have arisen. Since a person 
was respectable if he or she acted respectably, and it was only through one’s actions 
(and not birth or inheritance) that one became respectable, it was crucially important 
for Melck to be seen to have acted respectably.85 As respectability was a commodity 
which needed to be earned, it could also be contested; and this is essentially what 
Broedersz was doing. Although for both persons involved, financial gain was at the 
root of the disagreement, the vehemence of Melck’s reaction also reveals how much 
respectability was wound up with issues regarding the symbolic importance of an 
individual’s standing in society.  
 Another case concerning honour and respectability, but one which also reveals 
much about the nature of the social ties which existed between some pachters, was 
the result of the behaviour of Michiel Lourich in 1736.86 The latter arrived at the 
house of Jacob de Vries where he also found the pachter Johannes van Helsdingen. 
Lourich started to berate the absent Carel Boetendagh, calling him a schelm (crook). 
This was no mere insult: in general, the word denoted professional or financial 
untrustworthiness, but could easily lead to ‘a general suggestion of untrustworthiness, 
in the worst imprecations, even of baseness and dishonourableness.’87 This was an 
insult particularly aimed at men and was meant to attack their public honour and 
reputation.88 Being called a schelm was clearly not something a pachter would desire.  
 What is particularly significant in this case is the role of Van Helsdingen. 
After having insulted Boetendagh, Lourich continued: ‘You, Van Helsdingen can go 
and report this to him [i.e. Boetendagh] or I would consider you to be one (namely a 
                                                 
85  Cf. Smith, Consumption and the Making of Respectability, 205-206, for an analysis of the 
issues involved in acting respectably.   
86  Although Michiel Daniel Lourich was a pachter only once, he worked through most of the 
1730s as a bijtapper (see pages 137-44 above for a discussion of the long involvement of his in-laws, 
centred on Aletta de Nijs, in the malt beer pacht). Lourich abused his wife, was involved in several 
disputes with other alcohol pachters, and in 1740 was banished after having murdered a slave woman 
in his tavern; cf. Worden and Groenewald, Trials of Slavery, 176-87. 
87  ‘een algehele suggestie van onbetrouwbaarheid, in de felste verwensingen zelfs van 
laaghartigheid en eerloosheid’; Roodenburg, ‘De Notaris en de Erehandel’, 377.  
88  Women were more often the target of insults, such as hoer (whore), attacking their personal 














crook), since I am well aware that you are a good friend of his.’89 Van Helsdingen 
defended Boetendagh and took Lourich to task for insulting ‘an honourable man’ 
behind his back. Boetendagh learned of this episode from his friend and sued Lourich, 
claiming that the latter had tried in this way ‘to steal … the crown from his head.’90  
 Van Helsdingen’s defence of Boetendagh’s honour becomes more 
understandable when one considers the important role of friends in this period. From a 
friend one expected solidarity and help, but in return one too accepted responsibility 
and offered help. In addition, ‘friends also exercised social control, because they 
suffered from the bad reputation of someone closely connected to them.’91 Where 
both of them, as demonstrated in the preceding chapters, were also involved in high-
risk entrepreneurial undertakings which depended on their public reputation, it 
becomes crucial that such friends should defend one another. This explains Van 
Helsdingen’s behaviour in this case: since the late 1720s he and Boetendagh had been 
business partners and stood surety for one another on several occasions.92 If 
Boetendagh’s reputation became compromised, it would reflect negatively on Van 
Helsdingen’s, who might suffer financially as a result. In this way, the operation of 
reputation in the social world of Cape pachters could lead to a greater feeling of 
solidarity, perhaps even something of a group identity, among those who supported 
one another. But contesting a person’s reputation and respectability could also be used 
against one’s competitors, as is demonstrated by the case of Broedersz and Melck.   
 A court case of a rather different kind affords us a rare opportunity to discover 
something about the self-identity and perception of at least one pachter.93 In 1746 
                                                 
89  ‘Gij Van Helsdingen kund het hem [Boetendagh] wel weder te rugge zeggen off ik zal er uw 
voor houden (te weeten voor een schelm). Want mij wel bewus is, dat gij een goed vriend van hem 
zijt’; CA, CJ 1049, 443.  
90  ‘een eerlijk man’ and ‘om de kroon van zijn hooft … te ontvreemden’; ibid., 447. By using the 
latter metaphor, Boetendagh clearly expressed that he considered his good reputation to be the most 
significant contributor to his public image.  
91  Kooijmans, ‘Risk and Reputation’, 32. A particularly insightful discussion of how friendship 
was conceived and operated in the eighteenth century is provided by N. Tadmor, Family and Friends in 
Eighteenth-Century England: Household, Kinship and Patronage (Cambridge, 2001), 167-215. 
92  See pages 127-29 above.  
93  For comparative work on the topic of the self-identity and perception of early modern 
entrepreneurs, merchants and other business people; see M.C. Jacob and C. Secretan (eds), The Self-














Abraham Leever, who by this stage had become the most important, wealthy and 
influential alcohol pachter at the Cape, was sued by his sister-in-law, Jacomina 
Brommert, 94 for having insulted and assaulted her in her house. Leever certainly had 
a strong and forceful character and had previously been in trouble with the law over 
his quick temper. 95 The reasons for the assault are complex and had to do with tense 
family relations; but, significantly, the last straw for Leever was when Brommert 
called him a schelm (crook) after which he hit her in the face.96 To add insult to 
injury, she then went into the street – a public space – where she shouted at the 
daughters of Leever: ‘he is a crook as God and the whole world know; that is what he 
is known as, and I shall make his eyes stream, if God would grant me life!’97 The 
further details of the case are not relevant here, but some of the statements Leever 
made in his very vigorous and lengthy defence are most revealing about how he 
viewed himself in the context of the Cape’s burgher population.98 
 As Leever and his wife were leaving Brommert’s house after having assaulted 
her, she threatened to lay a complaint with the fiscal. To this Leever replied: ‘you 
would not dare going there since one word from me would carry greater weight than 
                                                 
94  Jacomina Brommert was the widow of Jacob Leever, the brother of Abraham. Jacob was the 
Secretary of the Orphan Chamber for many years. Upon his death in 1737 it was discovered that over 
the years he had defrauded the Orphan Chamber of f 121 742; J.L.M. Franken, ‘’n Kaapse Huishoue in 
die 18de Eeu: Uit Von Dessin se Briefboek en Memoriaal’, Archives Year Book for South African 
History 3/1 (1940), 37-38. The VOC went to considerable pains to recover as much of this money from 
his estate (cf. the various cases concerning this issue in CA, C 1101, 58-70 and CJ 832-833), with the 
result that Jacomina Brommert was left destitute and in later years had to be supported by the Church’s 
poor fund; Mentzel, Description, vol. 1, 27-28. 
95  In 1736 the baker Jan Bam sued Leever for overstepping the bounds of his office as an ensign 
of the militia when he gave him a spot fine during the 1736 Cape Town fire for having started up his 
oven. Bam claimed that Leever charged at him ‘als een brieschende leeuw’ with his ‘brutaliteijten’; 
CA, CJ 1049, 235. Hesselink, ‘In de Schaduw van de Tafelberg’, 60 characterises Leever ‘als een 
eigenzinnig en koppig persoon, die niets en niemand uit de weg ging om zijn doel te bereiken.’ 
96  CA, CJ 353, 257. 
97  ‘hij is een schelm dat Godt en de heele weerelt weet, daar staat hij voor te boek, en ik zal [’]t 
hem in zijn oogen doen druijpen, spaar Godt mij ’t leeven’; ibid., 291.  
98  Leever had served several years as an official in the VOC before becoming a free burgher, 
which is certainly betrayed by the excellent command of VOC officialese he used in his defence. The 














ten of yours, seeing that he is a bosom friend of mine.’99 The fiscal at this time was 
Baron Pieter van Reede van Oudtshoorn, a rich nobleman who was to become a future 
governor of the Cape.100 It is highly plausible that Leever would have had friendly 
relations with him – they certainly had a great deal of official business with one 
another101 – although the fiscal denied this in his eijsch (the plaintiff’s plea).102 But 
what is revealing about this statement is that Leever thought his position in Cape 
society, and his influence with the authorities, was of such a nature that he could 
receive special treatment. 
 This belief in his own superior importance in the world of mid-eighteenth 
century Cape Town is revealed by what Leever wrote in his defence. Leever was 
particularly upset and hurt by the very strict punishment the fiscal demanded in his 
conclusie (the plaintiff’s recommendation of punishment): a fine of one thousand 
rixdollars and that Leever be declared een onwaardig burger (‘an unworthy citizen’) 
and be banished from the Cape.103 Leever felt that the fiscal had no right to act ‘so 
rigorously’ against him and to exact a punishment ‘so outrageous, so terribly 
exceeding the limits of reasonableness and so little applicable to the deed.’104 As if the 
fine was not ridiculously high enough (‘indeed a pretty sum’), the fiscal went out of 
bounds by suggesting banishment: ‘the eijsch has no poles [i.e. knows no limits] and 
the right of citizenship is an insufficient dyke to staunch the violent fury of this 
                                                 
99  ‘daer durft gij niet koomen, want mijn een word sal merder [sic] geloof hebben als thien van 
u, want ’t is een boesemvriend van mij’; ibid., 258v. When Brommert later went to Leever threatening 
to go to the fiscal, he encouraged her; saying nothing would come of it since the fiscal was his bosom 
friend; ibid., 258v-59. 
100  See his entry in W.J. de Kock and D.W. Krüger (eds), Suid-Afrikaanse Biografiese 
Woordeboek: Deel II (Cape Town and Johannesburg, 1972), 816-17. 
101  Leever was one of the most vigilant protectors of the pachters’ right to monopoly and he 
reported the slightest whiff of smuggling to the fiscal who was duty bound to investigate this. There are 
numerous such court cases instigated by Leever in the 1730-40s. The fiscal benefited from the 
prosecution of such cases since he received a share of the fines imposed. On the problem of smuggling 
for pachters, see page 43 with note 116 above.  
102  CA, CJ 353, 260.  
103  Ibid., 260v.  
104  ‘soo enorm, soo schrikkelijk van ’t spoor der billijkheijt dwalende en soo weijnig applicabel 














flood.’105 What particularly galled Leever was that anybody could conceive of him as 
‘a useless subject.’ He writes with indignation that he ‘differs much in his feelings 
with the honourable fiscal since he believes that he is by no means a useless but 
indeed – in terms of contributing to the honourable Company’s gemeene 
landsmiddelen106 – a useful inhabitant.’107 For Leever, this was the crux of the matter: 
as a successful pachter of many years’ standing, he had to be considered as een 
dienstig inwoonder (‘a useful inhabitant’) – anything else was just inconceivable for a 
man of his attainments: ‘Since having paid, for conducting his civilian trade, to the 
aforementioned honourable Company, both specifically and in general, already the 
tiny sum of five times a hundred thousand guilders, and most likely more, rather than 
less.’108  
 Leever was exaggerating somewhat: by 1746 he had invested over almost a 
twenty-year period a total of about f 160 000 in the alcohol pachten at the Cape.109 
But the principle is certainly valid: this is a massive sum and this money, as discussed 
in chapter one, formed a major source of direct revenue for the Company at the Cape. 
In Leever’s eyes, this made him a particularly useful and valuable inhabitant of the 
Cape – one who, while making his own gains, also profited the Company immensely. 
According, then, to Leever’s own conception of himself and his role in Cape society, 
he should have received special treatment, and seemed to have believed that he indeed 
merited it, and hence could muster influence. And perhaps this was indeed the case 
since the Council of Justice rejected the fiscal’s eijsch and sentenced Leever to a 
                                                 
105  ‘[den] eijsch heeft geen paalen en het burger regt is geen suffisante dijk genoeg om den 
onstuijmige drift van deesen vloet te stuijten’; ibid., 295v.  
106  This was the term used in the VOC’s bookkeeping to refer to its income from the alcohol 
pachten.  
107  ‘differeert veel in sijn gevoelen met den Heer Eijs[che]r aangesien hij gelooft dat hij geensints 
een onnut, maar wel een, tot opbrenging van ’s E[dele] Comp[agnie]s gemeene landsmiddelen, dienstig 
inwoonder is’; ibid. 
108  ‘als hebbende voor sijn burgerlijke neering drijving aan wel opgem[elde] Edele Comp[agnie] 
soo wel in ’t particulier als generaal al een sommetjie van vijf maal hondert duijsent guldens veel eer 
meerder als iminder betaalt’; ibid., 296. 
109  This amount is what he paid directly for the alcohol pachten at the auctions: his reference to 
his particuliere contribution. What he had contributed in various taxes and excises with his business 
activities – and his cooperative business deals with others – would probably reach a considerably 














token fine of 100 rixdollars.110 Leever’s exceptional position in Cape society helped 
him in this case to retain his prestige, reputation and honour – he did not have to beg 
Brommert for forgiveness and was certainly not declared een onnut burger (‘a useless 





The pachters discussed in this chapter were among the most successful inhabitants, in 
financial terms, of VOC Cape Town. Their financial ascendancy also translated into 
social success which was represented symbolically. This took different forms: on the 
one hand some wealthy pachters chose to advertise their wealth publicly through 
consumption and the use of material culture; on the other hand, their involvement in 
the significant burgher militia meant that they were publicly presented to the bulk of 
Cape Town’s inhabitants as being set apart in symbolic terms. And these pachters 
were well aware of their exceptional position in the free burgher population, as was 
expressed by their obsession with protecting their reputation and honour. Both in their 
own eyes, and those of Cape Town society at large, their success as entrepreneurs 
made them deserving of social prestige and honour – even special treatment by the 
authorities. In terms of entrepreneurship, these pachters had realised their wishes and 
desires to be wealthy, powerful and respected.  
 This chapter focused only on a small group of successful alcohol pachters. It 
does not mean, however, that the processes and mechanisms used by them to gain 
ascendancy were not also used by the other inhabitants of Cape Town. The alcohol 
pachters were by no means unique; but they usefully serve as examples of how an 
entrepreneurial group of people could, and did, use social and symbolic capital to 
their own advantage. In essence, this chapter should be viewed as a case study of a 
process with wider application than to the alcohol pachters alone. Although the 
                                                 
110  CA, CJ 28, 70-71. 
111  The outcome of Leever’s involvement in the alcohol retail trade was less fortunate: by the 
mid-1750s he had overplayed his hand and his creditors started calling in their debts. He could not 
repay them all and as a result his estate was sequestrated. By 1758 he was forced to apply, like his 
sister-in-law two decades earlier, to the Church’s poor fund for financial support; NGKA, G 1 1/4, 8 














analysis in this chapter is based on a small sample only, it does demonstrate how 
people in a relatively small colonial town could use various forms of capital to 
promote their social mobility. Thus even though the focus of this chapter, like this 
thesis, is on the alcohol pachters, the investigation reveals a number of issues about 
the development of the burgher society of early modern Cape Town which suggest 



























The history of the Cape of Good Hope is unthinkable without Cape Town. Although this 
may seem like a truism, until recently an outsider would not have guessed this from the 
historiography of the VOC period of South African history. This is largely due to the 
development of the nationalistic invention of the (white) South African past during the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in which the conquest and settlement of land 
were the driving factors in the development of ‘South Africa.’ In this view Cape Town 
was merely the starting point for these processes and it stopped being of much 
importance after the ‘founding’ years of Van Riebeeck and Van der Stel. Cape Town 
always remained on the periphery of this view, while the focus was the expanding 
frontier and the role of the ‘pioneer’ trekboers with their restless spirit which 
strengthened over the years to find its fulfilment in the Voortrekkers of the nineteenth 
century.1  
 In general, the revisionist historians of the 1970s and 1980s successfully managed 
to demolish the old nationalistic myths about the development of South African society. 
This is also true for the history of the VOC Cape, but here curiously the focus remained 
very strongly on the frontier, or at least the landed classes of Cape society. The 
revisionists successfully broadened our perspective on the early Cape by writing 
previously ignored groups such as the slaves and Khoisan into the history of the Cape of 
Good Hope. However, insofar as the free burgher population continued to receive 
attention in their own right (most notably in the work of Robert Ross), the focus remained 
on the rural population; although less on the white frontiersmen and more on the settled 
population of the arable districts which had previously been rather ignored. It is only very 
                                                 
1  The classic work of P.J. van der Merwe was pivotal in the development, and acceptance, of this 
view (although it has its roots earlier): Die Trekboer in die Geskiedenis van die Kaapkolonie, 1657-1842 
(Cape Town, 1938) and, Trek: Studies oor die Mobiliteit van die Pioniersbevolking aan die Kaap (Cape 











recently, thanks largely to the project of which this thesis forms part, that Cape Town has 
begun to receive the attention which its historic importance merits.2 
 This thesis has demonstrated through a series of case studies centred on the 
alcohol pachters of Cape Town that the city was central to the economic and social 
development of the burgher population of the Cape of Good Hope. It has argued that the 
central mechanism for the creation of wealth in the town was the use of 
entrepreneurialism. In spite of the restrictive nature of the mercantilist economy of the 
VOC period, Cape Town as a port city with a large transient population, offered more 
economic opportunities for exploitation by the alert entrepreneur than elsewhere in the 
colony. The most lucrative, and also the most accessible, of these opportunities was the 
system of alcohol pachten which was successfully exploited by several dozen Cape Town 
free burghers who used it to create personal wealth. Some of the wealthiest individuals at 
the Cape during the VOC period, such as Hendrik Oostwald Eksteen and Martin Melck, 
used the alcohol pachten as a stepping stone in their rise to become financially ascendant. 
In this way, the development of wealth in the free burgher community was closely related 
to larger, international forces since the prosperity of Cape Town was crucially dependent 
on the visits and needs of calling ships.  
 A surprising result of the research for this thesis was the revelation of the 
centrality of male German immigrants to the alcohol retail trade of Cape Town. 
Throughout most of the eighteenth century they dominated this business. There were 
important changes in the role and nature of this group in the course of the eighteenth 
century. From chapter four it appears that by the second quarter of the eighteenth century, 
when German immigration was at its height, this group formed a rather tight-knit 
community which supported one another financially, brought family members to the 
Cape, and contracted endogamous marriages, with many of them actively promoting the 
                                                 
2  The NRF-funded project, ‘Social Identities in VOC Cape Town’, is set to change the way in which 
South African historians think about the role of Cape Town in the history of both South Africa and the 
Indian Ocean world. See N. Worden, ‘New Approaches to VOC History in South Africa’, South African 
Historical Journal 59 (2007), 10-18 on the aims and likely impact of the project. This latter project was 
inspired by the research done on the history of the city during the 1990s as part of the Cape Town History 
Project at the University of Cape Town, which was synthesised in N. Worden, E. van Heyningen and V. 











Lutheran faith. Over time, however, the more successful members of this group started to 
intermarry with the settled free-burgher population, although even by the last quarter of 
the century there were still indicators that Cape Town businessmen and women of 
German descent kept close ties (see chapter five).  
 Although this thesis only concentrated on Germans who were pachters, it has 
revealed how central this group were to the history of Cape Town, as well as more 
generally to the development of the burgher population of the colony. An intriguing 
discovery is the close ties German immigrant men had with the Cape Town free black 
community, especially in the first half of the century.3 It may well be that the decrease in 
such relations by the late eighteenth century was related to the growing incorporation of 
these German businessmen by the Cape gentry. German immigrants and their relations 
with both the free black community and the Cape gentry warrant further research.  
 This study has proved that, certainly in relation to German immigrants, there 
existed a close link between the urban environment (in the opportunities that it created), 
the entrepreneurship of newcomers to the Cape and social mobility. This can be seen 
most spectacularly in the career of Hendrik Oostwald Eksteen (chapter three), but there 
are many other smaller success-stories from both the 1730s and 1770s to prove the point. 
In all of these successes kinship and marriage played a crucially important role, although 
the nature of the alliances which entrepreneurs made changed over time as third and 
fourth-generation families at the Cape developed deeper histories and more complex 
                                                 
3  The impression one gets from works such as J. Hoge, ‘Personalia of the Germans at the Cape, 
1652-1806’, Archives Year Book for South African History 9 (1946); H.F. Heese, Groep sonder Grense: 
Die Rol en Status van die Gemengde Bevolking aan die Kaap, 1652-1795 (Bellville, 1984); K. Schoeman, 
’n Duitser aan die Kaap, 1724-1765: Die Lewe en Loopbaan van Hendrik Schoeman (Pretoria, 2004) and 
A. Malan, ‘Chattels or Colonists?: “Freeblack” Women and their Households’, Kronos 25 (1998-99), 50-
71, is that free-black women were more likely to marry first-generation German immigrants living in Cape 
Town than the sons of settlers; although the statistical analysis to prove this still remains to be done. Was 
the preponderance of first-generation German immigrants in Cape Town and their links to free blacks, as 
opposed to the farming community and their daughters, a function of the immigrant support network that 
existed in the city (cf. chapter four), or does it rather reveal an exclusionary prejudice of the rural gentry 
who would only allow German immigrants entry once they were financially successful (such as Hendrik 
Oostwald Eksteen), or to their descendants who had achieved social and economic ascendancy (such as 











connections (as shown in chapter five). Social capital likewise continued to be crucial to 
the success of entrepreneurs in Cape Town. Although here too changes over time can be 
flagged, it seems that a shared background or identity continued to play a very important 
role in the economic support networks people cultivated. Both in the younger, more face-
to-face society of the early eighteenth century and in the larger, more complex society of 
the last quarter of the century, German ethnicity did remain a valuable entry point for 
newcomers to enter established business and social networks in Cape Town. Central to 
accumulating social capital was honour and reputation, the loss of which could lead to 
both economic and social failure (chapter six). The way in which social capital operated 
among the entrepreneurs of Cape Town begs important questions which need to be 
answered by future historians: how was community and identity construed at the Cape of 
Good Hope during this period, and what role did common cultural markers such as 
ethnicity, language and religion play in these processes? Our starting point for an 
understanding of the society-in-the-making in Dutch colonial South Africa is thus the 
history of early modern Cape Town’s inhabitants and the ways in which they interacted 
with one another and the free burghers of the hinterland.   
 
The Urban Elite and the Cape Gentry 
 
This thesis is about more than the ways in which entrepreneurs exploited alcohol pachten 
in seventeenth and eighteenth-century Cape Town. Its focus on the growth of an 
entrepreneurial class in the Cape colony’s foremost settlement also reveals much about 
how economic and social mobility operated at the Cape which enabled the development 
of an elite. Hitherto Cape historians have posited the existence of a landed or rural ‘Cape 
gentry’ based on capital accumulation. This case study of entrepreneurs in Cape Town 
has shown that this picture needs to be amended in several respects. Entrepreneurialism 
needs to be recognised as an important mechanism in wealth creation for people who 
started off with no or little economic capital. Furthermore, it was the urban environment 
which presented the most lucrative of business opportunities. Ultimately, the Cape gentry 











 In addition, the Cape gentry were not as closed or endogamous as is generally 
believed. Although much still needs to be done to fully understand the processes of 
gentrification at the Cape, it is clear enough that the Cape gentry were never closed 
during the eighteenth century, but that new blood (and capital) continuously entered it 
from Cape Town. Instead of having a group of families marrying one another in the 
country, there was a dynamic process of assimilating successful and wealthy new 
families. Even by the last quarter of the eighteenth century new members entered the 
gentry from the urban elite through marriage alliances. Both these trajectories are 
revealed by the descendents of alcohol pachters: the Eksteens and the Van Reenens were 
perhaps the foremost gentry families of the late eighteenth century. The former were the 
children of arguably the most successful entrepreneur in the VOC Cape (see chapter 
three). The latter were the children and grandchildren of alcohol and meat pachters who, 
even by the 1780s, were marrying the children of an urban immigrant entrepreneur (see 
chapter five).  
 This development in the eighteenth-century Cape is similar in some respects to 
what was happening in the Dutch Republic from the late sixteenth to the late seventeenth 
century. The high level of urbanisation as well as the relative independence and power of 
individual cities, coupled with the fact that the nobility was not very powerful or visible 
in Dutch society, led to the development of the so-called regent class from wealthy urban 
burghers. These were the foremost burghers in social and economic terms who governed 
the cities. Up to the last quarter of the seventeenth century, the regent class remained 
fairly ‘open’, i.e. newcomers could enter its ranks. The absence of an urban aristocracy, 
as well as the fact that there was no stigma attached to deriving one’s livelihood from 
business, meant that wealth became the determining factor for social advancement. Thus 
the merchant elite could, and did, aspire to enter the regent class. This resulted in a 
dynamic social process whereby, in the seventeenth century, the children of successful 
and wealthy merchants became regenten. This started to change towards the end of the 
seventeenth century when the regent class started to contract socially in what Dutch 
historians call a process of ‘aristocratisation’ – increasingly regent families contracted 











(including pursuing rural estates and titles).4 Although English society differed 
significantly from the Dutch one, in England too there was what Richard Grassby has 
called a ‘dynamic social equilibrium’ whereby the (often younger) sons of gentry entered 
business in London and wealthy businessmen aspired to be gentry. It was, in both these 
countries, because of the process of assimilation between those in business (merchants) 
and those who lived off capital (gentry) that ‘no powerful or hostile social order arose to 
challenge the gentry, and new business wealth did not transform social institutions. 
Business did not create a self-conscious class, but a functional group.’5 
 It is among these lines that one can argue that, on a much smaller scale, a similar 
process was occurring in the eighteenth-century Cape: a dynamic process whereby 
successful entrepreneurs were assimilated into the gentry who, because of the nature of 
Cape society (i.e. lacking a nobility and access to political power6), was not threatened by 
the urban elite and continue to maintain close links with them. This does not mean that 
the urban elite were simply an extension of the rural gentry, waiting to be assimilated. 
                                                 
4  This theory was first put forward in H. van Dijk and D.J. Roorda, ‘Sociale Mobiliteit onder 
Regenten van de Republiek’, Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 84 (1971), 306-28, and received much attention 
from Dutch historians during the 1970s and 1980s. For recent syntheses of this line of research, see for 
example: M. Prak, J. de Jong and L. Kooijmans, ‘State and Status in the Eighteenth Century. Three Cities 
in Holland: Hoorn, Gouda and Leiden’, in H. Schilling and H. Diederiks (eds), Bürgerliche Eliten in den 
Niederlanden und in Nordwestdeutschland: Studien zur Socialgeschichte des europäischen Bürgertums in 
Mittelalter und in der Neuzeit (Cologne and Vienna, 1985), 183-94; J. de Jong, Een Deftig Bestaan: Het 
Dagelijks Leven van Regenten in de 17de en 18de Eeuw (Utrecht and Antwerp, 1987), 65-82; J.L. Price, 
‘De Regent’ and L. Kooijmans, ‘De Koopman’, in H.M. Beliën, A.Th. van Deursen and G.J. van Setten 
(eds), Gestalten van de Gouden Eeuw: Een Hollands Groepsportret (Amsterdam, 1995), 25-62 and 65-92.  
5  R. Grassby, ‘Social Mobility and Business Enterprise in Seventeenth-Century England’, in D. 
Pennington and K. Thomas (eds), Puritans and Revolutionaries: Essays in Seventeenth-Century History 
Presented to Christopher Hill (Oxford, 1978), 355-81, quotes from 380 and 381. Grassby suggests that this 
process was due to ‘the absence of an independent, urban aristocracy or a legal and office-holding nobility. 
The absence of privilege made the gentry no economic threat to the merchants, and the wish to identify 
with the upper class made the gentry more sympathetic to the social pretensions of business’; ibid., 380.  
6  The entrepreneurs of Cape Town should not be seen as a group similar to the Dutch regent class. 
Although exceptionally successful alcohol pachters such as Hendrik Oostwald Eksteen did attain a great 
deal of social prestige which translated into some political influence and power, this was not a hallmark of 











There seems to have been sufficient differences between these groups, at least until the 
late eighteenth century, to claim that the urban elite formed a different social group, albeit 
one with close ties to the rural gentry. The most important of these differences is that the 
pachters were primarily urban phenomena. In addition, they had much closer links with 
(and dependence on) the VOC than most of the other free burghers at the Cape. Yet, at 
the same time, they were not a group apart: they maintained close ties with the larger 
free-burgher community: both economically (the rural gentry who sold their wine to them 
as well as the larger urban community who acted as their customers) and socially 
(through marriage and other alliances).7 In addition, it is striking to what an extent 
alcohol pachters, certainly the more successful ones, remained immigrants until late in 
the eighteenth century.  
 What then could one call the group of successful alcohol pachters who played 
such an important role in the economy and society of Dutch colonial Cape Town? I 
suggest that they fulfilled the same social function – though not exactly the same 
economic one – as the urban bourgeoisie in eighteenth-century Europe. This term 
originally denoted somebody who had citizenship rights in a city (hence Dutch burger), 
which came with certain privileges and duties,8 but by the eighteenth century held a much 
narrower meaning for contemporaries in continental Europe. By this stage the term came 
to denote an urban dweller with definite social status derived from a certain measure of 
affluence.9 It is not necessary to find a narrow or restricted definition for the eighteenth-
                                                 
7  Cf. A.G. Hesselink, ‘In de Schaduw van de Tafelberg: Onderhuidse Spanning en Samenwerking in 
een Koloniale Samenleving in Zuid-Afrika, 1751-1771’ (unpublished Doctoraalscriptie, University of 
Amsterdam, 1997), 54, rightly states that ‘[d]e drankpachters speelden een sleutelrol in de maatschappij 
omdat ze zowel voor de overheid als voor de vrijburgers een belangrijke rol vervulden.’ 
8  J. di Corcia, ‘Bourg, Bourgeois, Bourgeois de Paris from the Eleventh to the Eighteenth Century’, 
Journal of Modern History 50 (1978), 207-33. 
9  The exact source of that affluence differed, though: in Vovelle and Roche’s study of the French 
bourgeoisie, they found that the bourgeoisie of Paris were more likely to be rentiers, while those in 
provincial cities often acquired their wealth through practising a profession; M. Vovelle and D. Roche, 
‘Bourgeois, Rentiers and Property Owners: Elements for Defining a Social Category at the End of the 
Eighteenth Century’, in J. Kaplow (ed.), New Perspectives on the French Revolution: Readings in 











century bourgeoisie, since the exact form this group took depended on local 
circumstances.10 I prefer to follow the suggestion of Reddy, viz. that the ‘bourgeoisie can 
easily be defined by means of a bundle of attributes (that is, of relationships) that 
characterise a cluster of individuals or families.’11 In eighteenth-century Cape Town these 
attributes included urban residence, a certain level of wealth and prestige, access to 
capital in order to engage in entrepreneurial activities, and generally a good relationship 
with the VOC authorities and the local alcohol producers.  
 The urban entrepreneurs of the Cape colony were not a group to be totally 
separated from the rural gentry – together they formed what can be called the burgher 
elite of the colony – but there are sufficient differences between these two groups to 
justify seeing the urban elite in terms of something akin to the eighteenth-century 
bourgeoisie of Europe or what in terms of Dutch historiography is known as the 
‘merchant elite’, although there are differences between the Cape and the Dutch 
versions.12 There were, as shown in chapter five, a symbiotic relationship between the 
urban and rural burgher elites: over time, second and third-generation members of the 
urban bourgeoisie established closer links with the rural gentry and the VOC officialdom 
                                                 
10  This is the point made by H.R. French in his study of social stratification in small English villages. 
Such small communities tended to only make one sort of distinction, viz. a differentiation between ‘chief’ 
and ‘other inhabitants’: ‘Within this truncated hierarchy [French writes] evaluation of status was based on 
contingent comparisons and relative criteria rather than by reference to absolute, or national, categories and 
stereotypes’; H.R. French, ‘Social Status, Localism and the “Middle Sort of People” in England, 1620-
1750,’ Past and Present 166 (2000), 96-97. Cape historians still need to determine what these ‘contingent 
comparisons and relative criteria’ were for the VOC Cape.  
11  W.M. Reddy, ‘The Concept of Class’, in M.L. Bush (ed.), Social Orders and Social Classes in 
Europe since 1500: Studies in Social Stratification (London and New York, 1992), 22.  
12  The major differences are in scale (size of capital, profits and risk) and the fact that alcohol 
pachters were essentially active in retail, not bulk trade. For a succinct synthesis of the nature of the 
merchant elite in early modern Dutch society, see J.I. Israel, The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness and 
Fall, 1477-1806 (Oxford, 1998), 344-48. Merchants in the proper sense of the word only developed at the 
Cape around the turn of the nineteenth century; cf. R. Ross, ‘The Cape of Good Hope and the World 
Economy, 1652-1835’, in R. Elphick and H. Giliomee (eds), The Shaping of South African Society, 1652-











so that the different elites of the Cape of Good Hope formed a dense network of 
connections by the end of the century.  
 The aforegoing paragraphs are tentative suggestions of the possible development 
of a Cape elite. As of yet our knowledge of the social complexities of life in early modern 
Cape Town is too limited to allow a clearer exposition of such a development. What other 
opportunities existed within Cape Town for entrepreneurs to exploit? What role did the 
meat pachters play – did they form a link between the urban and rural elites, as the 
history of the Van Reenen family suggests? What was the role of rentiers in the business 
and social life of Cape Town? What links existed between the urban and rural burgher 
elites, on the one hand, and the higher-ranking VOC officials? How did public office (and 
Church leadership) operate and what role did access to it play in the creation and 
maintenance of status and respectability? It is clear from this study of alcohol 
entrepreneurs in Cape Town that they provide a key focus for an understanding of the 




























DATABASE OF ALCOHOL PACHTERS AT THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE, 1680-1795 
 
This database lists in alphabetical form all the individuals who held any alcohol pacht during the 
period 1680 to 1795, with a cursory indication of which pacht(en) he or she held.1 1680 was 
chosen as a starting point since the major characteristics of the pacht system (as described in 
chapter one above) were established in that year; even though not all the various types of alcohol 
pachten were auctioned off publicly in 1680 (some were only added in later years).  
 The list is filed alphabetically by surname. Under each name, the pachten the person held 
are given using the abbreviations explained below. After identifying the pacht, only the year(s) 
during which the individual held that specific pacht is provided with no further information.2 
Following the name of any person who held pachten in more than one year there follows a date 
(in italics) which indicates the first and the last year in which that person held a pacht. This 
serves to provide a rough indication of the person’s years of activity in the alcohol pacht 
business; it does not follow that a person held alcohol pachten throughout that period.   
 The list follows the modern Afrikaans (and not the Dutch) usage of filing surnames 
starting with van, le or de under those words, and not the under the main word, e.g. van der Spuij 
is filed under van, not Spuij. I have consistently used the grapheme ij, not y, but treated it as a y, 
i.e. it is filed between x and z. 
As is typical of sources from this period, there is little consistency in the spelling of 
proper nouns. I have been guided by the form used most often in my sources, and have mostly, 
but not always, changed it where necessary in accordance with the spelling used in the register to 
H.C.V. Leibbrandt’s Requesten (Memorials). Cross references have, however, been included to 
facilitate searching. Names in which patronyms appear are filed under the last name, i.e. the 
surname, though cross references to the patronyms are also included. Thus, Jan Dirkz de Beer is 
filed under de Beer, not Dirkz. In cases where toponyms were used as surnames, e.g. Michiel van 
                                                 
1  This database is based on the pacht contracts and other sources which list details of the individuals who 
bought alcohol pachten; cf. the discussion of these sources on page 50 above. I have been unable to ascertain the 
names of the pachters for the year 1681 as none of the usual sources which mention the names of pachters have 
them for that year.  
2  See table 2.5 above (pages 63-69) for the total amount each alcohol pachter paid for his or her pachten at 














Lijpsigh, they are filed under van. Where toponyms appear after a surname, they are placed in 
brackets, and the person’s name is filed under the surname, e.g. Jan Rogiers (van Amsterdam) is 
filed under Rogiers. Women’s names, where possible, are filed under their maiden names, 
though cross filings under their married names are also included. Where part of a name appears 
in brackets it means that it is sometimes given as part of the person’s name, but otherwise 
omitted. For example: Hurter, (Jan) Willem means that the person mostly appears under the 
name Willem Hurter, but also occasionally as Jan Willem Hurter.  
 
A Note on Dates 
 
At first the pachten were auctioned off on the last day of the calendar year and therefore ran from 
1 January to 31 December. This changed in 1698 when the pacht year only ran from January to 
the end of August. From that year onwards the pacht year coincided with the VOC’s financial 
year: 1 September to 31 August. Thus, any date after 1699 in this database should be interpreted 
as a pacht year, i.e. running from 1 September of the previous calendar year until 31 August of 
the stated year.  
 
The Various Alcohol Pachten 
 
The database makes use of the following abbreviations for the different alcohol pachten.  
 
MB: Malt Beer 
 
This pacht was not auctioned off with the other alcohol pachten on 30 December 1679, 
but was included from the next year onwards. Because this pacht often remained in the same 
hands (the pachter was also the brewer) for a long time, it was sometimes not auctioned off 
publicly, but instead a specific arrangement was made between the authorities and the incumbent 
pachter to pay some set price for it annually.3 Where two people shared the pacht during the 
same year, this is indicated by a ½-sign after that year. This pacht was not awarded in 1720.4 
                                                 
3  See page 34 note 76 above for a list.  
4  Because the pacht could not raise more than f 600 at the public auction, the Company decided not to award 















BW: Brandy and Distilled Spirits 
 
This pacht also included the right to sell aracq and distilled spirits, and from 1696 
Spanish wine and secq (a heavy Spanish wine) too. From the 1704 pacht year onwards, this 
pacht was divided into four parts (percelen), each auctioned off separately. Thus for every year 
after that, there are four different contracts. However, there was no limit on how many parts any 
individual could buy, and hence some individuals held several parts, or even all, in a given year. 
In the database, as in the contracts, I indicate which of the four parts a pachter bought by adding 
the number of the part (1, 2, 3, 4) in brackets after the given year.  
 
VB:  European Beer and Wines 
 
This pacht’s name changed a few times, but it more or less always concerned the right to 
sell Dutch (vaderlandsche) and other European (uijtheemsche) beers and wines, i.e. not the Cape 
varieties for which separate pachten existed. This pacht was not awarded in 1714.5 
 
CW: Cape Wines 
 
This pacht was only auctioned off with the other three alcohol pachten at the end of 
1683. From 1700 onwards the pacht was divided into four parts, and like the brandy pacht, each 
part was auctioned off separately. In the database this is indicated with numbers following the 
given year. In 1734 (the pacht year ‘1735’) the generaele pacht was instituted, meaning that one 
person bought the whole pacht at a higher price than the four parts combined.6 Therefore, after 
1735 there are no numbers after the stated year, except on three occasions (1759, 1794 and 1795) 
when there were no generaele pachters, and the four individuals who first bought the separate 
parts together held the wine pacht. In some years two (or even three) people bid together for the 
generaele pacht and they therefore shared the wine pacht between them. This is indicated with a 
                                                 
5  The pacht was not awarded as nobody at the auction bid more than f 2000 which the Company deemed too 
low; CA, C 2702, 95-97. 














½-sign after the year in which there were two partners and a ⅓-sign for three partners. Finally, 
note that the pachters for 1711 held the pacht for only eleven months. 
 
RB: Rondebosch and False Bay 
 
All the above pachten were limited geographically to ‘this Table Valley’, usually giving 
the farm Roodebloem (modern Woodstock) as the boundary. The Company’s farm Rustenburg 
was rented out to private individuals during 1673-1683 and not only produced wine for the Cape 
market, but also sold some in the area. However, the farm reverted to the VOC, but in 1716 (the 
pacht year ‘1717’) it was decided to re-institute the Rustenburg pacht, after the example of the 
Stellenbosch pacht (see below). This pacht concerned the right to sell various types of alcohol in 
the area beyond Table Valley (but did not include renting the Company farm). At first it was 
called the Rustenburg pacht, but was renamed the ‘Rondebosje’ pacht in 1721. In 1744 the area 
covered by the pacht was extended to include False Bay (i.e. modern Simonstown).  
 
SD: Stellenbosch and Drakenstein 
 
In 1714 a pacht was instituted for Stellenbosch and a year later for Drakenstein. These 
pachten gave their holders the right to sell wine and brandy in small quantities within the 
boundaries of the district. Up to 1722 they were auctioned off separately and had different 
pachters each. From 1723 onwards, these two pachten were amalgamated into one pacht which 
gave the pachter the right to sell alcohol in both areas. For the period before this date, the 
abbreviations S and D are used in the database to designate Stellenbosch and Drakenstein.  
 
IV: Impost on Foreign Nations 
 
This pacht was only instituted in 1757 but soon became extremely valuable. The 
Company levied excise duties on all alcohol sold to ships of foreign nations docking in Table 
Bay. The right to manage and collect this excise became the seventh of the alcohol pachten. This 














Alcohol Pachters at the Cape of Good Hope, 1680-1795 
 
 
Adriaansz ,  Lambert  1700-1701 
 BW: 1702 
 CW: 1700 (1); 1701 (4) 
 
Auret ,  Jeremias 
 RB: 1783 
 
Baartman ,  Maarten 1763-1787  
BW: 1763 (2); 1764 (1); 1765 (1, 3); 1766 (2, 3); 1767 (2, 4); 1768 (1, 3, 4); 1769 (3); 
1770 (1); 1771 (2, 4); 1772 (2); 1773 (1); 1774 (3); 1775 (1); 1776 (2); 1777 (1); 
1778 (2); 1779 (3); 1780 (1, 4); 1781 (4); 1782 (2); 1783 (1); 1784 (2); 1785 (2); 
1786 (2, 3); 1787 (1, 3) 
 VB: 1783; 1784 
 
Backer ,  Noach 
 BW: 1735 (2) 
 
Bam ,  Jan Andries  1782-1785 
 BW: 1782 (1); 1783 (4) 
 RB: 1784; 1785 
 
Bam ,  (Jan) Christiaan  1780-1792 
 BW: 1780 (3); 1781 (3); 1784 (4); 1785 (3); 1787 (2); 1788 (2, 4); 1789 (4); 1790 (3) 
 VB: 1791 
 RB: 1787; 1788; 1792 
 
Bateman ,  Martin   















Beck ,  (Johann) Zacharias  1723-1737 
 BW: 1724 (2); 1725 (1); 1726 (1); 1727 (1); 1728 (1); 1730 (1) 
 VB: 1737 
 CW: 1723 (4); 1724 (2); 1725 (1); 1726 (1); 1727 (3); 1728 (1); 1730 (1) 
 RB: 1724 
 
Berdenis ,  Gerbregt (widow Mensink) 1701-1711 
MB: 1701 (½); 1702 (½); 1703 (½); 1704 (½); 1705 (½); 1706 (½); 1708; 1709; 1710; 
1711 
 
Bernard ,  widow7 
 SD: 1745 
 
Beukes ,  Dirk  1787-1788 
 SD: 1787; 1788 
 
Bierman ,  Frederik 
 SD: 1726 
 
Biesel ,  Jan 
 RB: 1754 
 
Boetendagh ,  Carel Diederik  1731-1739 
 MB: 1735; 1736 
 BW: 1734 (1); 1735 (1); 1736 (4) 
 VB: 1731; 1734; 1735 
 CW: 1732 (2); 1734 (1); 1738 (½); 1739 
 RB: 1737; 1738; 1739 
 
Botma ,  Cornelis Stevensz  1688-1691 
 VB: 1688 
                                                 














 CW: 1691 
 
Botma ,  Jan  1715-1719 
 S: 1715; 1716; 1718; 1719 
 
Botma ,  widow 
 see: De Bruijn, Christina 
 
Bouwman ,  Hendrik 
 CW: 1700 (3) 
 
Broeders ,  Pieter  1758-1773 
 BW: 1760 (2); 1767 (1) 
 VB: 1768 
 CW: 1759 (3); 1769; 1770; 1773 
 IV: 1758 
 
Bruijns ,  Johannes 
 RB: 1753 
 
Buurman ,  Frederik 
 see: Bierman, Frederik 
 
Buijtendagh ,  Carel Diederik 
 see: Boetendag, Carel Diederik 
 
Calteijer ,  Anthonij 
 see: Kalteijer, Anthonij 
 
Cannemeijer ,  Frederik 















Coert ,  Claas 
 RB: 1762 
 
Coetsee ,  Johan 
 see: Kotze, Johan 
 
Combrink ,  Hermanus  1770-1774 
 SD: 1770;8 1774 
 
Conterman ,  Hans (Jacob)  1718-1734 
 D: 17189 
 SD: 1724; 1728; 1729; 1730; 1731; 1732; 1733; 1734 
 
Coster ,  Maria (widow Feijt; wife Opperman) 1728-1732 
 MB: 1728; 1729; 1732 
 
Cruijwagen ,  Jan Meijndertsz  1701-1719 
 MB: 1707 
 BW: 1717 (4); 1718 (4); 1719 (3) 
 CW: 1701 (1); 1703 (2); 1704 (2); 1710 (3) 
 
Datis ,  Cecilia  1719-1720 
 D: 1719; 1720 
 
De Beer ,  Jan Dirksz  1686-1692 
 MB: 1692 
 BW: 1686 
 CW: 1686; 1688 
                                                 
8  Jan Smook bought this pacht at the auction of 31 August 1769, but sold it, with the permission of the 
Council of Policy, on 5 September 1769 for the same amount to Hermanus Combrink; CA, C 2731, 106-7.  
9  Conterman also had to take over the surplus of Jan Jurgen Hummel and had to pay f 150 for that on top of 














De Bruijn ,  Christina (widow Jan Botma) 1720-1722 
 S: 1720; 1721; 1722 
 
Deele ,  (Johan) Bernard  1749-1752 
 BW: 1749 (3); 1751 (2, 3); 1752 (2) 
 
De Goede ,  Jan  1784-1794 
 MB: 1784; 1785; 1786; 1787; 1788; 1789; 1791; 1793; 1794 
 
De Gruger ,  Willem 
 see: De Kruger, Willem 
 
De Jong ,  Dirk  1756-1763 
 BW: 1756 (2, 3); 1760 (1); 1761 (2, 3); 1762 (2); 1763 (1) 
 VB: 1756; 1757; 1759 
 
De Kruger ,  Willem  1770-1786 
 BW: 1775 (3, 4); 1776 (1, 3, 4); 1777 (2, 4); 1778 (4); 1779 (1, 4); 1782 (4); 1783 (3); 
  1784 (3); 1785 (4); 1786 (1) 
 VB: 1770; 1771; 1775; 1782 
 
Dempers ,  Willem 
 SD: 1775 
 
De Nijs ,  Aletta (widow Honk; widow De Vos) 1744-1762 
MB: 1744; 1745; 1746; 1748; 1749; 1750; 1752; 1753; 1754; 1755; 1756; 1757; 1758; 
1759; 1760; 1761; 1762 
 
De Swart ,  Ernst Frederik 















De Visser ,  Theunis10 
 MB: 1683 
 
De Vos ,  Gerrit Reijndersz 
 MB: 1751 
 
De Vos ,  widow 
 see: De Nijs, Aletta 
 
De Vries ,  Hendrik 
 BW: 1720 (4) 
 
De Waal ,  Jan 
 RB: 1744 
 
De Wit ,  Frederik Russouw 
 see: Russouw (De Wit), Frederik 
 
Dircx de Beer ,  Jan 
 see: De Beer, Jan Dirksz 
 
Dirxen (van Schalkwijk) ,  Theunis  
 see: Van Schalkwijk, Theunis Dirksz 
 
Doman ,  Gabriel 
 VB: 1705 
 
Dreijer ,  Andries 
 RB: 1763 
 
                                                 
10  This is probably Theunis Dirksz van Schalkwijk, who, apart from holding the Malt Beer pacht for several 














Eberg ,  Bartholomeus  1790-1795 
 BW: 1794 (3); 1795 (4) 
 CW: 1794 (3); 1795 (4) 
 IV: 1790 
 
Eems ,  Guilliam 
 see: Heems, Guilliam 
 
Eksteen ,  Hendrik Oostwald  1708-1721 
BW: 1708 (4); 1709 (3); 1710 (3); 1711 (3); 1712 (2); 1713 (3); 1714 (1); 1715 (2); 
1716 (1); 1717 (1); 1718 (2); 1719 (1); 1720 (1); 1721 (2) 
CW: 1712 (2); 1713 (3); 1714 (4); 1715 (1); 1716 (3); 1717 (2); 1718 (2); 1719 (2); 
1720 (1); 1721 (1, 4) 
 
Eksteen (Pietersz) ,  Johannes Paulus  1790-1794 
 RB: 1790; 1791; 1793; 1794 
 
Elberg ,  Bartholomeus 
 see:  Eberg, Bartholomeus 
 
Esselaar ,  Johannes Nicholaas  1762-1774 
 MB: 1772; 1774 
 BW: 1762 (3); 1763 (3); 1764 (2); 1765 (2); 1766 (1, 4); 1767 (3); 1768 (2); 1769 (2);  
1770 (2); 1771 (3) 
 
Esser ,  Isaac  1719-1725 
 BW: 1721 (4); 1722 (3); 1723 (2) 
 CW: 1719 (4); 1720 (3); 1721 (3); 1722 (4); 1723 (3); 1724 (4) 
 SD: 1725 
 
Essler ,  Johannes Nicholaas 














Eversdijk ,  Hendrik  1730-1736 
 RB: 1730; 1736 
 
Evertsz (Smit) ,  Hendrik  
 see: Smit ,  Hendrik Evertsz 
 
Eijbergen ,  Bartholomeus 
 see:  Eberg, Bartholomeus 
 
Feijt ,  Coenraad  1722-1727 
 MB: 1726; 1727 
 RB: 1722 
 
Feijt ,  widow 
 see: Coster, Maria 
 
Frank ,  Dirk Gijsbert  1752-1755 
 BW:  1754 (1); 1755 (2) 
 VB: 1752; 1753; 1755 
 
Frisnet ,  Guilliam  1711-1712 
 CW: 1711 (2); 1712 (3) 
 
Gardieu ,  Jean  1704-1705 
 BW: 1704 (2); 1705 (4) 
 
Geeringh ,  Willem 
 SD: 1795 
 
Gockelius ,  Nicolaas  1715-1723 
 VB: 1715 














Greijling ,  Jan  1753-1769 
 SD: 1753; 1754; 1759; 1760; 1761; 1764; 1765; 1767; 1768; 1769 
 
Hartog ,  Philip (senior) 
 SD: 1763 
 
Harwigh ,  (Johan) Frederik 
 see: Herwich, (Johan) Frederik 
 
Hauk ,  Hans Jurgen 
 see: Honk, Hans Jurgen 
 
Heems ,  Guilliam  1684-1687 
 BW: 1685 
 VB: 1684; 1687 
 CW: 1684; 1685; 1687 
 
Herhold ,  Albrecht  1755-1758 
 SD: 1755; 1756; 1757; 1758 
 
Hertzog ,  Johannes  
 SD: 1792 
 
Herwich ,  (Johan) Frederik  1792-1793 
 MB: 1792 
 IV: 1793 
 
Heufke ,  David  1706-1708 
 BW: 1706 (3); 1708 (3) 
















Heufke ,  Johannes  1727-1731 
 BW: 1727 (3); 1728 (3); 1729 (2); 1730 (3); 1731 (1) 
 CW: 1727 (2); 1728 (4); 1729 (4); 1730 (2); 1731 (3) 
 
Heugh ,  Evert  1785-1795 
 IV: 1785; 1788; 1795 
 
Heijns ,  Paul  1708-1713 
 CW: 1708 (2); 1709 (3); 1710 (2); 1712 (4); 1713 (2) 
 
Hiebner ,  Joachim Daniel 
 see: Hubner, Joachim Daniel (junior) 
 
Hiebner ,  Jochem 
 see: Hubner, Joachim (Daniel) (senior) 
 
Hoesemans ,  Anthonij  1709-1723 
BW: 1710 (1); 1711 (2); 1712 (3); 1713 (4); 1714 (2); 1715 (3); 1716 (3); 1717 (2); 
1718 (1); 1719 (2); 1720 (2); 1721 (1); 1722 (1); 1723 (1) 
 VB: 1717 
 CW: 1709 (1); 1710 (1); 1711 (1); 1712 (1); 1713 (4); 1714 (1); 1715 (2); 1716 (2); 
  1717 (1); 1718 (1); 1719 (1); 1720 (2); 1721 (2); 1722 (1); 1723 (1) 
 RB: 1719 
 
Holst ,  Jan (senior)  1740-1754 
 BW: 1740 (3); 1741 (1); 1742 (1, 3); 1743 (1, 4); 1744 (4); 1745 (4); 1747 (4);  
1750 (2, 3); 1751 (4); 1752 (3)  
 VB: 1742; 1743; 1744; 1750; 1754 
 CW: 1740 (½);11 1743; 1749; 1750; 1751; 1753 
 SD: 1751 
 
                                                 














Holst ,  Jan (Daniel) (junior)  1764-1773 
 RB: 1773 
 SD: 1766 
 IV: 1764 
 
Holtman ,  Johannes Casparus  1756-1766 
 RB: 1765; 1766 
 
Holtsmit ,  Jan 
 VB: 1685 
 
Honk ,  Hans Jurgen  1738-1743 
 MB: 1738; 1739; 1741; 1742; 1743 
 RB: 1740; 1742; 1743 
 
Honk ,  widow 
 see: De Nijs, Aletta 
 
Hörling ,  Jan Frederik 
 see: Hurling, Jan Frederik 
 
Hubner ,  Joachim Daniel (junior) 
 RB: 1795 
 
Hubner ,  Jochem (Daniel) (senior)  1740-1761 
BW:  1740 (2); 1743 (2); 1745 (1); 1746 (2); 1747 (1); 1748 (1); 1749 (4); 1750 (1); 
1752 (1); 1753 (1, 2, 3, 4); 1754 (2, 4); 1755 (1, 3, 4); 1757 (2, 3, 4); 1758 (4); 
1759 (1, 2, 3, 4); 1760 (3, 4); 1761 (1, 4) 
VB: 1760; 1761 
















Hugo ,  Daniel  1781-1793 
 BW: 1789 (1, 3); 1790 (2, 4); 1791 (2) 
 CW: 1781; 1782; 1783; 1784; 1787; 1789; 1790; 1793 
 
Hurling ,  Jan Frederik  1756-1759 
 BW: 1756 (1, 4); 1757 (1); 1758 (1, 2, 3) 
 RB: 1755; 1756 
 IV: 1759 
 
Hurter ,  (Jan) Willem  1763-1783 
 MB: 1763; 1764; 1770; 1771; 1780; 1782; 1783 
 
Huijgh ,  Evert 
 see: Heugh ,  Evert 
 
Jansz ,  Cent 
 CW: 1717 (4) 
 S: 1717 
 
Joubert ,  Josua 
 IV: 1787 
 
Joubert ,  Pieter (senior) 
 CW: 1728 (3) 
 
Kalteijer ,  Anthonij  1776-1777 
 SD: 1776; 1777 
 
Kamp ,  Jacob 
















Kannemeijer ,  Frederik  1789-1795 
 MB: 1795 
 VB: 1792 
 SD: 1789; 1791 
 
Kemp ,  Gerrit 
 SD: 1750 
 
Keijser ,  Jan Simon  1781-1786 
 BW: 1781 (1); 1782 (3); 1783 (2); 1784 (1); 1785 (1); 1786 (4) 
 VB: 1786 
 
Keijser ,  widow 
 see: Truter, Anna Clofia 
 
Kotze ,  Johan  1696-1702 
 VB: 1696 
 CW: 1702 (4) 
 
Kruijwagen ,  Jan Meijndertsz 
 see: Cruijwagen, Jan Meijndertsz 
 
Lambertz Meijburgh ,  Jan 
 see: Meijburgh, Jan Lambertz 
 
Laubscher ,  Nicolaas 
 see: Loubser, Claas 
 
Laurik ,  Daniel  
















Le Roux ,  Gerrit 
 RB: 1789 
 
Le Roux ,  Jan (senior)12  1747-1748 
 SD: 1747; 1748 
 
Le Roux ,  Jan (junior)13  1736-1739 
 SD: 1736; 1737; 1738; 1739 
 
Le Roux ,  Johannes (junior)14   
 VB: 1758 
 
Le Roux ,  Matthiam  1740-1744 
 SD: 1740; 1741; 1742; 1743; 1744 
 
Leever ,  Abraham  1727-1758 
 MB: 1747 
 BW: 1731 (4); 1732 (1); 1733 (2); 1734 (4); 1736 (2); 1738 (4); 1741 (3, 4); 1742 (2); 
 1744 (3); 1745 (2) 
 VB: 1738; 1748; 1751 
 CW: 1732 (1); 1733 (2); 1734 (3); 1735; 1736; 1741; 1744; 1745; 1746 (⅓); 1747 (⅓); 
  1748; 1754; 1758 
 RB: 1727; 1750 
 
Loubser ,  Claas 1700-1718  
 BW: 1700 (½)15 
                                                 
12  This is probably Jean le Roux, who came to the Cape in the 1690s and lived in Stellenbosch where he died 
in 1752. 
13  The appellations de oude and de jonge appear after these two names in the sources; and it is likely that this 
must then be the son of Jean le Roux mentioned in the previous note.  
14  It is not certain whether or not this is the same as the previous person. Probably not, as the name ‘Jan’ here 














 CW: 1718  
Lourich ,  Daniel 
 MB: 1737  
 
Luijt ,  Frederik 
 SD: 1752 
 
Luijten ,  Jan  1793-1794 
 VB: 1793; 1794 
 
Maartensz ,  Isaac  1735-1741 
 BW: 1736 (1); 1737 (2); 1738 (3) 
 VB: 1739; 1741 
 CW: 1737 (½); 1740 (½)16 
 SD: 1735 
 
Maasdorp ,  Christiaan  1717-1726 
 RB: 1717; 1718; 1720; 1721; 1725; 1726 
 
Marshoorn ,  Jacobus 
 BW: 1735 (4) 
 
Martens ,  Isaac 
 see: Maartensz, Isaac 
 
Masthorn ,  Jacobus 
 see: Marshoorn, Jacobus 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
15  At first, Steven Vermeij bought the whole pacht as per usual on 31 August 1699 for f 10450, but after six 
months he sold it to Claas Laubscher who held it from 1 March to 31 August 1700 and paid f 2550 for it; CA, C 
2699, 80-85 and 103-109. 














Matfeldt ,  Hendrik  1792-1795  
 BW: 1792 (1, 3); 1793 (2, 3, 4); 1794 (4); 1795 (3) 
 CW: 1794 (4); 1795 (3) 
 
Maijboom ,  Claas 
 see: Meijboom, Claas 
 
Maijhuizen ,  Godfried 
 see: Meijhuijsen, Godfried 
 
Melck ,  Martin  1760-1781 
 BW: 1764 (3) 
 VB: 1763; 1764; 1769 
 CW: 1760; 1761; 1762; 1763; 1764; 1765; 1766; 1767; 1768; 1771; 1772; 1774; 1775; 
  1776; 1777; 1778; 1779; 1780 
 IV: 1760; 1761; 1762; 1765; 1766; 1767; 1773; 1776; 1779; 1781 
 
Mensink ,  Rutgert 
 MB: 1700 
 
Mensink ,  widow 
 see: Berdenis, Gerbregt 
 
Mensink ,  Willem  1701-1713 
 MB: 1701 (½); 1702 (½); 1703 (½); 1704 (½); 1705 (½); 1706 (½); 1712; 1713 
 
Meijboom ,  Claas  1706-1717 
 BW: 1706 (4); 1707 (3); 1709 (4); 1717 (3) 
 
Meijburgh ,  Jan Lambertz  1716-1720 















Meijer ,  Gerrit  1704-1713 
 BW: 1704 (3); 1705 (2); 1712 (4); 1713 (2) 
 CW: 1711 
 
Meijer ,  Hendrik  1771-1773 
 SD: 1771; 1772; 1773 
 
Meijer ,  Pieter  1705-1713 
 BW: 1705 (1); 1706 (2); 1707 (2); 1708 (1); 1709 (2); 1710 (2); 1711 (1); 1712 (1); 
  1713 (1) 
 
Meijhuijsen ,  Godfried  1691-1695 
 BW: 1691; 1692 
 VB: 1695 
 CW: 1692; 1693 
 
Meijndertsz Cruijwagen ,  Jan 
 see: Cruijwagen, Jan Meijndertsz 
 
Morkel ,  Philip  1713-1714 
 CW: 1713 (1); 1714 (2) 
 
Mulder ,  Hendrik  1699-1711 
 MB: 1699 
 BW: 1701 
 VB: 1697; 1698; 1699; 1701; 1706; 1707; 1709 
 CW: 1704 (4); 1711 (4) 
 
Mulder ,  Jan Theunis 
















Munnik ,  Gerhardus 
 RB: 1779 
 
Munnik ,  Johannes (Albertus) (senior)  1741-1746 
 RB: 1741; 1745; 1746 
Mijburgh ,  Jan Lambertz 
 see: Meijburgh, Jan Lambertz 
 
Mijndertsz Cruijwagen ,  Jan 
 see: Cruijwagen, Jan Meijndertsz 
 
Odendaal ,  Judith Maria (widow Reijndersz) 1790-1794 
 SD: 1790; 1793; 1794 
 
Oortmans ,  Pieter Bertram 
 VB: 1716 
 
Oostwald Eksteen ,  Hendrik  
 see: Eksteen, Hendrik Oostwald 
 
Opperman ,  Godlieb Christiaan  1730-1734 
 MB: 1730; 1731; 1733; 1734 
 
Opperman ,  wife 
 see: Coster, Maria 
 
Palmer ,  Hannes 
 D: 1721 
 
Peijffer ,  Johannes 















Pentz ,  Michiel  1736-1752 
 BW: 1743 (3); 1744 (2); 1745 (3); 1746 (1, 4); 1747 (2); 1748 (2, 4); 1749 (1) 
 VB: 1736; 1745; 1746; 1747; 1749 
 CW: 1746 (⅓); 1747 (⅓) 
 RB: 1748; 1751; 1752 
Phijffer ,  Johannes  1697-1711 
 BW: 1697 (½); 1703; 1704 (1); 1705 (3); 1706 (1); 1707 (1); 1708 (2); 1709 (1); 
  1711 (4) 
 VB: 1702; 1710 
 CW: 1701 (2); 1702 (1); 1703 (1, 4); 1704 (3); 1705 (1, 4); 1706;17 1707 (2); 1708 (1); 
  1709 (2) 
 
Pietersz ,  Johannes Paulus Eksteen 
 see: Eksteen (Pietersz), Johannes Paulus 
 
Pretorius ,  Johannes 
 VB: 1682 
 
Pijthius ,  Johannes  1711-1714 
 VB: 1711; 1712; 1713 
 CW: 1705 (2); 1707 (4); 1708 (3); 1710 (4); 1714 (3) 
 
Raams ,  Willem 
 BW: 1734 (3) 
 
 
                                                 
17  In August 1705 W.A. van der Stel and the Council of Policy decided to change the rules for selling the 
wine pacht. Thus, when the pachten for the new year were sold on 31 August, the four parts of the wine pacht were 
auctioned off as per usual. Phijffer bought the first three parts for f 9 000 each, and Michel Leij the fourth for f 9 
450. The whole wine pacht (i.e. all four parts together) was then auctioned off again and awarded to Phijffer for f 39 
000; CA, C 2701, 18-25. Thus, in effect, Phijffer became the first generaele pachter. However, this innovation 
caused much unhappiness among the free burghers so that the VOC reverted to the former system in the following 














Rabe ,  Christiaan 
 BW: 1739 (4) 
 
Rasp ,  Christiaan 
 BW: 1716 (4) 
 
Redox , Hilletje (widow Valckenrijk) 
 VB: 1680 
 
Reijndersz ,  Johannes (Daniel)  1783-1786 
 SD: 1783; 1786 
 
Reijndersz ,  widow 
 see:  Odendaal, Judith Maria 
 
Reijndersz de Vos ,  Gerrit 
 see: De Vos, Gerrit Reijndersz 
 
Roep ,  Johannes  1767-1781 
 MB: 1768; 1769; 1773 
 VB: 1767 
 RB: 1768; 1769; 1770; 1772; 1774; 1775; 1778; 1780 
 SD: 1781 
 IV: 1768; 1770; 1771; 1772; 1774; 1775; 1777; 1778 
 
Rogiers (van Amsterdam) ,  Jan  1714-1726 
 BW: 1714 (4) 
 VB: 1726 
 
Rogiers ,  Tobias  1775-1778 















Roos ,  Francois (Tielmansz) 
 IV: 1794 
 
Rousseau (De Wit) ,  Frederik 
 see: Russouw (De Wit), Frederik 
 
Rothman ,  Sebastiaan 
 CW: 1792 
 
Roux ,  Jeremias 
 CW: 1729 (3) 
 
Russouw (De Wit) ,  Frederik  1688-1696 
 BW: 1688; 1689; 1695 
 VB: 1692; 1693; 1694 
 CW: 1694; 1696 
 
Rijndersz ,  Johannes (Daniel) 
 see: Reijndersz, Johannes (Daniel) 
 
Rijndersz de Vos ,  Gerrit 
 see: De Vos, Gerrit Reijndersz 
 
Saaijman ,  Bartholomeus 
 see: Zaaijman, Bartholomeus 
 
Scheffer ,  Hendrik 
 D: 1722 
 
Schenk ,  Joost 















Schreuder ,  Jan Jurgen  1738-1752 
 BW: 1738 (1); 1739 (2, 3); 1740 (4); 1742 (4); 1744 (1); 1746 (3); 1747 (3); 1748 (3); 
  1749 (2); 1750 (4); 1751 (1); 1752 (4) 
 
Schreuder ,  (Johan) Jacob  1762-1790 
 MB: 1765; 1766; 1767; 1781; 1790 
 BW: 1769 (1); 1770 (3, 4); 1771 (1); 1772 (1, 3, 4); 1773 (2, 3, 4); 1774 (1, 2, 4);  
1775 (2); 1777 (3); 1778 (1, 3); 1779 (2); 1780 (2) 
VB: 1762; 1765; 1766; 1772; 1773; 1774; 1776; 1777; 1778; 1779; 1780; 1781; 1785; 
1788; 1789 
 
Sebrits ,  Frans  1778-1782 
 SD: 1778; 1779; 1780; 1782 
 
Smal ,  (Jan) Jurgen 
 SD: 1746 
 
Smit ,  Carel  1791-1795 
 BW: 1791 (3); 1792 (4); 1794 (2); 1795 (2) 
 
Smit ,  Hendrik Evertsz  1680-1682 
 MB: 1680; 1682 
 
Smook ,  Jan  1763-1779 
 MB: 1779 
 BW: 1764 (4); 1765 (4) 
 RB: 1771 
 IV: 176318 
 
 
                                                 
18  The Impost pacht was not auctioned off with the other pachten on 31 August 1762. It was eventually 














Snijder ,  Jan Hendrik  1757-1759 
 CW: 1759 (2, 4) 
 RB: 1757; 1758 
 
Spengler ,  Jurgen  1762-1769 
 SD: 1762 
 IV: 1769 
Spengler ,  Lodewijk 
 IV: 1780 
 
Spoor ,  Jan  1718-1722 
 BW: 1718 (3); 1722 (4) 
 
Sprangel ,  Jan  1732-1735 
 RB: 1732; 1735 
 
Steenbok ,  Rudolf Frederik  1714-1725 
 MB: 1714; 1715; 1716; 1718; 1719; 1721; 1722; 1723; 1724; 1725 
 CW: 1715 (3) 
 
Stevensz Botma ,  Cornelis 
 see: Botma, Cornelis Stevensz 
 
Steijn ,  Jacobus  1714-1716 
 BW: 1714 (3); 1715 (1); 1716 (2) 
 
Stokvliet ,  Jan Jacob  1725-1729 
 BW: 1727 (2); 1728 (2); 1729 (1) 
 VB: 1725; 1727; 1728; 1729 
















Stokvliet ,  widow 
see:  Van Dam, Josina 
 
Taute ,  Matthias Petrus 
 IV: 1792 
 
Thomasz (van Hoesum) ,  Hendrik 
 RB: 1731 
Tielmansz Roos ,  Francois  
 see: Roos, Francois (Tielmansz) 
 
Truter ,  Anna Clofia (widow Keijser) 
 BW: 1788 (3) 
 
Truter ,  Hendrik 
 IV: 1786 
 
Valckenrijck ,  widow 
 see: Redox, Hilletje  
 
Valk ,  Cornelis  1718-1720 
 VB: 1718; 1720 
 
Van Aarden ,  Johannes  1759-1760 
 RB: 1759; 1760 
 
Van Amsterdam ,  Jan Rogiers 
 see: Rogiers (van Amsterdam), Jan 
 
Van As ,  Willem 















Van Bochem ,  Jacob  1721-1724 
 VB: 1721; 1722; 1723; 1724 
 
Van Dam ,  Josina  1730-1731 
 BW: 1730 (2); 1731 (2) 
 VB: 1730 
 CW: 1730 (3); 1731 (1) 
 
Van den Bergh ,  Jacobus Johannes  1785-1791 
 VB: 1787 
 CW: 1785; 1786; 1791 
 
Van der Lint ,  Frederik  1707-1708 
 BW: 1707 (4) 
 VB: 1708 
 
Van der Poel ,  Pieter  1703-1716 
 BW: 1715 (4) 
 CW: 1703 (3); 1715 (4); 1716 (1) 
 
Van der Spuij ,  Melt  1722-1733 
BW: 1723 (3); 1724 (3); 1725 (2); 1726 (3); 1729 (4); 1730 (4); 1731 (3); 1732 (4); 
1733 (3) 
CW: 1722 (3); 1723 (2); 1724 (3); 1725 (3); 1726 (4); 1729 (2); 1730 (4); 1731 (2); 
1732 (3); 1733 (3) 
SD: 1723 
 
Van der Steur ,  Claas Wolf 
 see: Wolf (van der Steur), Claas 
 
Van der Swijn ,  Jan  1732-1747 















 VB: 1732; 1733; 1740 
 CW: 1733 (1, 4); 1734 (2); 1737 (½); 1738 (½); 1742; 1746 (⅓); 1747 (⅓) 
 
Van der Westhuijsen ,  Pieter 
 CW: 1707 (3) 
 
Van Dieden ,  Willem  1680-1682 
 BW: 1680; 1682 
 
Van Donselaar ,  Claas 
 BW: 1724 (1) 
 CW: 1724 (1) 
 
Van Dijk ,  Burgert 
 RB: 1734 
 
Van Dijk ,  Hendrik  1725-1734 
 BW: 1725 (4); 1726 (4); 1727 (4); 1732 (4); 1734 (2) 
 CW: 1725 (2); 1726 (3); 1727 (4); 1731 (4); 1732 (4); 1734 (4) 
 
Van Hartmansdorf ,  Carel Hendrik 
 BW: 1736 (3) 
 
Van Helsdingen ,  Jan (Hendrik)  1728-1733 
 RB: 1728; 1729; 1733 
 
Van Helsdingen ,  Johannes Guilliam  1781-1787 
 BW: 1781; 1787 (4) 
















Van Hoesum ,  Hendrik Thomasz 
 see: Thomasz (van Hoesum), Hendrik 
 
Van Leijpsig ,  Marthinus  1719-1728 
 BW: 1719 (4); 1720 (3); 1721 (3); 1722 (2); 1723 (4); 1724 (4); 1725 (3); 1728 (4) 
 CW: 1722 (2); 1725 (4) 
 
Van Reenen ,  Jacob 
 BW: 1726 (2) 
 
Van Reenen ,  Jacobus Arnoldus 
 IV: 1789 
 
Van Reenen ,  Sebastiaan (Valentijn)  1788-1791 
 CW: 1788 
 IV: 1791 
 
Van Reenen ,  Willem 
 IV: 1782 
 
Van Schalkwijk ,  Theunis Dirksz  1684-1697 
 MB: 1684; 1686; 1687; 1688; 1689; 1690; 1691; 1693; 1694; 1695; 1696; 1697 
 BW: 1687 
 
Van Straalen ,  Joris  1690-1691 
 VB: 1690; 1691 
 
Van Wielligh ,  Hermanus 
 BW: 1754 (3) 
 
Vermeij ,  Steven  1693-1705 














 BW: 1693; 1694; 1696; 1697 (½); 1699; 1700 (½)19 
 VB: 1703; 1704 
 CW: 1695; 1698; 1699; 1705 (3) 
 
Victor ,  Gerrit  1683-1690 
 BW: 1683; 1684; 1690 
 VB: 1683; 1686; 1689 
 CW: 1689; 1690 
 
Victor ,  Jacobus 
 CW: 1700 (4) 
 
Vogel ,  Jacob  1697-1709 
 BW: 1698; 1704 (4) 
 VB: 1700 
 CW: 1697; 1700 (2); 1701 (3); 1702 (2); 1704 (1); 1709 (4) 
 
Volraad ,  Jan 
 RB: 1767 
 
Vooght ,  Johannes 
 CW: 1702 (3) 
 
Vos ,  Gabriel (Jacobus)  1794-1795 
 CW: 1794 (1); 1795 (1) 
 
Vrij ,  Jacob  
 D: 1717 
 
                                                 
19  At first, Steven Vermeij bought the whole pacht as per usual on 31 August 1699 for f 10450, but after six 
months he sold it to Claas Laubscher who held it from 1 March to 31 August 1700 and paid f 2550 for it; CA, C 














Weber ,  Hendrik  1784-1785 
 SD: 1784; 1785 
 
Webener ,  (Joachim) Ernst 
 see: Wepener, (Joachim) Ernst 
 
Welcher ,  Hendrik 
 VB: 1795 
 
Wemmer ,  Jacob 
 see: Wimmer ,  Jacob 
 
Wendel ,  Hendrik 
 BW: 1710 (4) 
 
Wepener ,  (Joachim) Ernst  1747-1749 
 RB: 1747; 1749 
 
Wespeler ,  Jacob 
 see: Wispelaar, Jacob 
 
Wiese ,  Benjamin 
 CW: 1717 (3) 
 
Wilders ,  Casper 
 MB: 1685 
 
Wilkens ,  (Jan) Willem (senior) 
 RB: 1777 
 
Wilkens ,  (Jan) Willem (junior) 















Willers ,  Casparus 
 see: Wilders, Casper 
 
Wimmer ,  Jacob  
 RB: 1764 
Wispelaar ,  Jacob  1788-1795 
 BW: 1788 (1); 1789 (2); 1790 (1); 1792 (2); 1793 (1); 1794 (1); 1795 (1) 
 VB: 1790 
 CW: 1794 (2); 1795 (2) 
 
Wolf (van der Steur) ,  Claas 
 SD: 1727 
 
Wolmarans ,  Joseph 
 RB: 1761 
 
Zaaijman ,  Bartholomeus 
 SD: 1749 
 
Zebrits ,  Frans 
 see: Sebrits, Frans 
 
Zeeman ,  Pieter 
 RB: 1786 
 
Zieteman ,  Godfried Christiaan  1762-1763 













SHIPPING VOLUME AND PACHT INCOME, 1685-1795 
 











As % of 
Highest 
       
1700 43 18 61 32.2 42875 20.9 
1701 46 20 66 34.9 48820 23.8 
1702 55 24 79 41.8 29650 14.4 
1703 48 27 75 39.7 41630 20.3 
1704 46 22 68 36 43900 21.4 
1705 46 18 64 33.9 43560 21.2 
1706 43 30 73 38.6 47550 23.2 
1707 39 27 66 34.9 49180 24 
1708 47 23 70 37 49075 23.9 
1709 47 12 59 31.2 51450 25.1 
1710 60 17 77 40.7 48525 23.6 
1711 43 30 73 38.6 41915 20.4 
1712 48 19 67 35.4 43730 21.3 
1713 42 24 66 34.9 62250 30.3 
1714 47 17 64 33.8 57675 28.1 
1715 61 21 82 43.4 49540 24.1 
1716 55 11 66 34.9 41445 20.2 
1717 66 23 89 47.1 48470 23.6 
1718 62 26 88 46.6 41780 20.4 
1719 63 27 90 47.6 36800 17.9 
                                                 
1  The amounts are in guilders. This is the combined total from all the individual pachten (see table 











1720 67 20 87 46 36440 17.7 
1721 76 28 104 55 31970 15.6 
1722 68 33 101 53.4 28330 13.8 
1723 76 20 96 50.8 45350 22.1 
1724 73 15 88 46.5 43375 21.1 
1725 65 8 73 38.6 43200 21 
1726 75 15 90 48.1 45950 22.4 
1727 77 6 83 43.9 60550 29.5 
1728 69 12 81 42.8 47425 23.1 
1729 73 8 81 42.8 42650 20.8 
1730 56 11 67 35.4 51950 25.3 
1731 73 10 83 43.9 23600 11.5 
1732 61 16 77 40.7 34760 16.9 
1733 66 10 76 40.2 36660 17.9 
1734 69 12 81 42.8 37935 18.5 
1735 74 10 84 44.4 48625 23.7 
1736 57 11 68 36 53225 25.9 
1737 78 9 87 46 51285 25 
1738 77 12 89 47.1 36295 17.7 
1739 64 11 75 39.7 42725 20.8 
1740 50 12 62 32.8 39350 19.2 
1741 60 13 73 38.6 41475 20.2 
1742 50 20 70 37 40875 19.9 
1743 46 16 62 32.8 41195 20.1 
1744 54 27 81 42.8 34600 16.9 
1745 53 18 71 37.5 32750 16 
1746 53 11 64 33.9 35400 17.2 
1747 53 21 74 39.1 30325 14.8 
1748 49 35 84 44.4 26525 12.9 











1750 60 21 81 42.8 33150 16.1 
1751 48 17 65 34.4 35750 17.4 
1752 60 18 78 41.2 32950 16.1 
1753 52 21 73 38.6 46875 22.8 
1754 56 13 69 36.5 50575 24.6 
1755 52 18 70 37 44725 21.8 
1756 46 9 55 29.1 33750 16.4 
1757 55 2 57 30.1 50500 24.6 
1758 52 14 66 34.9 54550 26.6 
1759 55 16 71 37.5 50025 24.4 
1760 53 12 65 34.4 28025 13.6 
1761 53 18 71 37.5 43925 21.4 
1762 45 14 59 31.2 50175 24.4 
1763 50 22 72 38.1 55250 26.9 
1764 50 28 78 41.2 61850 30.2 
1765 57 10 67 35.2 68200 33.3 
1766 50 14 64 33.8 57475 28 
1767 50 25 75 39.6 53025 25.8 
1768 40 26 66 34.9 57725 28.1 
1769 57 35 92 48.6 61900 30.2 
1770 52 26 78 41.2 71400 34.8 
1771 48 46 94 49.7 78525 38.3 
1772 58 60 118 62.4 76825 37.5 
1773 54 59 113 59.7 72050 35.1 
1774 53 73 126 66.6 77775 37.9 
1775 56 64 120 63.4 75125 36.6 
1776 58 65 123 65.1 72000 35.1 
1777 45 67 112 59.2 86175 42 
1778 51 66 117 61.9 82325 40.2 











1780 44 64 108 57.1 76575 31.8 
1781 29 59 88 46.5 105550 43.8 
1782 14 93 107 56.6 125625 52.1 
1783 20 151 171 90.4 103950 43.1 
1784 49 122 171 90.4 117800 48.9 
1785 53 117 170 89.9 164325 68.2 
1786 72 74 146 77.2 160750 66.7 
1787 70 90 160 84.6 167350 69.4 
1788 68 106 174 92 194500 80.7 
1789 76 113 189 100 214830 89.2 
1790 56 101 157 83 222450 92.3 
1791 64 119 183 96.8 240800 100 
1792 60 94 154 81.4 196150 81.4 
1793 53 75 128 67.7 127650 53 
Source: Beyers, Kaapse Patriotte, 333-35; CA, C 2697-2731 and RLR 163 
 
 












































































































         
1685 950 7400 1000 9900    19250 
1686 1900 10600 1900 1500    15900 
1687 2000 12500 1425 2200    18125 
1688 1650 11500 2000 2400    17550 
1689 1250 14100 2200 2125    19675 
1690 2000 8500 2500 2900    15900 
1691 2100 13500 4000 2150    21750 
1692 2000 15010 3975 3100    24085 
1693 2000 17575 3975 4100    27650 
1694 2000 15125 4160 10050    31335 
1695 2000 14400 5400 12800    34600 
1696 2000 16150 4870 14960    37980 
1697 3400 14400 4800 13325    35925 
1698 2025 10100 3200 11150    26475 
1699 2950 15375 3940 13875    36140 
1700 2950 13000 3625 23300    42875 
1701 2950 6000 1570 38300    48820 
1702 3000 2500 1700 22450    29650 
1703 3000 2700 1930 34000    41630 
1704 3000  1500 39400    43900 
1705 3000 6810 1100 32650    43560 
1706 2000 5350 1200 39000    47550 
1707 3350 7330 1300 37200    49180 
1708 2750 10500 2125 33700    49075 
                                                 
2  All the amounts are in guilders. Where a block is left blank, it means that no pacht was awarded 











1709 2750 11800 2000 34900    51450 
1710 2750 11500 3200 31075    48525 
1711 2750 7895 3100 28170    41915 
1712 1600 8970 2000 31160    43730 
1713 2000 14225 3125 42900    62250 
1714 2500 14350  40825    57675 
1715 2000 16500 1600 28620  820  49540 
1716 2000 12225 1050 24020  2150  41445 
1717 2010 11560 1600 28450 1550 3300  48470 
1718 2000 8000 2050 25100 1500 3130  41780 
1719 2500 6200 2450 20500 1250 3900  36800 
1720  6800 2500 23350 1300 2490  36440 
1721 2000 7000 2200 18600 1000 1170  31970 
1722 2000 5850 2100 16800 600 980  28330 
1723 2000 10100 2400 28650 1550 650  45350 
1724 2000 12225 2200 24100 1250 1600  43375 
1725 1500 10400 3350 25300 1200 1450  43200 
1726 1550 8250 6000 26300 1600 2250  45950 
1727 1600 14100 4500 37625 725 2000  60550 
1728 1400 10475 5000 28850 800 900  47425 
1729 1400 10325 4500 24925 850 650  42650 
1730 1325 12800 4700 30900 1600 625  51950 
1731 1300 4050 4050 12600 750 850  23600 
1732 1200 5325 5100 21250 825 1060  34760 
1733 1300 7000 5400 21760 520 680  36660 
1734 1300 7725 6700 21350 360 500  37935 
1735 1350 6825 7000 32000 650 800  48625 
1736 1700 7250 5550 36600 750 1375  53225 
1737 2900 7235 7550 32000 900 700  51285 











1739 1125 6800 3500 30500 400 400  42725 
1740 1000 6950 6050 24500 550 300  39350 
1741 750 10250 5000 24725 600 150  41475 
1742 800 7200 3800 28400 450 225  40875 
1743 800 7645 3225 29125 250 150  41195 
1744 900 10175 2350 20100 900 175  34600 
1745 1200 5350 2350 23000 650 200  32750 
1746 1000 7075 2525 23350 1250 200  35400 
1747 1425 5425 3050 19150 1050 225  30325 
1748 825 3825 1450 19150 1100 175  26525 
1749 850 6725 1800 19900 975 150  30400 
1750 900 8950 2525 19000 1525 250  33150 
1751 900 9525 2400 22000 825 100  35750 
1752 900 8125 2500 20000 1300 125  32950 
1753 1025 16725 3500 24300 1000 325  46875 
1754 925 13800 4300 30000 1125 425  50575 
1755 925 14750 2800 24400 1150 700  44725 
1756 875 7175 3500 20500 1100 600  33750 
1757 850 17000 2850 27100 1800 900  50500 
1758 725 24500 2300 24100 1800 625 500 54550 
1759 575 23250 2575 20375 2100 375 775 50025 
1760 750 8375 2050 12300 1600 250 2700 28025 
1761 675 14350 2350 18000 2175 375 6000 43925 
1762 775 17975 1850 20700 2350 225 6300 50175 
1763 800 23000 3100 20000 2750 500 5100 55250 
1764 1550 24750 6100 23200 2150 775 3325 61850 
1765 1050 24550 5000 31000 3000 600 3000 68200 
1766 1250 22300 2000 27400 2000 425 2100 57475 
1767 1575 23300 2250 22000 2500 600 800 53025 











1769 1650 24300 1700 28000 1750 400 4100 61900 
1770 1900 26300 1025 34500 2100 275 5300 71400 
1771 1900 26000 1225 40000 2550 650 6200 78525 
1772 1975 25400 1000 36300 2825 525 8800 76825 
1773 2150 26325 1500 32300 3275 500 6000 72050 
1774 2650 26975 2750 32000 3300 800 9300 77775 
1775 2600 24950 1125 35550 1800 600 8500 75125 
1776 2350 27525 650 29000 2500 1225 8750 72000 
1777 2400 33400 675 36200 3000 1000 9500 86175 
1778 1850 34200 500 35200 3800 675 6100 82325 
1779 1900 34600 725 32000 4800 450 8000 82475 
1780 2525 18300 600 32200 3900 550 18500 76575 
1781 2250 27300 1300 34600 5400 400 34300 105550 
1782 2300 37100 800 45000 7100 625 32700 125625 
1783 1575 42700 425 50600 8000 650  103950 
1784 1400 49550 600 61400 3700 1150  117800 
1785 2500 55950 650 71500 6500 1825 25400 164325 
1786 3000 52950 800 74500 9400 1100 19000 160750 
1787 3000 49950 1400 86500 7000 1500 18000 167350 
1788 2800 45200 1100 123000 6750 1450 14200 194500 
1789 1330 57100 1000 137000 7300 1800 9300 214830 
1790 3450 52000 2000 140000 13100 1300 10600 222450 
1791 3300 68100 2600 144000 12600 1700 8500 240800 
1792 4000 66000 2750 90000 13400 1700 18300 196150 
1793 4200 48000 2650 51500 10500 1600 9200 127650 
1794 3600 60850 2300 45050 10600 1050 8100 131550 
1795 3000 33700 1500 31050 9600 750 10500 90100 
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